CCCM
muh bruddas
climate change counter-movement
AUSTRIAN
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Brulle RJ, Hall G, Loy L, Schell-Smith K. 2021. “Obstructing action: foundation funding and US climate change counter-movement organizations,” Climatic Change. 2021;166(1):17.
Obstructing action: foundation funding and US climate
change counter-movement organizations
Robert J. Brulle1 & Galen Hall1 & Loredana Loy2 & Kennedy Schell-Smith1
Received: 1 February 2021 / Accepted: 28 April 2021/
The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2021
In a 2016 congressional hearing on the climate crisis, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) held
up a book entitled Why Scientists Disagree About Climate Change and asked: “Who funded
this phony climate science denial textbook that the Heartland Institute published and mailed to
thousands of schoolteachers around the country? ... We know it costs a lot of money to print
[but] we don’t know who paid for it!” (SDC 2019). The publisher of the “textbook” was the
Heartland Institute, a central organization in the Climate Change Counter-Movement (CCCM).
The CCCM is a complex network of organizations that functions to obstruct climate action
(Brulle 2020). Senator Whitehouse’s question points to the extensive network of anonymous
funders that supports the CCCM. This anonymous funding allows unaccountable, unknown
entities to promote climate misinformation and obstruct climate action. Several analyses have
shown that this deliberate and organized effort to misdirect and distort public discussion of
climate change drives widespread misunderstanding of climate science and legislative gridlock
on the issue (NRC 2011, p. 35).
For these ongoing efforts to continue, it is imperative that CCCM organizations mobilize
sufficient financial resources (Jenkins 1983). Thus, an examination of the funding sources of
the CCCM can provide a deeper understanding of the institutional dimensions of this effort.
The effort to understand the financial support of the CCCM has been the topic of scholarly
concern (Brulle 2014; Farrell 2015, 2016, 2019). The most extensive analysis was that of
Brulle (2014).In his analysis, he found that over the time period 2003 to 2010, the majority of
identifiable CCCM funding came from several conservative philanthropies and, increasingly,
through Donors Trust, a donor-directed philanthropy designed to preserve funders’ anonymity.
In this research, we revisit and update Brulle’s initial analysis. We double the timespan of the
prior study, analyzing data from 2003 to 2018, add an analysis of the amount of unidentifiable
funds supporting the CCCM, and considerably sharpen prior estimates by approximating the
proportion of this funding that directly supports work on climate change.
...
2 Findings
A small group of foundations constitute the core of financial support for the CCCM. Figure 1
shows the top grant makers and recipients in the CCCM by total grants given or received. The
top 1% of grant makers account for 67% of grants, and the top 10% of grant makers account
for 94% of grants. Similarly, seven CCCM organizations (5%) receive 50% of all grants. The
top three grant recipients—the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the
Hoover Institution—have remained unchanged since Brulle’s (2014) analysis, with some shifts
in the order of smaller grant recipients. The top grant makers have changed slightly: the
network remains dominated by the Donors Trust and Donors Capital Fund (DCF) and the
Scaife, Bradley, and Koch family foundations, with the Devos family foundations now among
the top ten as well. Donors Trust and DCF alone account for 13.7% of grants.
These
organizations are Donor Advised Funds (DAF), with a central role in coordinating donations
to CCCM and conservative organizations while keeping their core donors anonymous.
Alongside donations through DAFs, 74% of all contributions to CCCM organizations over
the sample period come from completely unidentified sources. Figure 2 shows a sociogram of
the top 1% of grant makers and recipients in the network by total grants given/received, where
each line represents all grants between two actors over the sample period, with contribution
...[graphs]
totals less than $5000 removed for clarity. Unidentified contributions are represented by a
single node to demonstrate their prevalence, although they come from many anonymous
donors. Individual organizations received between 25 and 100% of their contributions from
unidentified sources, with no strong (p < 0.05) correlations with organizational assets,
revenues, or the proportion of documents relevant to climate change.
Overall, the funding of organizations that make up the CCCM grew steadily between 2003
and 2018 in terms of both total contributions and foundation grants. Figure 3a displays yearly
total contributions to the 128 recipient organizations, with grants from the top 100 donors
distinguished by the category of the grant maker. Contributions increased steadily over the
sample period, from $357 million in 2003 to $808 million in 2018, with a peak at $811 million
in 2012.
....
Our analysis also supports the finding that funding strategies differ between progressive and
conservative philanthropists.We find a striking stability in funding over the 16-year time
period. The funding strategy of the conservative movement was laid out in the so-called Fat
Memo (Miller 2005), which informed the giving practices of the Olin Foundation, the first
major conservative philanthropy, and subsequent conservative donors. These funding efforts
focus on the development and promulgation of a clear conservative viewpoint. To realize that
effort, conservative philanthropies have funded a range of organizations that act to realize that
goal on a long-term basis. This strategy focused on the creation and maintenance of conservative
think tanks, development of public intellectuals (“thought leaders”), and promulgation
of a consistent ideological message. Additionally, conservative foundations focus on building
institutional capacity in organizations with strong communications capabilities (Covington
1997; Barley 2010).
This consistent and long-term funding strategy has enabled the development of a cohesive
institutional network of conservative organizations that work collectively to promulgate a
consistent message. This strategy stands in marked contrast to the funding strategy of
progressive foundations, which focus on individual research projects and short-term efforts.
Consequently, the progressive activist organizations and think tanks form a very loose and
disconnected network(Barley 2010, p. 792). This differs significantly from the very tight
network of organizations and think tanks that comprise the conservative movement. The
analysis confirms the long-term stable funding that maintains the CCCM.
This analysis still leaves Senator Whitehouse’s question unanswered. The source of over
three-quarters of the funding of the CCCM cannot be identified.While some of this funding
could come from small donations, the existing IRS disclosure rules do not enable any further
investigation in this area. Further research is needed to develop new means to extend our
understanding of the unidentified funders that created and maintain the CCCM.[refs]
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Who are 3%
...Moreover, the 2 per cent of peer-reviewed papers that reject AGW actually provide additional evidence in favor of the climate change consensus (Benestad et al.
Reference Benestad2016). Closer examination of thirty-eight papers that refute the 97 per cent consensus reveals all to have flaws rendering their conclusions invalid. The main errors identified were all related to the way the authors tested the data. As Dana Nuccitelli (Reference Nuccitelli2015, para. 10) describes: “the 2–3 per cent of papers that reject that consensus are all over the map, even contradicting each other.The one thing they seem to have in common is methodological flaws like cherry picking, curve fitting, ignoring inconvenient data, and disregarding known physics.” Additionally, co-author Katharine Hayhoe found: “Every single one of those analyses had an error—in their assumptions, methodology, or analysis—that, when corrected, brought their results into line with the scientific consensus” (Foley Reference Foley2017, para. 5).
Several authors of flawed anti-consensus papers also authored books on the same topic (Dunlap and Jacques Reference Dunlap and Jacques2013). Like the articles, Dunlap and Jacques asserted, these books help bolster claims that reject the climate change consensus. Of all books evaluated, the majority were linked to conservative think tanks; most were also affiliated with conservative ideology. These connections help illustrate the “the strong link between conservatism and promotion of climate change denial” (Dunlap and Jacques Reference Dunlap and Jacques2013, 707; see also Jacques et al. Reference Jacques2008; McCright and Dunlap Reference McCright and Dunlap2011a; McCright et al. Reference McCright2016).
The link between these publications and conservative think tanks/ideology is important since the“climate change counter-movement (CCCM)” is rooted in conservative (and, subsequently, conservative think-tank) efforts (Brulle Reference Brulle2014, 682). The CCCM's progress, however, requires significant corporate funding, political support, and magnification via the media and others who serve to profit from their efforts (Brulle Reference Brulle2014. In other words, while only a small number of expert scientists reject climate change consensus, there is a much more complex web of individuals and organizations that make up, and work to promote, contrarian efforts that use these expert and non-expert rejections to bolster their claims....}:
Table 7 shows authors of the aforementioned publications who appeared in our sample. We also note who meets climate expert criteria. Collectively, these publications illustrate one waya small, yet prominent, cohort works to expand the contrarian movement through the guise of academic research.
...[table]
Affiliations
A total of 82 per cent of all individuals in our dataset, including 100 per cent of individuals deemed climate experts, have affiliations with industries and/or organizations involved in the CCCM(Björnberg et al. Reference Björnberg2017; Brulle Reference Brulle2014; Dunlap and Jacques Reference Dunlap and Jacques2013; McCright and Dunlap Reference McCright and Dunlap2011a; McCright et al. Reference McCright2016; Oreskes and Conway Reference Oreskes and Conway2010; Plehwe Reference Plehwe2014. Of the 82 per cent, we found: (1) 69 per cent have affiliation(s) with conservative think tanks, conservative religious groups, and/or organized causes dedicated to the rejection of the climate consensus;(2) 11 per cent have affiliation(s) with both think tanks/groups/causes and CCCM-related industries (for example, fossil fuel, mining, and utility companies); and (3) another 2 per cent have affiliation(s) just with CCCM-related industries.}:
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Table 8 shows the number of affiliations with CCCM organizations that appeared in our data. Table 9 shows industry affiliations. Each corporation/company appeared just once, with the exceptions of ExxonMobil (seven), Peabody (four), Shell (four), and Western Fuels Association (three). Evaluating these companies/corporations is beyond the scope of this article; however, like other demographic information and affiliations, these affiliations may provide insight into contrarians' background and views. [i really want this table 8]
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WHO 3%
Discussion
What motivates experts and non-experts alike to pursue a position on climate change contrary to scientific consensus? The role of conservative politics, conservative think tanks, and industry efforts that make up the CCCM is well documented; however, our findings reveal other similarities among contrarians worthy of consideration.
In particular, the data reveal that most individuals in our data are aged sixty-five or older. This age group, at least in the United States, is also the most likely age group to disagree with the climate consensus; conversely,80 per cent of expert Earth scientists who agree with the consensus on AGW are under the age of sixty-five (Pew Research Center 2015). Although many individuals in our sample were non-experts, the experts were also aged 65 or older on average, with an average birth year of 1944. [1964 GOLDWATER, DIVISIONS ON VIET NAM ETC IE ORIG CTR-CULTURE] While we expect contrarian experts to hold views different from most of the scientific community, this age distinction suggests there may be other reasons that led these individuals to align with contrarian efforts. Individuals' experiences, for example, may impact their views of science and government. As a result, this may help explain why both experts and non-experts alike participate in a movement that hinders climate change mitigation efforts.
Behavioral research suggests that experiences during individuals' formative years (that is, teens and twenties) are the most important; collective memory association determines how individuals may apply past experiences to later behavior (Goffman Reference Goffman1974; Gongaware Reference Gongaware2011; Mannheim Reference Mannheim and Kecskemeti1952 [1928]; Schuman and Scott Reference Schuman and Scott1989. In theory, the memories of contrarians aged sixty-five and older would, then, have been defined by events of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. This period not only marked significant changes to the study of science, as well as the rise in scientific and technological advances, but also saw an increase in institutional deceit (Atkin and House Reference Atkin and House1981); Miller Reference Miller1983; Piller Reference Piller1991.Footnote^13 Relative to events of this period, trust in government declined among the US public in the mid-1960s; trust in science [WHY? A H BOMB? NAPALM?] also declined, particularly among conservatives, in the 1970s (Gauchat Reference Gauchat2012; Pew Research Center 2020). Relative to contrarians in our data, these events happened during the time when most received their degrees.}:
While one might assume that many contrarians in our sample would have higher trust in science because of their scientific degrees, prior research has found this not necessarily to be the case. Specifically, while higher education has a “positive” effect on the views of climate change for Democrats/liberals, educational attainment has a “weaker or negative” effect on the views of Republicans/conservatives (McCright and Dunlap Reference McCright and Dunlap2011a, 175, emphasis in original). As a result, and considering the conservative nature of contrarian efforts, we believe this period may have led to unique views on government and science—specifically, government intervention into scientific matters. In other words, despite older contrarians' scientific knowledge and/or education, their subjective concern about government intervention in science may surpass objectivity regarding mainstream consensus, especially considering the pervasiveness of neoliberalism during this period.[TWO FREDS OZONE SST?]
Neoliberalism emerged as a driving force to oppose government oversight and regulation, largely related to backlash from Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies and subsequent expansion of the federal government. While tenets ofneoliberalism (that is, a laissez-faire approach to the market with a heavy emphasis on deregulation and free trade) would become central to CCCM objectives, the ideology pervaded academic circles far earlier (McCright and Dunlap Reference McCright and Dunlap2011a; Oreskes and Conway Reference Oreskes and Conway2010. In fact, while the ideology is most notably associated with the creation of the Chicago School of economics, it was not unique to just Chicago. Neoliberalism was transnational in nature, permeating into other academic and political circles with the help of several institutions established solely to push this ideology (Mirowski and Plehwe Reference Mirowski and Plehwe2009). As a result,by the 1950s, there was “an all-out assault on virtually every aspect of Keynesian economics” led, most notably, by Milton Friedman (Yergin and Stanislaw Reference Yergin, Stanislaw, Yergin and Stanislaw1998), para. 8). By the 1960s and 1970s, neoliberalism was a prominent theory within economics and other disciplines. As a result, much like collective memories pertinent to older contrarians' formative years, it is reasonable to believe that neoliberal ideology would have impacted contrarians' attitudes toward science and government prior to the emergence of the CCCM.Footnote^14
...Perhaps one of the most interesting findings to come from this research is the cohesion among climate change contrarians when it comes to their age and the period in which their degrees were obtained. Although there are some individuals who are younger in age and/or were educated later, it is clear that a majority of contrarians are from a particular era.In addition, closer examination finds that distrust in both science and the government were growing at the same time that neoliberalism was gaining in prominence—not just as an economic theory, but because of a concerted effort to shape the political narrative regarding government involvement in the market. As a result, neoliberal thinking prevailed during most climate change contrarians' formative years. Among experts and non-experts alike, individuals who subscribed to tenets of neoliberalism during their formative years, we hypothesize, are now dedicated to efforts that push a laissez-faire approach. As a result, they may reject a mainstream consensus on issues like climate change even when most evidence points otherwise.
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