<h2><a class="thought-link" href="brain://En4XTIjoZEeGL7CZcEhZ9g/MinorityStatusReport">Minority Status Report</a></h2>
<p><a class="thought-link" href="brain://zJ3g-7t_CkGtc1kYHRyxgw/Facebook">Facebook</a>, <a class="thought-link" href="brain://kxLKVBDoLkKJw_eDwkhZ5g/Twitter">Twitter</a>, and <a class="thought-link" href="brain://C4UoRPzKRU6SxjE2_tRX1g/Google">Google</a>: The Committee convened an open hearing with executives from <a class="thought-link" href="brain://zJ3g-7t_CkGtc1kYHRyxgw/Facebook">Facebook</a>, <a class="thought-link" href="brain://kxLKVBDoLkKJw_eDwkhZ5g/Twitter">Twitter</a>, and <a class="thought-link" href="brain://C4UoRPzKRU6SxjE2_tRX1g/Google">Google</a> on <a class="thought-link" href="brain://JhrOISAiGkSlR-tM1mcTJA/20171101">2017-11-01</a> to inform the American public of the companies’ initial findings about Russia’s weaponization of social media prior to and during the <a class="thought-link" href="brain://OokLaFDm6UyEKgxi4vjbbA/2016">2016</a> U.S. elections. As these companies have acknowledged, they and other technology companies need to conduct more extensive forensic investigation of their platforms to map out the entire network of covert personas and accounts that Russia deployed; how Russia amplified fake pages and accounts, including through paid advertising; and how Russian disinformation spread within and across platforms. The Committee, in parallel, must investigate how Russian disinformation spread beyond social media to infiltrate press reporting and public debate; whether and how the presidential campaigns used or were harmed by this covert influence operation; and propose policy and legislative changes that can help guard against future foreign government weaponization of technology platforms. The Committee should therefore send all three companies follow-up letters requesting: (1) that these and other technology companies affected by the Russian influence campaign pool resources and conduct a joint investigation into the full scope and depth of the Russian influence campaign; and (2) that each company publish online an easily accessible and searchable public repository available to the entire online community of all content linked to malign Russian actors and identified as such.</p>