Although clearly a collective action problem, large players may internalize enough benefits to make it worthwhile to invest in the collective goods

<p>2009_Freeman_The Climate Winner Argument</p>

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While it is surely correct that climate change poses a collective action

problem, it is also true that large players may internalize enough of the

benefits from the production of collective goods (here, mitigated climate

change) to make it worthwhile to invest in those goods. Every player,

large or small, has an incentive to take action up to the point where the

State’s marginal cost of action exceeds the marginal benefit. This is why a

more complete accounting of cost makes a difference. A large, hegemonic

player like the United States internalizes a significant fraction of

the global gains of climate change abatement, making it worthwhile to

bear at least some costs. Although this might result in a less than optimal

amount of mitigation, the reductions in emissions could still be significant

and meaningful in terms of mitigating impacts.45 Most importantly

for this Essay, the reductions may require more action than is currently

contemplated by U.S. policy.</p>