Effects-Based Operations (EBO)

<p><font size="2"><font size="3">During the allied planning for the invasion of Europe in 1944, Supreme Allied Commander United States Army General Dwight David Eisenhower became greatly concerned that reinforcement from Germany, or the Eastern Front, would counterattack his forces before they could establish a foothold in Northwest France. Airmen proposed a plan attacking the railroad target system along many points, with particular attention to the marshalling yard target set. The allied plan was highly successful. Many years later, researchers discovered that attacks against the railroad target system indirectly led to the collapse of the German war economy by late 1944. Speculation exists that if the allies continued their efforts against the German Reichsbahn, the war economy might have collapsed even earlier and saved countless lives. At the strategic level, attacks that directly led to the isolation of the Normandy beachhead indirectly led to the effect of reduced war-waging supplies. Every major conflict since World War II (WWII) would more or less repeat this pattern. Furthermore, both effects-an isolated battlefield and reduced war-waging suppliesæwere strategic-level or theater objectives. In this example, allied planners gave little attention to how actions taken to achieve one effect might indirectly lead to attaining the other desired effect. This kind of analysis is striving to develop new concepts, tactics, and software tools to support an EBO strategy.</font></font></p>