A Romp Through Ethics for Complete Beginners (1/7)

<p>Part 1 of 7 in Marianne Talbot's "A Romp Through Ethics for Complete Beginners". In this episode we examine moral dilemmas, moral truth and moral knowledge, freewill and determinism.</p>

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<p>00:09
right hi I'm Marianne tall but you have
00:13
quite a few of you know me but there are
00:15
a few new faces here so I'm going to
00:17
hope get to know your names very quickly
00:19
and some of your names I'm going to
00:22
forget and if I call you you or
00:23
something like that you'll just have to
00:25
get used to it I'm afraid we're being
00:27
podcast so welcome to everyone who's
00:29
watching this on a podcast I see all
00:33
these slides that I'm using are going to
00:35
be available either in handout form or
00:37
with the podcast so you should be able
00:40
to follow everything that I'm doing
00:43
without needing to take copious notes
00:46
okay let's get started okay in this
00:49
session we're going to be doing all
00:51
these things it's not going to take us
00:54
too long to go through the first three
00:57
the last one may take a little bit
00:58
longer and but anyway we'll these are
01:01
the things that we're going to do and
01:02
let's start right away with looking at a
01:05
moral dilemma I want you to imagine that
01:09
your friends has just come home from the
01:11
hairdresser's and she walked in she says
01:13
what do you think and do you think yuck
01:16
okay you've got a problem haven't you
01:19
what's what's your problem
01:23
lack of right whether you tell the truth
01:27
or not okay but that's that's not a
01:29
problem because I mean we know we should
01:31
tell the truth shouldn't we so it can't
01:33
be that on its own that's the problem
01:38
okay so if you tell her the truth what
01:41
are you not being you or what you fear
01:45
you're not being is kind okay so we've
01:48
got two rules - two rules that we like
01:52
to obey in everyday life don't we be
01:54
truthful be kind and the problem with
01:57
this situation is it looks as if we
02:00
can't be both it looks as if you've got
02:02
to choose between honesty and kindness
02:04
and that's not a comfortable situation
02:07
to be in is it okay moral dilemmas of
02:12
this sort of common
02:13
and the reason they're common is that
02:15
the rules of everyday life like be kind
02:18
be generous be truthful whatever our
02:21
general rules that have to be applied in
02:24
particular situations and as a result of
02:27
that they come into conflict can you
02:29
think of any more moral dilemmas can you
02:31
think of any that you've come across
02:33
perhaps in your everyday life what about
02:40
at school when the teacher pressed you
02:43
up against the wall and said who did
02:44
that what's your problem here and you
02:47
know you know who did it
02:52
you don't want to rat on your mates
02:54
exactly so be loyal in again
02:58
to be polite to your teacher or be
03:00
truthful or something again it comes
03:02
into conflict here in all these
03:04
situations you've got a general rule
03:07
that come into conflict with another
03:09
general rule because a particular
03:11
situation brings them into conflict and
03:14
you might think that it's easy to get
03:17
out of this particular dilemma and one
03:20
that I mean let's have a straw poll okay
03:22
so if you're in this situation who would
03:24
tell your friends that you think your
03:26
hair looks terrible maybe not quite like
03:28
that you you okay one two okay quite a
03:34
few of you're putting up your hand okay
03:35
who would be kind most of you okay
03:39
that's interesting but you you probably
03:42
go or at some time in your life you will
03:45
have gone through this sort of way of
03:47
thinking well sometimes you have to be
03:49
cruel to be kind if you're kind to her
03:51
she might go around looking like that
03:53
for the next six months might and she
03:55
and that would be to be cruel to her
03:58
because when she realized how awful
04:00
she'd look it's a bit like looking at
04:01
those photographs of yourself in the 70s
04:03
isn't it ah and also another thing you
04:07
might try is well it's only a white lie
04:09
if I tell her she looks fine it's not a
04:13
black lie I'm not doing it for bad
04:15
reasons I'm doing it for good reasons so
04:17
we what we have to do here is that we
04:22
be required by dilemmas like this to
04:26
reflect on our values we say okay what
04:29
is truth what is it to be honest or what
04:32
is kindness what is it to be kind and if
04:37
I were God I would make sure there is
04:39
many moral dilemmas as possible because
04:41
I would want people to be asking
04:43
themselves well how do I act in order to
04:47
be kind what do I need to do in order to
04:49
be honest in this situation being honest
04:53
is difficult does that mean I heard that
04:55
is that an excuse not to be honest
04:58
etc all these things are prompted
05:02
prompting us to think about our values
05:05
and about what we should do in
05:07
particular situations but we yearn for
05:11
these moral rules don't we we we yearn
05:15
to have things like be truthful be kind
05:18
be generous be loyal etc because that it
05:22
makes life easy doesn't it it takes
05:24
decisions away from us and and in this
05:27
situation a lot of people attempted to
05:29
make further rules these are the sort of
05:31
rules that they're tempted to make so
05:35
here's one when kindness and honesty
05:37
conflict I'll always be honest now I bet
05:41
you know people who've made that rule
05:43
for themselves do you yes okay lots of
05:46
nods here or possible new rule to when
05:50
kindness and honesty conflict I'll
05:52
always be kind do you know anyone who's
05:55
who's living by that sort of rule yeah I
06:00
again lots of lots of nods
06:06
you're afraid you won't say all that I
06:08
like that you said you would say well
06:11
I'm afraid it doesn't suit me but maybe
06:14
it doesn't suit my teeth but it maybe
06:16
suit others you know yes
06:18
okay there are different ways in which
06:20
you might be honest I mean nobody's good
06:23
well actually that's not true and very
06:25
few people are going to actually say but
06:27
a few would say yuck
06:29
I mean your sixteen-year-old son is not
06:31
going to hold back
06:33
well he might okay but we yearn for
06:37
moral rules because moral rules make
06:40
life easy that's why we're tempted to
06:43
make rules like the former - which which
06:46
are not so obviously useful actually
06:48
but in this yearning for rules we reveal
06:51
ourselves to be moral generalists ok a
06:55
moral generalist is someone who believes
06:57
that morality is governed by rules and
07:00
one reason you might think this is
07:02
people think of morality is as
07:04
principles set of principles and of
07:07
course what are our principles but rules
07:09
by which to guide us in our thoughts and
07:12
in our actions so if you think that
07:15
morality is necessarily principled and
07:19
by that you mean that it's necessarily
07:21
rule governs then you're a moral
07:24
generalist ok but oh right ok there's
07:30
this little complication here it doesn't
07:32
matter how complicated the rules are
07:34
that you think we're governed by the
07:37
fact is if you think that morally we're
07:40
governed by rules then you are some sort
07:42
of moral generalist ok particularly
07:46
spurple ever let me try that again if I
07:49
take a run at it particular ists deny
07:53
that moral reasoning is governed by
07:55
rules of any kind okay Jonathan Dancy
07:59
here is a reading University he's a
08:02
particular Asst so he doesn't think that
08:04
moral rules
08:06
sorry morality is governed by rules at
08:09
all we might have a look later and ask
08:11
ourselves exactly what he means by that
08:14
but here's his arguments for it ok he
08:18
claims that all
08:19
reasons for acting are context sensitive
08:23
okay let's just have a quick look at
08:26
reasons for acting I mean when I asked
08:30
you to pass me a pen okay your reason
08:35
for acting is that you wanted to do what
08:39
I wanted you to do and you believed that
08:41
passing me that pen would be a way of
08:45
doing it okay so those were your reasons
08:48
for acting so whenever we act actually
08:52
it's not always when we act as we'll see
08:54
next week that we have reasons for
08:55
acting but when we act and we have
08:59
reasons for acting these reasons says
09:02
dancy are context sensitive and what he
09:05
means by that is that in some contexts
09:08
their reasons for acting and in other
09:11
contexts their reasons against acting
09:14
are their reasons for not acting if you
09:17
prefer so let's have a look at an
09:20
example for that imagine that your
09:22
reason for refusing to perform action eh
09:25
okay that action might be passing me a
09:27
pen for example but your reason for
09:30
refusing to perform action eh is that in
09:32
performing action eh you would be
09:35
telling a lie okay I'm not going to do
09:38
that because it would be lying if I did
09:40
that that's perfectly good reason for
09:42
acting isn't it
09:43
okay well then ask yourself does this
09:47
mean that you should refuse to perform
09:49
any and every act that has the property
09:53
of being a lie telling does it so okay
10:00
is it let me ask you two questions
10:02
firstly is it often the case with you
10:07
that you don't act you don't do
10:11
something because if you did it it would
10:13
be lying okay so it's a lie is sometimes
10:18
a reason for you to act to put your hand
10:19
up or not to act I should say I'm going
10:23
to assume you've all put your hand up
10:25
here
10:26
even if I'm wrong okay so the fact that
10:30
something has the property of being
10:32
allied as an action has the property of
10:34
being a lie is sometimes at least reason
10:38
for you to act or reason for you not to
10:41
act okay but it doesn't mean that every
10:45
time forever times when sometimes you
10:48
think you ought to lie that it's your
10:51
moral duty to lie can anyone give me an
10:54
example okay so if the Nazis come to the
11:04
door and they say are there any Jews
11:05
here you don't say yes actually three of
11:10
them under the bed it you think at that
11:13
point that it's your moral duty to lie
11:16
so it can't be the case that the having
11:19
the property of being a lie telling is
11:22
always a reason against an action fair
11:27
enough
11:27
or imagine that your reason for
11:30
performing action be for actually doing
11:33
something this time is that in
11:35
performing action be you would be
11:36
keeping a promise okay so how many of
11:41
you have done something because in doing
11:44
it you would be keeping a promise okay
11:46
so all of us act because we believe that
11:50
keeping a promise is a good thing but
11:52
does this mean that we always keep
11:55
promises that we would perform and we
11:58
believe that others should perform each
12:00
and every action that would be a promise
12:03
keeping do we know can anyone give me an
12:07
example an imaginative example of
12:17
the doctor then it's yes you have to
12:22
explain everything but understand that
12:26
but it's your moral duty but there's no
12:29
yes it's a shame to promise absolutely
12:37
so you promise to take your children to
12:38
the cinema but on the night your wife
12:40
your husband falls ill and it's more
12:44
important that you take them to hospital
12:46
then that you keep that promise again it
12:49
seems that the fact that an action has
12:51
the property of being a promise keeping
12:54
isn't always and everywhere reason to
12:57
perform that action that's what Dancy
13:00
means by reasons for acting a context
13:03
sensitive the context that you're in
13:06
changes your reasons for acting in some
13:09
context the fact that something's a lie
13:12
is reason not to tell it and in other
13:15
contexts that it's a lie isn't reason
13:18
not to tell it okay is that good so
13:23
that's dancies reason for being a
13:25
particular Asst so Dancy believes that
13:28
no reason for acting is always reason
13:31
for or reason against performing an
13:35
action every reason for action is
13:38
context-sensitive well so he doesn't
13:47
think that well I think actually I'm
13:50
just about to say this so let me check
13:52
okay so particular it's believed that no
13:55
moral rule is always and everywhere true
13:58
particularly sleeve that moral rules
14:00
like don't like eat promises and so on
14:03
are what philosophers call rules of
14:05
thumb now a rule of thumb is a rule that
14:09
you use because it's useful and it's
14:12
useful most of the time but it's not one
14:15
that's unbreakable if you come to a
14:18
situation where it's clearly clear that
14:20
this rule isn't going to be useful to
14:22
follow then then you just don't follow
14:24
it
14:25
so immoral rules like the ones we've
14:28
talked about if there rules of thumb are
14:31
not absolutely true they're not moral
14:35
absolutes so don't lie is not always and
14:38
everywhere true and so the question is
14:57
were wouldn't the Nazis have been
14:59
justified in giving as a reason that
15:02
they were following orders well
15:08
presumably dancy would say no because
15:10
dancy would think you should follow
15:12
orders is the rule that in some contexts
15:16
is true and in other contexts is false
15:20
because he thinks that no moral rule is
15:24
always and everywhere true so you should
15:28
follow orders or you should follow rules
15:30
it's not always and everywhere true
15:40
and that means the context the context
15:44
in which they were deciding should I
15:46
follow orders or not was a context in
15:49
which dancing would say probably or
15:54
certainly I would say that they
15:56
shouldn't follow orders in this context
15:58
that the answer to this question in that
15:59
context would be no whereas if you
16:02
ordered me now to explain again what I
16:05
meant by the I might take that as
16:07
something I should follow perhaps not
16:10
time would matter no but you don't
16:16
decide a context you're just in a
16:18
context so if you're the Nazis are at
16:22
the door you you know exactly you don't
16:25
don't look so worried Lee at me you are
16:27
all looking worried you make this sort
16:31
of decision all the time whenever you
16:33
face a moral dilemma whenever your
16:35
friend says do you like it and you think
16:37
yuck that provides you with a context in
16:40
which a moral decision must be made and
16:43
in that decision in that particular
16:46
decision one there are two rules be kind
16:49
be honest and the question is should you
16:51
in this context follow that rule or that
16:56
rule or neither so you're all used to
16:59
doing this this isn't something all I'm
17:02
doing is laying it out for you clearly
17:05
as a philosopher should okay now I'm
17:07
going to take two more questions because
17:09
I can see two more but then I'm going to
17:10
get on okay we dance to be described as
17:13
a situation I I have heard people call
17:18
particular ist's that I don't know
17:20
enough about what is being a situation
17:22
list is to be able to say for sure but I
17:25
suspect the answer is yes know how it
17:27
differs if it does it would be
17:29
interesting to know how it differs if it
17:31
does but I suspect it doesn't but I
17:33
might be wrong in this
17:36
is it not a question of ranking
17:38
priorities to attempt to to act for the
17:43
greater of two goods or the less evil of
17:47
two evils well if you don't mind I'm
17:49
going to obsess pon that question
17:51
because I think I'm going to answer it
17:53
later so may I do that and but but
17:56
notice that the separate rules that I
17:59
talked about people making I'm always
18:00
going to put kindness before honesty or
18:03
I'm always going to put honesty before
18:04
kindness that's another sort of rule
18:06
isn't it and that's a rule that
18:08
prioritizes other rules so there are
18:12
lots of different sorts of rules that we
18:14
might look at okay let's let's get on
18:17
and okay just a show of hands how many
18:22
of you think your particular ist's here
18:24
oh not everyone but nearly everyone I'm
18:30
dying to us why those who aren't
18:32
particular son but ended their mine we
18:35
might come to the reasons why you're not
18:37
in a minute okay I just want to point
18:40
out that in talking about the things
18:42
that we've been talking about for the
18:43
last ten minutes we've been engaged in
18:46
moral theorizing now that's a very
18:49
different sort of activity from the
18:51
activity that we're engaged in when
18:53
we're actually trying to make decisions
18:54
about how we should act so when you're
18:57
thinking shall I be kind or shall I be
18:59
honest that's one type of thinking about
19:01
morality but when you're thinking things
19:04
that are sort that we've been thinking
19:05
should we be generalists or particular
19:08
ist's or should we always follow moral
19:11
rules or not that's a different type of
19:14
moral thinking and moral theorizing is
19:17
called second order moral thinking
19:20
whereas everyday decision making about
19:23
how we should act is called first order
19:25
moral thinking and that's because moral
19:28
theorizing is thinking about our
19:31
thinking about how we should act okay
19:35
philosophers are good at this but you
19:38
see what I mean we when we think about
19:40
whether to be kind or we're honest we're
19:42
thinking about how we should act and
19:44
when we're asking well should we follow
19:47
rules like
19:49
we should be kind we should be honest
19:50
we're thinking about our thinking about
19:53
how we should act with me know I haven't
20:01
created any up well I'm creating rules
20:04
but not moral rules about how to use
20:06
language I am saying you should use
20:08
second order moral thinking for
20:10
theorizing and first sort of moral
20:13
thinking for thinking about your actions
20:15
and that is making a rule but it's not a
20:18
moral rule is it it's a it's a rule of
20:20
language okay
20:24
someday it might become a moral rule if
20:26
I think you're disobeying it okay can we
20:31
sort these questions into either
20:33
first-order practical questions or
20:35
second-order theoretical questions and
20:38
we're going to give you a minute to
20:39
think about it for yourself
20:41
and then we'll go through it together so
20:43
don't yell out the answers just think
20:45
about them for yourself that you've only
20:54
got ten seconds so you're not going to
20:55
get very far okay
20:59
it's lying morally acceptable is that a
21:02
first order or a second order question
21:09
let's let's go over it again shall we
21:12
okay first order moral thinking is is
21:16
asking about yourself about how you
21:18
should act okay and so if you ask is
21:23
lying morally acceptable I'll aren't you
21:26
saying to yourself should I feel free to
21:29
lie or not okay
21:36
No you're now making me question it okay
21:45
shall we leave that one I was going to
21:47
call that one first order because I
21:49
thought of it as being about actions to
21:52
the extent that it is about deciding how
21:54
to act
21:55
it's a first-order question okay what
21:57
about should female circumcision be
21:59
illegal Oh Erica no I'm not I absolutely
22:08
refuse to explain that here you don't
22:11
answer that question what about everyone
22:13
else
22:14
is that a first-order question or a
22:15
second-order question first
22:18
whoa we're nearly getting there but okay
22:21
I think that's the first-order question
22:23
for the same reason what about how can
22:25
we know whether a given oh that a given
22:27
moral judgment is correct second you're
22:31
getting getting there okay could it ever
22:35
be right to kill an innocent human being
22:37
first we are getting there aren't we
22:41
definitely what makes a moral judgment
22:43
right or wrong second very much
22:47
you see that's you're not thinking at
22:49
all about how to act on you what should
22:51
I do
22:53
you're asking here about well what is
22:56
here's a moral judgment what makes it
22:59
true or false we're going to be asking
23:01
this question in a minute what's up
23:08
well no because right or wrong here
23:11
actually in fact that's well pointed out
23:16
yes but what do I mean by right or wrong
23:20
here and I shouldn't have done this this
23:23
is a mistake that I've made can anyone
23:25
point out what the mistake is what
23:26
should I have written here true or false
23:34
actually is what I meant do you see what
23:37
I'm in so I would that question I mean
23:40
you're making me see that that that was
23:43
a bit of sloppy thinking on my part so
23:45
if I can do it that means you can do it
23:47
very occasionally and not certain
23:48
certainly not beyond lecture three I
23:52
should have asked there what makes a
23:54
moral judgment true or false rather than
23:56
right or wrong by using right or wrong
23:58
and I confused it with morality I
23:59
apologize
24:00
okay what about this one is it wrong to
24:03
kill embryos that have the genes for
24:05
Huntington's disease first order or
24:07
second order first order well done what
24:11
sort of evidence can we give for saying
24:13
that something's right or wrong second
24:16
good okay we need to work on that just a
24:21
little bit but only a little bit we're
24:24
thinking about decisions on the
24:26
gathering so you
24:30
well done you're right to make the
24:34
distinction between something's being
24:36
immoral and something's being illegal
24:38
we're going to look at that in depth
24:40
next week so I won't look at it here but
24:43
in order to make something illegal we're
24:46
usually asking whether either it's right
24:48
or wrong because we would only want to
24:51
make illegal something that's not right
24:53
or it could be a matter of
24:55
practicalities couldn't it
24:57
I mean we've either got to drive on the
24:58
right or the left doesn't matter which
25:01
it's certainly not a moral question not
25:04
one this one disagrees it's French wife
25:11
about that for anyone who didn't hear
25:13
hear that okay um so that's why we
25:17
started off looking at moral dilemmas
25:19
and I hope that what you've got from
25:21
looking at moral dilemmas is that quite
25:24
often in the particular situations in
25:27
which we find ourselves we find
25:29
ourselves in a dilemma because we find
25:31
that two moral rules or possibly moral
25:34
moral rules sometimes come into conflict
25:36
we can't obey all of them and therefore
25:39
we have a dilemma it looks as if we I
25:43
mean it's a very difficult dilemma
25:45
because both things seem to be right and
25:48
yet we can't do both of them so I hope
25:54
that's shown as something about rules
25:56
it's shown the importance do it our
25:58
rules central to morality or not but now
26:02
let's look at moral truth this is the
26:04
second thing we're going to do ok kitten
26:06
consider the following statements the
26:09
earth is elliptical the tag cat is tabby
26:12
these are straightforward true or false
26:14
if you looked at my cat EDA puss and I
26:17
said is that cat tabby you would say yes
26:22
yes you would say yes I suspect and ok
26:26
what makes those sentence is true our
26:28
facts about in the first case the earth
26:31
and its shape and in the second case my
26:35
cat and the fact that it's tabby ok
26:38
straightforward in
26:40
in philosophy we talk sometimes about
26:41
the redundancy theory of truth because
26:45
if you say the cat is tabby and the cat
26:49
is tabby is true in each case you seem
26:53
to be giving the same information as if
26:56
you assert the cat is tabby you are
27:00
saying in a way the cat is tabby is true
27:03
aren't you so they're straightforwardly
27:08
true I mean there are huge problems I
27:09
should say with the redundancy theory of
27:11
truth so we won't get into that here but
27:13
but just to point out that these are
27:15
very straightforward it even sounds
27:18
rather silly when I say what makes it
27:21
true that the cat is tabby is that the
27:23
cat is tabby and it's also sad very yes
27:32
yes absolutely and all sorts of thing I
27:35
should just like to point out that the
27:40
cat is tabby is true because the cat is
27:49
tabby notice that here I'm I'm quoting
27:55
this okay I'm mentioning this sentence
27:59
and I'm saying of it that it's true
28:02
because of this fact obtaining no
28:06
quotation marks around this so here I'm
28:10
using the cat is tabby and here I'm just
28:13
mentioning it very important distinction
28:17
that I'm sure is going to come up again
28:19
sometime in these lectures okay but but
28:22
these are straightforwardly true or
28:24
false
28:24
and there's the things that make them
28:26
straightforwardly true or false are
28:28
empirically verifiable facts but if we
28:31
look at statements such as it's wrong to
28:34
kill human beings or we should always
28:36
tell the truth
28:37
well are there facts that make these
28:40
statements true or false and if there
28:43
are what sort of facts are they okay now
28:47
when I asked that first question a lot
28:48
of you shook your head I said are there
28:50
facts
28:51
that make these things true or false and
28:53
a lot of people went No
28:55
okay that's interesting we've got a room
28:58
full of moral skeptics or at least a few
29:00
people it's certainly true isn't it that
29:04
if there are facts that make these
29:07
things true they're not the sort of
29:08
facts we can touch look at see here put
29:14
them in my pockets with nor can we
29:16
conduct experiments to see whether it's
29:19
true that lying is wrong or whatever it
29:21
was that I used and so some people think
29:25
that this shows that there aren't moral
29:28
facts and a few people in this room
29:30
obviously agree with them so whereas the
29:33
earth is elliptical or the cat is tabby
29:36
are actually they are true or false and
29:40
they're made true or false by facts the
29:44
thought is that things like lying is
29:46
wrong or you should tell the truth or or
29:49
whatever they're not made true or false
29:54
by facts sir question arises are they
29:58
true or false at all perhaps okay well
30:02
if there are no moral facts then perhaps
30:04
moral statements are neither true nor
30:06
false or perhaps we're free to decide
30:09
for ourselves whether they're true or
30:11
false perhaps it's just a matter of
30:13
agreeing with each other that they
30:15
should be true or false or something
30:17
like that
30:18
um okay quick strawpoll put your hands
30:23
up if you think that there are no moral
30:26
facts no don't shout out just put your
30:31
hand up okay we've got a few moral
30:41
skeptical about that we're not we're not
30:44
going to talk about moral skepticism
30:47
itdo later in the series but here's a
30:51
website that you might use to check up
30:54
on it and of course you've got this
30:55
written in your notes so you don't need
30:57
to write it down and it'll be available
31:00
with the podcast okay most moral
31:04
philosopher
31:04
is almost philosophers believe that
31:06
there are moral facts it is not the case
31:09
that most philosophers are moral
31:11
skeptics what sort of fact is a moral
31:15
fact well here we are here are a few
31:17
we're going to be looking in this series
31:20
of lectures at four different theories
31:22
about the sort of fact that makes a
31:25
moral statement true or false a virtue
31:28
ethicist believes that an action is
31:31
right if a virtuous person would perform
31:34
it so its facts about who's virtuous and
31:37
what they do that make true questions
31:42
about right or wrong so lying is wrong
31:44
is true if a virtuous person would
31:48
accept that lying is wrong and not lie
31:51
etc okay it's not a fact like that cats
31:53
being tabbies it but it's still a fact
31:57
isn't it oh yes defining virtue oh yeah
32:01
don't don't worry we're going to have
32:03
great fun with these theories we're
32:05
going to devote a week to each of these
32:07
theories so we'll have plenty of time to
32:08
talk about that but I just want to point
32:10
out that it's just possible that when
32:13
you were thinking about the facts that
32:14
make true or false moral statements you
32:17
might have been a bit parochial in your
32:20
thinking about what a fact is because if
32:22
you think a fact is the sort of thing
32:24
you can see or touch or put into your
32:26
pocket or or that sort of thing then you
32:29
might have missed the fact that there
32:31
are facts like this okay none
32:33
cognitivism says that an action is right
32:35
if a person with a stable and general
32:38
perspective would approve of it okay you
32:40
might think that there's something
32:41
rather similar here but okay and again
32:44
you're thinking I can see you thinking
32:46
were what's that what kind of fact is
32:48
this okay we'll look at what kind of
32:50
fact this is later in the series
32:53
deontologists say that an action is
32:55
right if it falls under a rule that
32:57
prescribes it so let's do a little bit
33:00
of revision okay I've given you two
33:03
technical terms earlier today and and
33:07
you can apply one of them to a day
33:09
ontology thinks that an action is right
33:12
if it falls under a rule that prescribes
33:16
it so rule like
33:19
keep promises or be kind okay is a day
33:25
ontology a particular store a generalist
33:27
put up your hand if you think he's a
33:29
particular escape route up your hand if
33:34
you think he's a generalist well done
33:36
okay good we're good we're getting the
33:39
terminology right a generalist is
33:41
someone who believes that there are
33:42
moral rules a particular astiz someone
33:45
who believes that all moral reasons are
33:47
context-sensitive okay a utilitarian
33:51
different sort of fact to make true a
33:54
moral statement he thinks that an action
33:56
is right if it produces the greatest
33:58
happiness of the greatest number so
34:01
telling that lie to the nazis is the
34:04
right action if it produces the greatest
34:07
happiness the greatest number well there
34:09
are facts about that let me ask you a
34:12
question well I'm sure I'll ask this
34:13
again dropping the bomb on Hiroshima was
34:16
it the right thing to do or not if
34:18
you're a utilitarian you think that it
34:20
was the right thing if it produced more
34:23
happiness than it took away and that it
34:27
wasn't the right thing if it did the
34:29
opposite well we don't know the fact of
34:32
that matter but there was a fact there
34:36
wasn't there so there's a fact that's
34:40
rather difficult different from the sort
34:42
of facts that makes EDA passes at a be
34:44
true but but it's nevertheless of fact
34:47
isn't it so for different accounts of
34:51
the facts that make true moral
34:55
statements so anyone who adopts any of
34:58
these moral theories is not a moral
35:00
skeptic they do think there are facts
35:02
that make moral statements true but they
35:04
don't think the facts are necessarily
35:06
facts that we can check empirically or
35:10
that we can look at or whatever okay and
35:14
this is good when we're doing well here
35:17
I'm pleased that we've got this far in
35:19
this session okay but this is the biggie
35:22
okay or I think it is in this okay
35:25
there's one question we're going to take
35:27
one question before I go on to it is
35:29
another word you could use rather than
35:31
fact because I would like to think of a
35:33
fact as something that could be tested
35:35
and proved to be true and I would prefer
35:38
to see another word used in place of
35:40
fact in your second case no I absolutely
35:44
refuse to change my language here
35:46
because a fact is what I mean and I
35:50
think you ought to change your view of
35:52
what a fact is because does love exist
35:58
yes okay most of us here are romantics
36:02
we believe that love exists is this a
36:05
fact of some move is this something that
36:08
can be established empirically well
36:12
actually we we could do perhaps we could
36:13
I mean maybe I've just established that
36:15
most people in this room believe that
36:17
love exists for the course they could
36:18
all be wrong do you see what I mean yes
36:26
but I think you're gonna have swayed me
36:28
all right here's another question then
36:30
just because I'm looking forward to
36:32
persuading you of this do possibilities
36:37
exist yeah
36:41
okay most people think yes is this
36:44
something that we can establish
36:48
empirically propose I do probabilities
36:52
exist no and we're not talking about
36:54
probabilities we're talking about
36:56
possibilities here can you know week if
36:59
you actual eyes a possibility then what
37:03
exists of course is an action actualized
37:05
possibility which is not of course a
37:08
possibility at all it is an actuality
37:11
what I'm asking you is well whether
37:13
possibilities exist okay
37:17
are are the facts that make true this is
37:20
possible an empirical fact if I'm sorry
37:25
I should actually I've I've dug myself a
37:27
terrible hole here and the reason I dug
37:30
myself a hole in I should have made a
37:32
distinction between empirical
37:33
possibility and logical possibility and
37:36
what I was actually asking about was
37:38
logical possibilities and if you like
37:42
we'll talk about that in question time
37:44
but I think having dug myself a hole I'm
37:46
now going to kick sand in it and move on
37:49
quickly okay um we're going to look at
37:53
moral truth and whether it's absolute or
37:56
relative okay firstly I'm going to
37:59
define both terms because we need to
38:01
know what we're talking about okay
38:03
you're a moral absolutist if you believe
38:05
that there's at least one moral
38:07
statement that's true absolutely okay an
38:11
example of that here's a non moral
38:13
example of an absolute truth the earth
38:16
is round I should have said elliptical
38:18
shouldn't I anyway just ignore that
38:20
complication the earth is round is true
38:24
everywhere for everyone at all times
38:27
irrespective of what people believe okay
38:30
so even when everyone believed for
38:33
perfectly good reasons that the earth is
38:35
flat I mean they are good reasons aren't
38:38
they look at it like actually this is
38:39
bad example as did the lecture-room
38:41
slopes even when everyone believes that
38:46
the earth was flat they were wrong the
38:49
earth was round then okay so that's a
38:52
non Moore
38:53
example of an absolute truth and what
38:55
makes it an absolute truth is it's true
38:57
everywhere for everyone at all times
38:59
irrespective of what people believe so
39:03
you're a moral absolutist if you believe
39:05
that there's at least one now notice
39:08
that at least one you don't need more
39:11
than one you just need one moral
39:14
statement that's true everywhere for
39:17
everyone at all times and irrespective
39:21
of what people believe okay that's what
39:24
moral absolutism is let's have a look at
39:26
moral relativism you're a moral
39:29
relativist if you believe that all moral
39:32
statements are true or false only
39:35
relative to something now you might be
39:40
thinking what does this mean well it can
39:42
anyone think of another example of an
39:44
area of discourse okay of language where
39:48
statements in that area of discourse are
39:50
true only relative to something or other
39:54
there are some very very common ones
39:57
let's see if you can think of some put
40:00
your thinking caps on
40:03
that's that's quite a good one yes the
40:05
house is big because big in relation to
40:07
what two other houses presumably it's
40:10
not big in relation to a skyscraper yep
40:15
so okay that's that's good one any
40:17
others
40:24
that someone's clever yes clever in
40:26
relation to what they might be clever in
40:28
in the domain of this classroom but not
40:31
clever outside this classroom or
40:33
something like that okay can anyone
40:35
think of a slightly different sort of
40:37
example here's an obvious one your
40:45
French wife does she go to France often
40:47
and stuff she ring you up and tell you
40:50
it's five o'clock well let's let's say
40:56
she done she she could and would you
40:59
argue with her and say no it's not it's
41:02
six o'clock or four o'clock or whatever
41:04
it is right okay well those of us who
41:13
don't insist on the time of the Sun
41:15
would they have it would they have an
41:18
argument with the French friends who
41:19
told him it was five o'clock when
41:21
looking at their watch in England it was
41:24
actually never is it going to be four
41:26
o'clock or six o'clock four o'clock
41:28
thank you no you wouldn't why wouldn't
41:31
you because statements about time so
41:35
there's an area of discourse temporal
41:38
statement statements about time where
41:40
the truth of all those statements is
41:43
relative to and what it's relative to is
41:46
a time zone isn't it okay so we're we
41:50
are used to the idea of the truth being
41:54
relative to something are that happens
41:56
often and I'll give you a couple of
41:58
other examples in a minute but here are
41:59
some non moral examples of different
42:02
types of relativism so you can believe
42:07
that moral statements are true only
42:09
relative to cultures so for example
42:12
here's a nun moral statement a meal
42:14
consists of meat and two veg well in
42:18
relation to my father's generation and
42:21
culture that was true my father would
42:24
certainly have believed that and for him
42:27
it was true my generation not not so
42:29
much I shouldn't think there are many
42:32
people in this room for whom that would
42:34
still be true but
42:35
then it was true prayers are said five
42:38
times a day
42:38
that's another non moral statement
42:41
that's false in our culture but there
42:43
are cultures in which it is true
42:45
so that's cultural relativism so there
42:49
are statements the truth of which is our
42:51
relative to cultures and you can believe
42:54
that moral statements are true only
42:56
relative to individuals so and you
42:59
Madame what's your name yes in the nice
43:02
screen Sybil do you like sardines no how
43:08
can you not like sorry sorry dishes
43:11
I love sardines so sardines are tasty is
43:15
true for me and false for Sybil straight
43:19
for when we're not going to argue about
43:20
that because what makes it true that
43:23
sardines are tasty for me is a personal
43:25
preference isn't it what makes it false
43:28
that sardines are tasty is true for
43:30
Sybil it is another personal preference
43:33
Sybil doesn't like sardines I do so
43:36
sardines are tasty is true for me
43:38
and false for Sybil again perfectly
43:41
standard right no I said these are non
43:46
moral examples okay so red is the most
43:49
beautiful color what's your name Volker
43:53
okay do you like red best I'm very glad
43:57
about that okay okay I do yes so red is
44:01
the most beautiful color is true for me
44:03
and false for Fulco okay so again now
44:08
these are statements that are true
44:10
relative to individuals and you're a
44:13
moral relative or an individual moral
44:16
relativist
44:17
if you believe that moral statements are
44:19
true only in relation to individuals so
44:22
abortion might be right for me but wrong
44:24
for you you might say or you can believe
44:28
that moral statements are true only
44:30
relative to situations so lying is wrong
44:34
is true in some contexts and false in
44:37
others I'm using context and situation
44:39
they're in interchangeably so that's
44:43
perhaps reason to think that again we
44:46
you were right to think the same thing
44:49
but yes it's cold here well that might
44:52
be true here but not true where you are
44:56
okay so lots of different types of moral
44:59
relativism there are also different
45:01
types of absolutism but we haven't
45:03
looked at any yet we will in a minute
45:05
okay let's do another little put up your
45:08
hand if you're a moral relativist cor
45:14
lummy
45:15
right okay that's nearly all of you
45:18
there are a couple who didn't have their
45:19
hands up that doesn't surprise me okay
45:23
now I want to know why ooh you've
45:31
suddenly gone quiet well a separate from
45:38
ethics anything moral is to do with
45:40
custom and therefore it's bound to be
45:42
really do right okay there's Erica's
45:45
answer does anyone else have an answer
45:47
what absolutely saw something on the
45:52
moral absence is there an eye level by
45:55
definition moral relativist good
45:58
question and I'm going to give you two
46:00
answers the first one I'm going to give
46:02
you now and it's looking at the way I've
46:04
defined it which I said that an
46:09
absolutist hang on yeah I broke my thumb
46:16
recently and the one thing I can't do is
46:17
turn pages okay an absolutist at least
46:27
one moral statement is absolutely true
46:35
relativist all moral statements are true
46:43
only relative to something or other okay
46:51
so you tell me look at the logical words
46:54
here you're doing philosophy now so
46:56
you've got to look at the logical words
46:57
at least one and all so you're an
47:01
absolute
47:02
if you believe at least one moral
47:05
statement is absolutely true and you're
47:07
a relativist if you believe that all
47:09
moral statements are true only relative
47:12
to something rather so can you be both a
47:16
moral absolutist and a relativist no not
47:21
not so far we will have a look later on
47:24
it why it's so tempting to want to be to
47:28
say that you might be both and it would
47:32
be like saying everybody in this room is
47:36
clever and then later on I say folker
47:40
isn't clever sorry forgive me Folker
47:42
this is okay I've contradicted myself
47:46
haven't I I must have done because if
47:48
all of you are P then it can't be the
47:52
case that one of you isn't P can it
47:56
right good let's establish that nothing
48:00
like a bit of logic right we still
48:03
haven't got any answers from you though
48:04
I'm just about to carry on moving okay
48:08
what what why coming Ural you're all
48:10
clear that your moral relativists I want
48:12
to know why if you don't believe this
48:25
God do you think I was some tiny
48:28
possibility Mike you think Oh God right
48:36
okay so where you're arguing from
48:39
exhaustion you you've had a look at all
48:41
the moral statements you can think of in
48:42
your mind you can't see any of them that
48:45
are absolutely true and therefore you're
48:47
inclined to think you're probably a
48:49
relativist none of them passed the test
48:52
okay
48:53
I should imagine that quite a few of you
48:56
think exactly that any other arguments
48:58
for moral relativism of some kind
49:04
and generally good
49:12
you use the word instances would you
49:14
change it for one of two other words
49:16
that we've used in this context I'm
49:19
putting you on the spot here and that's
49:20
rather not very fair okay certain
49:24
situations or contexts exactly so so
49:27
usually we'd say it's wrong to kill but
49:30
you can imagine you're saying contexts
49:32
or situations in which it wouldn't be
49:34
wrong to kill and I think we probably
49:36
could all imagine such situations so do
49:40
you see that you're using dances
49:44
argument actually aren't you to say that
49:46
the rule don't kill is not a moral
49:49
absolute good okay so you're going
49:53
something for situation relativism
49:55
aren't you you're saying that moral
49:58
rules are nowhere always and everywhere
50:00
true because there are always situations
50:03
in which they're false okay it can't be
50:22
both wrong
50:22
and right to kill and if you're in a
50:26
situation where it looks as if you ought
50:27
to kill someone it it looks as if that's
50:32
a situation where it's not wrong to kill
50:35
that person doesn't it and well if you
50:41
if you have where if I put my pen
50:51
we've often got different reasons for
50:54
doing the same thing but if you say okay
50:59
here this is the class of actions that
51:01
are killings okay
51:03
each one of these is a killing if you
51:06
say all killings all killing is wrong
51:10
then you're saying of each of those that
51:13
it's wrong okay then you come to this
51:15
one and you think Oh actually I ought to
51:20
do this unless I kill Sibyl a bomb is
51:24
going to go off that'll kill everybody
51:25
in continuing educational or worse
51:28
everybody in Oxford University I mean
51:31
obviously she's got to go hasn't she
51:38
done doesn't this mean that even if all
51:42
these are still wrong this one is a
51:45
killing that isn't wrong oh okay
51:51
you wouldn't necessary well maybe you
51:53
would serve us right you could say that
51:55
it's wrong what we could actually use
51:58
priorities here couldn't we
52:09
this is a continent of what just happens
52:13
well it's true that no utilitarian is
52:18
going to accept that because a
52:20
utilitarian won't because he would think
52:24
that if a killing produced the greatest
52:26
happiness of the greatest number as I'm
52:27
sorry simple this one would then it
52:32
wouldn't be wrong but I'm still i I
52:36
think you could still think whether you
52:40
can think something is wrong and still
52:43
do it is a question that we're going to
52:46
be looking at later in the and still
52:48
think you should do it sorry
52:49
is a question we'll be looking at later
52:50
when we do can't yes I'm not sure well
53:04
child and incest yeah so you're inclined
53:16
to absolutism you you think that you
53:19
think that we shouldn't have sex with
53:22
children is a moral absolute okay I mean
53:28
there might be some people who are
53:29
inclined to agree with that but whether
53:33
it's an absolute as another question one
53:36
more and then I'm moving on has to be
53:41
well usually it can be a general rule
53:43
but some well argued reason for breaking
53:46
their general well again let's go back
53:50
to the distinction I made earlier
53:52
between a rule of thumb and an absolute
53:55
and absolute is a rule that is
53:57
unbreakable you don't break it in any
54:00
situation it holds in every situation a
54:04
rule of thumb is a so this is my broken
54:09
thumb a rule of thumb is one that when
54:14
you get to it
54:15
usually you would fall it maybe you
54:18
would follow it every single time in
54:20
your life but you can imagine that a
54:22
time would come when actually it
54:23
wouldn't told and when you should break
54:26
it and if you believe that then you
54:30
believe it's a rule of thumb not a not
54:33
an absolute okay so if you think you
54:36
usually shouldn't kill people then you
54:39
don't think all killing is wrong you're
54:42
not an absolutist about killing you use
54:44
you have a rule of thumb or at least I
54:46
hope you do but killing is wrong on the
54:49
whole you wouldn't kill anyone but but
54:51
you can imagine a situation where maybe
54:53
killing would be the right thing to do
54:56
perhaps the simple one is the one in
54:59
point okay and you still haven't given
55:03
me many arguments but luckily I prepared
55:05
a few myself earlier okay here are some
55:08
arguments for moral relativism and some
55:12
people believe that we should be
55:15
relativists because all moral views
55:17
should be respected so if you believe
55:20
that abortion is right and I believe
55:22
that abortion is wrong I must respect
55:25
your view and think that abortion is
55:27
right for you and wrong for me so that's
55:30
why we might be relativists all we might
55:33
think well different people differ in
55:35
their moral beliefs so you think
55:37
abortion is right so this is getting to
55:40
be a bit of a hackneyed example isn't it
55:41
okay
55:42
you think killing is right and I think
55:44
killing is wrong and you know it's
55:47
entirely up to you so you know you you
55:49
carry on believing what you believe so
55:51
we become individual relativists at this
55:54
point all we think that different
55:56
cultures different differ in their moral
55:59
beliefs so the Somalians I understand
56:02
believe that female circumcision is
56:04
right in England we tend not to think
56:07
that but but who are we to say that the
56:11
Somalians are wrong you know they're
56:13
right for them we're right for us and so
56:16
on and the last one that you did give me
56:19
different situation make different moral
56:22
demands on us so
56:24
these are all arguments people have
56:26
given me at different times for being
56:28
moral relativists let's have a look at
56:31
each of them
56:32
so there okay the first argument it's
56:39
actually self-defeating it's logically
56:41
self-defeating it tries to derive moral
56:45
relativism from a moral absolute so for
56:48
example all moral truths should be
56:51
respected
56:52
therefore moral relativism is true I got
56:57
a problem here haven't you because if
56:58
you think of that as always and
57:02
everywhere true then that's false and if
57:06
you think of that as true then that's
57:09
not always and everywhere true is it so
57:13
one or the other of those has to be
57:15
false and you've defeated yourself in
57:19
this argument this is a you may have
57:22
heard of philosopher called Burton
57:23
Bernard Williams he calls this vulgar
57:28
relativism and he has a very very short
57:30
very pithy piece that if you want to
57:35
read email me and I'll pass it on to you
57:37
but it's he calls it vulgar relativism
57:40
you cannot go from the belief that all
57:43
moral beliefs should be respected or on
57:45
all moral truths should be respected I
57:47
should have put beliefs in there that's
57:49
really irritating in all your out
57:53
handouts would you cross that out and
57:56
put beliefs rather than truths because
57:59
I'm angry with myself for putting that
58:01
there
58:04
otherwise it's it is the argument known
58:07
as moral vulgar relativism okay so
58:10
that's the farts first argument here's
58:12
the second argument different people
58:15
differ in their moral believes well yes
58:19
but this assimilates moral statements
58:21
the statements of personal preference so
58:24
um it was Sybil who doesn't like
58:27
sardines strangely and I do you know she
58:32
has one personal preference I have
58:34
another but
58:35
if Sybil said to me well I don't like I
58:37
don't like kindness I would think hey I
58:43
think oh she's trying to be clever here
58:45
or something like that I wouldn't
58:47
actually believe her or if I did believe
58:49
her I'd shun her and so would you
58:52
because actually morality matters to us
58:54
far more doesn't it than whether people
58:57
like sardines and so on Volker you a
59:00
name may argue over the painting of a
59:02
room so you don't want it red and I
59:06
obviously do it being the most beautiful
59:08
color but unless we're painting a room
59:11
together you're quite happy to let me
59:13
have red as my favorite color I assume
59:14
thank you
59:16
the other thing is that if you say well
59:20
okay I think abortions wrong you think
59:23
it's right actually if I think abortion
59:27
is wrong and you think it's right your
59:31
belief contradicts mine they cannot both
59:34
be true one or the other of them must be
59:39
false so I'm sorry one or the other must
59:43
be false unless we're going to
59:45
relativize truth but why should we
59:48
relativize truth just because we don't
59:50
want to say that other people are wrong
59:52
and isn't that again going back to to
59:55
this all moral views should be respected
59:57
all moral truths
59:58
sorry beliefs should be respected we'll
60:01
have a look at that again in a minute it
60:04
would be just a quick one possible to
60:05
run society on the scene well let me
60:12
give you a good example of that cuz I
60:13
was just about to anyway tell me what
60:15
would happen if you couldn't expect most
60:18
people to tell the truth most of the
60:19
time what would happen if you couldn't
60:24
think okay Erica says chaos why would it
60:27
be chaos if you couldn't expect most
60:30
people to tell the truth most of the
60:31
time why would that be difficult why
60:35
couldn't you run society
60:38
sorry you're all shouting at once now it
60:53
would break down and it would break down
60:55
because we couldn't trust each other so
60:58
if I say to what's your name hey Jane
61:01
what's on the cinema tonight and you say
61:03
the King's Speech and I take a jolly
61:05
good and then I think no hang on do I
61:08
trust Jane well in the first case if
61:11
she's taught me the truth and I've saved
61:13
my time and energy haven't I I don't
61:16
don't now have to look it up on the web
61:17
myself if I suddenly lose trust in her
61:21
I've actually wasted my time and energy
61:23
by asking her haven't I
61:25
there was no point in asking her because
61:27
if I can't trust what she says to me and
61:29
think about this as well
61:31
lying is parasitic upon truth-telling in
61:35
order to lie successfully to you I've
61:38
got to get you to trust we haven't I
61:40
it's absolutely essential that you
61:43
believe me if I'm to lie successfully to
61:46
so if I'm a dishonest person I'm not
61:49
going to go around lying all the time on
61:51
the country it's in my interest to tell
61:54
the truth as much as I possibly can so
61:57
that you build up a trust in me the
61:59
difference between someone who's
62:01
dishonest and someone who's honest is
62:03
that the dishonest person is constantly
62:06
waiting for an opportunity we're not
62:09
telling you something untrue would be of
62:12
benefit to them and they won't be found
62:14
out that's the difference
62:17
III didn't hear that and I'm not going
62:20
to ask for it to be repeated but I'm
62:21
sure it but I'm glad you all enjoyed it
62:24
okay so yeah the difference between a
62:29
dishonest and honest person not that one
62:32
tells the truth all the time and the
62:34
other doesn't I think that answers your
62:37
question about that's why society so
62:40
personal preferences don't really matter
62:43
and that's why we call them personal
62:45
preferences people are entitled to their
62:47
own personal preferences but morality
62:50
really
62:51
matters without people following rules
62:54
like don't lie don't kill etc we society
62:59
would collapse I mean we still haven't
63:02
said anything about whether they're
63:03
absolutely true or only rules of thumb
63:05
at that point but the rules are
63:07
necessary and also it ignores the
63:10
possibility of moral error the fact that
63:13
you know okay
63:15
Sybil's wrong to not like sardines
63:17
obviously and you might be wrong to
63:21
think abortion is right or is wrong or
63:25
whatever it was okay let's look at the
63:27
third argument which different cultures
63:29
differ in their moral belief this
63:32
ignores the possibility that different
63:34
circumstances might generate different
63:35
beliefs have we got any biologists in
63:38
the audience not not a one okay
63:43
nevermind I don't think this question is
63:44
going to be difficult for even none
63:46
biologists if I have two genetically
63:48
identical seeds and I put one in John
63:51
Innes number three seed compost or
63:53
whatever it is and I water it just the
63:57
right amount and I put it on my
63:58
windowsill but I shield it from the
64:01
direct sunlight and so on and the other
64:03
one I stick in some garden soil and put
64:05
in the airing cupboard and water it just
64:07
enough to keep it alive but I don't do
64:09
anything else are they going to look
64:10
very alike after about six weeks they're
64:15
not going to look alike at all are they
64:16
does this stop them being genetically
64:18
identical no of course it doesn't
64:22
because nature and nurture go together
64:25
to make up what the plant looks like
64:26
after six weeks in the same way you
64:30
might have different circumstances the
64:33
inuit i believe there was a time when
64:35
they believe that their elderly should
64:37
be gently put to death and just allowed
64:42
to slip under the ice well we don't
64:45
believe that we keep ours alive as all
64:47
as possible you might think that we're
64:49
wrong in this but but anyway and perhaps
64:52
if we lived where they lived when they
64:54
lived there we would think that they
64:58
were doing that that we should do what
65:01
you do in other words we can understand
65:03
what they're doing is there a
65:05
higher-order value perhaps that we can
65:09
see the Inuit observing that we to
65:12
observe do you see what I mean but in
65:15
different circumstances generate very
65:19
different behaviors so respect the
65:22
elderly perhaps care for the elderly or
65:25
whatever might come out in two very
65:27
different behaviors in very different
65:29
circumstances and again the possibility
65:33
of error is a problem if you're going to
65:36
say that the fat Somalians believe that
65:39
female circumcision is acceptable and we
65:41
believe it isn't but they're right and
65:46
we're rights you know relativism holds
65:48
that means we can't turn around to a
65:50
culture and say you're wrong because you
65:55
can't if you can only be wrong within
65:57
your own culture okay it makes no sense
66:00
to say of another culture that it's
66:03
wrong if cultural relativism holds and
66:08
just there's another the second third
66:12
arguments might rest on a confusion
66:14
between P and believing P and I do like
66:18
to get logical blunders ask away so let
66:21
me give you a demonstration okay what's
66:26
your name John the last two times I've
66:31
asked who's called John and nobody has
66:33
put their hand up it's sods law that
66:36
there should be a John sitting in the
66:37
third row there so okay John believes
66:42
that Marianne is wearing black is that
66:50
true okay notice that there's one
66:54
sentence embedded in another sentence
66:57
okay Mary Ann is wearing black is one
67:01
sentence that's the embedded sentence
67:03
and John believes that Mary Ann is
67:06
wearing black is an embedding sentence
67:09
okay
67:10
and going back to look at facts that
67:13
make it true what's this fact that makes
67:15
the hot the embedding sentence true John
67:19
believes that Mary Ann's wearing black
67:23
well no it's his belief it's a fact
67:28
about John isn't it that makes it true
67:30
that John believes that man's wearing
67:32
black we don't know what sort of fact it
67:34
is this is this is difficult stuff but
67:36
doesn't matter we can just say it's
67:38
because John believes that Mary Ann's
67:40
wearing black that that sentence is true
67:43
what makes the embedded sentence true
67:46
Mary Ann is wearing black as as people
67:50
said okay now let me ask you quitting is
67:53
it possible that that's true and that's
67:55
false
67:57
yeah okay John might have a false belief
68:00
it might actually be dark blue or it
68:03
might be that the Lighting's weird here
68:05
or something like that okay could they
68:07
both be false yeah yeah maybe he does
68:12
hasn't formed any beliefs he meant to
68:14
come to this lecture but actually didn't
68:15
so he hasn't formed any beliefs about
68:17
what I'm wearing and I'm not wearing
68:20
black because it's actually dark blue
68:21
okay so they could both be false could
68:24
they both be true actually that's
68:28
probably as the current situation isn't
68:30
it it's true that john believes Marian's
68:32
wearing black and it's also true that
68:33
Mary Ann's wearing black and now I can't
68:35
remember which the fourth possibility is
68:37
but which is it that would be false and
68:42
that would be true okay could is that
68:45
possible of course it is because John
68:48
might not have come here today he may
68:50
have decided and says form no beliefs at
68:52
all about what I'm wearing and but it's
68:55
still true that I am wearing black okay
68:58
so the important thing to realize is
69:00
that the truth value of the embedded
69:02
sentence and the embedding sentence
69:04
value completed very completely
69:07
independently of each other now let's
69:11
have a look at okay if I say if I now
69:16
look say
69:18
Maryann is wearing black is true for
69:26
John okay that's ambiguous it could just
69:33
mean john believes Marian's wearing
69:35
black or it could be that Marian's
69:38
wearing black is true for him I mean
69:42
actually we don't like to think of that
69:44
because whether I'm wearing black seems
69:46
to be an objective fact about the world
69:48
not anything that could be made true by
69:51
his believing it but so P is morally
69:58
acceptable for s is ambiguous it could
70:01
mean S believes piers morally acceptable
70:03
or P is morally acceptable for s let's
70:08
have a look at a couple of examples
70:10
mugging elderly ladies is morally
70:13
acceptable for Fred okay
70:16
that could mean Fred believes that
70:18
mugging elderly ladies is morally
70:20
acceptable or it could mean that mugging
70:23
elderly ladies is morally acceptable for
70:26
Fred now the first of these Fred
70:30
believes that mugging elderly ladies is
70:33
morally acceptable
70:34
well that's unremarkable isn't it I mean
70:37
poor old Fred may have had the sort of
70:39
upbringing in which he ended up
70:40
believing that we might want to put him
70:44
in prison because of it but we're not
70:46
going to deny that he believes it the
70:48
fact he's been out doing it every night
70:50
for the last three weeks shows that he
70:53
believes it so this is this is not
70:56
written not remarkable at all but
70:58
mugging elderly ladies is morally
71:01
acceptable for Fred well this is
71:04
individual relativism okay this is a
71:07
completely different kettle of fish
71:10
if we believe this and Fred Muggs and
71:13
elderly lady in front of us this means
71:16
we've got to stand back because even if
71:18
mugging elderly ladies is morally
71:20
acceptable for unacceptable rather for
71:22
us for Fred it's morally acceptable so
71:27
just as I won't engage Sybil in
71:29
arguments about whether sardines
71:31
taystee because I'm quite happy to say
71:33
that they're tasty for me but not tasty
71:35
for you if mugging elderly ladies is
71:37
okay for you but not for me and I accept
71:39
that then if you go and mug an elderly
71:41
lady I'm supposed to stand back and say
71:43
I wouldn't do it but for him it's fine
71:48
that's what I meant about it doesn't
71:50
take account of moral error if you're an
71:54
individual relativist you believe the
71:57
truth of mugging elderly ladies is okay
72:00
the truth of mugging elderly ladies is
72:03
okay is relative to individuals so it
72:07
might be true for you for me and false
72:09
for you and that's how it is not not
72:14
just you believe it's okay it is okay
72:20
very different kettle of fish now I
72:23
think I had another example now I didn't
72:26
the other example I was going to use was
72:28
a cultural one it was the Aztecs
72:30
believed fought for the Aztecs killing
72:32
children is morally acceptable okay does
72:36
this mean that the Aztecs believes that
72:39
killing children is morally acceptable
72:40
or does it mean that killing children is
72:43
morally acceptable for the Aztecs surely
72:46
it only means the first it doesn't mean
72:49
the second it doesn't mean that they
72:51
were okay to kill children when they did
72:54
it it just meant that they believed
72:56
which is nothing very interesting well
73:01
I'm sorry it isn't if it is interesting
73:03
if especially if you're archaeologists
73:04
and so on and anthropologists so what
73:08
I'm asking is should we believe that
73:09
mugging elderly ladies is morally
73:11
acceptable for Fred simply because we
73:13
believe that Fred believes that mugging
73:15
elderly ladies is morally acceptable
73:17
blindingly obviously we shouldn't
73:20
instead we should say fred is wrong this
73:26
is the argument we can then make against
73:28
stoning adulterers we can certainly say
73:33
that Sistani adulterers is wrong you
73:35
mean yes absolutely we don't say stoning
73:38
adulterers you know where you believe
73:40
stoning adulterers is okay we don't
73:42
believe Soni adulterers is okay but
73:44
morality is cult
73:45
really relative so that's okay you carry
73:47
on mate cultures believe that it's
73:49
acceptable to stone adulteress but I
73:52
guess most of us here wouldn't and I've
73:55
always found it difficult to make that
73:56
argument but this this is the argument
73:59
you now can make against that well and
74:03
perhaps I'll come back to what you're
74:05
saying
74:06
later on we're actually running out of
74:08
time let me move on but I but I think I
74:10
will address that just want to move on
74:12
we've looked at the first three
74:13
arguments for moral relativism now let's
74:17
look at the fourth do you remember that
74:18
was different situations make different
74:21
demands the fourth argument assumes that
74:24
the only form of moral absolutism on
74:27
offer is what I'm going to call lower
74:29
order absolutism and here the only form
74:32
candidates for moral absolutes are
74:35
everyday whoops
74:36
everyday moral rules like don't lie tell
74:39
the truth etc actually there are three
74:42
types of absolutism so-called law lower
74:46
order absolutism higher order and token
74:49
absolutism let's have a look at them
74:51
okay that I think that's fairly
74:54
straightforward
74:55
okay here's higher order absolutism oops
75:00
yes okay if you're a particular issue
75:03
deny lower order moral absolutism you
75:05
don't think that things like don't like
75:08
eat promises are everywhere and always
75:10
true you think they're rules of thumb
75:13
okay higher order absolutism is the
75:16
belief that moral absolutes are rules
75:18
like this produce the greatest happiness
75:21
of the greatest number that's the
75:22
utilitarian rule or treat others as ends
75:25
in themselves
75:26
that's the downto logical moral rule
75:28
we'll be looking at both of these later
75:30
on but can you see these are completely
75:33
different sorts of moral rules and
75:35
whereas don't lie keep promises are very
75:37
good school rules aren't they these
75:39
lousy school rules I mean you wouldn't
75:42
have those up in the hall saying
75:44
everyone's got to obey those because
75:45
you'd have everyone going hey and as
75:49
somebody that said earlier in connection
75:52
to virtue theory well what is a virtuous
75:54
person you might ask
75:57
unsuitable for school others well
76:01
because there's there not many 11-year
76:03
olds who would know what it would be to
76:04
be an end in themselves yes but you
76:08
don't want set rules that are only going
76:10
to be obeyed or understood by the sixth
76:12
formers anyway the the higher order
76:18
absolutism is the belief that these are
76:20
moral absolutes and token absolutism is
76:24
the belief that moral absolutes are
76:26
imperatives about token actions okay
76:29
type token distinction if I wrote wrote
76:32
on the board let me do it where's my pen
76:45
the name of a well-known pop group well
76:50
known to anyone of our age anyway um I
76:53
apologize to anyone who's younger okay
76:57
how many letters have I written down
77:00
here you could answer four or you could
77:04
answer to and if you answer for you're
77:08
looking at token letters and if you
77:11
answer to you're looking at type letters
77:15
okay I pinch static I pinched that
77:19
example from Peter Milliken by the way
77:24
another famous philosopher Oxford
77:26
University okay you can do like this too
77:29
I'm the token human being okay there's a
77:31
type of thing a human being I'm a token
77:35
you're a token you're a token you're a
77:37
token okay there are lots of chairs in
77:39
this room that are all of a type but
77:43
that's a token one of those chairs okay
77:47
so you can be a token absolutist it
77:50
would be wrong to tell that lie you
77:53
might think or you must keep that
77:56
promise so you're not an absolutist
77:59
about all lies but when it comes to a
78:02
particular lie you are so let's let's
78:06
move on higher order absolutism and
78:09
can absolutely and go together if it's
78:12
absolutely true that we ought to produce
78:15
the greatest happiness of the greatest
78:16
number or treat others as ends then it's
78:20
going to be absolutely true in any given
78:22
situation that we should perform
78:25
whichever action produces the greatest
78:28
happiness the rest number or treats
78:30
others as ends so the Nazis are at the
78:32
door where are the Jews they say and you
78:38
could tell them where the Jews are but
78:40
you think actually my aim my job is to
78:44
produce the greatest happiness greatest
78:45
number in this situation it will only
78:48
produce the greatest happiness of the
78:50
greatest number if I say there aren't
78:53
any Jews here so telling that lie there
78:57
aren't any Jews here at this occasion in
79:00
this context in this situation is the
79:03
right thing to do do you see what I mean
79:06
higher order absolutism and token
79:09
absolutism go together even if don't lie
79:15
is nothing more than a rule of thumb and
79:20
higher order absolutism and token
79:23
absolutism together may explain firstly
79:26
why lower order rules are not absolutely
79:28
true and also why lower order rules are
79:31
important here's the first one low order
79:35
rules are not absolutely true because if
79:37
telling a lie in a given situation
79:39
wouldn't promote the greatest happiness
79:41
the greatest number or respect others as
79:45
ends then we ought not to tell it but if
79:48
it would promote the greatest happiness
79:50
greatest number or respect others as
79:52
ends then we ought to tell it so why is
79:57
don't lie nothing more than a rule of
80:00
thumb okay why is it sometimes true and
80:02
sometimes not true answer because the
80:05
thing that's always and everywhere true
80:07
is we should produce the race happiness
80:10
aggress number and sometime or mostly
80:13
lying doesn't SPRO deuce the grace
80:16
happiness the grace number but in this
80:18
situation it does therefore we should
80:21
tell this lie so
80:23
so higher-order absolutism plus token
80:26
absolutism explain why lower order
80:30
absolutism is false and lower order
80:36
rules are important because if we see
80:38
many situations in which token lies are
80:41
absolutely wrong okay so mostly lying is
80:45
wrong isn't it
80:46
and only a few where they're absolutely
80:48
right then don't lie becomes a useful
80:51
rule of thumb doesn't it um where we go
80:55
wrong is in thinking that it's
80:57
absolutely true
80:58
not in thinking that it's generally true
81:01
usually true that that is true sorry
81:06
and another reason we might think of low
81:09
order rules as important is that when we
81:11
were children we were all taught lower
81:13
order moral rules as if they were
81:14
absolutes tell me why it makes life easy
81:21
doesn't it and I said we don't say
81:24
darling you know what you've got to do
81:26
is produce the greatest happiness of
81:27
grace number what yours are darling
81:29
don't tell lies and of course when your
81:33
child catches you lying the first time
81:36
says mummy you just lied and at that
81:40
point you sort of backpedal don't you
81:42
quite quickly and and you explain to the
81:45
child's that lower order moral rules are
81:48
da da da da
81:49
so our discovery that the rules we were
81:53
taught as absolutes aren't absolutes
81:57
causes us to think the standard view the
82:01
knee-jerk view the view of authority if
82:04
you like is that the low order moral
82:07
rules are absolutes rather than just
82:10
that that's what we were taught when we
82:12
were children and for the obvious and
82:15
very good reasons
82:16
so not only might we be absolutists
82:20
while accepting that no order moral
82:22
rules are not absolutely true we also
82:24
might think that absolutism explains why
82:26
lower order moral rules are not
82:29
absolutely true
82:32
at this point we've got five minutes
82:35
left and I'm quite tempted to just
82:37
finish there and have five minutes for
82:40
question what I was going to go on to do
82:42
is distinguish two different types of
82:46
absolutism from different types of
82:49
relativism and then I was going to give
82:52
what I think is a psychological process
82:54
by which people come to believe that
82:58
their relativists but I can do that or I
83:03
can have a question or answer session
83:05
who would like the question-and-answer
83:06
session do put your hands up don't be or
83:12
at just signaled to me like that if you
83:13
don't want to put your hands okay who
83:16
would like me to go on oh right
83:20
I'll go on then even though I can hardly
83:22
speak anymore right ah it would bring
83:30
the greatest happiness of the greatest
83:31
number okay it's important to
83:33
distinguish token absolutism from both
83:35
individual relativism and situation
83:38
relativism okay what I mean by that
83:39
let's have a look and instantly I just
83:42
want to say if your mind is buzzing now
83:44
for a start it's not buzzing any more
83:47
than mine is and secondly that's
83:49
entirely to be expected I can't teach
83:52
you these things all I can do is put
83:54
them in front of you you've now got to
83:56
go home and do the thinking for yourself
83:59
okay you've got to go back have a look
84:01
at your notes think about what I've said
84:02
and see why what I've said make sense
84:06
you might disagree with what I said and
84:08
that's absolutely fine but but you need
84:11
to go and do the thinking for yourself
84:13
before you're in a position to see
84:15
whether you agree with me or not but
84:17
let's have let's distinguish these
84:20
things
84:20
okay mugging Mabel Smith at 5:30 on
84:23
Tuesday the 6th of December 9 2009 was
84:26
wrong that's a token moral statement
84:29
it's a moral statement about a token
84:31
action see what I mean token absolutism
84:36
says if this statement is true it's true
84:38
absolutely ok anyone who thinks it's
84:42
false is wrong ok
84:45
a so if you believe that you believe it
84:49
as an absolutist okay
84:53
a situation sorry an individual
84:55
relativist believes that even if this
84:57
statement is true it's only true in
85:00
relation to individuals so there might
85:03
be people Fred for example for whom it's
85:06
false and this doesn't just mean that
85:09
there are people who believe it's false
85:11
but that there are people for whom it is
85:14
false perhaps the person who mugged
85:18
Mabel Smith de dar de dar maybe we
85:21
should let him off because if we accept
85:24
the individual relativism then it wasn't
85:26
wrong for him to do it and what right
85:29
have we got to punish him for something
85:31
that wasn't wrong so that's token
85:34
absolutism
85:35
that's individual relativism don't
85:37
confuse the two because if you do you
85:40
might think that you're an individual
85:42
relativist whereas what you actually are
85:44
as a token absolutist and of course it
85:47
is very important as you know to get
85:49
these things right don't know why you're
85:53
laughing it's huge okay distinguishing
85:57
token absolutism from situation
85:59
relativism token absolutism claims that
86:02
lower order moral rules are only rules
86:05
of thumb okay so lying is wrong
86:08
perfectly good rule it's one that I used
86:11
myself all the time if I see an action I
86:13
see it as a lie I am inclined to think
86:16
it's wrong because I think that most
86:18
lies are wrong so as a token absolutist
86:23
if I am I'm not telling you that I'm
86:24
just putting it too there are only rules
86:28
of thumb so even if most lies are on
86:30
there can be token lies perhaps that the
86:32
Jews are not here that are right
86:35
situation relativism claims that lower
86:38
order moral rules are true only in
86:40
relation to situations so in situation s
86:43
lying is wrong
86:45
whereas in situation s star lying isn't
86:48
wrong it's actually difficult to know
86:51
what that means does that mean you can
86:53
tell any lie you like in situation s
86:57
here's a situation that is characterized
87:00
by the fact that lying in this situation
87:02
isn't wrong
87:04
it isn't that lying to say that the
87:06
Nazis that throw the Jews aren't here
87:08
isn't wrong it's to say lying isn't
87:11
wrong in this situation something odd
87:14
there isn't that again I'll leave you
87:17
two to think about that here's the
87:19
process now you're getting very jerky
87:23
about your parking meter aren't you are
87:25
try and move quickly okay I think that
87:27
our knee-jerk moral relativism is a
87:29
combination of several of the errors
87:31
that we've examined and often the result
87:34
of the following process this is the
87:36
process and I'm going to go through it
87:38
so I'm not going to give you time to
87:39
read that but I am going to go discuss
87:42
each of those briefly right abortion is
87:46
wrong is controversial isn't it I mean
87:48
we all accept that this is it some
87:51
people believe this some people don't
87:52
believe this and so on best explanation
87:55
I believe of this is that abortion is
87:57
wrong as a rule of thumb okay it's
88:00
generated by beliefs about whether
88:01
abortion promotes the greatest happiness
88:03
greatest number or treats others as ends
88:05
and so on and so on but but the fact is
88:09
it is controversial some people believe
88:11
it some people don't you might think
88:14
well actually nobody needs to believe it
88:16
as an absolute perhaps we can all
88:18
believe it as a as a rule of thumb
88:23
anyway respect for each other leads to
88:27
reluctance to disagree oh dear
88:29
civil thinks that abortion is wrong and
88:31
I think it's right and but dear old
88:34
Sybil she's nice old bat and sorry
88:37
that's what I used to call my mum superb
88:41
it was meant very affectionately well
88:46
hang on a second what we've got here
88:49
what seems to be vulgar relativism
88:50
because actually I don't think that
88:53
disagreeing that somebody is a sign of
88:55
respect if you say P and I believe not P
88:59
actually I show my respect for you by
89:01
saying oh that's interesting you believe
89:04
P I believe not P maybe I'm wrong why do
89:08
you believe P tell me
89:11
reasons and I'll tell you my reasons for
89:13
believing not Pia maybe we'll both
89:15
discover that we're wrong or maybe we'll
89:17
discover that you are right and I am
89:19
wrong on or maybe so how can it possibly
89:22
be disrespectful to disagree with
89:25
someone it may be disrespectful we may
89:28
agree with them in a way that
89:30
disrespects them but it doesn't
89:33
disrespect somebody just to disagree
89:35
with them does it so I that's the second
89:40
move in the process third one is that
89:43
okay having done this having said that I
89:45
respects it with Sybil therefore I'm not
89:47
going to argue with her abortion must be
89:49
right for you and wrong for me or the
89:51
other way around I can't remember what I
89:53
said before but it doesn't matter
89:55
so here can you see that the logical
89:57
blunder threatens now I I'm thinking
90:01
that well okay Sybil believes that
90:04
abortion is wrong I believe that
90:05
abortion is right but that's merely a
90:07
statement about what we believe not
90:09
about the truth of our beliefs so why do
90:12
we go the extra step and and in doing so
90:17
become individual relativists third move
90:20
we accept lower order relativism okay
90:24
abortion is wrong is true only relative
90:27
to individuals did I okay so so we go
90:33
from the unremarkable belief that I
90:35
believe abortion is wrong you believe
90:37
abortion is right to the relativistic
90:39
belief abortion is wrong for you and
90:41
abortion is right for me and actually if
90:44
you think about it both of these are
90:46
hugely controversial because even if I
90:49
accept that abortion is right for me and
90:53
I would certainly think that there are
90:55
times when it wasn't right if I if I
90:57
choose to have an abortion at eight and
90:59
a half months because I want to go on
91:00
holiday you know is abortion right for
91:04
me then well surely not it seems is
91:08
wrong for me then and as I would think
91:10
it is four or Cybil might think it is
91:13
for other people and we might then go
91:17
from lower order moral relativism to the
91:19
belief that all moral truth is relative
91:22
either because we're ignorant of or big
91:25
we're ignoring the possibility of higher
91:28
order or token relativism so do you see
91:31
what I've done is I've taken us from a
91:33
through a psychological process by
91:38
several quite easy and easily explained
91:42
steps by how we get to beliefs in
91:46
relativism that are actually not
91:49
justified at all now this is not to say
91:52
and I think I've finished that ok we'll
91:56
come back to that in a minute this is
91:58
not to say that moral relativism can't
92:01
be a much more sophisticated position
92:04
that has a fighting chance of being
92:07
right I mean I don't think it's right
92:09
but then that's me and but there are
92:11
other good philosophers who think that
92:13
moral relativism is true but not in
92:16
these crude forms okay what I want you
92:20
to do if you can if you've got time if
92:22
you haven't it does matter
92:24
go home look at your handout work
92:26
through what I've said and see if you
92:29
can see where the errors come in that'll
92:32
do you that's all you need to do ok I
92:35
just like to take a straw poll here
92:37
because half the room right should well
92:39
over half the room said that they're
92:40
relativists who now thinks they're a
92:43
relativist oh god this is still quite a
92:47
lot of people ok I think I might offset
92:49
a question again at the beginning of
92:51
next week there's the reading for next
92:54
week so this is for this week's lecture
92:57
ok and yeah it's yes it is yep yep and
93:02
if you'd like to test your understanding
93:04
ask yourself whether you can do those
93:07
questions ok and if you'd like to do
93:10
some reading for next week there's a
93:12
lecture of some reading for next week
93:15
that's it and thank you for this thing
93:18
I'm sorry</p>