Human Factor Question

The ACP under Henry Tizard was charged (by Herbert Morrison) with setting up The Tizard Committee set up to answer the Human Factor Question

A sub-committee of the main committee stated

"current fundamental research in phyical and biological sciences is unlikely . . to have any material short term effect on increasing productivity . . the blunt fact . . is that the problem is essentially psychological in the short term"

Tiratsoo, Nick; Tomlinson, Jim Book Industrial efficiency and state intervention: Labour 1939-51:-

“One decision was to launch a formal investigation into the whole question of the human factor. The origins of this development lay with a committee that Morrison had formed in early 1947. The Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, under Sir Henry Tizard, was charged with finding the 'most appropriate form of research effort to assist the maximum increase in .. . national productivity during, say, the next ten years, including research in natural and social sciences'. The Tizard Committee, as it was popularly known, was not considered to have been very successful in general, but it had come up with one significant finding, that the human factor was extremely important. Indeed, a sub-committee of the main Committee had gone so far as to argue: Current fundamental research in physical and biological sciences is unlikely .. . to have any material short term effect on increasing productivity.... The blunt fact... is that the problem is essentially psychological in the short term.6 Clearly such a conclusion fitted the mood of late 1947 and so Ministers began discussing what it meant in practical terms. Officials reported that quite a number of organisations were already working on aspects of human relations - the Tavistock Institute, the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, etc. - but their efforts tended to be uncoordinated. In these circumstances, Ministers agreed that their best option would be to form 'a good steering body', a central organisation, to be named the Committee on Industrial Productivity, with several offshoots examining specific questions. Crucial amongst the latter would be a panel on human factors, which might be headed by Sir George Schuster.7 Schuster was in agreement with this proposal, and, as the year ended, approached both the FBI and the TUC to gain their co-operation. The TUC was generally acquiescent, though the General Secretary, V. Tewson, emphasised that he did not want all of the emphasis in the new enquiry to be on labour. Nor should public statements on what was intended lend themselves 'to misrepresentations, such as that the workers were to be psychoanalysed'.8 The FBI, on the other hand, was more cautious. It was not prepared to obstruct Schuster in public, but behind the scenes remained highly suspicious. The FBI's leadership felt that it should have been consulted at an earlier stage and did not really like the whole idea anyway. An enquiry might perhaps be useful, but there were great dangers, particularly with the subject Schuster was tackling, 'of doing harm', particularly if 'theorists' became too involved.9

Given this climate of suspicion, those involved in an official capacity clearly felt that it was their duty to 'talk up' the whole project and so, during 1948, both Tizard (by now in charge of the whole CIP exercise) and Schuster were to be heard singing its praises. The former felt that he was directing a 'survey on survival'. Britain must catch up with best overseas practice, or perish: 'We've got to do it quickly, too I've set a time limit of two years. If we haven't got results in that time we shall have failed.' Schuster made much the same kind of point, arguing that something must be done 'to bring the laggards into line': 'You will be starting a new era if you can get British industry to depart from its old traditional methods of secretive individualism and join in co-operative effort.'10 This was a powerful message, and it at first seemed to bring results. Thus, Schuster's panel was quickly operational and boasting a prestigious membership, including L. Russell from the BIM, J. Tanner and E.P. Harries from the TUC, and representatives from the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, the Medical Research Council and the Tavistock Institute.11 This, in turn, allowed a quick start with actual investigations, the majority being joint ventures directed by the panel and carried out by teams of experts drawn from existing organisations.12 Within a relatively short time, therefore, enquiry was being undertaken on such diverse subjects as work load and machine control (involving the Cambridge Psychological Laboratory); morale (involving the Medical Research Council's Industrial Psychology Research Unit); and human relations within particular settings (for example, the Glacier Metal Company project run by the Tavistock Institute).13 This was an impressive performance but, in the end, it proved difficult to sustain. Schuster's relationship with bodies such as the Medical Research Council remained less than easy, complicated by administrative and funding problems.14 Moreover, the condition of the wider CIP organisation continued to be unsatisfactory, undermined by, amongst other things, a rapid turnover of personnel.15 In fact, Tizard's first report was given an almost universally poor reception, with Industry concluding that it did 'not inspire confidence'.16 The final blow to the whole initiative came as a result of the success of the AngloAmerican Council on Productivity: as that body blossomed, the CIP was left requesting its own liquidation, convinced that the work that it had 94 Industrial efficiency and state intervention started could best be finished by others.17 The CIP had bequeathed a legacy of detailed studies and had reinforced some general points about productivity. It could not be said, however, to have galvanised either the public or the two sides of industry.