Active perception and perceiving action : The Shared Circuits Hypothesis - Hurley
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<i>Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing
across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings
of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the </i>
<i><b>shared circuits hypothesis</b></i>
<i>. This hypothesis about subpersonal functional architecture describes a unified
framework for the mechanisms that enable control, imitation, and simulation, which makes
explicit the relationships among them. It should have heuristic value in sharpening up
questions and predictions at both higher, personal and lower, neural levels, while
avoiding over-simple or a priori assumptions of isomorphism between the subpersonal and
personal levels. A striking aspect of the shared circuits hypothesis is the way it
connects a shared information space for action and perception with a shared information
space for self and other, while at the same time illustrating how the distinctions between
self and other, and between the imagined and the real, can be overlaid on these shared
information spaces. In this model information about intentional agents arrives in the
first person plural: without distinction or inference between self and other. The shared
circuits hypothesis also illustrates a horizontally modular architecture: it avoids the
common conception of perception and action as separate and peripheral to central
cognition. Rather, it views perception and action as dynamically co-constituted and shows
how cognitively significant resources, such as distinctions between self and other and
between the imagined and the real, and information for action understanding and planning,
might emerge from the information space that action and perception</i>
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<i>share.</i>
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