Reflexion - Representation de representation
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<i>Reflection</i>
. Issues about reflection merge inherently with those about consciousness and reflective
consciousness. On the one hand, any issue about the
<i>existence</i>
of such reflection is settled by any reflection on the question. On the other hand, a
naturalistic model is much more problematic.
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I will not need and will not assume a full naturalistic model of reflective consciousness
in the following discussion (even though such a model will be offered elsewhere: Bickhard,
in preparation-a; see also Bickhard, in press-a, in press-b, forthcoming). What I will be
making use of is a notion of epistemic reflection: representations of (properties of)
representations.
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This possibility derives readily from the interactive model of representation. Just as a
system can interact with its environment and can represent various things about that
environment, so also can a second level system interact with and represent things about a
first level system. This intuition is developed into a notion of levels of knowing: at
level one, the system interactively represents its environment; at level two, it
interactively represents (properties of) level one; level three represents (properties of)
level two; and so on. Such a hierarchy of levels of knowing is a hierarchy of
<i>possibility</i>
-- (levels of) possibilities of things to be known -- not a hierarchy of forced or
inherent actual knowing systems. Most epistemic systems, in fact, are restricted to level
one, and even human beings seem mostly to be limited to just a few levels (Campbell &
Bickhard, 1986). But it is those (few) levels of reflection in human beings that I will be
making use of in the discussion of rationality to follow.
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