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Evolutionary Epistemology

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        <i>Evolutionary Epistemology</i>
      
      
        . Correspondences with the world might be impressed into a passive substrate -- e.g., 
        forms into a waxed slate. If representations are thought to be some version of such 
        correspondences, then it is tempting to think that representations could be created or 
        invoked by such impressions into a mind: point-in-time 
      
      
        <i>trans</i>
      
      
        ductions into encodings, or scratching-the-wax over time 
      
      
        <i>in</i>
      
      
        ductions into encodings. Note that the mind is epistemically passive in such models. Any 
        activity or action is epistemically superfluous, even if biologically understandable. Not 
        so in the interactive model. 
      
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        Interactive representation is constituted in interactively competent system organization, 
        not in correspondences. There is in this view no temptation to model the origins of 
        representations in terms of impressions into an epistemically passive system. 
      
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        All representation -- indeed, all system organization -- must be constructed. Such 
        constructions cannot be assured of being correct, so they must be tried out and selected 
        out if inadequate. The interactive model of representation forces a variation and 
        selection constructivism; it forces an evolutionary epistemology (Campbell, 1974; Hahlweg 
        & Hooker, 1989; Radnitzky & Bartley, 1987; Wuketits, 1990). 
      
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