Implicit and Explicit Processes in Cognition

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        <b>Implicit and Explicit Processes in Cognition</b>
      
      
        
      
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        <i>Axel Cleeremans</i>
      
      
        
      
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        The implicit-explicit distinction has a long history in cognitive psychology. 
        Conceptually, the distinction overlaps largely but not completely with the distinction 
        between conscious and unconscious processing. The distinction is relevant to all aspects 
        of information processing (from perception to action), and at many different levels of 
        description (from low-level perceptual processes to high-level cognition such as problem 
        solving). In this workshop I will review existing work and discuss three fundamental (and 
        hence, controversial)
      
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        issues that the distinction raises, as follows:
      
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        (1) Which empirical methods are best adapted to demonstrate implicit processing? Most 
        existing methods take it as a starting point that to demonstrate unconscious processing, 
        it is sufficient to show that conscious awareness of the relevant information is nil. But 
        this logic assumes that there exist measures of awareness that are both exclusive and 
        exhaustive. Alternative methods that do away with this assumption will be reviewed and 
        discussed.
      
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        (2) How should we conceptualize the relationship between implicit and explicit processing? 
        Many theories assume either (1) that conscious and unconscious processing involve the same 
        kinds of mental representations, or (2) that unconscious states should not be considered 
        as mental. I will review and discuss these proposals, as
      
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        well as alternatives that view the conscious/unconscious distinction not as a dichotomy, 
        but rather as a graded continuum.
      
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        (3) Are there dissociable neural systems that subtend conscious and unconcious cognition? 
        This question is at the core of many contemporary debates in domains involving perception, 
        memory, learning, or action. Current evidence, involving behavioral, imaging, and 
        computational modeling techniques, will be contrasted and
      
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        discussed.
      
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        <i>Axel Cleeremans, Cognitive Science Research Unit, Free University of Brussels</i>
      
      
        
      
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