Over this evolution, distinctions between analytical truths (logical or conventional necessity) and empirical truths (contingent upon observation) were abolished ...
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Contrasted with the cybernetic approaches were logic-based approaches to reasoning that
were part of a larger wave of Platonism that gained momentum in the 1930’s. Over this
evolution, distinctions between analytical truths (logical or conventional necessity) and
empirical truths (contingent upon observation) were abolished, such that "observation
terms" and notions of semantics external to notational systems were replaced by internal,
logical semantics. (One sees this in Rudolf Carnap’s trajectory). In this way, "semantic"
relations between the symbols in the notational systems and the material world became
syntacticized. One of the consequences of this turn was to isolate the mind and questions
of intelligence from the outside world, relegating the processes of perceiving and acting
to secondary, tertiary, and even inconsequential status. In symbolic AI it was held that
the really important problems were those of symbolic reasoning, that the sensors and
effectors of devices were peripheral to the central questions of mind. The distinction
between analog and digital processes was argued to be inessential, on the grounds that, in
principle, any analog process could be simulated in a digital computer. Even in arenas
like machine vision, the distal stimulus was quickly pixelized and reduced to a set of
features that could be logically manipulated. In theories of science, the earlier
conceptions of the scientific model that made clear distinctions between operations of
measurement and those of formal computation (e.g. von Helmholtz, Hertz’s commutation
diagram, Mach, Bridgman, Bohr) eventually gave way to accounts of science that claimed
that no observables are even needed (e.g. (Churchland, 1985)).
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