This is directly relevant to, for example, recent simulation or emulation theories of cognition and representation (e.g. Jeannerod, 1994, Hesslow, 2002, Grush, in press) ...

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        The work of Heinz von Foerster, in
      
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        particular his detailed account of how the bodies of organisms construct their own reality
      
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        from sensorimotor interaction with the ‘external’ environment (e.g. von Foerster, 1970),
      
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        might help to avoid another round of mechanistic oversimplifications, such as the
      
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        currently common identification of embodiment with “being physical” or “interacting
      
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        with an environment” (cf. Chrisley & Ziemke, 2002; Ziemke, 2001b, 2003a). Von
      
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        Foerster’s notion of the “double closure” indicates that the key to understanding the
      
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        “embodiment” of cognitive processes is to understand how they emerge from the neural
      
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        mechanisms of sensorimotor interaction. This is directly relevant to, for example, recent
      
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        simulation or emulation theories of cognition and representation (e.g. Jeannerod, 1994;
      
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        Hesslow, 2002; Grush, in press) which postulate the ‘sharing’ of neural circuitry between
      
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        sensorimotor and cognitive processes.
      
      
        
      
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