Phenomenologie cognitive

<div><b>the proponent of cognitive phenomenology claims that a conscious

cognitive state can have a phenomenology that is irreducible to purely

sensory phenomenology.</b></div><div><b>
</b></div><div>It is challenging to give a clear characterization of the cognitive

phenomenology debate, since different contributors conceive of the

debate in different ways. Central for the debate is the question of

whether conscious thoughts possess a non-sensory phenomenology.

Intuitively, there is something that it is like to consciously think,

consciously judge and consciously believe something. However, the debate

about cognitive phenomenology is not, strictly speaking, about whether

there is something that it is like to consciously think. Rather, the

debate concerns the nature of cognitive phenomenology. Is the

phenomenology of cognitive states reducible to purely sensory

phenomenology? Or, is there an irreducible cognitive phenomenology? A

sceptic about cognitive phenomenology claims that conscious cognitive

states are non-phenomenal. But, conscious cognitive states may <em>seem </em>to

be phenomenal because they are accompanied by sensory states. For

instance, when one thinks that ´Paris is a beautiful city`, one´s

thought may be expressed in inner-speech and an image of Paris may

accompany it. These accompanying sensory states are phenomenal states,

and not the thought itself. Contrary to this, the proponent of cognitive

phenomenology claims that a conscious cognitive state can have a

phenomenology that is irreducible to purely sensory phenomenology.<b /></div>