REALITY
<p class=default>
<b>REALITY</b>
<br/>
The word
<i>reality</i>
comes from the Latin noun
<i>res</i>
, meaning "thing." The fundamental operation that an observer can perform is an operation
of distinction, the specification of an entity by operationally cleaving it from a
background. Furthermore, that which results from an operation of distinction and can thus
be distinguished, is a thing with the properties that the operation of distinction
specifies, and which exists in the space that these properties establish. Reality,
therefore, is the domain of things, and, in this sense, that which can be distinguished is
real. Thus stated, there is no question about what reality is: It is a domain specified by
the operations of the observer. The question that remains is a question in the domain of
cognition: It is a question about objectivity. In other words, to paraphrase the questions
presented at the beginning, "How is it that we, human beings, can talk about things,
describe things, and predict events in terms of things to be observed?"
<br/>
After all that I have said throughout this chapter, the answer to this question should be
unambiguous. Yet let me recapitulate, as an observer, the essence of what I have said.
<br/>
First, the epistemological analysis of our operation as scientists showed that all
scientific statements are necessarily subject-dependent, even these that I am making now
as a scientist writing about the problem of objectivity.
<br/>
Second, the analysis of the organization of the living and the nervous systems showed:
<i>(a)</i>
both are closed systems and, accordingly, do not offer means for the description of an
objective reality; and
<i>(b)</i>
that the effective operation of a living system (nervous system included) in the medium
in which it is realized (as an autopoietic unity) is the result of its structural coupling
to that medium.
<br/>
Third, the analysis of language showed:
<i>(a)</i>
that language exists in a consensual domain generated by the interactions of closed
systems and not in the domain of states of each individual system; and
<i>(b)</i>
that a description always implies an interaction of the system that describes. Let us now
as author and reader, adopt the roles of super-observers and answer two questions, which
again are reformulations of the questions presented at the beginning:
<br/>
How is it that human beings, being closed autopoietic systems, can talk about things and
make descriptions of them?
<br/>
How is it that, if language is behavior in a consensual domain, human beings can use
language to predict events to be individually experienced ?
<br/>
</p>