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Open in TheBrain

Function

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        <i>Function</i>
      
      
        . A function of a system or process is one or more of its causal consequences (Wimsatt, 
        1972). But all systems and processes have many consequences that are not involved in their 
        functions, assuming they have any functions at all. The heart, for example, not only pumps 
        blood, but it also creates heart beats and consumes oxygen. The latter two are not 
        normally considered to be functions of the heart. But, then, on what basis can we 
        determine which consequences are functions? What of hearts that are not pumping properly: 
        do they have a function or not? The notion of "
      
      
        <i>not</i>
      
      
         pumping properly" relies on a notion of "functioning properly": how can we distinguish 
        function from dysfunction? The problems of a naturalization of function are not simple. 
      
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        I will be relying on a model of natural function -- not designed or intended function -- 
        as being emergent only in certain kinds of open systems. The intuition of the model is 
        that open systems (a flame, for example) require the maintenance of various conditions 
        (such as combustion temperature) in order for the systems themselves to continue to exist 
        -- and, therefore, to continue to have their natural causal influences in the world 
        (whatever they may be). Functional consequences are those that contribute to the 
        maintenance of such conditions, and thus that contribute to the maintenance of the 
        existence of the open system itself (and conversely for dysfunctional consequences). In 
        turn, they contribute to the maintenance of whatever natural consequences that system 
        might have (Bickhard, 1993, 1998b, forthcoming).
      
      
        <u>[1] <http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/critical.html></u>
      
      
         
      
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        <u>[1] <http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/critical.html></u>
      
      
         It should be noted that the dominant etiological approach to modeling function 
        (Godfrey-Smith, 1994; Millikan, 1984, 1993) suffers from a serious failure of naturalism: 
        etiological function cannot be constituted in the current state of a system, but only 
        current state can be causally efficacious. The etiological model of function, then, is a 
        model of causally epiphenomenal function (Bickhard, 1993, 1998b, forthcoming). 
      
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