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"technical code" of the object mediates the process

    <p class=default>
      
        <b>The Technical Code </b>
      
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        That these conflicts over social control of technology are not new can be seen from the 
        interesting case of the "bursting boilers."22 Steamboat boilers were the first technology 
        the U.S. Government subjected to safety regulation. Over 5000 people were killed or 
        injured in hundreds of steamboat explosions from 1816, when regulation was first proposed, 
        to 1852, when it was actually implemented. Is this many casualties or few? Consumers 
        evidently were not too alarmed to continue traveling by riverboat in ever increasing 
        numbers. Understandably, the ship owners interpreted this as a vote of confidence and 
        protested the excessive cost of safer designs. Yet politicians also won votes demanding 
        safety. 
      
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        The accident rate fell dramatically once technical improvements were mandated. Legislation 
        would hardly have been necessary to achieve this outcome had it been technically 
        determined. But in fact boiler design was relative to a social judgment about safety. That 
        judgment could have been made on strictly market grounds, as the shippers wished, or 
        politically, with differing technical results. In either case, those results 
      
      
        <u>constitute</u>
      
      
         a proper boiler. What a boiler "is" was thus defined through a long process of political 
        struggle culminating finally in uniform codes issued by the American Society of Mechanical 
        Engineers. 
      
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        This example shows just how technology adapts to social change. What I call the "technical 
        code" of the object mediates the process. That code responds to the cultural horizon of 
        the society at the level of technical design. Quite down-to-earth technical parameters 
        such as the choice and processing of materials are 
      
      
        <u>socially</u>
      
      
         specified by the code. The illusion of technical necessity arises from the fact that the 
        code is thus literally "cast in iron" or "set in concrete" as the case may be.23 
      
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        Conservative anti-regulatory social philosophies are based on this illusion. They forget 
        that the design process always already incorporates standards of safety and environmental 
        compatibility; similarly, all technologies support some basic level of user or worker 
        initiative. A properly made technical object simply 
      
      
        <u>must</u>
      
      
         meet these standards to be recognized as such. We do not treat conformity as an expensive 
        addd-on, but regard it as an intrinsic production cost. Raising the standards means 
        altering the definition of the object, not paying a price for an alternative good or 
        ideological value as the trade-off model holds. 
      
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        But what of the much discussed cost/benefit ratio of design changes such as those mandated 
        by environmental or other similar legislation? These calculations have some application to 
        transitional situations, before technological advances responding to new values 
        fundamentally alter the terms of the problem. But all too often, the results depend on 
        economists' very rough estimates of the monetary value of such things as a day of trout 
        fishing or an asthma attack. If made without prejudice, these estimates may well help to 
        prioritize policy alternatives. But one cannot legitimately generalize from such policy 
        applications to a universal theory of the costs of regulation. 
      
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        Such fetishism of efficiency ignores our ordinary understanding of the concept which alone 
        is relevant to social decision-making. In that everyday sense, efficiency concerns the 
        narrow range of values that economic actors routinely affect by their decisions. 
        Unproblematic aspects of technology are not included. In theory one can decompose any 
        technical object and account for each of its elements in terms of the goals it meets, 
        whether it be safety, speed, reliability, etc., but in practice no one is interested in 
        opening the "black box" to see what is inside. 
      
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        For example, once the boiler code is established, such things as the thickness of a wall 
        or the design of a safety valve appear as essential to the object. The cost of these 
        features is not broken out as the specific "price" of safety and compared unfavorably with 
        a more efficient but less secure version of the technology. Violating the code in order to 
        lower costs is a crime, not a trade-off. And since all further progress takes place on the 
        basis of the new safety standard, soon no one looks back to the good old days of cheaper, 
        insecure designs. 
      
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        Design standards are only controversial while they are in flux. Resolved conflicts over 
        technology are quickly forgotten. Their outcomes, a welter of taken-for-granted technical 
        and legal standards, are embodied in a stable code, and form the background against which 
        economic actors manipulate the unstable portions of the environment in the pursuit of 
        efficiency. The code is not varied in real world economic calculations but treated as a 
        fixed input. 
      
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        Anticipating the stabilization of a new code, one can often ignore contemporary arguments 
        that will soon be silenced by the emergence of a new horizon of efficiency calculations. 
        This is what happened with boiler design and child labor; presumably, the current debates 
        on environmentalism will have a similar history, and we will someday mock those who object 
        to cleaner air as a "false principle of humanity" that violates technological imperatives. 
      
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        Non-economic values intersect the economy in the technical code. The examples we are 
        dealing with illustrate this point clearly. The legal standards that regulate workers' 
        economic activity have a significant impact on every aspect of their lives. In the child 
        labor case, regulation helped to widen educational opportunities with consequences that 
        are not primarily economic in character. In the riverboat case, Americans gradually chose 
        high levels of security and boiler design came to reflect that choice. Ultimately, this 
        was no trade-off of one good for another, but a non-economic decision about the value of 
        human life and the responsibilities of government. 
      
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        Technology is thus not merely a means to an end; technical design standards define major 
        portions of the social environment, such as urban and built spaces, workplaces, medical 
        activities and expectations, life patterns, and so on. The economic significance of 
        technical change often pales beside its wider human implications in framing a way of life. 
        In such cases, regulation defines the cultural framework 
      
      
        <u>of</u>
      
      
         the economy; it is not an act 
      
      
        <u>in</u>
      
      
         the economy. 
      
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