Capurro’s Trilemma

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        <b>Capurro’s Trilemma</b>
      
      
        
      
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        Capurro’s Trilemma runs like this: in attempting to define and determine what 
        "information" means throughout the disciplines and what it should or could mean you are 
        facing a logical situation that offers three options none of which, however, is 
        satisfactory. 
      
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        The first option is: there is only one meaning of the term "information", it means the 
        same regardless of the field of application. This option is called synonymity, because the 
        terms are synonyms (see table).
      
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        The second option is: there are several meanings of the term "information", they are 
        similar to a particular meaning, which serves as standard of comparison. This option is 
        called analogical reasoning, because the terms are analogies (see table).
      
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        The third option is: there are several meanings of the term "information", all of which 
        are different from each other. This option is called equivocalness, because the terms are 
        equivocations (see table). 
      
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        No option meets demands for scientificity. Synonymity does not meet them, because 
        information in one domain would not differ from information in a different domain — a 
        premiss which has long been contested. Analogical reasoning does not meet them either, 
        because there is no agreement on the 
      
      
        <i>primum analogatum</i>
      
      
        , the standard of comparison. Nor does equivocalness meet them, because the babel of 
        languages which are not communicable would mean the end of scientific enterprise at all. 
      
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