Such commonsense knowledge is difficult, perhaps impossible, to package into explicit, propositional knowledge - Varela & al., 1991, p.147-148 [i know, soto]

L’expérience corporelle qui est attachée à notre usage du concept de connaissance, dont

ne rend pas compte la seule notion de justification propositionnelle, consiste dans la multitude

de gestes, de conduites, plus ou moins élaborées, qui reposent sur l’acquisition d’aptitudes

motrices et constituent la charpente silencieuse d’une forme de vie partagée: « … successfully

directed movement such as driving depends upon acquired motor skills and the continuous use

of commonsense or background know-how. Such commonsense knowledge is difficult, perhaps

impossible, to package into explicit, propositional knowledge – ‘knowledge that’ in the

philosopher’s jargon – since it is largely a matter of readiness to hand or ‘knowledge how’

based on the accumulation of experience in a vast number of case s. » (Varela & a l., 1991,

p.147-148)