Ontological Commitment and Reconstructivism - Carrara

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        <b>Abstract. </b>
      
      
        Some forms of analytic reconstructivism take natural language (and common
      
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        sense at large) to be ontologically opaque: ordinary sentences must be suitably rewritten 
        or
      
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        paraphrased before questions of ontological commitment may be raised. Other forms of 
        recon-structivism
      
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        take the commitment of ordinary language at face value, but regard it as meta-physically
      
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        misleading: common-sense objects exist, but they are not what we normally think
      
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        they are. This paper is an attempt to clarify and critically assess some common limits of
      
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        these two reconstructivist strategies.
      
      
        
      
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