A second point concerns this solipsism... (/ HvF)

    <p class=default>
      
        A second point concerns this solipsism. von Foerster cannot avoid it by referring to a
      
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        practical criterion of success like other constructivists (or to "viability", as von 
        Glasersfeld
      
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        calls it). Instead, he refers to analogy. He argues that a human being experiences other 
        humans
      
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        behaving just like him or her; hence, they must be just as "real". "We" invent our world, 
        and
      
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        others do the same. It is not discussed, however, who or what is "we", and why the others 
        are
      
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        "real", although invented. This situation is illustrated by a picture showing a man who has
      
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        himself and other persons inside his head, and the others have in turn persons in their 
        heads,
      
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        like the Russian dolls. The analogy certainly works for the persons inside the first, most 
        outer,
      
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        head and the subsequent iterations. But the very first head is in an empty space on the 
        page,
      
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        what about it? While von Glasersfeld deals with this difference by distinguishing the most
      
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        outer head as "epistemic self" from the other selves inside the head, von Foerster does not
      
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        address this issue and only points to the "analogy".
      
      
        
      
    </p>