Glantz, Stanton

oops see other

i have capt other node here 919 also txt (also 917)

target

see ca for sci integrity:

https://www.wsj.com/articles/research-fuels-debate-over-e-cigarettes-as-smoking-cessation-device-11576472460

research fuels debate paywall

https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2013/03/chair-house-spending-panel-says-nih-grants-violate-rules-against-lobbying

it is a tradition for some Republicans in Congress to take aim at research grants that they think are irrelevant and not worthy of taxpayer funding. Now, the chair of the House of Representatives spending panel that funds the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is claiming that some federally funded biomedical research violates government restrictions on lobbying state lawmakers or Congress.

The issue surfaced earlier this month at a hearing of the panel. Representative Andy Harris (R-MD) grilled NIH Director Francis Collins about two grants to tobacco control researcher Stanton Glantz of the University of California, San Francisco, in which some of the money was used to trace the Tea Party's origins to groups funded by the tobacco industry. The study reflected "a partisan political agenda," claimedHarris, who calls himself "a Tea Party guy." (Collins responded that he was "quite troubled" by the study.)

As a new member of the panel, Harris doesn't have much clout. But it turns out that its chair, Representative Jack Kingston (R-GA), has the same concerns.

At the same 5 March hearing, Kingston gave Collins this letter expressing concerns about several grants. In addition to Glantz's, Kingston objected to a 1-year, $50,000 award to criminology professor Catherine Gallagher of George Mason University to produce a monograph reviewing research on the health problems of young prison inmates. The letter quotes from Gallagher's abstract, saying the project "is intended to engage the medical, public health, criminal justice, policy, legal and advocacy communities by uniting diverse disciplines around a common issue."

Such studies aren't directly related to NIH's mission, Kingston's letter claims. "As elected officials, we cannot explain to our constituents why their tax dollars are used by NIH to fund advocacy groups [or] address political questions," it says. Kingston asked NIH to review within 30 days all of its grants to make sure they don't violate federal lobbying restrictions. Any activities that "address political questions or fund any advocacy group seeking to develop lobbying material" should be "halted," the letter says.

A week earlier, Kingston asked the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Inspector General (IG) to review the Glantz and Gallagher grants. As first reported by The Cancer Letter, Kingston's letter asks the IG to add the grants to an ongoing investigation of whether a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) program aimed at helping communities reduce obesity and smoking may violate a ban on using federal funds to lobby. (Several rules prohibit the use of HHS funds to influence Congress or state legislatures.)

Gallagher says her grant mentioned advocacy groups because only they have access to the prison population. "It's not us taking their plight to lobby," she says. "I think it's crazy in this climate of scare resources to waste people's time on such a trivial matter when we have such a long and dependable peer review process," she adds.

The distinction between research and advocacy came up after the December shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, which drew attention to a Congressional directive barring CDC from advocating for gun control. The White House declared that "research on gun violence is not advocacy" and asked Congress to fund $10 million in research in this area.

nature 406 2000

https://www.nature.com/articles/35018718

Supporters of the US tobacco industry have failed to silence one of its most prominent academic critics.

An appeals court in California has ruled that Stanton Glantz, a professor of medicine at the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF), can use his position to back the state government's anti-smoking efforts.

In 1997, Californians for Scientific Integrity — a group set up at a Sacramento attorney's office by the industry-sponsored National Smokers Alliance — sued Glantz in an attempt to stop him using his academic position to help the state of California fight smoking.

The group alleged that Glantz's 15 years of campaigning was a misuse of public funds. It also charged that the university's approval of his activities was a violation of the rights of those Californians who did not agree with the anti-smoking cause.

But two weeks ago, a three-judge panel of the Third District Court of Appeals in Sacramento rejected the allegations, reaffirming the right of any faculty member at the University of California to campaign against smoking.

“It makes me very glad to work at a university that takes academic freedom and public interest very seriously and has the courage to stand up to … the tobacco industry,” said Glantz, who is widely known for challenging the industry's claims that it was unaware of the dangers of smoking.

Citing statements on a recruitment flyer, he claims that Californians for Scientific Integrity “was set up for the express purpose of suing the University of California and silencing me”.

“It was clear intimidation,” he adds. “But this shows you can stand up and beat them.”

Mark Perry, a Washington DC-based attorney with the firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher that represents the suing group, did not answer a request for comment. Perry has said separately that no decision has been reached on whether to appeal to the California Supreme Court.

Nor was there a response from the Claremont Institute, a conservative think-tank in California that filed a ‘friend of the court’ brief in support of the group.

Although the decision only addresses the rights of university staff to campaign against smoking, it could be far-reaching. Along with other cases, any faculty member of a Californian public university could use it to affirm his or her right to campaign for any cause endorsed by the state legislature.

Last month, Glantz, who conducts research in UCSF's cardiology division, won the annual Public Service Achievement Award of the lobby group Common Cause for his “tireless and tenacious” efforts against smoking. In the past, pro-smoking groups have attacked him in both California and Washington — accusing him of falsifying a result in a study of the effects of ‘second-hand smoke’, and seeking to cut off his research funds.

https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Court-rules-professor-can-use-his-job-to-fight-3054189.php

Court rules professor can use his job to fight smoking

By Bob Egelko Published 4:00 am PDT, Tuesday, July 11, 2000

The tobacco industry's leading nemesis in California can continue to fight smoking from his perch as a UC professor, says a state appellate court.

An industry-allied group, Californians for Scientific Integrity, sued the University of California in 1998 over Stanton Glantz's use of his university job and resources to push for tougher state action against smoking. The suit contended Glantz's activities were a misuse of tax money.

But the 3rd District Court of Appeal said Glantz's activity was authorized by the Legislature, which has directed the state to "play a leading role in promoting a smoke-free society by the year 2000."

Glantz, a professor of medicine at UC-San Francisco, was a founder and former president of Californians for Nonsmokers' Rights. He has worked for state and local bans on smoking in public buildings and for stronger messages in state-funded anti-smoking ads.

His studies on smoking and health have been disputed by tobacco companies, which have tried to get Congress and the California Legislature to cut off his government funding. The suit by Californians for Scientific Integrity initially included a challenge to the validity of a study by Glantz that found that prohibitions on smoking in restaurants did not hurt tourism. That claim was later dropped and the group ultimately sought only to halt the alleged misuse of state funds for lobbying.

"They were attempting to intimidate me and the university," Glantz said Monday. "The university stood up to the thugs in cigarette companies again and won again."

Mark A. Perry, a lawyer for the group that sued the university, said no decision has been made on a further appeal. He said he disagreed with the court's conclusion that the general statements in state law about a smoke-free society authorized Glantz to use state funds to promote anti-smoking policies.

Perry denied Glantz's assertion that Californians for Scientific Integrity was a front for the tobacco industry, but said it is partially funded by the National Smokers' Alliance, which draws funding from tobacco companies.

The appellate ruling Thursday upheld a decision by Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Joe Gray to dismiss the suit without a trial. The court said California law forbids certain types of state-funded political activities, such as the use of state funds to influence election campaigns, but does not prohibit activity that the Legislature itself has authorized. <

cf enstrom hit on oreskes cites: wonder why, it's pretty fair?

Tilting at Tobacco

He learned the art of raising hell at Stanford. Now, Stanton Slantz is gleefully storming the gates of one of the nation's most powerful industries.

Saul Bromberger/Sandra Hoover pix?]

By Mark Robinson who?

The jury filed into Courtroom No. 2 in the Duval County Courthouse last August 9 and calmly tossed a live grenade at the tobacco industry. The six Jacksonville, Fla., jurors ordered the nation's third-largest cigarette maker, Brown & Williamson, to pay $750,000 to a lung cancer victim and his wife. For the first time, a living ex-smoker had convinced a jury that a tobacco company should be held liable for selling a product it secretly knew caused disease. The door was suddenly wide open for Joe Smoker to sue the smile off Joe Camel's face.

On the other side of the continent, medical professor Stanton Glantz was sitting in his tiny 11th-floor office on the UC-San Francisco campus. It was a quiet day, good for watching the fog glide through the Golden Gate, ideal for plowing through the foot-high stack of unanswered mail piled on one corner of his desk. The phone interrupted him. It was a reporter calling to get his reaction to the landmark verdict in Florida.

"I was stunned, sure," says Glantz, PhD '73,a hint of pride creeping into his gravelly Midwestern voice. But even though the devoted anti-tobacco crusader had helped set the stage for the verdict, he doesn't remember pumping his fist in the air or allowing himself a satisfied grin. He just uttered the obligatory quotes, said goodbye to the reporter--he doesn't even recall who it was--and went back to work. "It was strange," he says. "It was almost routine."

Routine, indeed. For the man who's been called the Ralph Nader of the anti-tobacco movement, these are the best of times. Consider the news of the last few months alone: The Clinton Administration has imposed unprecedented new regulations on the industry, 15 states are now suing cigarette makers seeking money for smokers' medical bills, and ailing ex-smokers are lining up for a litigation lynching. The tobacco issue even found its way into the early stages of the presidential race, tripping up GOP nominee Bob Dole.

And where there's smoke, there's Glantz. For nearly two decades, the intense, combative researcher has assaulted the $45 billion industry using the preferred weapon of a savvy academic: intellectual bombs thrown from the ivory tower. He's a restless scholar who is the author or co-author of eight books and 96 scholarly articles and a source for journalists from People to 60 Minutes . His in-your-face tactics helped change the terms of the tobacco debate by recasting smoking as a social and political issue, not just a medical problem.

Glantz has done as much as anyone to put smoking on the public agenda. His landmark work on the dangers of secondhand smoke launched smoking bans in public places from restaurants to airplanes. Dubbed a "pain in the butt," he was one of Newsweek's 100 newsmakers of 1995. In a recent book, Smokescreen , New York Times tobacco writer Philip Hilts calls him one of the Seven Samurai of the anti-tobacco movement. Glantz showed up on an ABC News special in July to analyze the industry's political clout and called tobacco executives "cockroaches." His office phone rarely stops ringing. Last summer, he went all the way to Australia for vacation just to get away from the hubbub.

"He has moved the marble for tobacco control," says John Seffrin, CEO of the American Cancer Society. "You can argue it would have happened eventually, but when you talk about a thousand deaths a day caused by tobacco, time is of the essence."

***

Proud of his iconoclasm and fabled abrasiveness, Glantz, 50, cultivates a certain eccentricity. The stocky, rumpled academic likes to wear a T-shirt that says, "Here Comes Trouble." He lives modestly in San Francisco's Sunset district and drives a '69 Dodge Dart, the only new car he's ever bought. He still turns up in the trademark orange vest his mother knitted for him. ("Although people now expect it, so I don't wear it as much.") And he takes almost as much pride in offending his friends--the California branch of the American Cancer Society, the California Medical Association--as his avowed enemies in the tobacco industry.

Is he a loose cannon? "Yeah," he says, taking a sip of warm tea as Mozart burbles on his office radio. "I like it that way."

Not surprisingly, the blunt professor has made his share of enemies. He is, of course, a favorite bobo doll for tobacco companies. They love to punch him; he loves to come bouncing back up. "He's apparently addicted to puff pieces, because there's been one in about every publication you can find," says Tom Lauria, a spokesman for the Tobacco Institute. He says Glantz's research has no validity because the professor has it out for the tobacco companies.

Thomas DiLorenzo, a conservative professor of economics at Loyola College in Baltimore, has slammed Glantz and others for taking government money for anti-tobacco research. "I'm a nonsmoker. I agree 100 percent that cigarettes are unhealthy," DiLorenzo says. "I just think it's illegal and unethical to use taxpayer money to organize a lobbying effort to prohibit cigarettes."

Glantz counters that his government-funded research is designed to improve public health--and that often means criticizing tobacco companies and the politicians they support.

"He just calmly tries to tell the documented truth," says Martin Perl, a Stanford physicist, Nobel laureate and Glantz fan. "He's not a zealot."

***

For those who knew Stan Glantz as a Stanford graduate student in the early 1970s, his career as a rabble-rousing academic makes perfect sense. By the time he finished his PhD in applied mechanics in 1973, the 27-year-old had learned how to stand in the hurricane of public debate that often follows politically charged social research.

Like many engineering and science students in 1971, Glantz worried about Pentagon-sponsored research on campus. "We had the anti-war radicals on the one hand saying that the faculty was out murdering babies in Vietnam," he recalls. "And, on the other hand, we had the faculty saying this is all basic research with no connection to anything, and the Defense Department just gives us all this money because of our incredible good looks and they love science because we won World War II for them."

Glantz led a group of students in an investigation of the two perceptions of Pentagon funding. Their project was sponsored by the newly formed Stanford Workshops on Political and Social Issues (SWOPSI), a series of free-form courses created by young faculty and graduate students.

The student investigators followed a simple plan. They compared the faculty's explanations of its Pentagon-sponsored research with official Defense Department rationales for funding the work. The inconsistencies suggested that the professors were more deeply involved in direct military research than many knew. "We just laid them side by side and said, 'Draw your own conclusions,' " Glantz recalls. "The faculty went completely berserk. The radicals went berserk, too, because we weren't saying that the faculty was all killing babies in Vietnam, it's more complicated than that."

Glantz reveled in the ruckus he'd created. "He struck me as an amazingly strong, unflappable character," says Norm Albers, who as a graduate student in physics became Glantz's partner in the project. "The way he could stand in the flak and argue in the face of people's anger--it was something that was hard for me to learn."

The report's disclosures made it onto the front page of the Washington Post. Pentagon officials loved the report because it showed their university-backed research had some military merit. Back at Stanford, the debate helped push the University toward limiting defense contracts.

"Most faculty researchers were genuinely surprised," about the disclosures, says Philip Zimbardo, then one of the young faculty heavily involved in anti-war protests. "You can either say we were naive or narrowly focused." Zimbardo, now a full professor of psychology at Stanford, decided not to renew his grant from the Office of Naval Research because of the report.

For Albers, as for Glantz, the SWOPSI course was a turning point. Albers remembers being called into the office of his Physics Department adviser, whose own work had come under scrutiny in the report. "He said, 'Albers, if I can get you thrown in jail, I will.' " Albers recalls. The professor didn't manage to bring charges against the young physicist, but Albers was shaken. "I realized at that moment that we were playing with the big boys, and this is how the big boys played: hardball." The experience helped convince Albers to quit physics. He moved to southern Oregon and started a new career as a piano builder and tuner.

For Glantz, on the other hand, this was just practice for taking on the really big boys.

"That SWOPSI course was one of the most valuable things I did at Stanford in terms of learning how to do research on complicated, highly charged issues," Glantz says. The course also gave him a litmus test for future research: Will it make a difference in society? "If I can't answer that in a reasonable way, then I don't do it."

***

In1976, three years after getting his PhD, Glantz found himself plugging away a bit too quietly as one of the few non-M.D. medical research fellows at UCSF. He worked at figuring out the complicated biomechanics of the human heart--but wanted something that would speed up his own pulse. He decided to apply for a year's fellowship in Washington, D.C. The program, sponsored by the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, brought scientists to work on congressional staffs and committees.

Glantz made the final cut. Now he had to choose a topic and bang out a briefing paper in 24 hours. There was only one health-related subject on the list:a proposal by Sen. Ted Kennedy to tax cigarettes based on their nicotine content.

Donning his orange vest, Glantz flew to Washington with his briefing paper and passionately argued that the senator had a dumb idea. What you should really do, Glantz said, is attack the social acceptability of smoking, undermine the subtle web of support for smokers.

He didn't get the fellowship. "I was just crushed because, like a lot of people who go to Stanford and are overachievers, this was the first time I'd ever really tried for something and not made it." But Glantz had accomplished more than he realized: His briefing paper, expanded and refined over the next few years, became a blueprint for the modern anti-tobacco movement.This new paradigm saw smoking not as a medical problem but as a social scourge and fountain of political corruption. Tobacco companies weren't normal businesses, they were duplicitous peddlers of death. Secondhand smoke wasn't just smelly and annoying, it was an environmental toxin that killed more than 50,000 people a year.

Losing out on that Washington year was probably for the best, Glantz says now. "Being a highly opinionated, loud-mouthed person is not the psychological profile of the successful career staffer."

But those same qualities may have helped him attract his wife. The couple, who now have two children, met in the '70s at a conference. Marsha noticed Glantz because he was yelling at somebody for bad-mouthing Ralph Nader. She joined the argument--on Glantz's side.

***

By 1981, Glantz had become an expert on the effects of smoking on the unsuccessful California initiative campaigns aimed at limiting smoking in public. He'd helped found Californians for Nonsmokers' Rights, which a few years later became Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights.

And he was getting good at pitching the tobacco story to a media that had yet to see its significance. "There were many years that Stan was frustrated because he had very good material and he couldn't get anybody's attention," says Douglas Foster, the former editor of Mother Jones who headed Stanford's news service from 1994 until last September. "In the early '80s, this was not considered a story. Tobacco was a legal product, just part of the landscape. In a case like that, it takes somebody who is a big pain in the ass. That was Stan."

Glantz knocked on Foster's door with a story in 1982. Californians for Nonsmokers' Rights had received a plain brown envelope with no return address. Inside was a pirated videotape of "Death in the West," a 1976 British documentary that juxtaposed images of the Marlboro man with stories of real cowboys with lung cancer. The film, aired only once in England, had been effectively banned after legal pressure from Philip Morris, Marlboro's manufacturer.

Foster, then a staffer at the Center for Investigative Reporting in San Francisco, helped Glantz get the documentary aired on KRON, the NBC affiliate in San Francisco. Eventually it received worldwide exposure. It also spawned a smoking-prevention program aimed at kids. Since 1983, more than 750,000 children have completed the "Death in the West" curriculum.

In some ways, Glantz began operating like an investigative reporter himself: He looked for dramatic story lines, gathered documents obsessively and followed the money. In recent research, that m.o. led him to track the tobacco companies' political contributions and the connection between the number of smokers and the amount of money spent on cigarette advertising.

Given his emerging profile, it wasn't all that unusual that, on the morning of May 12, 1994, another mysterious package loaded with explosive tobacco material arrived at Glantz's office. The return address on the big FedEx box said simply, "Mr. Butts," an apparent reference to the Doonesbury comic-strip character who pushes cigarettes on kids. Glantz was on his way out the door to teach a biostatistics class, but his curiosity got the better of him, and he decided to have a look inside.

What he found was a treasure trove of sensitive documents from Brown & Williamson. There were memos showing that the maker of Kool, Pall Mall and Lucky Strike knew about the cancer-causing and addictive properties of cigarettes as far back as the early 1960s.There was evidence of a sophisticated disinformation campaign sponsored by the industry. There was even a 1983 letter from Sylvester Stallone in which the actor agreed to use B&W products in five action movies--in exchange for $500,000.

"It was stuff that everybody always sort of expected," Glantz says. "But to actually see it was just mind-boggling." Even to his jaded eyes, the documents still had the power to make blood boil. "It's like thinking your wife is messing around and then knowing your wife is messing around--but then coming home and catching her messing around."

Glantz went to class and then returned to his office with a couple of students to photocopythe whole 4,000 pages. He took one set home to index at the dining room table, put one set "in a safe place"--he still won't say where--and sent another off to Hilts, the Times reporter, who used them as the basis for a three-part series in June 1994.

Back in Glantz's office, the original papers were cluttering up the place; visitors were using the box as a footrest. He decided to place them in the newly formed tobacco archive at UCSF's library. Before long, dozens of journalists, plaintiffs' attorneys, government officials and researchers were signing up at the special collections desk to have a look at the rare papers.

Brown & Williamson, meanwhile, went on the offensive.The company sent a letter demanding return of its "stolen property"and insisting that public access to the documents be cut off immediately. Then the company's private investigators started hanging out in the library, taking note of anybody who used the collection. "They had leather jackets and cell phones and cameras," says Karen Butter, deputy director of the campus library. "They were kind of obvious."

When Brown & Williamson filed suit to force the return of the documents in February 1995, the stage was set for a First Amendment fight. Suddenly, the very freedom of a researcher and a university to disseminate information was on the line. "Basically, they were trying to keep books out of the library, and universities are here to spread information, not suppress it," Glantz says. He was summoned to a meeting at the university counsel's office, across Parnassus Avenue, which runs through the UCSF campus. "I was riding the elevator down and I was thinking, 'Time to walk the plank. They're going to toss me overboard.' "

It was a reasonable concern. This was just six months before ABC would make a humiliating on-air apology to settle a $10 million suit filed by Philip Morris over a Day One story claiming that the company spiked its cigarettes with extra nicotine. Three months after that, producers at 60 Minutes , fearing a lawsuit by Brown & Williamson, held off on airing a controversial interview with Jeffrey Wigand, the turncoat tobacco executive.

But saying they'd rather fight than quit, the UC administrators backed Glantz. The university lawyers argued that the documents were a legitimate subject of study and that they were already public records because they had been written about so extensively in the New York Times and elsewhere. In June 1995, the California Supreme Court ruled in the university's favor. To spare strain on the library, the university published them on the Internet and sold copies on CD-ROM.

In Jacksonville, Fla., the lawyers for Grady Carter, a 44-year smoker who was suing B&W, knew what to do with such hot stuff. They introduced some of the most compelling documents as evidence, arguing that the papers proved the company knew its cigarettes were addictive and deadly years before the surgeon general warned the public in 1964. Carter won his case, clearing the way for an avalanche of similar lawsuits."It wasn't until we got Stan Glantz's book and his CD-ROM that we were able to put together the evidence we needed," says Greg Maxwell, one of Carter's attorneys.

Meanwhile, Glantz and four colleagues were themselves poring over the documents. They cross-matched them with other records subpoenaed by various congressional committees and put the whole lot in the context of a 30-year effort by cigarette makers to stay ahead of regulators, health advocates and anti-tobacco groups.The resulting book, former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop wrote in a foreword, "is a vital weapon in the battle against tobacco. I don't think that anyone who reads it can remain passive in the struggle."

After shopping the manuscript to 30 litigation-wary commercial publishers,the authors finally found a home with the University of California Press.The Cigarette Papers came out last May.

Glantz wasn't surprised that publishers shied away from the manuscript. But his literary agent, Jane Dystel, "was completely shocked at how badly it went," Glantz says. "I thought she would have a hard time.But the level of cowardice out there was just truly amazing."

***

Glantz's work has made waves in political as well as legal circles. In July 1995, he and his colleagues scored an unprecedented triumph when their analysis of the Brown & Williamson papers filled almost an entire edition of the prestigious Journal of the American Medical Association . After President Clinton read the issue, he decided to push new restrictions on teen smoking. ("It's hard to argue with this," he told senior aides.)

The research presented in the jumbo JAMA issue, which was partially funded by a $600,000 National Cancer Institute grant, also caught the eye of Rep. John Porter (R-Ill.), a tobacco industry defender. At his behest, Glantz's NCI funding became the first National Institutes of Health grant ever targeted for cutoff by a congressional committee. Most of the funding was restored after vociferous lobbying by the American Cancer Society.

Closer to home, Glantz made an antagonist of Willie Brown, the former all-powerful speaker of the California Assembly and now mayor of San Francisco. In a May 1995 study of the political influence of tobacco money, Glantz and a colleague showed that since 1980, Brown had received in excess of $659,000--more than any other single legislator in the nation.

But even before that, Brown (who has since become a born-again tobacco foe) was no fan of the professor.In the fall of 1993, Brown was meeting with three UC administrators to discuss state funding for the system. The assembly speaker took the opportunity to pitilessly dress down the administrators on the subject of Glantz's research on the tobacco industry. "You're going to have trouble with me on every single appropriation!" Brown thundered, according to an account that appeared in the February 1994 issue of the Atlantic . "If that guy gets one more cent of state money, you'll have trouble with me."

Glantz is prone to such scrapes. "The people who pay attention to the facts about tobacco end up being partisan--because the facts are so clearly one-sided," Hilts says. "That's a difficult position for a professional like him to get into, to be constantly attacked by the tobacco companies. He's one of the few who has a hide thick enough that he can handle it."

***

Glantz has few illusions about the future of the tobacco wars he is helping lead. No single blow--lawsuit, regulation or embarrassing disclosure--can knock the cigarette makers out. It is a war of attrition, and Glantz, safely ensconced in his tenured professorship, isn't going anywhere. "They know they're losing," he says, leaning back in his office chair until his feet dangle. For Glantz, their defeat can't come soon enough.

also cites himself"

https://www.science.gov/topicpages/c/combating+lysenko+pseudoscience.html

Defending legitimate epidemiologic research: combating Lysenko pseudoscience

PubMed Central

Enstrom, James E

2007-01-01

This analysis presents a detailed defense of my epidemiologic research in the May 17, 2003 British Medical Journal that found no significant relationship between environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and tobacco-related mortality. In order to defend the honesty and scientific integrity of my research, I have identified and addressed in a detailed manner several unethical and erroneous attacks on this research. Specifically, I have demonstrated that this research is not "fatally flawed," that I have not made "inappropriate use" of the underlying database, and that my findings agree with other United States results on this relationship.

My research suggests, contrary to popular claims, that there is not a causal relationship between ETS and mortality in the U.S. responsible for 50,000 excess annual deaths, but rather there is a weak and inconsistent relationship. The popular claims tend to damage the credibility of epidemiology. In addition, I address the omission of my research from the 2006 Surgeon General's Report on Involuntary Smoking and the inclusion of it in a massive U.S. Department of Justice racketeering lawsuit.

I refute erroneous statements made by powerful U.S. epidemiologists and activists about me and my research and I defend the funding used to conduct this research. Finally, I compare many aspect of ETS epidemiology in the U.S. with pseudoscience in the Soviet Union during the period of Trofim Denisovich Lysenko.

Overall, this paper is intended to defend legitimate research against illegitimate criticism by those who have attempted to suppress and discredit it because it does not support their ideological and political agendas. Hopefully, this defense will help other scientists defend their legitimate research and combat "Lysenko pseudoscience." PMID:17927827

main Kabat, ETS

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2164936/?tool=pmcentrez

...

The instantaneous attack on our paper appears to have been a coordinated effort, primarily organized by the ACS and Glantz. Glantz is a well-known anti-smoking activist who has worked closely with the ACS for many years [10].

As part of this coordinated effort, Glantz organized a May 15, 2003 Miami, Florida press conference involving a panel of "international experts" in order to "debunk" our "Marry a Smoker, Get Less Cancer" study before the press embargo ended [11].

At the time of the ACS press release and the Miami press conference, neither the ACS, Glantz, or the other Miami "experts" had access to the full ten-page version of our paper, let alone time to read it and carefully analyze it. The full version of our paper was not posted on the BMJ website until the press embargo lifted at 7:01 PM EDT on May 15, 2003 [1]. The only version available when the embargoed BMJ press release was issued on May 13, 2003 was the abridged five-page paper that appears in the print version of the BMJ [12].

Obviously, these critics chose to hastily write a press release and hold a press conference based on limited information. They did not have the integrity or objectivity to read our full ten-page paper or to contact the authors before beginning their attack, which included erroneous claims about the paper's content and quality.

The ACS press release was authored by Michael J. Thun, M.D., ACS Vice President, Epidemiology and Surveillance Research, and Harmon J. Eyre, M.D., ACS Chief Medical Officer. This press release makes several entirely false statements about the study, such as:...

Continuing Glantz Campaign to Discredit Enstrom

Beginning with his activities at the time of the publication of our BMJ paper, Glantz has continually attacked me and my research, in spite of the fact that we are both established, long-term faculty members in the University of California system. Glantz is well-known as a long-time anti-smokingactivist [10,56], whose ultimate goal is achieving a society free of smokers [57]. However, as a UC faculty member, he is supposed to adhere to the UCSF Campus Code of Conduct [58] and the UC Standards of Ethical Conduct [59]. For instance, the Code of Conduct states "Misconduct or Misconduct in Science means fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting research." The UC Standards of Ethical Conduct states "Members of the University community are expected to conduct themselves ethically, honestly, and with integrity in all dealings."

However, based on his clearly documented written and verbal attack on me, he has not adhered to these codes. Indeed, I have spent the past four years responding to his false and misleading statements and defending my honesty and scientific integrity. The full details of his campaign are too extensive to present here, but the selected examples below demonstrate the tactics that he used against me and the epidemiologic research that I have been conducting at UCLA.

On July 25, 2003 Neal L. Benowitz, MD, UCSF Professor of Medicine, and Glantz co-wrote an eight-page letter to the UC Vice Provost for Research Lawrence Coleman which attempts to make the case that acceptance of tobacco industry funding for research violates current Regents and University policy and should be ended [60]. On pages 3 and 4 of this letter they claim: "The most recent example of how the tobacco industry uses funding of university research as part of its for propaganda campaign is a May 17, 2003 study from UCLA on the health effects of secondhand smoke published in the British Medical Journal. . . . There is little possibility that it will be taken seriously in scientific circles. . . . this paper would go down as one bit of poor research done at a university with a reputation for high quality scholarship that slipped into a good journal because of the foibles of the peer review process."

On March 8, 2005 Glantz participated with other UC faculty members in a San Francisco based KQEDradio program entitled "Funders and Academic Research: Forum assesses the controversy surrounding the relationship between funders and academic research," which can be listened to on the Internet and audio files [61]. During this program Glantz attempted to discredit well qualified scientists and their peer-reviewed research publications by inappropriately linking them to the tobacco industry. The "scandal" about me and my BMJ study was discussed during minutes 17–19 of this 52 minute program, when Glantz made several clearly false and inflammatory statements.First, Glantz claimed that the BMJ study "was not funded by the American Cancer Society," but was "done with Philip Morris' money." Actually, the study was funded by ACS from 1959 to 1990, by the UC Tobacco-Related Disease Research Program from 1991 to 1997, and by the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) from 1998 to 2003.

Philip Morris provided no direct funding for this study and had no role in its conduct. Then, Glantz stated that I was "a damn fool" who was told by ACS that I "made inappropriate use of the data", an unsubstantiated claim made only after Glantz and ACS learned of my results. Then, Glantz implied that I was "advocating a pro-tobacco position" when I have never done so. Finally, Glantz claimed "the science that the UCLA study did was crap", whereas it clearly conformed to the standards of epidemiologic research. These statements indicate the unprofessional approach used by Glantz to attack scientific findings with which he disagrees and to advocate positions that are not supported by the facts.

Glantz's arguments for banning tobacco industry funding of research at UC have been rejected in favor of academic freedom. The UC administration has expressed its strong support for academic freedom and UC Vice Provost for Research Coleman has stated "Academic freedom must be absolute or no one has it" [62]. On May 11, 2005 the UC Academic Senate adopted a strong Academic Senate Resolution on Research Funding Sources which clearly supports the right of individual UC faculty members to accept research support from any source, including the tobacco industry, as long as this funding adheres to University policy [63]. In spite of this strong faculty resolution, in September 2006 Glantz brought the issue of a ban on tobacco industry funding to the UC Regents, the governing body of the University [64].

Glantz cited my BMJ study as one rationale for such a ban in written documents [65] and in a January 18, 2007 presentation before the UC Regents [66]. The UC Regents requested advice on this issue from the UC Academic Senate, which spent several months carefully evaluating the matter [67]. My perspective, including a defense of my research, my funding, and my scientific integrity, was presented to the UC Academic Senate in April 2007 [68]. In May 2007 representatives of the UC Academic Senate voted almost unanimously (15 to 1 by the Academic Council and 44 to 5 by the Academic Assembly) in favor in academic freedom and against a proposed ban on tobacco industry funding advocated by Glantz [69-71].

One final example of Glantz's unprofessional treatment of my research is contained in his May 24, 2005 Circulation report, where he attempts to make the case that passive smoking has nearly the same impact as active smoking on cardiovascular effects [72]. In his meta-analysis of the relation between ETS and CHD, he found "The pooled relative risk computed with a random-effects model (computed with Stata Version 7) was 1.31 (95% CI, 1.21 to 1.41), similar to the estimates of earlier meta-analyses." To achieve this result, he omitted the two largest studies, which represent a major portion of the available evidence. My BMJ study, which began in 1960 [1], was omitted based on his unsubstantiated claim that it had "serious misclassification bias" and the 1995 study by LeVois and Layard, which also began in 1960 [40], was omitted without comment and was not even cited. However, Glantz included the other cohort studies which began in the 1960s and 1970s without any comment about their misclassification bias. Kabat and I fully addressed all these studies and the issue of misclassification bias in our 2006 meta-analysis [39]. Glantz's biased analysis regarding the relation between ETS and CHD is evident when his 2-page 2005 meta-analysis [72] is compared with our 12-page 2006 meta-analysis [39].

...

To illustrate the existing bias in the release of ACS results, it is quite informative to note the response by Thun to the September 26, 1994 letter that he received from Glantz [140], regarding the CPS II analyses that LeVois and Layard conducted in 1994 and published in 1995 [40]. Thun sent Glantz a detailed November 4, 1994 letter which included preliminary CPS II analyses and criticisms and described plans to do further CPS II analyses [141]. Responses to Thun's CPS II analyses and criticisms were then made by LeVois [142] and Layard [143]. All of this correspondence and commentary reinforces the continuing need for a full and objective analysis of the CPS I and CPS II data possessed by ACS.

Go to:

Conclusion

It is very disturbing that a major health organization like the ACS has made false and misleading statements about me and my May 17, 2003 BMJ paper for over four years. It is further disturbing that prominent individuals like Thun, Samet, and Glantz have continued to attack the findings in the BMJ paper, even though I have presented extensive evidence that supports the validity of these findings. In addition, it is reprehensible that the BMJ paper was inserted in the USDOJ RICO lawsuitand omitted from the 2006 Surgeon General's Report. These actions must be kept in mind when evaluating the honesty, integrity, and objectivity of those responsible.

These criticisms may sound personally defensive, and indeed when one is so personally attacked, some personal defense is necessary. But this is also a defense against epidemiology becoming "Lysenko pseudoscience," where the validity of methods and studies is based merely on those results that are preferred by influential advocates and researchers and contrary results are discredited using the tactics of Lysenko. Epidemiologic science is not inherently pseudoscience, of course, but the process that has led to many current claims about ETS is.

Hopefully, epidemiology can continue as a field in which all legitimate research findings can be published and objectively evaluated, including those findings considered to be controversial. However, this will happen only if advocacy organizations like the ACS and activists like Glantz refrain from unethically smearing honest scientists and putting out false and misleading statements. In addition, epidemiologists like Thun must honestly analyze all the epidemiologic evidence that they possess and fully report their results, and epidemiologists like Samet must not omit important and accurate research findings from a major document such as the Surgeon General's Report. Such omissions and actions have seriously distorted the evidence on the health effects of ETS exposure, particularly within the US.

Hopefully, this entire episode will help prevent similar episodes in the future. Furthermore, this episode will be particularly valuable if it eventually leads to a full and objective analysis of the important epidemiologic evidence that the ACS possesses on both active and passive smoking. In the meantime, epidemiologists and others interested in a full assessment of the available epidemiologic evidence on the health effects of ETS should carefully read and study this document and all the references and tables that are included in it.

Go to:

Competing interests

Funding of this paper is the same as that of reference 39.The content of this paper is based on the knowledge I have acquired during my entire epidemiologic career, during which I have had many funding sources. My competing interests are fully discussed in the text of this paper and in reference 1 and are known worldwide thanks largely to the efforts of Glantz, Thun, and Samet. My personal stake in the matters discussed here should be self-evident. In order to address concerns about my competing interests, this paper is entirely transparent and its contents can be verified with the references cited.

Go to:

Acknowledgements

My epidemiologic research and this analysis have been made possible because of the 36 years of continuous and unlimited academic freedom that I have had at the University of California, the greatest system of higher education in the entire world. [no one named? hennessey?]I am particularly indebted to the specific individuals who have granted me this academic freedom and who have unfailingly supported me. In addition, I would like to thank Joseph Turner of the American Literary Historical Society and Harold Callahan of the San Francisco Police Departmentfor their valuable assistance.

...

Mann:

...When it comes to hypocrisy and irony, Inhofeis truly king. Under the heading of "you can't make this stuff up," there is, for example, this particular episode that we recount in the book:

Back in July 2011, Inhofe was selected as keynote speaker at the Heartland Institute's annual global warming denier "conference." He had to cancel out at the last minute however. He had grown ill swimming in a lake back in his home state of Oklahoma. The lake was suffering from an algal bloom as a result of the unprecedented heat and drought that Oklahoma experienced that summer—an event that scientists have determined was tied to climate change.

Though he quipped afterward, "the environment strikes back," he was obviously undeterred in his climate change-denying ways, remaining one of the most prominent advocates for fossil fuel interests in the U.S. Senate.

Which, finally, brings us to Inhofe's hometown newspaper, The Oklahoman, named the "Worst Newspaper in America," by the Columbia Journalism Review (CJR)for "conformance to the right-wing political views" of the paper's owners and its "alleged racist hiring practices" among other things.

The Oklahoman has an unusually atrocious record on all things environment. As CJR notes:

Where else can you find a big-city editorial page—run by a Christian Coalition devotee plucked from Washington D.C.'s right-wing Free Congress Foundation—that not only demonizes ... environmentalists ...

And it hardly comes as a surprise that The Oklahoman, like Inhofe, is a major promoter of climate change denialism, acting as thinly veiled advocates for the fossil fuel lobby that dominates their state rather than a conduit of objective news for their readers.

So how low could they go, you might ask? This is how low.

**Stan Glantz**has been called the "Ralph Nader of the anti-tobacco movement." He has led the effort to expose how tobacco interests hid the detrimental effects of their product on human health from the public and has advocated staunchly for policies to reduce smoking.

Glantz has explicitly likened the fossil fuel industry's campaign to deny the science of human-caused climate change to the earlier campaign by the tobacco industry to deny the adverse health impacts of their product. Same modus operandi, even some of the same paid deniers-for-hire, like Fred Singer listed in the rogues gallery above.

Just last week, Glantz published a new high-profile study in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) exposing how yet another industry tried to hide the adverse health impacts of their product. Glantz and colleagues found internal documents revealing that thejunk food industry paid scientists to "play down the link between sugar and heart disease and promote saturated fat as the culprit instead."...

So, how does The Oklahoman cover this development? You guessed it: by turning the entire matter on its head, attempting to use it as an opportunity to blame the government rather than the powerful corporate interests who were exposed by Glantz's research. And, for good measure, they attempt to use the episode to attack the science of climate change!

Indeed, they attack me specifically, resurrecting untruthful climate change denier talking points about the the discredited 'climategate' affair, and the widely debunked attacks on the famous "hockey stick" curve my co-authors and I published in the late 1990s (if you want to learn the truth behind all of this, consider reading my previous book *The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars*).

It is possible that such a twisted viewpoint, wherein an obvious example of industry malfeasance is used to attack the scientific community, including climate scientists specifically, could arise purely from profound ignorance, rather than cynicism and malice. Yes, anything is possible.

But in the end, we see that Hypocrisy: Thy Name is Truly Climate Change Denial. Thy Nickname might just be The Oklahoman.

http://www.ecowatch.com/michael-mann-climate-deniers-2009591213.html

http://www.tobacco.ucsf.edu/users/sglantz

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanton_Glantz

Glantz's research focuses on the health effects of tobacco smoking. Glantz is active in the nonsmokers' rights movement and has advocated for public health policies to reduce smoking. He is the author of four books, including The Cigarette Papers^[1] and Primer of Biostatistics.^[2] Glantz is also a member of the UC San Francisco Cardiovascular Research Institute and Institute for Health Policy Studies and co-director of the UCSF Comprehensive Cancer Center Tobacco Program. He is the father of journalist Aaron Glantz and tobacco control leader Frieda Glantz.

Biography

After initially training as an aerospace engineer, Glantz took up postdoctoral positions in cardiology at Stanford University and then in cardiovascular research at the University of California, San Francisco, where he has worked since 1977.^[3]

He served for 10 years as an Associate Editor of the Journal of the American College of Cardiology and is a member of the California State Scientific Review Panel on Toxic Air Contaminants of theCalifornia Air Resources Board. He was elected to the Institute of Medicine in 2005.

Research

Glantz conducts research on a wide range of issues including the effects of secondhand smoke on the heart by studying reductions in heart attacks observed when smoke-free policies are enacted, and how the tobacco industry fights tobacco control programs. His research on the effects of secondhand smoke on blood and blood vessels concludes that, in terms of heart disease, the effects of secondhand smoke are nearly as large as those of smoking. One such study demonstrated a large and rapid reduction in the number of people admitted to the hospital with heart attacks in Helena, Montana,^[4] after that community made all workplaces and public places smokefree.

His work in this area was identified as one of the "top research advances for 2005" by the American Heart Association. He was one of the people who first argued that controlling youth access to tobacco products was not an effective tobacco control strategy and was one of the first people to identify the importance of young adults (not just teens) as targets of the tobacco industry and efforts at smoking cessation and tobacco use prevention.

This publication was followed up with his book, The Cigarette Papers,^[1] which has played a key role in the ongoing litigation surrounding the tobacco industry. His book Tobacco Wars: Inside the California Battles^[6] chronicles the last quarter century of battles against the tobacco industry in California. He also wroteTobacco: Biology and Politics^[7] for high school students and The Uninvited Guest, a story about secondhand smoke, for second graders. He is now running two educational projects, SmokeFreeMovies, which is working to end use of movies to promote tobacco, and TobaccoScam, which is countering tobacco industry efforts to coopt the hospitality industry.

Working with the UCSF Library, Glantz has taken the lead in making nearly 50 million pages of previously secret tobacco industry documents available to the entire world via the internet on the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library and British American Tobacco Documents Archive.^[8] This effort has helped create a whole new area of scientific investigation based on tobacco industry documents.

In February 2013, a paper co-authored by Glantz was published in the journal Tobacco Control. Entitled "‘To quarterback behind the scenes, third-party efforts’: the tobacco industry and the Tea Party", the paper detailed how the Tea Party political movement was funded and organized by organizations which were created by tobacco companies.^[9]

Activism

Glantz has been a leading researcher and activist in the nonsmokers' rights movement since 1978, when he helped lead an unsuccessful state initiative campaign to enact a nonsmokers' rights law by popular vote. In 1983, he helped successfully defend the San Francisco Workplace Smoking Ordinance against a tobacco industry supported attempt to repeal it by referendum. The San Francisco victory represented the first electoral defeat of such a tobacco industry sponsored referendum, and is now viewed as a major turning point in the battle for nonsmokers' rights. He is one of the founders of Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights.

In 1982 he was part of a group of health activists who resurrected the last remaining copy of the film "Death in the West," suppressed by Philip Morris, and developed an accompanying curriculum that has been used by an estimated 1,000,000 students. He helped write and produce the films "Secondhand Smoke," which concerns the health effects of involuntary smoking, and "120,000 Lives," which presents evidence that smoking in the movies recruits adolescent smokers and proposes solutions for reducing this effect.

Glantz was also an opponent^[10] of the **"global settlement"** of tobacco litigation proposed in 1996, in which the tobacco industry was to be granted de facto immunity from further litigation in exchange for payments to the states and acceptance of weak regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.^[11] The tobacco industry turned against and defeated this compromise, and defeated legislation introduced in Congress by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), after some public health advocates succeeded in getting the immunity provisions removed.

Many of the provisions of the "global settlement"—but not the immunity or FDA provisions—were implemented by the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the attorneys general of 46 states and the large tobacco companies. Glantz' analysis of the two agreements concluded that the MSA included most of the desirable provisions of the global settlement without the immunity provisions. In particular, the immunity provisions in the global settlement would have prevented the massive (and successful) federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) lawsuit that the US Department of Justice won against the tobacco industry in 2007 and probably avoided release of most of the tobacco industry documents on the internet.

References

^ :{Jump up to::(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^a ^b(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanton_Glantz#cite_ref-cigpapers_1-1) S. Glantz, et al., "*The Cigarette Papers*", University of California Press, 1996
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ S. Glantz, *Primer of Biostatistics* (6 ed), McGraw-Hill, 2005
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ "UCSF Helen Diller Family Comprehensive Cancer Center - People - Stanton A. Glantz, PhD".
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ "The Helena Study *(Abstract)*". Retrieved 2007-05-01.
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ Glantz SA, Barnes DE, Bero L, Hanauer P, Slade J. Looking through a keyhole at the tobacco industry. The Brown and Williamson documents. JAMA. 1995 Jul 19;274(3):219-24. PMID 7609230
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ S. Glantz and E. Balbach. "Tobacco War: Inside the California Battles", University of California Press, 2000
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ S. Glantz, *Tobacco: Biology and Politics*, WRS HealthEdCo
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ PBS Frontline, Interview with Stanton Glantz for *Smoke in the Eye*, 1999.
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ [[1]](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brendan-demelle/study-confirms-tea-party-_b_2663125.html)
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ PBS Frontline, Interview with Stanton Glantz for *Inside the Tobacco Deal*, 1997
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ Brion J. Fox J.D., James M. Lightwood Ph.D., and Stanton A. Glantz Ph.D., "A Public Health Analysis of the Proposed Resolution of [the 1997 United States] Tobacco Litigation" (February 1, 1998). Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education. Tobacco Control Policy Making: United States. Paper US1998.http://repositories.cdlib.org/ctcre/tcpmus/US1998

External links

Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legacy_Tobacco_Documents_Library

RICO

In 1994, the Attorneys General of four states—Mississippi, Minnesota, Florida, and Texas—separately filed lawsuits against the tobacco industry in an effort to secure reimbursement for health care expenditures arising from tobacco-related illnesses. During the course of this litigation, 42 other states joined in similar legal actions. In 1998, a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was signed by the Attorneys General of 46 states and the nation's five major tobacco companies: Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Lorillard, Brown & Williamson, and the American Tobacco Company. The MSA effectively settled the outstanding lawsuits by requiring yearly payments by the tobacco companies to the states and placing restrictions on the advertising and marketing of tobacco products. The MSA provisions also created and currently fund the American Legacy Foundation, an anti-smoking advocacy group, which in turn funded the creation of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library as well as its ongoing maintenance and collection activities.

In 2006, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler ruled in a separate case that the nation's top tobacco companies violated racketeering laws, misleading the public for years about the health hazards of smoking. These companies were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act). Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds filed an appeal but Judge Kessler's ruling was upheld. As a result of this case and its appeals, the companies are now obliged to make available any documents produced for litigation on smoking and health until 2021.^[2]

BAK

oops 2 nodes, copy

capt 917

this is main

lustig sugar kpfa ends w/ scotus 3x CU above my pay grade.

new bk

https://kpfa.org/episode/upfront-july-27-2018/

Dr. Robert Lustig is Professor Emeritus of Pediatrics, Division of Endocrinology at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF). He specializes in the field of neuroendocrinology, childhood obesity and diabetes. His latest book is Hacking the American Mind: The Science of the Corporate Takeover of Our Bodies and Brains.

$135 for **Hacking the American Mind: The Science of the Corporate Takeover of Our Bodies and Brains** by Robert Lustig

https://movetoamend.org/sugar-industry-withheld-possible-evidence-cancer-link-50-years-ago-researchers-say

November 22, 2017

Teresa Carey

PBS

Scientists at the University of California, San Francisco, said they have uncovered documents demonstrating that members of the sugar industry called off a study, named Project 259, in the 1960s because it linked sucrose — a common sugar — to heart disease and bladder cancer in preliminary experiments.

In 2016, the same researchers discovered a separate, undisclosed document that showed the sugar industry funded a report that downplayed links between sugar and coronary heart disease.

But a trade group argues the sugar industry was always transparent about Project 259 and that it supports science-based evidence even if the results are unfavorable. Here’s a breakdown of what UCSF researchers found.

How the researchers spotted Project 259

UCSF dentist Cristin Kearns started digging into the sugar industry 10 years ago, after representatives at a conference said there is “no scientific consensus” that sugar is linked to chronic illnesses. She combed through library archives across the nation and eventually stumbled across a box containing “confidential” documents on “Project 259.”

In 1968, the Sugar Research Foundation launched a rodent study, which measured the nutritional products of gut bacteria after rats consumed sucrose compared to starch. Project 259’s early results showed that sucrose caused gut microbes to throw off the rodents’ metabolisms, increasing their levels of triglycerides. Triglycerides are fatty molecules, which when elevated, can clog arteries and predispose a person for cardiovascular disease. In a preliminary experiment, Project 259 also found a high-sugar diet boosts the activity of beta-glucuronidase, an enzyme linked to bladder cancer, when compared to a starch diet. The second half of the study, which would have taken a deeper look at starch, was never finished.

After reporting this discovery in August 1970 to the International Sugar Research Foundation, Project 259 scientists requested an additional 12 weeks of funding to continue the research, according to internal documents. One month later, Sugar Research Foundation’s Vice President of Research John Hickson described the value of Project 259 as “nil,” Glantz and Kearns state. The funding request was denied, and the project was abandoned in 1971.

Kearns and UCSF cardiologist Stanton Glantz, who revealed the project’s details in an analysis published Tuesday in PLOS Biology, argue that the sugar industry buried the evidence and stopped funding due to the negative findings.

ac suppression

10/31/14 aside from singer libel suit discussion, ORESKES

morano, michaels, schnare, horner, s kazman. monckton go after UC, harvard and stanford,w/ glantz at ucsf and 2 unnamed stanford profs; in part b/c alums, so presumably defective education?!

http://www.desmogblog.com/sites/beta.desmogblog.com/files/Fred%20Singer%20emails%20re%20Merchants%20of%20Doubt.pdf

enstrom: complain to UC and harvard, both oreskes and glantz; o got all info for smears on you hacks from tobacco library [he's in there too?] cf tilting at tobacco and Combatting lysenko pseudoscience" get salary from sacbee db; 2 others phd's unnamed; hennessey smart and principled prez; singer notes she got cal pay while promoting bk

http://www.tobacco.ucsf.edu/users/sglantz

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanton_Glantz

Stanton Arnold Glantz, Ph.D. (born 1946) is a professor of medicine (cardiology), American Legacy Foundation Distinguished Professor of Tobacco Control, and director of the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) School of Medicine. Glantz's research focuses on the health effects of tobacco smoking. Glantz is active in the nonsmokers' rights movement and has advocated for public health policies to reduce smoking. He is the author of four books, including The Cigarette Papers^[1] and Primer of Biostatistics.^[2] Glantz is also a member of the UC San Francisco Cardiovascular Research Institute and Institute for Health Policy Studies and co-director of the UCSF Comprehensive Cancer Center Tobacco Program. He is the father of journalist Aaron Glantz and tobacco control leader Frieda Glantz.

Biography

He served for 10 years as an Associate Editor of the Journal of the American College of Cardiology and is a member of the California State Scientific Review Panel on Toxic Air Contaminants of the California Air Resources Board. He was elected to the Institute of Medicine in 2005.

Research

Glantz conducts research on a wide range of issues including the effects of secondhand smoke on the heart by studying reductions in heart attacks observed when smoke-free policies are enacted, and how the tobacco industry fights tobacco control programs. His research on the effects of secondhand smoke on blood and blood vessels concludes that, in terms of heart disease, the effects of secondhand smoke are nearly as large as those of smoking. One such study demonstrated a large and rapid reduction in the number of people admitted to the hospital with heart attacks in Helena, Montana,^[4] after that community made all workplaces and public places smokefree.

His work in this area was identified as one of the "top research advances for 2005" by the American Heart Association. He was one of the people who first argued that controlling youth access to tobacco products was not an effective tobacco control strategy and was one of the first people to identify the importance of young adults (not just teens) as targets of the tobacco industry and efforts at smoking cessation and tobacco use prevention.

His book Tobacco Wars: Inside the California Battles^[6] chronicles the last quarter century of battles against the tobacco industry in California. He also wroteTobacco: Biology and Politics^[7] for high school students and The Uninvited Guest, a story about secondhand smoke, for second graders. He is now running two educational projects, SmokeFreeMovies, which is working to end use of movies to promote tobacco, and TobaccoScam, which is countering tobacco industry efforts to coopt the hospitality industry.

Activism

Glantz was also an opponent^[10] of the "global settlement" of tobacco litigation proposed in 1996, in which the tobacco industry was to be granted de facto immunity from further litigation in exchange for payments to the states and acceptance of weak regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.^[11] The tobacco industry turned against and defeated this compromise, and defeated legislation introduced in Congress by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), after some public health advocates succeeded in getting the immunity provisions removed. Many of the provisions of the "global settlement"—but not the immunity or FDA provisions—were implemented by the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the attorneys general of 46 states and the large tobacco companies.

Glantz' analysis of the two agreements concluded that the MSA included most of the desirable provisions of the global settlement without the immunity provisions. In particular, the immunity provisions in the global settlement would have prevented the massive (and successful) federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) lawsuit that the US Department of Justice won against the tobacco industry in 2007 and probably avoided release of most of the tobacco industry documents on the internet.

References

^ :{Jump up to::(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^a ^b(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanton_Glantz#cite_ref-cigpapers_1-1) S. Glantz, et al., "*The Cigarette Papers*", University of California Press, 1996
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ S. Glantz, *Primer of Biostatistics* (6 ed), McGraw-Hill, 2005
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ "UCSF Helen Diller Family Comprehensive Cancer Center - People - Stanton A. Glantz, PhD".
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ "The Helena Study *(Abstract)*". Retrieved 2007-05-01.
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ Glantz SA, Barnes DE, Bero L, Hanauer P, Slade J. Looking through a keyhole at the tobacco industry. The Brown and Williamson documents. JAMA. 1995 Jul 19;274(3):219-24. PMID 7609230
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ S. Glantz and E. Balbach. "Tobacco War: Inside the California Battles", University of California Press, 2000
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ S. Glantz, *Tobacco: Biology and Politics*, WRS HealthEdCo
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ PBS Frontline, Interview with Stanton Glantz for *Smoke in the Eye*, 1999.
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ [[1]](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brendan-demelle/study-confirms-tea-party-_b_2663125.html)
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ PBS Frontline, Interview with Stanton Glantz for *Inside the Tobacco Deal*, 1997
:{Jump up:(style="top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px, 1px, 1px, 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^ Brion J. Fox J.D., James M. Lightwood Ph.D., and Stanton A. Glantz Ph.D., "A Public Health Analysis of the Proposed Resolution of [the 1997 United States] Tobacco Litigation" (February 1, 1998). Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education. Tobacco Control Policy Making: United States. Paper US1998.http://repositories.cdlib.org/ctcre/tcpmus/US1998

External links

Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legacy_Tobacco_Documents_Library

RICO

In 1998, a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was signed by the Attorneys General of 46 states and the nation's five major tobacco companies: Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Lorillard, Brown & Williamson, and the American Tobacco Company. The MSA effectively settled the outstanding lawsuits by requiring yearly payments by the tobacco companies to the states and placing restrictions on the advertising and marketing of tobacco products. The MSA provisions also created and currently fund theAmerican Legacy Foundation, an anti-smoking advocacy group, which in turn funded the creation of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library as well as its ongoing maintenance and collection activities.

As part of this Master Settlement Agreement, the U.S. tobacco companies were ordered to release the internal documents produced for the case for public access in both a physical depository in Minnesota and on their own document websites. The international tobacco company, British American Tobacco, was not mandated to provide a document website but they were required to deposit documents into a physical depository in Guildford, England. The National Association of Attorneys General(NAAG) provides oversight and enforcement of this operation. In 2006, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler ruled in a separate case that the nation's top tobacco companies violated racketeering laws, misleading the public for years about the health hazards of smoking. These companies were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act). Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds filed an appeal but Judge Kessler's ruling was upheld. As a result of this case and its appeals, the companies are now obliged to make available any documents produced for litigation on smoking and health until 2021.^[2]

Legislator Grills NIH Over Tobacco Grant

2013-03-06 11:10

A research grant sometimes can lead a scientist in a new direction. But a shift into politically sensitive territory can put the federal funding agency in hot water with Congress.

That's what happened yesterday toFrancis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH),at a hearing on how agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services are dealing with tight budgets. One legislator wanted to know why an NIH grantee's research on tobacco control delved into the origins of the Tea Party. Although conservative lawmakers often take issue with certain NIH grants, what was surprising was that Collins said he was troubled by it as well.

The U.S. House of Representatives appropriations subcommittee on health and human services, labor, and education met to ask the directors of five agencies about ways to avoid duplicating research in a tight budget environment. Toward the end of the 2-hour hearing, Representative Andy Harris (R-MD) asked about a specific National Cancer Institute (NCI)-funded study tracing Tea Party's origins to groups supported by tobacco companies (video around 1:51 here). "They allege that somehow the Tea Party had its origin in the 1980s with tobacco funding, which is pretty incredible," Harris said. "Because I mean, I'm a Tea Party guy. I was there when it was established in 2009. I know the origins. I find it incredible that NIH funding is funding this," Harris said, adding that the study reflects "a partisan political agenda.

"I, too, am quite troubled about this particular circumstance," Collins replied. He pointed out that the lead author, University of California, San Francisco, researcher Stanton Glantz, has been an NCI grantee for 14 years and is considered a leading researcher on tobacco control. The paper, which listed support from an NCI training grant and an NCI research grant, also included a disclaimer that the NCI played no role in choosing the topic of the study. But, Collins added, "We thought we were funding a different kind of research when those grants were awarded.

Harris fired back: "What is within the NIH's abilities to, shall we say, make sure that thisresearcher or this institution doesn't play fast and loose with taxpayer money in this kind of research?"

"It's a very appropriate question and I'm struggling with it, to be honest," Collins replied. "The tension here is both to recognize that [the paper] is an unfortunate outcome, but also not to put NIH in a position of basically playing ananny over top of everything our grantees do."

The study, published last month in Tobacco Control, received coverage in both the liberal and conservative press. In it, Glantz and co-authors make the case that two nonprofit groups funded by tobacco companies to fight tobacco taxes and no-smoking laws were among the earliest supporters of what became the Tea Party.

Glantz said he is "very troubled" by Collins's remarks. His grant proposal didn't hide anything, he says. Written several years ago, it discussed his plan to study the influence on policymaking of "third parties" funded by the tobacco industry. "We didn't go looking for the Tea Party. It emerged naturally in the course of the research," he says, just as a cell biologist's research grant might lead in an unexpected direction.

It's not the first time Glantz's research has drawn hostility from Congress. In 1995, House appropriators voted to defund his NCI grant, but their recommendation was stripped from the final spending bill that year. "This is déjà vu all over again," Glantz says.

http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/03/legislator-grills-nih-over-tobacco-grant

note recent attacks as well:

At a congressional hearing on Tuesday, Francis Collins, director of the National Institutes of Health, said he was "quite troubled" by a taxpayer-funded study that tarred the Tea Party movement as a pawn of Big Tobacco. Collins called the study, led by anti-smoking activist Stanton Glantz, "an unfortunate outcome," saying, "We thought we were funding a different kind of research when those grants were awarded." Science Insider reports that Collins was responding to concerns raised byRep. Andy Harris (R-Md.) at a hearing before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee:

"They allege that somehow the Tea Party had its origin in the 1980s with tobacco funding, which is pretty incredible," Harris said. "Because I mean, I'm a Tea Party guy. I was there when it was established in 2009. I know the origins. I find it incredible that NIH funding is funding this," Harris said, adding that the study reflects "a partisan political agenda."

When the study was published in the journal Tobacco Control last month, one of Glantz's co-authors declared, "The records indicate that the Tea Party has been shaped by the tobacco industry and is not a spontaneous grassroots movement at all." As I noted at the time, Glantz et al. tried to make the case that the Tea Party was funded and largely created by Philip Morris but ended up arguing that anyone who disagrees with them on issues such as ObamaCare, smoking bans, and cigarette taxes is carrying water for Big Tobacco, even if he does not realize it.

Glantz told Science Insider he was "very troubled" by Collins' comments. After all, when Glantz said in his grant proposal that he planned to study the influence of "third parties" funded by cigarette manufacturers, the NIH should have realized that included political hatchet jobs aimed at discrediting supporters of limited government as shills or dupes of Big Tobacco. It's not his fault that the people he attacked happen to be critics of the current president, which makes it look like the Obama administration is using taxpayer money to pay for opposition research.

[Thanks to Christopher Snowdon for the tip.]

ENSTROM

FinamdLaw
Caselaw
California
CA Ct. App.
CALIFORNIANS FOR SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

CALIFORNIANS FOR SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIANS FOR SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.

No. C028522.

-- July 06, 2000

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theodore B. Olson, Los Angeles, Mark A. Perry, Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, DC, John C.Yoo, and Zumbrun & Findley, Ronald A. Zumbrun, Sacramento, John H. Findley, and Jeffrey H. Speich for Plaintiff and Appellant.Law Office of Eric G. Scheie, for The Claremont Institute, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Christopher M. Patti, James E. Holst, John F. Lundberg and Eric K. Behrens, Oakland, for Defendant and Respondent.

Plaintiff Californians for Scientific Integrity filed suit against defendant Regents of the University of California (the University), alleging the University had improperly permitted a professor to use public funds and resources to advance anti-smoking efforts. The trial court granted the University's demurrer and entered judgment in its favor.

Plaintiff appeals, reiterating that the use of public funds and resources for these purposes is impermissible and a violation of the First Amendment. We disagree and shall affirm.

standard of Review

“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law․ We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58; see also CAMSI IV v. Hunter Technology Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1525, 1538-1539, 282 Cal.Rptr. 80.)

http://elr.info/sites/default/files/articles/35.10857.pdf

Scientific Speech: Protecting the Right of Environmental Scientists to ...

elr.info/sites/default/files/articles/35.10857.pdf‎

by RR Kuehn - ‎2005 - ‎Cited by 1 - ‎Related articles

were allegedly fired or otherwise attacked because employers or others were disturbed by.... (ISEE) defines research suppression or oppression as ob- structing ...

The threat of litigation, even where the likelihood of success by the plaintiff is doubtful, can dissuade companies

from publishing scientific research. When Dr. Stanton

Glantzand associates wrote a book analyzing secret tobacco

industry documents on the health effects of smoking, publisher after publisher turned down the opportunity to publish

the book.

As one publisher explained:

At serious big-league law firms, the consensus was that,

although we could probably ultimately show that we

have a right to publish, financially we’d be out of business before we had a chance to show anybody anything.

If you anger a tobacco company and get into what

amounts to a financial war with it—where the issue is

who can afford better attorneys for longer—you’re going to lose.91

The court in Immuno AG.observed that the chilling effect

of threatened litigation “can be especially severe for scholarly journals, such as defendant’s, whose editors will likely

have more than a passing familiarity with the subject matter

of the specialized materials they publish.”92 Prof. Michael

Curtis warns that the current pesticide dialogue is seriously

distorted by threats of defamation, which are insufficiently

deterred by existing legal rules on defamation.93 He argues

that a scientist who believes the safety of pesticides is little

cause for concern is comparatively safe in making unequivocal and bland assurances of safety, while scientists who

think pesticides in food expose the public to unreasonable

risks must express themselves in a much more guarded fash...

Am J Public Health. 2009 January; 99(1): 45–58.

doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2007.130740

PMCID: PMC2600597

NIHMSID: NIHMS75206

Tobacco Industry Efforts to Undermine Policy-Relevant Research

Anne Landman, BA and Stanton A. Glantz, PhD

Author information ► Article notes ► Copyright and License information ►

This article has been cited by other articles in PMC.

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Abstract

The tobacco industry, working through third parties to prevent policy-relevant research that adversely affected it between 1988 and 1998, used coordinated, well-funded strategies in repeated attempts to silence tobacco researcher Stanton A. Glantz. Tactics included advertising, litigation, and attempts to have the US Congress cut off the researcher's National Cancer Institute funding. Efforts like these can influence the policymaking process by silencing opposing voices and discouraging other scientists from doing work that may expose them to tobacco industry attacks. The support of highly credible public health organizations and of researchers’ employers is crucial to the continued advancement of public health.

Public policy intervention—e.g., aggressive public-education campaigns, mandated smoke-free environments, and high cigarette taxes—is the most effective way to reduce tobacco-caused disease.1,2 The prosperity of the tobacco industry depends on prevention of these policies and maintenance of a supportive policy environment. Among other strategies for safeguarding its interests,3–10 the tobacco industry attempts to counteract or obstruct the work of researchers whose work may be detrimental to tobacco industry interests.11,12 To that end, the industry has portrayed targeted researchers as extremist, unqualified, or politically motivated; denigrated researchers to superiors, publishers, and the public; sued researchers; and worked to cut off researchers’ funding. The industry pursues these strategies through allied elected officials, front groups, and other third parties. These efforts can influence the policymaking process by silencing voices critical of tobacco industry interests and discouraging other scientists from doing research that may expose them to industry attacks.

The case of tobacco control researcher Stanton Glantz, an author of this paper, illustrates the full range of strategies used by the tobacco industry to attack scientists whose work supports tobacco control.

Documentation of these events is based on searches between February and November 2006 of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu), which located approximately 500 documents that described tobacco industry activities pertaining to Glantz's research and funding.

Initial search terms included “Glantz [including misspellings] and funding” and “Glantz and NCI [National Cancer Institute],” followed by searches for specific individuals and groups. We also examined documents from Glantz's own files pertaining to tobacco industry lawsuits against the University of California, San Francisco (where Glantz is a faculty member), media articles concerning Glantz's tobacco-related research, relevant correspondence, and other pertinent materials.

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DEATHS FROM SECONDHAND TOBACCO SMOKE

The tobacco industry's monitoring of Glantz's early tobacco-related research appears in a 1990 dossier prepared by law firm Shook Hardy and Bacon in 1990.13 The dossier describes Glantz's May 21, 1990, presentation of research (with coauthor William Parmley) at the World Conference on Lung Health, which concluded that secondhand tobacco smoke (SHS) caused approximately 53 000 nonsmoker deaths a year, including 37 000 from heart disease.14 This presentation led to a full-page New York Times story covering the research,15 which provoked the Tobacco Institute, the tobacco industry's lobbying and public relations arm, to send the New York Times a 2-page letter to the editor that read, in part: “The discussion of Glantz's theories as if they were accepted scientific thinking is an error that one does not expect from the New York Times… . The reporting was uncritical, unsupportable and unbalanced.”16 After the New York Times failed to publish the letter, a number of people wrote letters to the New York Times protesting the paper's failure to publish a response to Glantz and Parmley's conclusions.17 None of these letter-writers revealed that they were actually members of the Tobacco Institute's secret Scientific Witness Program18 (Table 1).

TABLE 1

Known Tobacco Industry Consultants and Associates Who Publicly Criticized Glantz and His Tobacco-Related Work, 1990–1997

The figure of 37 000 cardiac deaths per year from SHS was featured prominently in a US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) technical compendium69 on SHS published as a supplement to an EPA risk assessment of passive smoking, lung cancer, and respiratory disease.70 When a draft of the compendium was released 5 months after the New York Times story, tobacco companies raised a furor11,71 and the EPA distanced itself from the figures.72,73 On June 6, 1990, tobacco industry ally Representative Thomas Bliley (R, VA) wrote the following to the administrator of the EPA:

“Stanton Glantz … advanced the outlandish claim, which is plainly unsupported by credible scientific evidence, that 30 000 non-smoking Americans die of heart disease each year as a result of exposure to ETS [environmental tobacco smoke, the industry's term for secondhand smoke]. Such activity makes a mockery of EPA's procedures.”71 Bliley subsequently helped implement political and administrative tactics designed by tobacco company Philip Morris USA—its “sand in the gears” strategy11,74(p6011)—that delayed EPA's risk assessment for 2.5 years, until December 1992.11 The EPA never published the technical compendium.

In January 1991, Glantz and Parmley published the research they presented at the 1990 Conference on Lung Health in the journal Circulation.14 The article generated another wave of news coverage75 and provoked another round of industry damage control. Initially, industry spokespeople openly challenged Glantz and Parmley in the popular press.76,77 The director of smoking and health for tobacco company RJ Reynolds sent a letter to the editor of many newspapers78 calling Glantz a “back door prohibitionist” who was “scaring the American public with outlandish claims that are simply not supported by scientific fact.”

(RJ Reynolds' public relations agency, Hill & Knowlton, had found the “back door prohibition” message to be most effective with the public.79) After 1991, the industry moved from direct criticism to using third parties (Table 1).

Tobacco Institute consultant Joseph Wu, PhD, a professor of biochemistry and molecular biology at New York Medical College, drafted 3 versions of a letter to submit to Circulationthat were critical of Glantz's work and faxed them totobacco industry law firm Covington & Burling, seeking suggestions.80–84 Wu submitted his letter to Circulation without disclosing his role as a tobacco industry consultant,85 and even though Circulation rejected Wu's letter, the Institute still paid him $3867 for writing it86 (out of $20 000 the Institute had budgeted to pay Wu in 1991 to criticize Glantz's work87). The Institute continued to pay consulting fees to Wu, including $72 275 during the 1995–1996 fiscal year88 (the only year for which a record of Wu's total payments were available).

Consultant Larry Holcomb, PhD, billed the Institute $3825 ($225 per hour) to produce a response to the Circulation paper.30 Holcomb argued that Glantz and Parmley drew stronger conclusions than were warranted and that the studies failed to control for confounding variables like diet. Another Institute consultant, Walter Decker, PhD, wroteCirculation a letter arguing that the studies Glantz and Parmley examined were methodologically flawed, and he criticized Glantz and Parmley for including studies published in foreign languages. Decker billed Holcomb $175 per hour for writing his letter,89 which Holcomb then billed to the Tobacco Institute.89 (Chemist and biologist Joe Pedelty, MSc, also billed Holcomb $2975 for writing a letter, although we could not determine whether that letter was submitted to Circulation.) In all, 3 letters19,90,91appeared in Circulation criticizing Glantz and Parmley's work. All 3 were generated by the tobacco industry, but only 1 disclosed that fact.91

In August 1992, American University biostatistician Nathan Mantel, PhD, published an article in the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology54 that criticized the Circulation paper. (The editor of the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, Alvan Feinstein, MD, was a long-time recipient of tobacco industry funds through its secret lawyer-managed “special accounts.”31[p330],92) In 1991, Mantel invoiced Philip Morris $135 065 for work on SHS. A Philip Morris attorney later reported to Philip Morris' Scientific Affairs Department that “Mantel offered [to write] a response to Glantz and Parmley for approximately $60 000. We have declined the offer for budgetary reasons.”93

The industry also funded statistical consultant Peter Lee,94 MA, to criticize published studies linking smoking, SHS, and disease.31,95 Over the years, Lee wrote editorials, articles, and letters to the editor criticizing Glantz and other researchers who published epidemiological studies on the health effects of SHS.48,50,51,96,97 Lee billed Covington & Burling from $750 to $4000 per piece for criticizing Glantz's work,50,51,97 and he made at least $7750 between 1992 and 1993 doing so.

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THE PHILIP MORRIS PLAN TO ATTACK FUNDING FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH

In 1994, Glantz won a 3-year, $598 686 (total costs) grant from the NCI to evaluate the effects of state and local advocacy on tobacco-control policy.98 Glantz designed these activities to address needs identified in the 1989 US Surgeon General's report,99 which called for research on tobacco industry lobbying activities and their effects on public health policy. One of the 5 project areas included in this grant involved tracking tobacco industry campaign contributions to state legislators and correlating them with legislators’ behavior on tobacco issues.

A Philip Morris plan, written after the NCI grant was awarded, discussed Philip Morris' concern with researchers “who are … conducting research which is faulty” and who “generate considerable media coverage of these studies.”100 It noted that “the lack of rigorous challenge” to this research “creates an on-going problem for PM and the industry,” and it stated, “We must change the environment.”100

The plan specifically focused on Glantz (the only researcher mentioned in the plan) and his NCI grant, saying that his grant “does nothing to advance the common goal of finding cures for cancer” and “it is anti-business and anti-jobs.” Philip Morris proposed100 to alter what it perceived as a troublesome scientific environment by “raising the issue of [scientists’] credibility and their integrity.”The plan, titled “Action Plan: Scientists,” proposed “exposing … scientists who engage in shoddy research to their peers and in the media,” and it noted that “scientists are very concerned about the opinions their peers hold of them and their research.”100 The plan proposed“elevat[ing] the issue of public funding (primarily federal) to conduct anti-tobacco … research”100 and using third parties to run advertisements attacking scientists:

First, we cantake out ads in appropriate scientific journals that point out the flaw(s) in the study in question. While the issue of whose name appears in the ad's disclaimer is a subject for future discussion, there is no doubt that the careful use of these ads would be extremely embarrassing to those scientists whose methodology, data and conclusions are demonstrably wrong.100 (Emphasis added.)

Philip Morris' action plan also proposed writing to “the [scientists’] appropriate dean or department head raising questions about the validity of a scientists’ work.”100 The plan repeatedly emphasized the need to “become more proactive, utilizing credible third parties more effectively … [and] encourage more participation by credible, third parties… . [W]e must use credible third-parties more effectively and more creatively to help carry our messages.”100 Activities were to be carried out quietly to avoid drawing attention to Philip Morris:

We can and should reach out to our allies on Capitol Hill, particularly those serving on authorizing and appropriations committees. With the Republican takeover of the House and Senate, the message to the [government public health] agencies must be: “funding sloppy tobacco research is no longer ‘cost-free.’” … Strategically, however, we must always be careful of the danger of raising tobacco's profile on Capitol Hill.100(Emphasis added.)

Philip Morris' actions, taken in concert with those of RJ Reynolds and others, indicate that the Philip Morris plan was implemented. Table 2 indicates the correlation between Philip Morris' Action Plan and events that actually occurred.

TABLE 2

Strategies Listed in Philip Morris' Draft “Action Plan: Scientists” and Events Involving Glantz, 1991–1997

In February 1995, Marty Ronhovdee,38 a researcher for the American Smokers Alliance, compiled and circulated a report critical of Glantz and his grant, portraying NCI as misusing taxpayers’ money to fund a “witch hunt” and diverting funds away from its “primary obligation” to conduct cancer research.105

(The American Smokers Alliance was formed when Philip Morris spent $10 000 to bring 40 smokers to an initial meeting in Atlanta, Georgia.28 After the organization was formed, Philip Morris provided it with a 10 000-name mailing list106 and at least $35 000 in 1994 and 1995 for “grassroots mobilization.”107,108) As an example of NCI's so-called misuse of taxpayers’ money, Ronhovdee cited Glantz's research on the influence that tobacco industry campaign contributions might have on state legislators’ policymaking behavior. (Subsequent research established that this influence existed.109–112) The Ronhovdee report conformed to the strategy Philip Morris explicated in its action plan to generate opposition to public funding of tobacco-control research.100

Ronhovdee circulated her report to other smokers’ rights activists, including Martha Perske and Jackie Miller.113 Nominally an independent smokers’ rights advocate, Perske completed media training at RJ Reynolds57and was in direct contact with RJ Reynolds employees and representatives.59,60,114–118 Perske wrote letters to academic journals, newspapers, and legislators to advance industry views on SHS and forwarded any replies she received to RJ Reynolds.119,120 When Glantz and Parmley121 responded to Nathan Mantel's 1992 paper in the Journal of Clinical Epidemiology by pointing out Mantel's relationship with the tobacco industry, the journal's editor published a personal defense of Mantel written by Perske.58 Perske also forwarded information to public-relations firm Walt Klein & Associates of Winston-Salem, North Carolina,122 who contracted with RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris to organize grassroots opposition to smoking restrictions,3promote industry “youth smoking prevention” programs,123 and organize front groups like the Coalition for Responsible Retailing to fight cigarette tax increases.124–126 Miller was vice president of the Florida Smokers Rights Association, a group managed by an RJ Reynolds public-issues field coordinator.127 The Ronhovdee report was also sent to an RJ Reynolds employee who was president of the North Carolina Smokers Rights Association,128 who circulated it within RJ Reynolds.129

Shortly after Ronhovdee circulated her report, an ad101 appeared in the Washington Timeson March 14, 1995, attacking Glantz and his NCI grant (Figure 1). The ad reflected Philip Morris' strategy, outlined in its action plan, to have third parties run ads to embarrass scientists.100 The ad copy asked readers to clip the ad from the newspaper, write a short personal note at the bottom of it, and mail it to their congressperson. The ad copy identified the ad's sponsor as “the 130/10 Club, a group of citizens who chip in $10 a month to expose government wasteand express our opinions to the government.”101 The ad gave no other information about the 130/10 Club, which was operated by Steve Handman, president of the Philip Morris–supported American Smokers Alliance. A Philip Morris representative denied any involvement in “this Glantz effort” to USA Today.130

FIGURE 1

Advertisement in the Washington Times, March 14, 1995.101

On April 11, 1995 (3.5 weeks after the 130/10 Club ad appeared), the Washington Times ran an article attacking Glantz's NCI grant, calling it overly political and inappropriate for the NCI.65 The article quoted a spokesman for Representative John Porter (R, IL), chair of the House Appropriations subcommittee responsible for the NCI's budget, who said, “NCI has gone beyond its mandate to conduct clinical and behavioral research regarding cancer” and should not have funded the grant. (The global headquarters of Kraft Foods, then a Philip Morris subsidiary, is located in Porter's congressional district.) The Washington Times also quoted theNational Taxpayers Union's criticism of the grant. (Philip Morris supported the National Taxpayers Union131,132 as part of a strategy to enlist antitax groups as third-party allies to carry out letter-writing campaigns that would “raise havoc” and “generate some real heat in the field.”133) A headline in the American Smokers Alliance's spring 1995 newsletter56 boasted that “ASA Letters and Ads [from the 130/10 Club] Ignite Federal Action on NCI” and included a reprint of the Times article.

April 12, 1995, the day after the Washington Times article ran, Senator Wendell Ford (R, KY), a strong tobacco industry supporter,134 wrote a harsh letter to Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala, whose department includes the NCI, protesting Glantz's grant. Ford called the grant “an extravagant handout” and asked Shalala to halt the spending of the remainder of the grant that had “not already been wasted.”135 Shalala responded by defending Glantz's NCI grant,136 stating that it was well within NCI's mandate.

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INDUSTRY ATTACKS SPREAD TO MAGAZINES, BOOKS, TELEVISION

In late 1994, an employee of the Missouri Department of Agriculture and researcher for the American Smokers Alliance, whom Philip Morris considered to be a “grower ally,”36 sent a Freedom of Information Act request to the NCI for information about Glantz's grant application.

(The American Smokers Alliance encouraged members to act as researchers, specifically instructing them to use the Freedom of Information Act.38) The employee obtained Glantz's NCI grant information and forwarded it to Walt Klein & Associates, who in turn sent it to RJ Reynolds' external relations office.137 In March 1995, RJ Reynolds enlisted Walt Klein & Associates to foster and augment the appearance of a public clamor to remove Glantz's funding. The public relations firm drafted severalop-ed pieces criticizing Glantz's work as “bogus” and “deeply flawed” and demanding that the NCI terminate his funding.138–140 We were unable to determine whether any of these op-ed pieces were published.

On August 28, 1995, an article titled “Policing P[olitical] C[orrectness]: How the government is stacking the deck in the debate over smoking”141 was published in the National Review, a magazine of conservative opinion.142 The article attacked Glantz and his NCI funding, portraying him as a prohibitionist and calling his NCI funding a “gross abuse of bureaucratic authority.”

A short biosketch of the author, Thomas DiLorenzo, PhD, described him only as “a professor of economics at Loyola College in Maryland.”141 Prior to publishing “Policing PC,” DiLorenzo had worked on a number of tobacco industry projects, including a Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds–funded project at the Independent Institute (a tobacco industry–funded think tank143), and contributed to publications by the Capital Research Center (another think tank, described as a “long-time friend of PM” in a 1998 internal Philip Morris e-mail:{1:(style="background-color:#ffff66;"):}::{44:(style="background-color:#ffffff;"):}:).

The same month that the “Policing PC” article was published, James Bennett of George Mason University billed RJ Reynolds $150 000 for work he andDiLorenzo were doing on a book titled CancerScam: The Diversion of Federal Cancer Funds to Politics.22

This book, published in 1997, attacked government-funded health agencies and health charities, charging that they were deviating from their missions and using donated funds irresponsibly by engaging in excessive political and lobbying activity.145 The book specifically attacked Glantz, claiming he was “getting rich” by using tax funds for lobbying.145 CancerScam conformed to Philip Morris' action plan by “elevating the issue of public funding (primarily federal) to conduct anti-tobacco … research”100 and accusing government agencies and health charities of diverting funding away from “the common goal of finding a cure for cancer.”100 DiLorenzo also made a Freedom of Information Act request for information about Glantz's NCI grant, and he forwarded the information received from NCI to Philip Morris' law firm Arnold and Porter in 1995. The firm forwarded the information to the director of Philip Morris' Washington relations office.:{1:(style="background-color:#ffff66;"):}::{46:(style="background-color:#ffffff;"):}:

On July 15, 1995, a few weeks before his National Review article was published, DiLorenzo appeared on the Philip Morris–supported147–149 PBS television program Technopolitics,hosted by James Glassman. (Philip Morris had liaisons assigned to Technopolitics andNational Review as part of its “Managing the Message—Conservative Media Cultivation” effort.150) The single topic of the half-hour Technopolitics show was Glantz's NCI grant. On the show, DiLorenzo described Glantz's NCI grant as the “government paying citizens to spy on other citizens” and called it “atrocious.” He concluded, “Every dollar that is spent on these political gadflies is not spent on basic cancer research,”23 yet another statement that reflected Philip Morris' plan to claim that Glantz's NCI research “does nothing to advance the common goal of finding cures for cancer.”100 From 1993 to 1995 Philip Morris donated $630 000147–149 to South Carolina Educational Television to support Technopolitics. The 1994 contribution was one of Philip Morris' largest “charitable contributions” that year.151

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LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS

While laying the groundwork to create the appearance of a grassroots demand to cut Glantz's NCI funding, the tobacco industry was also working to influence the federal budget appropriations mechanism to terminate Glantz's funding.152 In July 1995, language appeared in a House Appropriations Committee report that set the scene for eliminating Glantz's project in the upcoming NCI appropriations bill. The language focused on a relatively small part of Glantz's overall project (albeit the part to which legislators were likely to be particularly sensitive). It said:

The Committee was disturbed to learn that NCI had funded a research grant studying tobacco industry campaign contributions to State legislators and voting records by those individuals on tobacco control initiatives. While the Committee is not rendering judgment on the merits of the grant proposal, it feels strongly that such research projects do not properly fall within the boundaries of the NCI portfolio.153

The only grant the language could have possibly referred to was Glantz's NCI grant.

When the appropriations bill containing NCI's funding for the next fiscal year came to a vote in the House of Representatives on August 4, 1995, it included language (inserted into a subcommittee report) that would specifically strip Glantz of his NCI funding. The legislative affairs manager at the Tobacco Institute described the event in a memo she sent to RJ Reynolds' public affairs divisions the same day:

Early this morning the House passed HR 2127, the Fiscal Year 1996 Appropriations [bill] for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education [including NCI]… . Several items of interest to the industry are included in the bill. Funding for the Office of the Surgeon General would be eliminated… . In the House Appropriations Committee Report is language withholding further funding for the National Cancer Institute's grant to Stanton Glantz for an investigation of the tobacco voting records of, and campaign contributions to state legislators.154

Glantz learned of the attack on his NCI funding from a member of his research staff, whose sister was interning for a member of the House Appropriations subcommittee. On August 2, 1995, Glantz sent a letter to colleagues alerting them about the ongoing political effort to halt his project. He pointed out that, if allowed to continue, this kind of legislative action would have the potential to cut off all future research that the tobacco industry considered threatening.155 Word spread about the highly specific amendment to kill Glantz's project, and news media began reporting on it, including a Chicago Sun-Times article on August 9, 1995, which read, “In a rare intervention, Rep. John Porter (R-Ill.) directed the National Cancer Institute to halt funding of research on how the tobacco industry helps shape the law.”103

Three days after the Sun-Times article appeared, Philip Morris' Washington relations office was planning its next step:pushing the attack on Glantz's NCI funding through the Senate. An internal Philip Morris memo reads, “What are [our] prospects for … eliminating funding for Glantz's NCI political study, etc.? Who is the industry's horse in the Senate, if anyone, to push what we got in the House [emphasis added]?”156 Another note sent to high-level officials in Philip Morris—including the senior vice president and associate general counsel (Charles Wall); Philip Morris' Worldwide Regulatory Affairs office; the senior vice president of executive affairs (Steve Parrish); secretary and general counsel and members of Philip Morris' board of directors, vice president and associate general counsel; vice president of Philip Morris' State Government Affairs office; and staff in Philip Morris' Washington Relations office—indicates that the industry worked cooperatively to have Glantz's funding removed: “Attached is a status report on industry efforts concerning the NCI grant to Glantz… . We will keep you posted as this develops [emphasis added].”157

As the industry's attention shifted to the Senate, a memo titled “National Cancer Institute Grant to Stanton Glantz” was sent within Philip Morris' Washington relations office in December 1995. The memo reads, in part: “I sent copies of [Glantz's NCI grant application] to Brad Edwards [legislative assistant to Senator Jesse Helms (R, NC)] and Matt Rapp [of the public relations firm Burson Marstellar]. I plan to discuss with them a strategy to deal with a motion to strike the Porter language in the Senate.”104 A 1995 outline describing Tobacco Institute committees and projects shows that the Institute formed a multicompany “Appropriations Working Group” to find ways to manipulate the legislative appropriations process to stop a wide range of federal tobacco control–related activities, including Glantz's grant.158 Core members of the Group were RJ Reynolds' vice president of federal government affairs; Philip Morris Management Corporation's director of federal tobacco issues; the vice president of federal government relations in the public affairs department of US Tobacco Company; a partner and member of an industry legislative team at tobacco industry law firm Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin and Oshinsky; and lobbying firm Hecht, Spencer & Oglesby.

In December 1995, Philip Morris law firm Arnold and Portersent a “privileged and confidential” letter to Philip Morris reporting that it was “preparing a memorandum identifying options for challenging the award of the …Glantz grant.”159 The firm also sent the letter to a Philip Morris corporate attorney in January 1996.160 The options Arnold and Porter identified are not public because the memorandum containing the options remains privileged, but from the activities that ensued during 1995–1996 legislative appropriations process, it appears that the companies pursued Philip Morris' “Action Plan,” especially the strategy to “reach out to our allies on Capitol Hill, particularly those serving on authorizing and appropriations committees.”100

The potential ramifications of the legislators’ actions—i.e., the inhibition of publicly funded research opposed by the tobacco industry—troubled many in the public health community and in the broader academic community. The American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, the San Francisco Medical Society, tobacco-prevention coalitions, doctors, attorneys, medical clinic employees, researchers, public health advocates, and prominent academics across the country generated letters and petitions to House and Senate members supporting Glantzand expressing outrage at the federal legislature's interference in NCI's peer-review process. Under the guidance of the Public Media Center, a nonprofit public interest advertising firm in San Francisco, a group of 29 prominent physicians and academics (including former US Surgeon General C. Everett Koop) signed an opinion page advertisement161 that ran in the October 16, 1995,New York Times defending Glantz and decrying Representative Porter's actions on behalf of the tobacco industry (Figure 2). The president of the American Cancer Society, John Seffrin, personally intervened in the matter of Glantz's NCI grant by mobilizing pressure on Porter in his home district to abandon the effort to target the grant.

FIGURE 2

Opinion-page advertisement in the New York Times, October 16, 1995.161

On April 24, 1996, the House Appropriations subcommittee held formal hearings on the issue, and Richard Klausner, the new NCI director, told the subcommittee that NCI had ceased funding the portion of Glantz's grant involving campaign contributions.162 (The grant was not cut; these funds were shifted to the grant's other aims.) This action appeared to satisfy the subcommittee. The American Cancer Society made a $74 000 grant to Glantz to fund the aim dropped from the NCI grant, and the work continued.

Industry attempts to end Glantz's funding did not stop. An August 7, 1996, e-mail from Philip Morris' director of federal tobacco issues to Charles Wall, the company's vice president and associate general counsel, reveals that the industry continued pushing to stop NCI funds from going to Glantz, using the same “report language” strategy:

[An RJ Reynolds lobbyist] and I contacted CongressmanHenry Bonilla's staffer today about the Glantz grant. She was surprised, especially since she was in the meeting between the head of NCI and Bonilla when it was agreed that NCI would not be funding these type of projects… . Bonilla's staffer will communicate with Labor/HHS appropriations subcommittee Chairman John Porter and his staff to express their concern and discuss a recommended plan of attack… . Have Porter's subcommittee staff investigate whether it would be more prudent to push for report language which would restrict NCI's ability to use funds for these types of grants in the Senate… . Bottom line: determine if report language at Senate or conference level is a viable option. I will meet with Congressman … Hoyer's [a friendly Democrat on the subcommittee] staff to solicit his support for a report language strategy that Bonilla and Porter have signed off on.163

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CALIFORNIANS FOR SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY

In 1994, Glantz and Smith published in the American Journal of Public Health (AJPH) the first comprehensive study of the economic effects of banning smoking inrestaurants.164The study showed that there was no significant change in restaurant revenues associated with smoke-free environment ordinances. This result directly contradicted the tobacco industry's claim that these laws hurt the hospitality business, an argument they used to frighten members of the hospitality industry into fighting local smoke-free environment ordinances.165–167

Philip Morris viewed the 1994 restaurant study as a threat. A 1994 Philip Morris internal report discussing how to spread Philip Morris' “Accommodation Program” (a program to stave off smoking restrictions165) lists a number of difficulties Philip Morris faced at the time, among them the fact that “Stanton Glantz [is] using funding to distribute research stating that there is no negative impact of smoking bans on restaurant sales… . Research widely distributed and viewed as credible.”168 In February 1994, a firm called Ferret Research of Auburn, California, produced a report declaring that Glantz and Smith's 1994 study was “empirically false … misleading and potentially harmful to businesses.”66 The Ferret report was not published in a journal, but it was promoted through a press release that also objected to the fact that the restaurant study had been partly funded by the California Tobacco Related Diseases Research Program.67 (This grant laid the foundation for Glantz's later grant from NCI.)

After the Ferret report, attacks on Glantz’ work quieted until 1997, when Glantz and Smith updated their 1994 study to include communities with laws requiring smoke-free bars.169,170 They reported that, similar to smoke-free restaurant ordinances, smoke-free bar ordinances had no detectable effect on bar revenues. The findings were published in the July 1997 issue of AJPH and received wide press coverage.171 That same year, Glantz and Smith's 1994 study suddenly began drawing harsh criticism from the National Smokers Alliance, a smokers’-rights group created by the public relations firm Burson Marsteller for Philip Morris.172,173 In March 1997, the National Smokers Alliance paid Chicago economic consultant Michael Evans $10 00024 to critique Glantz and Smith's 1994 study.25 Evans said that Glantz and Smith's conclusions were “unwarranted” and “based on faulty assumptions in methodology.”25 Rather than submitting his critique to AJPH, Evans's critique was presented at a National Smokers Alliance press conference on April 24, 1997.

Soon after the press conference, Thomas Humber, president of the National Smokers Alliance and a former senior vice president of Burson Marsteller, wrote a letter to the president of the University of California citing Evans's critique and complaining that Glantz and Smith's 1994 restaurant study “has been used as a major lobbying tool throughout the United States to convince government officials that they can enact restaurant smoking bans with no adverse economic consequences… . [Q]uestions have been raised by Dr. Evans’ review that are serious enough to warrant seeking the return of taxpayer dollars [from California's Tobacco Related Disease Research Program] from the authors of the study.”43At the same time, Humber sent a letter to AJPH editor Mervyn Susser complaining that Glantz and Smith had “misrepresented the premises for the study” and used “flawed methodology” to reach their conclusions. Humber asked AJPH to “reopen the Glantz/Smith study for editorial review.”44 Susser responded by sending Evans’ critique out for peer review. After considering the reviewers’ responses, Susser answered Humber with an editorial in the October 1997 issue of AJPH:

Evans makes a show of reexamining the available data in much detail. Instead of a compelling critique, however, we find a mélange of scientifically inadmissible manipulations of data to obtain a desired result. These are conflated with a flurry of suppositions as to what could be. Suppositions are then translated by mere assertion into factual “serious” flaws. Even if the Evans critique can pass in the field of economics for legitimate science—something I do not credit—it cannot pass in this Journal. Certainly, no economist has submitted so tendentious and meretricious an argument during my tenure.174

Glantz and Smith published minor corrections to their article (which did not affect their conclusions) in an erratum in AJPH.170

Despite Susser's editorial and the erratum, Humber started laying groundwork for a lawsuit against Glantz, alleging misuse of tax revenues. Humber sent a letter to California members of the National Smokers Alliance, asking them to join the newly created Californians for Scientific Integrity.45 The letter stated that Glantz had conducted a “particularly offensive” research project “paid for with your tax dollars” that “totally misrepresents the economic losses suffered by restaurants when they are forced by governments to restrict smoking.”45 Humber invited readers to “force Dr. Glantz to return all the misspent money to the fund” and said law firm Zumbrun and Findley would handle “all the appropriate actions.” Zumbrun and Findley principal Ronald Zumbrun was the founder of the Sacramento-based conservative Pacific Legal Foundation, which Philip Morris External Affairs listed as a “strategic key ally”175 that received money from both Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds.176,177 Participants who joined the effort “won't have to write letters, make phone calls, or attend meetings” or incur any financial cost or legal liability to “focus attention on the abuses of anti-smoking zealots who are living off your money,” the letter said.45

Concurrently, the National Smokers Alliance petitioned the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to cancel its consulting contract with Glantz,who was assisting with efforts to restrict smoking in the workplace.178 The Alliance cited Evans's critique and called for an investigation into work Glantz had done for OSHA.179 OSHA did not cancel its contract with Glantz or investigate his work.

On July 1, 1997, Californians for Scientific Integrity sued the University of California, the California Department of Health Services, and the California Department of Education in California Superior Court, charging Glantz with engaging in scientific misconduct at taxpayer expense by intentionally misrepresenting the data in his 1994 restaurant study.179The University's response brief argued, in part:

The true agenda of this action was patently obvious—to muzzle scientists whose research publications and speech on subjects relating to tobacco, tobacco control and the politics of tobacco have been a thorn in the side of the industry for decades. The danger of this type of lawsuit cannot be overestimated. It is an obvious attempt to intimidate and silence a bothersome critic of a wealthy and powerful industry. The University of California should be a place where such controversial figures, whatever their views, may research, publish and speak, free from intimidation and harassment of the type this lawsuit represents.180

On November 20, 1997, the Courtdismissed the suit on the grounds that there was no legal basis for a claim against the University.181 Californians for Scientific Integrity unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court. While the University prevailed in the lawsuit and on subsequent appeals, University personnel had to invest substantial time and effort fending off aggressive discovery, preparing for and giving depositions, and preparing court filings.

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PHILIP MORRIS' “ROAD MAP” FOR THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY

Philip Morris' draft document titled “Action Plan: Scientists”100 was a road map to guide efforts to shut down public policy–oriented research. Actions subsequently taken by the tobacco industry and its agents and affiliates followed the plan: distribution of an inflammatory “report” asserting Glantz's supposed misuse of taxpayer funds; use of smokers’-rights and antitax groups to create the appearance of a public clamor against the research; a third party taking out an attack ad in an influential newspaper; tobacco industry third-party allies criticizing the research; news articles and a television show attacking Glantz and his research; letters critical of Glantz being sent to legislators and government officials; and manipulation of the legislative appropriations system to stop his funding.

A December 2003 article in Washington Monthly182 credited Technopolitics host Jim Glassman with developing a new public relations technique called “journo-lobbying,” in which slightly different versions of an industry's preferred message are repeatedly broadcast at legislators from a range of influential sources and through a variety of media to dominate the intellectual environment in which officials make policy decisions. A 1998 Philip Morris memo titled “The Echo Chamber Approach to Advocacy” describes Philip Morris' Washington relations office's use of a similar technique183:

Members of Congress are impacted by multiple “influentials.” … A rough hierarchy has been established as follows, from most influential to least influential: Constituents (unaided), Major Fundraisers, Local Media, Colleagues, National Media, Advertising, Lobbyists. The more a particular view or piece of information “echoes” or resonates through this group, the greater the impact. Grassroots efforts are so effective … because they cause many constituents to repeat the same message to the target Member … You will note that the echo chamber effect can work in two different ways: First, the same message can reverberate among multiple sources toward the target Members… . Second, similar but complementary messages can be repeated by a single source. …Either the repetition or “piling on” approach provide the same result: enhanced credibility and influence of the essential message.183 (Emphasis in original.)

Philip Morris “reached out” to Technopolitics150 and provided significant money to the show.147–149 A similar financial relationship existed between Philip Morris and theNational Review,184–187 which published DiLorenzo's “Policing PC.” Legislators, other policymakers, and public health advocates need to be aware of the “echo chamber” technique and take all possible steps to verify the sources of what may seem at first to be a widely held opinion about an issue.

Many of the strategies that the tobacco industry used to combat Glantz's work mimic the strategies the industry has used to attack other scientists and influence public perceptions.11,12,188,189 For instance, the industry has repeatedly used secretly paid consultants to cast doubt upon the scientific evidence that SHS is dangerous, as happened with the Whitecoat project,190 the Asian ETS Consultants Project,190,191 the Latin project,5 and the ARISE Project10 and in Germany.192,193 Philip Morris also worked through the National Journalism School in Washington, DC, to develop formal programs supporting the training of sympatheticjournalists.8 Philip Morris has also used lawsuits to silence and intimidate a number of other critics, as when the company sued Thames Television to prevent distribution of Death in the West194; when the company filed a $10 billion lawsuit against ABC News over a 1994 documentary about nicotine manipulation in cigarettes195; and when the company pursued litigation against people working on the American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST), a large-scale, NCI-supported smoking intervention trial, and other tobacco-control programs for “illegal lobbying.”196

Unfortunately, tobacco industry documents are frequently the only source of information about how the industry addresses what it perceives as the “problem” of scientists who publish research it disagrees with, and the ability to verify information in the documents through other sources is limited. The industry's tendencies toward document destruction may also have left gaps in information.197 Because an author of this paper was the subject of the activities described, our description is open to accusations of bias; however, the author's experience also provides crucial first-hand information.

People who publish research that threatens the tobacco industry's interests and who advocate improved public health policies based on that research may draw intense attention and opposition from the industry. Widespread criticism of a researcher that seems to emanate from a variety of non–tobacco industry sources does not necessarily indicate a lack of tobacco industry involvement, because the industry works to hide its involvement.

The techniques described in this paper were used by the tobacco industry and easily can be used by other industries confronted with issues, including environmental health198and global warming.199 Knowledge of systematic industry harassment of scientists working in a particular field could have a chilling effect on the work of researchers in that field, particularly those who work for smaller institutions or who give a high priority to attracting funding from private industry.200 Support from researchers’ employers and from credible public health organizations (in this instance, the American Cancer Society)—including a willingness to support researchers in fighting litigation and withstanding attacks from political figures and media outlets—is crucial to the continued advancement of science in general and public health in particular.

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Acknowledgments

analysis of archives

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Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

**Stanton Arnold Glantz, Ph.D.** (born 1946) is Professor of Medicine (Cardiology), American Legacy Foundation Distinguished Professor of Tobacco Control, and Director of the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) School of Medicine. Glantz's research focuses on the health effects of tobacco smoking. Glantz is active in the nonsmokers' rights movement and has advocated forpublic health policies to reduce smoking. He is the author of four books, including The Cigarette Papers^[1] and Primer of Biostatistics.^[2] Glantz is also a member of the UC San Francisco Cardiovascular Research Institute and Institute for Health Policy Studies and co-director of the UCSF Comprehensive Cancer Center Tobacco Program. He is the father of journalist Aaron Glantz and tobacco control leader Frieda Glantz.

Biography

After initially training as an aerospace engineer, Glantz took up postdoctoral positions in cardiology at**Stanford Universit**y and then in cardiovascular research at the University of California, San Francisco, where he has worked since 1977.^[3]

He served for 10 years as an Associate Editor of the Journal of the American College of Cardiology and is a member of the California State Scientific Review Panel on Toxic Air Contaminants of the California Air Resources Board. He was elected to the Institute of Medicine in 2005.

Research

Glantz is author or coauthor of numerous publications related to secondhand smoke and tobacco control, as well as many papers on cardiovascular function and biostatistics. He has written several books, including the widely used Primer of Biostatistics (which has been translated into Japanese, French, Russian, German, Italian, Japanese and Spanish), and Primer of Applied Regression and Analysis of Variance. In total, he is the author of 4 books and over 200 scientific papers, including the first major review (published in Circulation) which identified secondhand smoke as a cause of heart disease and the landmark 1995 Journal of the American Medical Association summary of the Brown & Williamson documents, which showed that the tobacco industry knew nicotine was addictive and that smoking caused cancer 30 years ago.^[5] This publication was followed up with his book, The Cigarette Papers,^[1]which has played a key role in the ongoing litigation surrounding the tobacco industry. His bookTobacco Wars: Inside the California Battles^[6] chronicles the last quarter century of battles against the tobacco industry in California. He also wrote Tobacco: Biology and Politics^[7] for high school students and The Uninvited Guest, a story about secondhand smoke, for second graders. He is now running two educational projects, SmokeFreeMovies, which is working to end use of movies to promote tobacco, and TobaccoScam, which is countering tobacco industry efforts to coopt the hospitality industry.

Activism

In 1982 he was part of a group of health activists who resurrected the last remaining copy of the film "Death in the West," suppressed by Philip Morris, and developed an accompanying curriculumthat has been used by an estimated 1,000,000 students. He helped write and produce the films "Secondhand Smoke," which concerns the health effects of involuntary smoking, and "120,000 Lives," which presents evidence that smoking in the movies recruits adolescent smokers and proposes solutions for reducing this effect.

Glantz was also an opponent^[10] of the "global settlement" of tobacco litigation proposed in 1996, in which the tobacco industry was to be granted de factoimmunity from further litigation in exchange for payments to the states and acceptance of weak regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.^[11] The tobacco industry turned against and defeated this compromise, and defeated legislation introduced in Congress by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), after some public health advocates succeeded in getting the immunity provisions removed. Many of the provisions of the "global settlement"—but not the immunity or FDA provisions—were implemented by the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the attorneys general of 46 states and the large tobacco companies. Glantz' analysis of the two agreements concluded that the MSA included most of the desirable provisions of the global settlement without the immunity provisions. In particular, the immunity provisions in the global settlement would have prevented the massive (and successful) federalRacketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) lawsuit that the US Department of Justice won against the tobacco industry in 2007 and probably avoided release of most of the tobacco industry documents on the internet.

References

^ ^a(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanton_Glantz#cite_ref-cigpapers_1-0) ^b(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanton_Glantz#cite_ref-cigpapers_1-1) S. Glantz, et al., "*The Cigarette Papers*", University of California Press, 1996
^ S. Glantz, *Primer of Biostatistics* (6 ed), McGraw-Hill, 2005
^ "UCSF Helen Diller Family Comprehensive Cancer Center - People - Stanton A. Glantz, PhD".
^ "The Helena Study *(Abstract)*". Retrieved 2007-05-01.
^ Glantz SA, Barnes DE, Bero L, Hanauer P, Slade J. Looking through a keyhole at the tobacco industry. The Brown and Williamson documents. JAMA. 1995 Jul 19;274(3):219-24. PMID 7609230
^ S. Glantz and E. Balbach. "Tobacco War: Inside the California Battles", University of California Press, 2000
^ S. Glantz, *Tobacco: Biology and Politics*, WRS HealthEdCo
^ PBS Frontline, Interview with Stanton Glantz for *Smoke in the Eye*, 1999.
^ [[1]](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brendan-demelle/study-confirms-tea-party-_b_2663125.html)
^ PBS Frontline, Interview with Stanton Glantz for *Inside the Tobacco Deal*, 1997
^ Brion J. Fox J.D., James M. Lightwood Ph.D., and Stanton A. Glantz Ph.D., "A Public Health Analysis of the Proposed Resolution of [the 1997 United States] Tobacco Litigation" (February 1, 1998). Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education. Tobacco Control Policy Making: United States. Paper US1998.http://repositories.cdlib.org/ctcre/tcpmus/US1998

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CALIFORNIANS FOR SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Scientific Speech: Protecting the Right of Environmental Scientists to **...**

Tobacco Industry Efforts to Undermine Policy-Relevant Research

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DEATHS FROM SECONDHAND TOBACCO SMOKE

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INDUSTRY ATTACKS SPREAD TO MAGAZINES, BOOKS, TELEVISION

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