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Bitcoin Thesis by Satoshi Nakamoto (2008)

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          </div><div >Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System</div><div >Satoshi Nakamoto</div><div >satoshin@gmx.com</div><div >www.bitcoin.org</div><div >Abstract.</div><div >   A  purely   peer-to-peer   version   of   electronic   cash   would   allow   online</div><div >payments   to   be   sent   directly   from   one   party   to   another   without   going   through   a</div><div >financial institution.   Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main</div><div >benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending.</div><div >We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network.</div><div >The   network   timestamps   transactions   by   hashing   them   into   an   ongoing   chain   of</div><div >hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing</div><div >the proof-of-work.   The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of</div><div >events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power.   As</div><div >long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to</div><div >attack the network,  they'll  generate the  longest  chain  and  outpace attackers.   The</div><div >network itself requires minimal structure.   Messages are broadcast on a best effort</div><div >basis,   and   nodes   can   leave   and   rejoin   the   network   at   will,   accepting   the   longest</div><div >proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.</div><div >1.</div><div >Introduction</div><div >Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as</div><div >trusted third  parties  to process electronic payments.   While the  system works  well enough for</div><div >most   transactions,   it   still   suffers   from   the   inherent   weaknesses   of   the   trust   based   model.</div><div >Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot</div><div >avoid   mediating   disputes.     The   cost   of   mediation   increases   transaction   costs,   limiting   the</div><div >minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions,</div><div >and   there   is   a   broader   cost   in   the   loss   of   ability   to   make   non-reversible   payments   for   non-</div><div >reversible services.  With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads.  Merchants must</div><div >be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need.</div><div >A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable.  These costs and payment uncertainties</div><div >can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments</div><div >over a communications channel without a trusted party.</div><div >What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust,</div><div >allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted</div><div >third  party.    Transactions  that  are  computationally  impractical  to   reverse   would  protect  sellers</div><div >from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers.   In</div><div >this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed</div><div >timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions.  The</div><div >system   is   secure   as   long   as   honest   nodes   collectively   control   more   CPU   power   than   any</div><div >cooperating group of attacker nodes.</div><div >1</div><div >2.</div><div >Transactions</div><div >We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures.  Each owner transfers the coin to the</div><div >next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner</div><div >and adding these to the end of the coin.  A payee can verify the signatures to verify the chain of</div><div >ownership.</div><div >The problem of course is the payee can't verify that one of the owners did not double-spend</div><div >the coin.  A common solution is to introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every</div><div >transaction for double spending.  After each transaction, the coin must be returned to the mint to</div><div >issue a new coin, and only coins issued directly from the mint are trusted not to be double-spent.</div><div >The   problem   with   this   solution   is   that   the   fate   of   the   entire   money   system   depends   on   the</div><div >company running the mint, with every transaction having to go through them, just like a bank.</div><div >We   need   a   way   for   the   payee   to   know   that   the   previous   owners   did   not   sign   any   earlier</div><div >transactions.   For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one that counts, so we don't care</div><div >about later attempts to double-spend.  The only way to confirm the absence of a transaction is to</div><div >be aware of all transactions.  In the mint based model, the mint was aware of all transactions and</div><div >decided   which   arrived   first.    To  accomplish   this   without   a   trusted   party,   transactions   must   be</div><div >publicly announced [1], and we need a system for participants to agree on a single history of the</div><div >order in which they were received.  The payee needs proof that at the time of each transaction, the</div><div >majority of nodes agreed it was the first received. </div><div >3.</div><div >Timestamp Server</div><div >The solution we propose begins with a timestamp server.  A timestamp server works by taking a</div><div >hash   of   a   block   of   items   to   be   timestamped   and   widely   publishing   the   hash,   such   as   in   a</div><div >newspaper or Usenet post [2-5].   The timestamp proves that the data must have existed at the</div><div >time, obviously, in order to get into the hash.  Each timestamp includes the previous timestamp in</div><div >its hash, forming a chain, with each additional timestamp reinforcing the ones before it.</div><div >2</div><div >Block</div><div >Item</div><div >Item</div><div >...</div><div >Hash</div><div >Block</div><div >Item</div><div >Item</div><div >...</div><div >Hash</div><div >Transaction</div><div >Owner 1's</div><div >Public Key</div><div >Owner 0's</div><div >Signature</div><div >Hash</div><div >Transaction</div><div >Owner 2's</div><div >Public Key</div><div >Owner 1's</div><div >Signature</div><div >Hash</div><div >Verify</div><div >Transaction</div><div >Owner 3's</div><div >Public Key</div><div >Owner 2's</div><div >Signature</div><div >Hash</div><div >Verify</div><div >Owner 2's</div><div >Private Key</div><div >Owner 1's</div><div >Private Key</div><div >Sign  </div><div >Sign  </div><div >Owner 3's</div><div >Private Key</div><div id="outerContainer"><div id="mainContainer"><div id="viewerContainer" tabindex="0">
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