B. Plaintiffs’ Standing to Sue Under Section 11(b)

The Court addresses Plaintiffs standing to sue based on the trial evidence. Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1246 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he facts necessary to establish standing . . . must not only be alleged at the pleading stage, but also proved at trial.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1931 (2018))). Standing requires Plaintiffs show an injury in fact (that is both “concrete and particularized” and “actual and imminent”), as well as a causal connection between the injury and conduct at issue, and that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

As the Court has determined that the TTV Defendants are to be treated separately from Defendants Davis and Somerville, the Court must ensure that trial evidence supports the elements of standing as to both sets of Defendants. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2017) (concluding “the district court committed no error in dismissing [p]laintiff's injunctive relief claim for lack of standing” when “the district court[ ] [determined] that [p]laintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that each defendant had committed a constitutional violation . . . .” (emphasis added)); Coffie v. Fla. Crystals Corp., 460 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“Plaintiffs must still show that the injuries they allege are fairly traceable to each Defendant.”).

Most importantly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Heredia has satisfied the standing requirements as to both Defendants based on the trial evidence. She has asserted an injury-in-fact caused by both the TTV Defendants and Defendants Davis and Somerville in the Section 230 challenges made by both efforts against her. Cf. Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1246 (“‘[A] person’s right to vote is individual and personal in nature,’ so ‘voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue.’” (quoting Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929)). She moreover continues to reside in Georgia and thereby any injunctive relief granted against Defendants making future Section 230 challenges (or other efforts aimed at Georgia at issue in this case) would redress the injury caused by the conduct alleged in this case against Georgia voters.

When the standing of one plaintiff has been shown, moreover, it is unnecessary to consider if the other plaintiffs have standing to sue. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977); Am. C.L. Union of Ga. v. Rabun Cnty. Chamber of Comm., Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1108–09 (11th Cir. 1983); Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017). Thus, the Court need not further assess in great detail the other Plaintiffs’ standing to sue derived from the trial evidence.

The Court notes that Plaintiff Scott Berson has not (and indeed could not have) shown standing as to Defendants Davis and Somerville because there has been no evidence that Davis’s and Somerville’s Section 230 challenge list was filed in Muscogee County. See Doc. No. [222], 29–31.

Moreover, Fair Fight asserts standing under the organizational standing doctrine. See Doc. No. [318], ¶¶ 432–440 (proposing as the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that “Plaintiff Fair Fight, Inc. has organizational standing”). “[A]n organization has standing to sue on its own behalf if the defendant’s illegal acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.” Common Cause/Georgia et al. v. Billups, et al., 554 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1165 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Black Voters Matter Fund v. Raffensperger, 508 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (“Under Eleventh Circuit law, a litigant can establish organizational standing to challenge election laws by showing it has or will have to divert time, personnel, or other resources from its usual projects to assist voters whose ability to vote is affected by State action.”). In the summary judgment order, the Court hinted that the harm protected by Section 11(b) does not readily apply to an organization and that Fair Fight would have to show at trial how it was injured by Defendants’ actions under Section 11(b). Doc. No. [222], 17 n.11.

Here, while Fair Fight submitted adequate trial evidence that it has diverted, and continues to divert, resources on account of TTV’s actions (see, e,g., Tr. 49:1–15, 55:1–58:24) it has not put forth any trial evidence that Defendants Davis’s and Somerville’s actions have caused it to divert resources. Fair Fight representative, Cianti Stewart-Reid’s, testimony did not mention Defendants Davis or Somerville, let alone indicate that Fair Fight diverted resources to address their voter challenges or communications, either before the Senate runoff election or currently. See generally Tr. 42:18–79:6. Plaintiffs’ proposed finding that Fair Fight has shown standing to sue Davis and Somerville relies on the Court finding that Davis’s and Somerville’s actions were connected to TTV for purposes of liability. Doc. No. [318], ¶ 439 (proposing the Court conclude that “[b]ecause the Court has found that all Defendants—including Ms. Engelbrecht, Mr. Williams, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Somerville, and Mr. Davis—assisted True the Vote in launching and amplifying its challenges, the Court finds that Fair Fight has satisfied the traceability requirement as to these Defendants as well.”). The Court has refused to make such a finding. See Section (II)(C)(2)(a) supra.

Thus, Plaintiffs Fair Fight and Berson have not shown trial evidence of standing to sue Defendants Davis and Somerville. Again, however, because Plaintiff Heredia has shown standing to sue Davis and Somerville, the case against Davis and Somerville continues. Moreover, because Heredia and Fair Fight have shown standing to sue the TTV Defendants, there is sufficient basis for the case to proceed to the merits, at the very least, based on these Plaintiffs’ standing to sue. The Court thereby proceeds with its merits review of the Plaintiffs’ Section 11(b) claim in this case.