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</div><div>REVOLVING DOOR REFERS TO PEOPLE MOVING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR, ALMOST ALWAYS TO BENEFIT THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PUBLIC GOOD.  It hit new heights (lows) in Bush 43 administration, which installed not just industry ppl in order to compromise regulatory agencies but industry PR flacks with no real expertise to neutralize them.  See especially CEQnewer content in tag revolvdrcapt 219/719see pension planhtml cleanliness  =tool:
<a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/">https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/</a><a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/search_result.php?admin=George+W.+Bush&id=9">https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/search_result.php?admin=George+W.+Bush&id=9</a>...<h3 style="margin: 2.5em 0px 0px; clear: left;">Dept of the Interior</h3>
<a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/rev_summary.php?id=70163" style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; text-decoration-line: none; margin-left: 15px;">Artman, Carl J</a>
<a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/rev_summary.php?id=82367" style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; text-decoration-line: none; margin-left: 15px;">Bernhardt, David L</a> <a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/lobbyists/summary?id=Y0000027922L&cycle=2016" style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial; text-decoration-line: none;"><img src="/2f098048-2678-54da-a09f-713714a0c9c3.jpg"/></a></center>http://www.republicreport.org/category/lobbying/page/4/= <a href="http://www.republicreport.org/category/lobbying/">http://www.republicreport.org/category/lobbying/</a> see also <h2 class="headline"><a href="http://boingboing.net/2012/03/17/average-congresscritter-gets-1.html" rel="bookmark">Average Congresscritter gets 1,452% raises when they turn corporate lobbyist</a></h2>By <a href="http://boingboing.net/author/cory_doctorow_1" title="Posts by Cory Doctorow" rel="author">Cory Doctorow</a> at 5:55 pm Saturday, Mar 17Republic Report has released figures documenting the fact that the average member of Congress gets a 1,452% salary hike when she or he leaves office and becomes a corporate lobbyist. They point out that politicians are allowed to negotiate these raises while they are in office, and don't have to disclose this fact when they're working on legislation that will benefit their future employers. One of the poster children for this is former Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) who fought against financial reforms to the derivatives market, then joined the board of a derivatives-trading company and was given an advisory role at Goldman Sachs.<blockquote>Our research effort uncovered the partial salaries of twelve lawmakers-turned-lobbyists. Republic Report’s investigation found that lawmakers increased their salary by 1452% on average from the last year they were in office to the latest publicly available disclosure: Former Congressman Billy Tauzin (R-LA) made $19,359,927 as a lobbyist for pharmaceutical companies between 2006 and 2010. Tauzin retired from Congress in 2005, shortly after leading the passage of President Bush’s prescription drug expansion. He was recruited to lead PhRMA, a lobbying association for Pfizer, Bayer, and other top drug companies. During the health reform debate, the former congressman helped his association block a proposal to allow Medicare to negotiate for drug prices, a major concession that extended the policies enacted in Tauzin’s original Medicare drug-purchasing scheme. Tauzin left PhRMA in late 2010. He was paid over $11 million in his last year at the trade group. Comparing Tauzin’s salary during his last year as congressman and his last year as head of PhRMA, his salary went up 7110%. Former Congressman Cal Dooley (D-CA) has made at least $4,719,093 as a lobbyist for food manufacturers and the chemical industry from 2005 to 2009. Republic Report analyzed disclosures from the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), an industry lobby — for companies like Kellogg — where Dooley worked following his retirement from Congress. We also added in Dooley’s salary from the American Chemistry Council, where Dooley now works as the president. The Chemistry Council represents Dow Chemical, DuPont, and other chemical interests. Dooley’s salary jumped 1357% between his last year in the House and his last reported salary for the Chemistry Council in 2009. Former Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) makes approximately $1.5 million a year as the chief lobbyist for the movie industry. Dodd, who retired from the Senate after 2010, was hired by the Motion Picture Association of America, the lobbying association that represents major studios like Warner Bros. and Universal Studios. Although the MPAA would not confirm with Republic Report Dodd’s exact salary, media accounts point to $1.5 million, a slightly higher figure than the previous MPAA head, former Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman. Dodd received about a 762% raise after moving from public office to lobbying.</blockquote><a href="http://www.republicreport.org/2012/make-it-rain-revolving-door/">ANALYSIS: When a Congressman Becomes a Lobbyist, He Gets a 1,452% Raise (on Average)</a>  <a href="http://boingboing.net/2012/03/17/average-congresscritter-gets-1.html">http://boingboing.net/2012/03/17/average-congresscritter-gets-1.html</a>       B2 CREW reoport:CREW compiled a list of CEQ, OSTP and EPA officials appointed under President Bush, using
United States Government Manuals from 2001-2009. CREW then cross referenced that list with
the Senate Office of Public Record’s lobbying disclosures database. Google and Lexis-Nexis
also were utilized to further round out biographical information. While aiming to be exhaustive,
because information is not always readily available, CREW may not have identified every
official, uncovered every position held by former officials, or found complete biographical
information.

Key findings:
• 22 former officials with CEQ, OSTP, and EPA have gone onto lobbying or
government relations
• 14 of these former officials have been registered lobbyists
• 7 of these former officials work for companies or trade associations involved in
the energy production industry
• 3 of these former officials founded their own lobbying or government
relations firms
 ---
 Typically we think of revolving door as between industry and government.  This can be honorable public service, as when executives became part of the war effort in WWII (Tuxedo Park).  Moreover, some regulatory entities are in fact quasi-governmental (FAA, FCC?).  Legit in that often people in industry have the best info.  However, Regean invited industry to help dismantle regulation and reporting, removing public ability to constrain behavior.  These acts are done in the name of economic efficiency and even freedom (provate property rights limited by ES Act, for example). We also see politicians and their staff leaving gov't service and go to work for industry to lobby for legislation and to teach them to avoid the regulations they once were in charge of enforcing.  Think tanks and even academic posts (e.g., Starr at Pepperdine) also provide a defecto pension/safety net, even for those who leave under a ethics cloud). LONGTIME PLAYERS/FUNDERS CAN BE GIVEN AMBASSADORSHIPS (short duration but high prestige)--- grenpeace: Since my last post about the Bush Administration and its cozy relationship with logging industry lobbyists, the “revolving door” between the two has spun again.

The latest whirl has Jan Poling, a high-level lawyer for the Forest Service, landing in the lap of the nation’s most powerful timber industry lobbying group – the American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA).

As Poling takes her post as general counsel for AF&PA, she’ll run into lots of familiar faces.  There will be, of course, industry friends who kept her company during her stint at the Forest Service.  But there will also be Dave Tenny, Bush’s former “deputy undersecretary of agriculture for natural resources and environment” (does that title even fit on a business card?) who, like Poling, swapped his job at the Bush administration for one at AF&PA this year.

To bring the door back full circle, I’ll point out Dave Tenny’s new job at AF&PA – vice president of forestry and wood products – is the same one that Undersecretary of Agriculture Mark Rey held before Bush put him in charge of the Forest Service. ----<ul><li>
</li><li><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Ed_Gillespie" title="Ed Gillespie">Ed Gillespie</a> - Gillespie, a prominent Republican party leader and campaign advisor to <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=George_W.Bush" title="George W. Bush" class="mw-redirect">George W. Bush</a>, also owns his own lobbying and PR firm, <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Quinn_Gillespie%26_Associates" title="Quinn Gillespie & Associates">Quinn Gillespie & Associates</a>. Shortly after Bush took office, Gillespie went to work for a few days for the <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=U.S.Commerce_Department&action=edit&redlink=1" title="U.S. Commerce Department (page does not exist)" class="new">U.S. Commerce Department</a>, where he arranged for the department to hire as its press secretary one of his own employees at Quinn Gillespie, <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Jim_Dyke&action=edit&redlink=1" title="Jim Dyke (page does not exist)" class="new">Jim Dyke</a>. Gillespie finished his work at the Commerce Department on February 15, 2001, and the following day he was back at work at his own office at Quinn Gillespie.</li><li>
</li><li><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Ronald_Fogleman" title="Ronald Fogleman">Ronald Fogleman</a>: While serving on the <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Defense_Policy_Board" title="Defense Policy Board" class="mw-redirect">Defense Policy Board</a>, which advises the Secretary of Defense (<a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Donald_H.Rumsfeld" title="Donald H. Rumsfeld">Donald H. Rumsfeld</a> at the time) on military strategy, was hired by <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Boeing_Company" title="Boeing Company" class="mw-redirect">Boeing Company</a> as a consultant while it was seeking Pentagon approval for a $20 billion contract for aerial refueling tankers. "An internal Boeing e-mail message indicated that the men, Adm. <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=David_Jeremiah" title="David Jeremiah" class="mw-redirect">David Jeremiah</a>, a retired vice chairman of the <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Joint_Chiefs_of_Staff" title="Joint Chiefs of Staff">Joint Chiefs of Staff</a> and a member of five corporate boards, and Gen. Ronald Fogleman, who retired from the Air Force, were to lobby Mr. Rumsfeld's office."<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/business/29door.html" rel="nofollow" title="http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/29/business/29door.html" class="external autonumber">[7]</a>
</li><li><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=J.Steven_Griles" title="J. Steven Griles">J. Steven Griles</a><ul><li>Government: Deputy Secretary, Department of the Interior, where he worked closely with the industries he is supposed to regulate on polluting and exploitive policies like the <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Clear_Skies_initiative&action=edit&redlink=1" title="Clear Skies initiative (page does not exist)" class="new">Clear Skies initiative</a>. (2001-)</li><li>Industry: Lobbyist for coal, energy, oil, gas, mining and manufacturing industries (1989-2001)</li><li>Government: In a variety of positions, primarily in the Department of the Interior, Griles worked on policies such as pushing for oil drilling off the coast of California and selling land contracts for oil and shale extraction at give-away prices. (1970-1989)</li><li>"A disciple of the infamous <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=James_Lee_Watt&action=edit&redlink=1" title="James Lee Watt (page does not exist)" class="new">James Lee Watt</a>, for whom he worked in the Reagan years, Griles went on to be a lobbyist for the National Mining Association, Edison Electric, <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=ChevronTexaco" title="ChevronTexaco" class="mw-redirect">Chevron</a>, Occidental Petroleum, and other energy giants. Appointed the overseer of America's 500 million acres of public lands, Griles was hailed by the NMA as 'an ally of the industry,' and the mining association welcomed him as 'a breath of fresh air' -- for polluters, of course, not for us air breathers! Even though he is a public official now, he still draws $284,000 a year from his former lobbying firm, which represents corporations he supposedly regulates. Also, he has continued to meet behind closed doors with his former (and perhaps future) industry clients. The inspector general is investigating him for the blatant conflicts of interest posed by these meetings, which he had pledged to avoid in a 'recusal agreement' he signed to get his government job."<a href="http://www.utne.com/web_special/web_specials_2004-06/articles/11232-1.html" rel="nofollow" title="http://www.utne.com/web_special/web_specials_2004-06/articles/11232-1.html" class="external autonumber">[9]</a></li><li>
</li><li><a href="http://www.utne.com/web_special/web_specials_2004-06/articles/11232-1.html" rel="nofollow" title="http://www.utne.com/web_special/web_specials_2004-06/articles/11232-1.html" class="external autonumber">http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Government-industry_revolving_door</a></li></ul></li></ul> For starters, many White House watchers have already documented this administration's strong ties to the fossil-fuel lobby. The president tops the list of past oil company executives, followed by Vice President Dick Cheney, former CEO of Halliburton, the country's largest oil-field services firm. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice served on Chevron's board of directors, while Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans worked for a Denver oil and gas company, Tom Brown, Inc. Philip Cooney, chief of staff for the White House Council on Environmental Quality, was formerly head of the climate unit of the American Petroleum Institute, the main lobbying arm of the oil industry, and a group that is among the most rabid critics of climate science. boiling pthttp://www.grist.org/article/gelbspan-boiling/  <table><tbody><tr align="left"><td><div align="left">Published on Tuesday, June 29, 2004 by the <a href="http://www.ips.org/" target="new">Inter Press Service</a></div></td></tr><tr align="left"><td><div align="left">Report Shows Revolving Doors Between Gov't, Business</div></td></tr><tr align="left"><td><div align="left">by Emad Mekay</div></td></tr><tr><td height="10"> </td></tr><tr align="left" valign="top"><td>WASHINGTON - Hundreds of U.S. military and government officials routinely leave their posts for jobs with private contractors who deal with the government, a process that has eroded the lines between government and the private sector, according to report released by a watchdog group on Tuesday.

�There is a revolving door between the government and large private contractors where conflict of interest is the rule, not the exception,� said the report by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), a Washington-based group that monitors military expenditures.

�The revolving door has become such an accepted part of federal contracting in recent years that it is frequently difficult to determine where the government stops and the private sector begins,� adds the report, titled �<a target="new" href="http://www.pogo.org/p/contracts/c/co-040101-contractor.html#%0AExecSum%0A">The Politics of Contracting</a>�.

The document says that the current contracting system where current and former public servants use their positions for private gain means powerful private contractors can potentially rig the system in their favor.

The group examined the current top 20 federal government contractors from January 1997 through May 2004 and found that in fiscal year 2002, those top 20 contractors received over 40 percent of the 244 billion dollars in total contracts awarded by the federal government.

The group says that it also identified 291 instances involving 224 high-ranking government officials who moved to the private sector to serve as lobbyists, board members or executives of the contractors.

The report found that at least one-third of the former senior government employees who went to work for or served on the board of a government contractor were in official positions allowing them to influence government contracting decisions, and that accountability rules were not enough to control them.

�Generally, revolving door laws do not apply to the most senior policymakers who ultimately have the most power in shaping programs and policies that benefit contractors,� says the report.

The issue is gaining interest in the U.S. Congress. Arizona Senator John McCain, a leading Republican, is expected to hold hearings in mid-July that would be the first congressional oversight of the revolving door question in nearly a decade.

But the report says that some congressmen are also part of the revolving door practice. At least two-thirds of the former members of Congress who are lobbying or have lobbied for the top 20 government contractors, served on authorization or appropriations committees that approved programs or funds for their future employer or client during their tenure in Congress.

Among the companies benefiting from the tolerated practice are top U.S. defense contractor Lockheed Martin, which now employs 57 former senior officials, aerospace giant Boeing which employs 33, Air Force contractor Northrop Grumman at 20, Raytheon at 23 and General Dynamics which employs 19.

The nonprofit watchdog gave the example of Richard Perle, a former Pentagon official who served as assistant secretary of defense in the Ronald Reagan administration and was a member of the Defense Policy Board from 1987-2004, serving as its chair from 2001 to 2003.

He resigned as chairman in March 2003, after a conflict of interest controversy involving a consulting job he took with the bankrupt telecommunications firm, Global Crossing Ltd.

The report says that during the summer of 2003, Perle expressed his support for a Boeing tanker contract -- a deal that would direct billions of dollars to the company. His support for the tankers came just 16 months after Boeing pledged to invest 20 million dollars with Perle's venture capital firm, Trireme Partners, notes the report.

The report also cites how Pentagon official Darleen Druyun, who supervised and directed the management of the Air Force's weapons acquisition program, moved through the revolving door to become Boeing's deputy general manager for missile defense systems.

�Darleen Druyun is the poster child for the ills of the revolving door,� said the report.

The report recommends �revolving door protections�, especially when it comes to high-level officials.</td></tr></tbody></table>  dow: <ul><li><div>Barbara Hackman Franklin, former U.S. Secretary of Commerce, is a Director of Dow Chemical.<a id="ednref78" title="ednref78" name="ednref78" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDow.dv.html#edn78">[78]</a></div></li><li><div>Harold T. Shapiro, former presidential appointee to the Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, is a Director of Dow Chemical.<a id="ednref79" title="ednref79" name="ednref79" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDow.dv.html#edn79">[79]</a></div></li><li><div>John C. Danforth, former U.S. Senator, sits on Dow’s Board of Directors.<a id="ednref80" title="ednref80" name="ednref80" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDow.dv.html#edn80">[80]</a></div></li><li><div>Clayton K. Yeutter, former head of USDA and former U.S. Trade Representative, is now a Director of Mycogen Corporation, which is majority owned by Dow AgroSciences.<a id="ednref81" title="ednref81" name="ednref81" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDow.dv.html#edn81">[81]</a></div></li><li><div>Kathleen M. Bader, member of the Homeland Security Advisory Panel, is Corporate Vice President at Dow.<a id="ednref82" title="ednref82" name="ednref82" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDow.dv.html#edn82">[82]</a></div></li></ul>= dupont Government connections  DuPont CEO and Chairman Charles Holliday Jr. has served on President Bush’s National Infrastructure Advisory Council.<a id="ednref68" name="ednref68" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDuPont.dv.html#edn68">[68]</a> Richard H. Brown, a member of DuPont’s board of directors, serves on the President’s National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee.<a id="ednref69" name="ednref69" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDuPont.dv.html#edn69">[69]</a> Director William K. Reilly is a former administrator of EPA and Director Charles M. Vest serves on the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology.<a id="ednref70" name="ednref70" href="http://www.panna.org/campaigns/caia/corpProfilesDuPont.dv.html#edn70">[70]</a>  ---- TiHP JHT p 9  b2:  tobacco, conagra, edison elect, enron, exxon, GE, ibm, lockheed, monsanto, northrup, occidental , raytheon, tesoro, union pac rr eg John D graham harvard ctr risk analysis <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=John_D.Graham">http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=John_D.Graham</a> As founding director of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, his acceptance of funding from America's largest corporate polluters, including <a title="Dow Chemical" class="mw-redirect" href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Dow_Chemical">Dow Chemical</a>, <a title="DuPont" href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=DuPont">DuPont</a>, <a title="Monsanto" href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Monsanto">Monsanto</a>, <a title="Alcoa" href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Alcoa">Alcoa</a>, <a title="Exxon" class="mw-redirect" href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Exxon">Exxon</a>, <a title="General Electric" href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=General_Electric">General Electric</a> and <a title="General Motors" class="mw-redirect" href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=General_Motors">General Motors</a>, was considered a conflict of interest. No environmental or consumer group is represented on the center's advisory board. <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Harvard_Center_for_Risk_Analysis">http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Harvard_Center_for_Risk_Analysis</a> c boyden gray -- Elizabeth Stolpe, previously in-house lobbyist for Koch Industries, is now Associate Director For Toxics & Environmental Protection at the White House Council on Environmental Quality. = B2 2004 <a href="http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2004/Advocates-Become-Regulators23may04.htm">http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2004/Advocates-Become-Regulators23may04.htm</a> === <h3>The Power Elite</h3>Now that the upper class, corporate community, and policy-planning network have been defined and described, it is possible to discuss the leadership group that I call the "power elite." I define the power elite as the leadership group of the upper class. It consists of active-working members of the upper class and high-level employees in profit and nonprofit institutions controlled by members of the upper class through stock ownership, financial support, or involvement on the board of directors. This does not mean that all members of the upper class are involved in governing. Some are only playboys and socialites; their social gatherings may provide a setting where members of the power elite mingle with celebrities, and sometimes they give money to political candidates, but that is about as close as they come to political power.Conversely, not all those involved in the power elite are members of the upper class. They are sons and daughters of the middle class, and occasionally, the blue-collar working class, who do well at any one of several hundred private and state universities, and then go to grad school, MBA school, or law school at one of a handful of elite universities -- e.g., Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, MIT, Johns Hopkins, University of Chicago, and Stanford. From there they go to work for a major corporation, law firm, foundation, think tank, or university, and slowly work their way to the top. The idea of the power elite intertwines class theory and organizational theory, two theories which are often thought of as distinctive or even as rivals. The basis for the intertwining of the two theories is to be found in the role and composition of the boards of directors that govern every large profit and nonprofit organization in the United States. It is on boards of directors that the values and goals of the upper class are integrated with those of the organizational hierarchy. Upper-class directors insure that their interests are infused into the organizations they control, but the day-to-day organizational leaders on the board are able to harmonize class interests with organizational principles. It is important to stress that I am not saying that all experts are members of the power elite. People have to be high-level employees in institutions controlled by members of the upper class to be considered part of the power elite. Receiving a fellowship from a foundation, spending a year at a think tank, or giving advice to a policy-discussion organization does not make a person a member of the power elite. It also may be useful to note that there are many experts who never go near the policy-planning network. They focus on their teaching and research, or work for groups that oppose the policies of the power elite. In short, experts and advisers are a separate group just below the power elite in the pecking order.<center><img alt="" src="file:///C:/DATAleno/BRAINS/webodec3_brain/Files/37845597-FEE6-7703-4548-32ECF6CB8702/PersonalBrain%20Notes/copiedlocalimagefile0.gif" /></center>

 With the composition of the power elite clearly stated, it is now possible to show how it dominates the federal government in the interest of the upper class and corporate community.<h3>The Power Elite and Government</h3>Members of the power elite directly involve themselves in the federal government through three basic processes, each of which has a slightly different role in ensuring "access" to the White House, Congress, and specific agencies, departments, and committees in the executive branch. Although some of the same people are involved in all three processes, most leaders specialize in one or two of the three processes. These three processes are:<ol><li>The special-interest process, through which specific families, corporations, and industrial sectors are able to realize their narrow and short-run interests on taxes, subsidies, and regulation in their dealings with congressional committees, regulatory bodies, and executive departments;</li><li>
</li><li>The policy-making process, through which the policies developed in the policy-planning network described earlier are brought to the White House and Congress;</li><li>
</li><li>The candidate selection process, through which members of the power elite influence electoral campaigns by means of campaign donations to political candidates.</li></ol>Power elite domination of the federal government can be seen most directly in the workings of the corporate lobbyists, backroom super-lawyers, and industry-wide trade associations that represent the interests of specific corporations or business sectors. This special-interest process is based in varying combinations of information, gifts, insider dealing, friendship, and, not least, promises of lucrative private jobs in the future for compliant government officials. This is the aspect of business-government relations described by journalists and social scientists in their case studies. While these studies show that the special interests usually get their way, the conflict that sometimes erupts within this process, occasionally pitting one corporate sector against another, reinforces the image of widely shared and fragmented power in America, including the image of a divided corporate community. Moreover, there are some defeats suffered by the corporate rich in the special-interest process. For example, laws that improved auto safety standards were passed over automobile industry objections in the 1970s, as were standards of water cleanliness opposed by the paper and chemical industries.... WRA <div align="center"><table width="90%"><tbody><tr><td>Table 2: The 15 most central organizations in the corporate/foundation/think tank/policy-planning group/university/charity/advisory committee network.</td></tr></tbody></table>
<table border="1" cellpadding="3" cellspacing="0" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: 1px solid rgb(153, 153, 153);"><tbody><tr valign="middle"><th class="smaller">Organization</th><th class="smaller">Sector/Subsector</th><th class="smaller">Centrality score</th></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Committee for Economic Development</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Think Tank</td><td class="smaller" align="center">140.81</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">University of Chicago</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">University</td><td class="smaller" align="center">3.66</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Conference Board</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Think Tank</td><td class="smaller" align="center">3.60</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Verizon</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Business</td><td class="smaller" align="center">3.29</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Proctor & Gamble</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Business</td><td class="smaller" align="center">3.21</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">National Bureau of Economic Research</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Think Tank</td><td class="smaller" align="center">3.01</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Network Reliability and Interoperability Council</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Government Advisory Board</td><td class="smaller" align="center">2.41</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Government Advisory Board</td><td class="smaller" align="center">2.38</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Allied Signal</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Business</td><td class="smaller" align="center">2.36</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Exxon Mobil</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Business</td><td class="smaller" align="center">2.36</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">President's Export Council</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Government Advisory Board</td><td class="smaller" align="center">2.32</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Columbia University</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">University</td><td class="smaller" align="center">1.66</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Ford Foundation</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Foundation</td><td class="smaller" align="center">1.66</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">Sara Lee Corporation</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Business</td><td class="smaller" align="center">1.66</td></tr><tr valign="top"><td class="smaller">National Petroleum Council</td><td class="smaller" nowrap="nowrap">Government Advisory Board</td><td class="smaller" align="center">1.66</td></tr></tbody></table></div> </div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>