Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

<p>Jan 26, 2011 11:08 AM

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The world is everything that is the case.

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<h3>Propositions 1.-3.</h3>

<p>The central thesis of 1., 2., 3. and their subsidiary propositions is <b>Wittgenstein’s </b><i><b>picture theory</b></i><b> of language</b>.&#160;

This can be summed up as follows:</p>

<ul>

<li>The world consists of a <b>totality of interconnected atomic facts, and propositions make "pictures" of the world.</b></li>

<li>In order for <b>a picture to represent a certain fact it must in some way possess the same </b><a class="mw-redirect" title="Logical" href="/wiki/Logical"><b>logical</b></a><b> structure as the fact</b>. The <b>picture is a standard of reality. In this way, linguistic expression can be seen as a form of </b><a class="mw-redirect" title="Geometric" href="/wiki/Geometric"><b>geometric</b></a><b> </b><a title="Projection" href="/wiki/Projection"><b>projection</b></a><b>, where language is the changing form of projection but the logical structure of the expression is the unchanging geometric relationships</b>.</li>

<li>We cannot <i>say</i> with language what is <b>common in the structures, rather it must be </b><i><b>shown</b></i>, because any language we use will also rely on this relationship, and so we cannot step out of our language <i>with</i> language.</li>

</ul>