29 - Al-Nakba debate
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The historic struggle for Palestine is characterised as the claims and counter-claims of Arabs and Jews, but one factor that is often overlooked behind the Palestinian 'Nakba' or 'catastrophe' of 1948, is the part played by an old imperial power, Britain. The history is written by the victors, who are the rewriters of history as new information, new documents, and new historians, come to light. It is time to examine how history itself is the battleground for the hearts and minds of new generations today.
00:20
hello and welcome the historic struggle
00:23
for Palestine is characterized as the
00:25
claims and counterclaims of Arabs and
00:27
Jews but one often overlooked factor
00:31
behind the birth of Israel and the
00:32
Palestinian Nakba the catastrophe is the
00:35
part played by an old imperial power
00:37
Britain whose interests were best served
00:41
by the British in Palestine how did it
00:43
honor its mandated duty of care and what
00:46
were the calculations and miscalculation
00:48
it made in redrawing the map of
00:50
Palestine and reshaping its history the
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67 words of the Balfour Declaration and
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the 65 years of Israeli statehood
00:59
continue to cause conflict on
01:01
controversy if history is written by the
01:04
victors who are the writers of history
01:07
as new information new documents new
01:10
historians come to light
01:12
after essentially of British involvement
01:14
in Palestine it is time to take stock of
01:17
the cliches and propaganda that served
01:20
competing interests and examine how
01:23
history itself is the battleground for
01:26
the hearts and minds of new generations
01:28
today we discuss the historic events
01:32
that led to the Nakba
01:33
the birth of Israel and the making of
01:35
history we are joined here in London by
01:39
Rosemary House professor of Middle East
01:41
Policy Studies at City University London
01:44
and former head of the Middle East
01:46
program at the Royal Institute of
01:48
International Affairs also known as the
01:50
Chatham House
01:51
James Renton senior lecturer in history
01:55
University and author of the Zionist
01:58
masquerade the birth of the angular
02:00
scientist Alliance and last but not
02:03
least avi Shlaim emeritus professor of
02:05
international relations at Oxford
02:07
University author of collusion across
02:10
the Jordan King Abdullah the Zionist
02:12
movement and the partition of Palestine
02:14
and more recently Israel and Palestine
02:18
but first to mark the 65th anniversary
02:21
of anaka
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Al Jazeera has been airing a special
02:24
series on its roots and ramifications
02:28
the outbreak of World War one in 1914
02:31
created new opportunities to reshape the
02:34
Middle East Hillel and had everything in
02:37
can in fact grew and al-mulk a
02:40
Philistine Accord Menken at Suez word
02:44
our briefing of the master and back
02:47
Canyon de la allah door has Liberatore
02:51
Philistine bara Oh fear Yahoo to fill
02:54
her Catalunya shriek in 1917 the British
03:03
Cabinet headed by Prime Minister David
03:05
Lloyd George pledged to establish a
03:08
homeland for the Jews in Palestine at
03:11
the Paris Peace Conference in 1919
03:14
Britain was represented by Prime
03:16
Minister David Lloyd George and Arthur
03:19
Bellefleur a delegation from the Zionist
03:22
Organization attended headed by Klein
03:24
baseman they presented a map seen here
03:28
proposing the area to be allocated for a
03:31
Jewish home
03:32
in 1922 the League of Nations formalized
03:36
British rule in Palestine the second
03:39
Clause of the British Mandate document
03:41
approved by the League of Nations
03:42
stipulated the British mandatory shall
03:46
be responsible for placing the country
03:48
under political administrative and
03:50
economic conditions that will secure the
03:52
establishment of the Jewish National
03:55
Home British High Commissioner Herbert
03:57
Samuel decreed Hebrew as an official
04:00
language of Palestine alongside Arabic
04:03
and English the letters E and why were
04:06
added to the word Palestine in Hebrew as
04:09
an abbreviation of the words Eretz
04:12
Israel
04:13
meaning Land of Israel why would we
04:16
carry on with the year that we can
04:18
attribute a woman the yahood a union to
04:21
death what artwork when you say that a
04:24
Scalia well Madea was a - Nasia
04:28
fair Yamaha Julia are malleable it on
04:32
the year we're in a happen man who as an
04:35
apple never ever suffer horribly
04:37
embarrassing
04:38
in the 1930s the number of Jews
04:41
immigrating to Palestine began to
04:43
increase significantly from 4,000 in
04:46
1931 the figure jumped to 9500 the
04:51
following year in 1933 the number rose
04:54
to 30,000 in 1934 42,000 and in 1935 a
05:01
further jump to 62,000 leads to hiya
05:11
hatta me cattle market Malaysia a
05:14
lottery had in our gamble true
05:18
in Wagga muna Fez yeah I eat a feral
05:23
[ ] Hawk will be returned if you
05:24
come I offer you but they should be
05:26
coming in rahiba villa in 1945 following
05:30
the end of World War two
05:31
US President Harry Truman appeared to
05:34
encourage the Zionist agenda by
05:37
recommending the 100,000 displaced Jews
05:40
in Europe be allowed to emigrate to
05:42
Palestine in February 1947 Britain
05:47
announced the decision to end its
05:49
mandate in Palestine its spokesman said
05:52
his country would turn over the
05:54
difficult situation to the United
05:56
Nations Britain was now washing its
05:59
hands of Palestine setting in motion
06:01
events that would lead towards the
06:04
momentous year of 1948 gentlemen was
06:14
Mary welcome there's let's start with
06:17
you so here we had a declaration that
06:19
basically promised a national homeland
06:22
for the Jews in Palestine what basically
06:25
motivated double for declaration from
06:29
reading all of your writings apparently
06:32
there is an evangelical angle there is a
06:34
zionist angle there's a colonial anger
06:36
perhaps a humidity angle that's at with
06:38
the evangelical is there an evangelical
06:40
roots for that declaration for those
06:45
British members of the British
06:47
establishment at the time who were
06:50
Christian with an evangelical bent yes
06:55
but I think it's important to recognize
06:57
that the man who penned the original
07:00
letter to Lord Rothschild
07:02
in other words Lord Balfour it was not
07:06
motivated by an evangelical Christian
07:09
mission in fact at the same time as he
07:12
was writing that letter he was also
07:14
shepherding through the British
07:16
Parliament a piece of legislation which
07:18
would limit Jewish immigration to
07:21
Britain but is there a contradiction
07:22
between promising national homeland for
07:25
the Jews in Palestine and passing laws
07:27
that are not friendly to Jews in England
07:29
they were there's no contradiction
07:31
whatsoever
07:32
in fact they were mooting the idea of a
07:34
Jewish homeland somewhere else in the
07:36
Empire the British were in imperial vain
07:38
they thought it was okay to organize the
07:41
lives of other people to move groups
07:44
around they were busy in the First World
07:47
War anticipating moving people from the
07:50
Indian subcontinent to Mesopotamia what
07:53
became Iraq they thought that was what
07:55
you do that's all part of the Empire
07:57
exactly
07:58
Jim's what I've read of of Arthur
08:02
Balfour is that he thought of himself as
08:04
an instrument of divine of the divine or
08:08
divine intervention as a mystic question
08:11
of sort I think the religion aspects to
08:15
a significant extent is a red herring it
08:18
was a profound contribution to the
08:24
reason why members of the British
08:25
establishment was so readily able to
08:28
accept one of the the key tenets of
08:31
Zionist ideology that the Jews were a
08:34
nation an ancient nation they saw
08:37
Palestine as the Holy Land as the
08:40
promised land as the landscape of the
08:42
drama of the Bible probably the primary
08:46
reason for the Balfour Declaration was
08:49
propaganda in that in 1917 the British
08:53
government was desperate to stem the
08:57
tide of pacifism in Russia the type of
09:02
revolutionary socialism in Russia and to
09:04
try to keep Russia in the war at the
09:06
same time they were desperate to try to
09:09
mobilize the full resources of the
09:11
United States in the conflict and it was
09:14
believed in the British establishment
09:17
that Jews held tremendous power in
09:21
Russia and also in the United States
09:24
that there's that smell of a bit of
09:26
anti-semitism absolutely it was shaped
09:30
by an anti-semitic belief that the Jews
09:32
control inventors of power in Jewish
09:35
influence before we got to the Jews no
09:37
influence and on the question of
09:38
evangelism RV I think there is a view
09:43
that the Balfour Declaration was
09:45
inspired
09:46
by knowledge of the Bible sympathy for
09:50
the Jews and recognition of the Jews as
09:55
an ain't ancient nation and according to
09:58
this view
10:00
Zionism was a noble project and the
10:03
Balfour Declaration was a novel and out
10:05
artistic move on the part of the British
10:09
government they completely reject this
10:13
explanation of the motives behind the
10:15
Balfour Declaration and it seems to me
10:19
that the driving force behind the
10:22
Balfour Declaration was not the Foreign
10:24
Secretary Arthur Balfour but the Prime
10:27
Minister David Lloyd George and the
10:31
timing is significant November 1917 when
10:35
Britain was not doing at all well in the
10:38
First World War and Britain was
10:41
anxiously looking for allies from any
10:44
quarters it could find and the support
10:47
for Zionism was based on a misperception
10:49
a misperception of the British political
10:52
elite and by Lloyd George in particular
10:55
Lloyd George thought that the Jews were
10:59
a really powerful force in world
11:03
politics he thought that the Jews made
11:05
the wheels of history turn and therefore
11:09
by issuing this declaration in support
11:11
of Jewish national aspirations in
11:13
Palestine he would acquire a really
11:16
powerful ally in the war I think we have
11:19
to be very careful about a distinction
11:21
between the British desire to try and
11:24
enlist the what they imagined to be the
11:26
weapon for the warfare of winning over a
11:29
Jewish world opinion during the conflict
11:32
and Imperial designs there were some
11:34
members of the British government who
11:36
thought that sian ISM would be a useful
11:38
way to try to secure British control of
11:42
Palestine after the First World War
11:45
now there was a general consensus in the
11:47
British government that obtaining
11:49
control of Palestine it was an important
11:52
thing in terms of Britain's imperial
11:54
security because Palestine was supposed
11:56
to act as a bulwark to Egypt and
11:59
his canal the artery of the British
12:00
Empire but I think it's important that
12:03
we acknowledge that there are only a few
12:07
members of the government who thought
12:09
that Zionism would be a useful way to go
12:12
about doing that but there is no point
12:14
of making enemies of the Arabs a the
12:16
point is is that there was a profound
12:17
consensus within the government about
12:19
Jewish power and its importance for the
12:21
war we have to remember that in 1917
12:24
everything was at stake it wasn't just a
12:27
question of iearning decision-making in
12:30
London not you and across the empire you
12:34
certainly had the the classic British
12:37
Arabists and you had the the servants of
12:40
the crown working in India who had a
12:43
completely different perspective on what
12:45
was likely to be the consequence of
12:47
facilitating the creation of a Jewish
12:49
home in Palestine I mean there were
12:51
those who were servants of the Empire in
12:53
the subcontinent who were worried of the
12:56
effect that it would have on Muslims in
12:58
India and I would like to suggest one
13:00
additional motive which is anti-french
13:06
sentiment because empires are much in
13:09
great powers are much more concerned
13:11
with the relations with one another then
13:14
there are with minorities and the
13:18
subjects yes the subjects so behind them
13:20
are about four declaration there is a
13:22
colonial mindset which dismisses of no
13:27
significance the Arab majority the
13:30
Muslim majority in Palestine but there
13:34
is also a calculation which was directed
13:38
against the French because in 1916
13:41
Britain and France signed the
13:43
sykes-picot agreement a secret agreement
13:45
to carve up the Middle East in two
13:48
spheres of influence between them and
13:50
Palestine wasn't assigned either to
13:53
Britain or to France and Lloyd George
13:57
thought that was a mistake
13:59
and he wanted to acquire Palestine for
14:04
the British sphere of influence and one
14:06
way of doing this is forming the
14:08
alliance with the Zionists who would
14:11
then claim Palestine and
14:12
would Britain would have an entree into
14:15
Palestine through its ionic how would
14:18
you in this context judge or evaluate
14:21
the language used in those very few
14:24
words of the Declaration the wording is
14:27
fascinating which is why the scholars
14:29
have been disarmed discussing them ever
14:33
since the Balfour Declaration promised
14:37
British support for the establishment of
14:39
a national home for the Jewish people in
14:43
Palestine provided it didn't prejudice
14:46
the civil and religious rights of the
14:49
non-jewish communities in Palestine now
14:52
in 1917 the Jews were 10% of the
14:57
population and the Muslims were 90% and
15:01
it's absurd to offer a national home
15:04
national rights to a minority of 10% and
15:08
ignore the rights the natural right of
15:10
the of the majority but that's precisely
15:13
what barfle did in his declaration and
15:17
that's why it's such a classic colonial
15:20
document okay but I don't think it's
15:23
only colonial I am always fascinated by
15:25
the capacity of the British to depict
15:29
things in a way that kind of glosses
15:32
over the kind of problems that that
15:35
logic the logic of the words the
15:37
document would imply and well basically
15:41
that this whole land they didn't define
15:43
what the size of it would be
15:45
they didn't define what the population
15:48
spread would end up being they didn't
15:51
trouble themselves with whether it would
15:55
be a kind of cultural home or it would
15:59
be a sovereign state in fact I don't
16:01
think most of the British establishment
16:04
envisaged sovereign statehood for
16:06
anybody in the Empire at that time but
16:08
empires do thrive on generalities don't
16:10
they don't care for discussion on
16:14
ambiguity ambiguity who can interpret
16:17
later yes to suit the only reason but
16:21
the ambiguities that are not
16:23
constructive ambiguity is they are
16:25
destructive and we do
16:26
ambiguity is for the subject and the
16:29
wording of the Balfour Declaration came
16:32
back to haunt the British in the
16:33
interwar period the dialogue between the
16:36
Zionists and the British authorities
16:39
went as follows the Zionists said but
16:42
you promised us a state and the British
16:45
replied no we didn't promise you a state
16:48
we promised you a national home which
16:50
isn't the same so the arguments
16:53
continued about the meaning of the
16:54
declaration George come come back in
16:57
1922 or so and say yes we were talking
17:00
about a Jewish state yes I think that
17:04
there's two points that need to be made
17:06
to them about the terminology the first
17:09
is is that when they were drafting the
17:11
decoration the focus was on its
17:13
potential impact on world Jewry outside
17:16
of Palestine there was hardly any
17:19
discussion in the cabinet at all as to
17:20
what the future might be for Zionism and
17:24
a big part of that the the inability to
17:26
truly understand the populations that
17:29
were affected on the one hand the
17:33
Palestinian population were not
17:35
considered to be a national community
17:38
they were considered to be a hodgepodge
17:41
they were thought by the British not to
17:44
be a significant concern and in addition
17:49
to that the British also completely for
17:51
the most part completely misunderstood
17:53
Zionism they thought that mainstream
17:56
Zionism was not the Status movement they
17:58
misunderstood Jews and Zionism and ours
18:02
they thought that they were backward
18:03
they thought Jews were more advanced
18:04
than Arabs but they thought that both
18:07
communities were backward and they
18:10
assumed that because they were backward
18:12
they would never seriously consider that
18:15
they would actually have proper
18:18
independence now moving on by the mid
18:21
30s with the Arab Palestinian revolt now
18:23
we have a British white paper that
18:26
speaks of perhaps two states on
18:29
Palestine or in parts of Palestine does
18:32
that mean that the British started by
18:33
then regretting some of the stuff that
18:36
they were making in the early part of
18:38
the century
18:39
I think in 1937 when you have the report
18:41
of the Palestine Royal Commission that
18:43
sent to Palestine to figure out what's
18:45
going wrong and what should be the
18:47
future direction and it's hugely
18:49
significant that this is the first time
18:51
that the British start to think about
18:53
what the endgame might be now the the
18:55
Commission plans for the solution the
18:57
two-state solution given that the
19:00
declaration the Balfour Declaration was
19:02
issued in 1917 and the British
19:05
government only seriously considers
19:06
where all of this is heading in the long
19:08
term in 1937 makes a lot of questions in
19:13
between was the Balfour Declaration has
19:15
been written into the League of Nations
19:17
mandate so under the terms of the
19:20
mandate the British are supposed to
19:22
implement it that carry through on the
19:25
Balfour Declaration one of the other
19:26
things they're supposed to do and didn't
19:28
do is to set up Assemblies of the
19:32
population in Mandate Palestine for them
19:36
to participate in the running of their
19:37
own affairs and they neglected to do so
19:39
so briefly obvious the British wrote the
19:46
Balfour Declaration into the terms of
19:48
the League of Nations mandate over
19:51
Palestine and then it became a legal
19:53
commitment but the British realized in
19:56
the interwar period that they had made a
19:58
mistake they were saddled with these
20:00
incompatible promises and they had to
20:03
somehow manage the two conflicting
20:05
communities that they had encouraged
20:07
during the First World War and there was
20:12
no solution
20:13
there was one land and two people and
20:16
this was the conflict was about the
20:18
British philosopher Isaiah Berlin
20:21
compared the British Mandate over
20:22
Palestine to a minor British public
20:25
school where there was the high
20:26
commissioner who was high-minded and
20:29
fair-minded and wanted justice for
20:32
everybody but the assistant masters were
20:35
much more sympathetic to the Arabs than
20:41
they were to the Jewish boys who had the
20:45
irritating habit of writing letters to
20:48
their influential relatives around the
20:51
world complaining about everything
20:53
from the quality of food to the quality
20:55
of the tea they may have been marginally
20:59
more sympathetic to the Arabs but they
21:01
were arrogant towards both I think that
21:05
the key thing here is it going to
21:06
stripes of the Balfour Declaration is
21:07
that the fact that the British did not
21:09
define did not define what a national
21:12
home was and there's a reason for that
21:14
the reason being is that first of all
21:17
the Balfour Declaration was issued
21:18
primarily for concerns outside of
21:21
Palestine during the war but also the
21:23
British assumed that they could easily
21:25
manage what they decide what they
21:26
thought was mainstream Zionism which was
21:29
non-status Zionism they also thought
21:32
they made another significant error in
21:34
that they thought that the Palestinians
21:35
were not a nation and would eventually
21:37
accept Zionism because they thought that
21:40
the Zionists and the Jews were quasi
21:41
Europeans not real Europeans quasi
21:44
Europeans almost white beginners when
21:47
they went to Palestine I guess more
21:48
European but never right before we end I
21:51
just need to finish up with 1947 RV so
21:54
here we have recently a new classified
21:57
in from information or documents to
21:59
released and I think here The Guardian
22:01
in April 26 says that the British
22:04
government knew from the moment it
22:07
planned to withdraw its forces from
22:08
Palestine more than six years ago 1947
22:11
that partition of the territory and the
22:14
founding of the State of Israel would
22:15
lead to war and the defeat of the Arabs
22:18
as a secret documents revealed so
22:21
actually there their departure was as
22:23
controversial as their arrival in
22:25
Palestine yes and as dishonest as their
22:30
rival in Palestine because during the
22:35
twilight of the British Mandate they
22:39
also played a double game officially
22:43
they disengage there was a UN partition
22:46
plan to partition mandatory Palestine
22:49
into a Jewish state and an Arab state
22:51
and the British refused to implement
22:55
this UN resolution so they stood back
22:58
but they knew full well as the documents
23:01
reveal that there would be a war and
23:04
that the Arabs would lose
23:06
and that the Jews will come out but we
23:08
shouldn't leave the impression that they
23:09
wanted that war hold that hold that
23:11
thought rosemarie these were the days of
23:14
empire as it were we will take a news
23:17
break and when we come back we'll
23:18
discuss more about both the British and
23:21
the Israeli narratives on Palestine when
23:24
we come back from an Uzbek
23:35
if I'm vice Minh beside him former
23:38
British Prime Minister David Lloyd
23:39
George reaffirmed his own Zionist
23:42
credentials it is 60 years since he
23:56
recruited me I've been converted into a
24:08
happy woman British news bulletins at
24:13
the time described Palestine as akin to
24:16
a desert the reality was very different
24:24
well welcome back Rosemarie you were
24:26
talking about whether they did or did
24:28
not intend for that to be part of their
24:31
war in our earlier discussion we were
24:34
mentioning what the fortunes of the
24:37
British in the First World War meant for
24:39
their decisions about Palestine we
24:41
should remember that by 1947 whilst they
24:44
were on the winning side in the Second
24:46
World War the British were a spent force
24:49
completely it was the beginning of the
24:51
end of the empire 1947 is the year that
24:55
they withdrew from India Palestine was
24:58
only one of the places from which they
25:00
felt they had to retreat because they
25:02
didn't have the power or the will to
25:05
suppress opposition to their presence
25:08
and hold on and they basically organized
25:13
themselves to get out of Palestine they
25:17
didn't feel that they have the capacity
25:19
to implement the two-state solution and
25:21
they favored and they acknowledged in
25:23
their own records that they were
25:25
favoring the Jewish community in the way
25:28
that they organized their retreat why
25:30
they because they needed the port of
25:33
Haifa to get away they knew that the the
25:37
you show the Jewish community the
25:40
Zionist organizations were much better
25:43
organized and could be much of a service
25:45
for the Empire and that they could do a
25:47
deal with them to get all the British
25:49
forces presence equipment and so on out
25:52
the the there wasn't the possibility of
25:55
a deal with any kind of Palestinian
25:57
Authority to do that yeah let's get to
26:00
the Israeli narrative avi so here we
26:03
have a narrative that says look this is
26:04
a prosecuted people came back to the
26:07
home of their forefathers they were
26:11
attacked by a huge number of Arabs and
26:14
armies and they miraculously warned
26:17
their independence what is right and
26:20
what is wrong with this narrative this
26:23
is the standard Zionist
26:25
narrative about the origins and the
26:28
course of the israeli-palestinian
26:32
conflict and it portrays the Jews as the
26:37
victims of
26:38
this conflict but in the final outcome
26:42
it was the Palestinians who the victims
26:47
there is a large Zionist historiography
26:51
about this conflict which elaborates on
26:55
this narrative but in the late 1980s a
27:00
new group of Israeli historians emerge
27:05
Ilan Pappe and myself I am one of them
27:10
and with the help of Israeli and British
27:14
and American and UN documents we mounted
27:17
a frontal assault on all the legends
27:20
that have come to surround the 1948 war
27:24
in the birth of Israel so why do the old
27:28
historians refer to you as not new and
27:31
not historians because they don't like
27:35
the conclusions that we have reached in
27:39
our rewriting of the history of 1948 on
27:42
the basis of the new evidence so let's
27:45
take for example the idea that Israel
27:47
was attacked by a number of Arab armies
27:50
and they are they have miraculously won
27:52
the war of independence against them
27:54
okay well the Israeli narrative says
27:59
that the whole of the Arab world was
28:02
united behind a clear war aim which is
28:06
to throw the Jews in into the sea and to
28:11
strangle the infant Jewish state at
28:14
birth but if you look at the Arab
28:17
coalition that invaded Palestine on the
28:20
5th of May 1948 which consisted of five
28:25
Arabs the regular armies of five Arab
28:28
states plus irregular Palestinian forces
28:31
you will see that it's the most bitterly
28:35
divided disorganized and ramshackle
28:39
coalition in the history of warfare and
28:41
there was no United Arab owain but in
28:46
the Syrians of Jordanians weren't united
28:48
so actually afraid of one another yes
28:51
there was rivalry between Egypt and the
28:55
Hashemite country is ruled by Hashemite
28:59
our rulers in Iraq and Transjordan
29:03
Lebanon and Syria were afraid of King
29:08
Abdullah's project and ambition for
29:11
Greater Syria to incorporate Lebanon and
29:15
Syria in his kingdom so there are very
29:17
very different agendas in this conflict
29:20
what about people without a land going
29:24
to a land without a people yeah I think
29:26
he's perhaps us dwelling for a moment on
29:29
the profound connection of what we were
29:30
talking about before which is the
29:31
British connection to the evolution of
29:33
the conflict and harness mythology and
29:36
also Palestinian mythology and the
29:39
mainstream idea sense of things is that
29:45
actually the the the British betrayed
29:48
Zionism and on the other hand of
29:52
mainstream Palestinian view and our view
29:55
is that the British colluded with the
29:59
Zionists but I think is very important
30:01
nonetheless that we don't fall into this
30:04
trap of going one side or another that
30:06
we acknowledge that there was also
30:07
profound ambivalence amongst the British
30:10
about the Zionist project right up until
30:14
at the end of the mandate I think
30:16
there's a continuity between Ernest
30:19
Bevin the British Foreign Secretary who
30:20
was directing Palestine policy at the
30:22
end of the mandate and his fear that a
30:25
Jewish state would become a satellite
30:27
for the Soviet Union and feared Jewish
30:29
communism and I think it's important
30:32
that we avoid the trap of falling into
30:35
two very straightforward nice and simple
30:37
narratives that really derive from the
30:40
beginnings of the mandate in the 1920s
30:42
onwards about the British were the good
30:44
guys or the British were the bad guys
30:45
well the British themselves obviously
30:47
have their narrative and it's different
30:49
from the other two and it it basically
30:53
as with all national narratives is about
30:56
vindicating the establishment especially
30:59
the establishment of the day and today
31:02
it's too embarrassing by half to
31:04
acknowledge that the
31:05
British may have had a profound role in
31:08
creating the mess that has continued as
31:11
a conflict ever since but it's very
31:14
difficult for all of us to identify any
31:18
one moment at which you could say that
31:22
that this is the moment for which they
31:25
must make the biggest apology because
31:28
shall we hold our breath or was it
31:30
coming apology well once they apologized
31:33
for one little piece of the story then
31:37
what happens to the whole of the rest of
31:39
the story are they supposed to apologize
31:40
for Empire are they supposed to
31:42
apologize for what they thought was
31:45
trying to keep the two sides apart in a
31:47
civil war
31:48
they described israeli-palestinian or
31:51
Jewish Arab conflict as a war between
31:55
the locals and they gave up trying to
31:59
separate them and I think to this day
32:01
the tendency has been not only in London
32:05
but also in other European capitals too
32:08
to put the major onus on both the
32:11
Israelis and the Palestinians for the
32:13
continuation of the conflict they don't
32:15
want to go back into history for a
32:17
variety of that's gonna be very
32:18
difficult isn't it after the case the
32:20
ruling of the hi Kourtni October 2012
32:22
about the case being brought against the
32:25
British government in relation to the
32:27
Mau Mau uprising in Kenya which is open
32:30
the can of worms it's no coincidence
32:31
that since then it's awesome is
32:32
compensation yes and that they now have
32:35
the right to bring a case against the
32:36
government it's no coincidence that we
32:38
now also have a campaign that's being
32:41
put forward by the Palestinian refugee
32:43
center in London for an apology for the
32:45
Balfour Declaration and British colonial
32:48
rule in Palestine
32:49
I would like to assign to Britain a
32:52
share of the responsibility for the
32:55
Nakba and James mentioned Ernest Bevin
32:59
the Labour's foreign secretary Bevan
33:02
once said that the Balfour Declaration
33:05
was the worst mistake in Western foreign
33:10
policy in the first half of the 20th
33:14
century but he was in power after the
33:18
war
33:19
after the Second World War and he was
33:22
not moved by any sentiments he was an
33:24
imperial policy maker and there is a
33:30
debate one of the main bones of
33:32
contention between the old historians
33:35
and the new historians is British policy
33:39
towards the end of the mandate the
33:42
oldest toy and say that the British
33:44
Britain was activated inspired by strong
33:49
anti Zionist and even anti-semitic calm
33:53
sentiments and that Britain's policy was
33:57
to arm and to encourage its Arab allies
34:01
to invade Palestine and put an end to
34:04
the Zionist project the new historians
34:11
perspective on British policy is rather
34:14
different Ilan pappé was the first to
34:17
challenge the Zionists our account and
34:21
he claimed that the key to British
34:26
policy towards the end of the mandate
34:30
was not through Israeli or / Arab it was
34:34
pro-british british imperial interests
34:37
and the key was greater Transjordan in
34:41
1947 1948 there was a tacit agreement
34:44
between king abdullah of Transjordan and
34:48
the Zionist leaders to partition
34:50
Palestine between themselves at the
34:52
expense of the Palestinians and this is
34:55
what happened in the end and a
34:58
subsidiary are a subsidiary argument is
35:00
that Britain knew and approved of this
35:05
collusion across the Jordan because the
35:10
British saw a Palestinian state as
35:13
synonymous with a multi-state and the
35:15
mufti was a renegade and hostility to
35:20
the mufti and a Palestinian state was a
35:22
constant factor in British policy to
35:27
throughout this period and I would say
35:31
that the subtext here
35:33
is that the British always understood
35:34
that there would be two states and a
35:37
two-state solution there was to be an
35:39
Arab state in a Jewish state but really
35:41
they thought that the Jordan River was
35:42
the dividing line between the two the
35:44
Jordan River but I think it is important
35:47
that despite the Bevin and the British
35:49
government thought that it was in their
35:50
interests to work with the reality of
35:55
United Nations support for a Jewish
35:57
state at that point Bevin was no fan of
36:01
the prospect of a Jewish state
36:02
even if reasons of realpolitik it was
36:06
something that he had to go with and at
36:08
the same time as everyone already
36:09
mentioned that there was this profound
36:12
distaste for the Palestinian Arab
36:15
leadership and I think that we have to
36:18
acknowledge that there is a clear
36:20
continuity from this point to the
36:22
present day in the international
36:24
community including the British
36:26
government of an uneasiness with what
36:30
they regard as non mainstream Zionism
36:34
they're always looking for moderate
36:36
Zionism in other words Zionism that will
36:38
fit in with the international
36:40
community's grand design and also at the
36:43
same time quote unquote moderate
36:45
Palestinians who will also fit in with
36:47
the international community's grand
36:49
design and that takes us all the way
36:51
back to the First World War when you say
36:53
international community grand design
36:54
meaning what exactly I mean in the sense
36:56
in in terms of the of the quartet so at
37:01
the Western head
37:03
absolutely but then again that's a bit
37:06
of a complicated because if we talk
37:08
about the West it doesn't really explain
37:09
the entire membership at the quartet
37:11
does it but I think that there is a
37:12
mainstream sense within international
37:15
politics that there is a search for
37:18
moderate Zionists and moderate
37:19
Palestinians and that there's a way
37:21
forwards that doesn't that isn't
37:24
involved mutually exclusive nationalism
37:26
on the part of both parties and I think
37:28
that this is a misunderstanding of this
37:30
war for statehood that goes back to the
37:33
first world it's a joke isn't it that
37:35
you get some Arabs who I think probably
37:39
are motivated by the desire to flatter
37:41
the British saying but you know us so
37:43
well what a joke
37:45
I mean basically the bridge
37:46
weren't seeing anything and it's not
37:48
unlike the the way the British plowed in
37:51
with the Americans into Iraq in 2003
37:55
and all sorts of things happened that
37:56
they've never anticipated they they
37:58
really do not have that good handle on
38:01
the realities of the region I must go
38:04
back to the Israeli narrative the
38:06
Zionist Israeli narrative so in the
38:08
1980s there's a new history that was
38:11
introduced which says look there are no
38:13
Palestinians these are Arabs that
38:14
emigrated in the 19th century to
38:16
Palestine there is no such a thing as a
38:18
Palestinian people and the likes of John
38:20
Peters onward time immemorial and so on
38:23
advance the idea that there is that
38:25
needs to be a swap of refugees Arab
38:27
refugees back to the Arab world and
38:29
Jewish refugees back into their homeland
38:31
what's wrong with this Israeli argument
38:41
it's such a completely unconvincing and
38:44
implausible argument because the
38:49
Palestinians are refugees and no one
38:51
denies that the debate is why did they
38:53
become refugees the old historian said
38:58
they left of their own accord the new
39:01
historians say historians say they were
39:04
pushed out no one denies that there were
39:06
refugees and that there were three
39:09
quarters of a million Palestinian
39:12
refugees more than half of the
39:14
Palestinian population in Palestine
39:16
that's the biggest refugee problem and
39:19
the most enduring refugee problem in
39:22
post-war so were they squeezed were they
39:25
encouraged by their leaders to leave as
39:27
the Zionist narratives introduces or is
39:30
something else very Maurice studied this
39:33
question in very great depth and with
39:36
the support of a mass of Israeli
39:38
documentation and his conclusion is that
39:42
there were many reasons for the
39:45
Palestinian exodus from Palestine but
39:48
the single most important most central
39:51
reason was Zionist military and
39:54
psychological pressure so by and large
39:57
most of the Palestinians were driven out
39:59
and
40:00
for Israel created this refugee problem
40:03
Israel is responsible for this problem
40:07
the documentary evidence includes
40:10
photographs obtained from the Israeli
40:13
archives of the busing of Palestinians
40:17
out of the areas in which they were
40:19
living of the separation of men and
40:21
women the organization of the population
40:23
into camps to be bused out or put in
40:27
lorries out though there was an
40:29
organization to the Exodus it didn't
40:32
happen overnight and it went on for
40:34
months and months over a year before I
40:37
go to what James talked about or called
40:40
Palestinian mythology I just want to
40:43
finish up with the question of Israel
40:45
you mentioned the new historians and the
40:47
new narrative introduced revisionist
40:49
history of sort how much influence does
40:51
that have in Israel during the few years
40:55
after the Oslo accord was signed in 1993
41:00
the Israeli public was quite receptive
41:04
to the new perspectives and you mean
41:07
because of the political environment
41:08
because because the Palestinians and the
41:11
Israelis have had embarked on the road
41:14
to peace and there was greater openness
41:16
to the narrative of the other side and
41:20
new interpretations had some traction
41:24
history books for secondary schools were
41:27
rewritten not abandoning the old Zionist
41:31
narrative the version that I was taught
41:34
at school in Israel but opening up a
41:38
debate about the causes of the
41:40
Palestinian Exodus and Edward Saeed who
41:45
wasn't a historian saw that the new
41:47
history for played quite an important
41:50
part in Israeli politics in the decade
41:54
after Oslo at three levels he said that
41:57
the new historians educated the Israeli
42:01
public about their own history and about
42:05
the relations with the Arabs it also on
42:09
to the Palestinians it presented a
42:12
version of history
42:13
which was
42:14
just the propaganda of the victors it
42:16
was genuine history honest history which
42:19
correspond to their own experience of
42:21
the Nakba and thirdly the new history
42:25
created a climate of opinion on both
42:28
sides of the divide which was conducive
42:30
to progress along the peace front
42:34
Jim's history perceived or revisited
42:37
within the constraints of ideological
42:39
and the political situation of the day a
42:41
great deal of the scholarship that's
42:45
there's been published in recent years
42:47
about the origins of the conflict and
42:49
the evolution of the conflict and
42:51
there's a willingness to accept and to
42:56
emphasize I think quite clearly the
42:59
significant role that was played by the
43:01
British but I think that in a lot of the
43:06
historiography there's still a tendency
43:09
to go down either one path or another
43:11
that that essentially for example with
43:15
reference to the British that they were
43:16
either pro-zionist or that they were
43:19
anti Palestinian but there is a new
43:21
history that speaks more to the
43:23
commonalities between Palestinians and
43:25
Jews in the early part of the century
43:27
then later perceived to be in a
43:31
commensal see ology of sort if you were
43:33
there's an attempt to restore the city's
43:35
relations for City Jewish relations
43:38
well mentioned historians of Europe like
43:43
[ ] sand who've questioned the have
43:46
talked about the invention of the Jewish
43:48
people and there's a thesis out there
43:51
that says that the Palestinians are also
43:53
Jews I mean this can go on and on what I
43:58
would say in terms of the situation and
44:01
its tragedy because we have Palestinians
44:05
either living outside historical
44:08
Palestine as refugees or within the West
44:12
Bank and Gaza as refugees and citizens I
44:15
beg your pardon
44:16
inhabitants of land under occupation and
44:19
if they are to have the rights
44:22
recognition of their rights as human
44:24
beings and as the
44:28
the victims of a sequence or series of
44:33
catastrophes and to have representation
44:38
citizenship somewhere if that has to
44:42
happen then it possibly is the case that
44:45
the British could help by acknowledging
44:48
that they have take some of the heat
44:51
take some of the weight and revisit
44:56
their own history and say that there are
44:59
a lot of people who had they acted
45:02
differently could have prevented some of
45:04
this spinning out the way it did instead
45:06
we have Tony Blair now the
45:07
representative of the international
45:09
community in Palestine all the parties
45:12
to this conflict need to reassess the
45:15
history in the light of new evidence
45:18
this is what the new historians have
45:21
done and I think this encourage the
45:23
emergence of new historians and we have
45:26
eminent new historians like Professor
45:28
Rashid Holliday of Columbia University
45:32
and Edward Saeed once wrote to me and
45:36
asked me to organize a conference at
45:39
Oxford on the moral and political
45:42
consequences of 1948 for him the moral
45:45
consequences came before the political
45:49
consequences that's significant the
45:52
result was a conference we organized in
45:54
a book that Eugene Rogan and I co edited
45:57
on the war for Palestine rewriting the
46:01
history of 1948 but to go back to an
46:06
earlier discussion we had his history
46:10
isn't written in a vacuum
46:11
history is written in a political
46:14
context and the emergence of the new
46:17
history in the late 1980s owed very much
46:22
to the aftermath of the Israeli invasion
46:24
of Lebanon in 1982 which was very
46:28
controversial and aroused a great deal
46:30
of criticism of the Israeli
46:32
establishment and that opened up a space
46:35
for going further back to reexamine
46:37
critically Israel's history and
46:40
similarly as a result of the outbreak of
46:44
the Second Intifada in 2000 the Israeli
46:49
minds have become closed again there has
46:52
been a reversal to fundamentalist
46:54
positions to us on them to this notion
46:57
that the Palestinians cannot be trusted
46:59
that the Oslo accord was a mistake and
47:02
the whole of the Arab world is against
47:06
us and we must stand up and fight for
47:09
ourselves but I guess it's we're back to
47:12
ground zero point zero as it were and
47:15
rosemary gentlemen we're gonna have to
47:17
end thank you for joining us until next
47:21
time
47:29
you