TheTiesThatBindPreview
Open in TheBrain

SARS (BIU)

At a glance: Tracks how SARS’s Business Intelligence Unit evaluated and acted on Blue File–related information about the Bernard Glazer estate, tax irregularities and possible corruption.

South African Revenue Service

(Business Intelligence Unit)

Summary

This thought tracks the involvement of the South African Revenue Service – Business Intelligence Unit (SARS BIU) in the wider Blue File / BF Legal matter. It focuses on how SARS BIU analysed, responded to or acted upon information relating to the Bernard Glazer estate, suspected tax irregularities and possible grand corruption.

Key aspects include:

In short, SARS (BIU) here represents the tax‑investigative and intelligence response node in the Blue File network: what SARS knew, when they knew it, how they interpreted the information, and what – if any – enforcement or remedial actions followed.

Historical Narrative – Blue File & SARS BIU (2005–2009)

1. Context and Purpose

Between roughly 2005 and 2009, SARS’s Business Intelligence Unit (BIU) and allied agencies (notably NIA) received a sustained stream of structured intelligence from John D. N. Schoeman ("Blue File"). This intelligence focused on:

The aim of these submissions – and therefore of this historical record – was to:

  1. Enable SARS/NIA to reconstruct complex structures (“a matrix of reconstruction where there was none”).
  2. Support enforcement/action in South Africa (and, via Botswana and Canada, abroad).
  3. Secure a fair recognition of the intellectual property, costs and risks carried by the compiler.
  4. Prevent further dilution and externalisation of South African–linked assets from the Glazer estate and related structures.

This section preserves the sequence of key filings, communications, agreements and non‑performance, so the history is not lost even if official processes stalled or failed.

2. Key Actors & Institutions

Inside or liaising with SARS / the state:

Blue File / External:

3. Filings and Submissions to SARS & NIA – Chronological Overview

Note: Much of the evidence is embedded in email trails and attached summaries. The dates below come from BF SARS 06 & 07.txt and SARS A Trainor 16 Nov 07.txt. The content of attached Word/PDF files is summarised based on their titles and covering emails.

3.1 Early Blue File Submissions (c. 2005–2006)

From March 2005 (by John’s own reference), SARS Business Intelligence began receiving advance submissions relating to:

While the detailed contents of all 2005–2006 attachments are in Word/PDF files, the email record confirms:

Selected evidence from 2006 (as later referenced in 2007 emails):

– Document: SARS JS Knight BF review 8 August 06.doc

– Context: SARS’s internal review of Blue File material by/with Knight.

– Documents: SARS M Mokwena BF Status 5 Dec 06.doc and SARS M Mokwena Head BIU & BF Status 5 Dec 06.doc (referred to again in 2007 closure emails).

– Indicates that by end‑2006 there was a formal SARS BIU view/status on BF submissions.

Taken together, these show that Blue File was no longer an informal side‑channel: it had become a recognised SARS BIU intelligence stream, with named SARS and NIA interlocutors and some internal documentation.

3.2 Transfer to a “Special Task Force” and NIA (2006–Early 2007)

By early 2007, John is informed that:

However, there is then a long period of silence:

This becomes a major theme in correspondence from May 2007 onwards.

3.3 Mid‑2007 – Intensified Submissions on LionOre, Tati & Related Structures

From May–August 2007, John significantly intensifies the LionOre / Norilsk / Xstrata / Tati / Botswana evidence submissions.

Key threads:

* Tati Concessions and Mineral Rights (MR) in Botswana.

* The 1970 B. Glazer – Sir Seretse Khama agreement (farms 73 & 75 NQ, sale of surface rights subject to retention of MR by Tati; Botswana Govt not to be in a better position than Tati).

* Cessions and “abandonments” of MR in June 1974, where MR appears to revert to Tati rather than the Botswana government, despite appearances in mineral department records.

* Formation of Tati Nickel, shareholdings of Francistown Mining & Exploration (Guernsey), Lexan Trading (Anglo) and Botswana Govt (15%).

* Reverse takeover via Liberian Ore to form LionOre and subsequent acquisition of Anglo’s interest (43.35%) for $79m.

* Transfer of Bechuanaland Mining & Exploration Company (BEC) assets to Tati for $2 in 1988, then via Sam Estates Land Company into Tati Nickel and then into LionOre, including Bamangwato Concessions Ltd (BCL) – “the mother load”.

* LionOre–Xstrata takeover battle, competing Norlisk offer, and escalating share prices.

* Glencore, RusAL, SUAL, and Russian strategic plays around Norilsk and gold/mineral assets.

* Interlocking roles of Falconbridge, Noranda, Xstrata, and historical agreements filed on SEDAR/CEDAR.

Examples from the email record:

John sets out, point‑by‑point, how the 1970 agreement, 1974 cessions/abandonments, Tati Territory, Anglo JV, Tati Nickel, Francistown Mining & Exploration, Lexan Trading, and the later LionOre corporate structure fit together.

He explicitly flags Abandonment of Mineral Areas as a possible smoke screen for a joint venture that kept MR effectively in private hands while appearing to change ownership, with Botswana’s 15% shareholding tied to tax concessions for the life of the mine.

John explains he now has “conclusive evidence for Government to intervene in terms of Jurisdiction by the Master of the Supreme Court over the Glazer Will Trust”.

He emphasises that:

* The LionOre/Norilsk acquisition ($7B) is the most pressing transaction for urgent intervention, ideally to interdict or affect the Competition Tribunal approval.

* A 2007 summary is being prepared, interlocking older BF summaries with new evidence, especially on Tati concessions.

* LionOre‑related agreements already exceed 100 pages, but a small number of core agreements would be sufficient for legal action.

John presses for a response, stressing the historical significance of the BF matrix and that it was the basis for assistance & cooperation.

He notes that “a fortune of time and energy has gone into BF without compensation”, and quotes Mamphela Ramphele on the importance of South Africans working with government.

He also draws SARS’s attention to ABN AMRO, Barclays, and links back to the Glazer Property Portfolio, referencing 1970s loans to South Africa (Frankfurt Documents) and later global bank restructurings.

3.4 May–June 2007 – Requests for Status, Recognition and Accreditation

On 31 May 2007, John writes directly to Mandisa Mokwena under the subject “J Schoeman & Blue File”:

“I was advised last year that the Blue File was transferred to a special task force to include NIA & others for investigation in conjunction with yourselves… In February this year I was advised by Karen L that the GM of NIA would contact me soon regarding the way forward. Other than the above, I have had no response… for 9 months.”

He asks explicitly:

He requests:

“Some written accreditation & validation for the historical research… Apart from academic purposes, I will at the very least be able to explain the last 5 years in order to seek alternative employment.”

This becomes a central expectation/undertaking theme: that SARS/NIA should at minimum provide formal recognition of the work and its national value.

3.5 October–November 2007 – Crisis Point, “Closure” and Terms

By October 2007, John’s correspondence reflects deep frustration and a sense of being prejudiced by the process:

He links changing political conditions in Russia, Russian–US tensions and Russian resource raids (using GF bonds and resultant structures) to what may be happening in Africa, with Norlisk/LionOre/Gold Fields as examples.

He notes that “the might of SA ‘teeth’ [is] a distant memory” as externalisation proceeds.

He describes contacting NIA via a UK address in June to establish BF progress, discovering a worrying status, and urgently compiling evidence on LionOre/Norilsk to attempt to overturn Competition Tribunal approval.

He summarises 2.5 years of involvement as leaving him “completely prejudiced” and regretful of ever illuminating the subject.

This sets out a clear list of requested outcomes, which functions as a quasi‑agreement offer:

1. Recognition for intellectual property.

2. Acknowledgement that he has served his country.

3. Terry’s residence visa.

4. Some compensation for costs.

5. A clean record.

6. (a) Assistance/sanction from central government to expand a Nature Reserve for the benefit of the community, and (b) OPIC financing for wind power for George as a model sustainable “green footprint”.

7. Clearance.

In return, John offers:

“…a complete set of all my records as a copy and/or by rights convey any entitlement by virtue of a cession, assignment, transfer or cancellation of interest. Of course the option is available to establish an Academy or Research Institute in the Reserve.”

This is a key moment: it crystallises the exchange – national intelligence and IP, at personal risk and cost, for recognition, clearance and a constructive social outcome.

John sends “BF Closure”, attaching:

* SARS M Mokwena BIU BF Submissions 2005-07 13 Nov 07.doc

* SARS M Mokwena Head BIU & BF Status 5 Dec 06.doc

* NIA Terms of Reference John Schoeman 24 August 07.doc

* NIA Note of Termination 13 Nov 07.doc

He writes:

“Please find my personal correspondence to you dated 13 Nov 07.”

This signals formal closure of his active cooperation, at least in the existing framework.

John forwards to Mandisa Mokwena:

* Example submissions re African Diamonds (Investec holdings, Mwana Africa’s acquisition of SouthernEra Diamonds).

* New Series Part 1 & Falconbridge Exit – including Falconbridge prospectus, Noranda trust indentures, AIFs, management circulars, etc.

* BF Summaries (Tati‑related companies, Botswana restructuring, Glazer mineral interests).

* Botswana Addendum (Gallery Gold).

* Tati Mineral Right Status FF & LionOre (including title deeds).

* BF 07 Part 2 and Part 3, and Part 1 of Botswana Glazer Minerals/LionOre submissions.

Some of these emails trigger MailMarshal alerts because attachments exceed 2MB, evidencing the volume and seriousness of what he was sending, and how close to the technical limits of SARS’s systems he was operating.

By late 2007, Blue File had effectively completed its investigative compilation phase vis‑à‑vis SARS BIU and NIA, but the institutional response remained unclear or unsatisfactory.

4. Agreements, Expectations and Understandings

From the correspondence, we can reconstruct the practical agreements and expectations that governed the relationship between John (Blue File) and SARS BIU/NIA.

4.1 Institutional Side (SARS BIU / NIA / State)

SARS BIU and NIA accepted extensive evidence on:

* Glazer estate and Glazer‑linked mineral and financial structures.

* Botswana Tati concessions; LionOre, Norilsk, Xstrata; Falconbridge, Noranda; African Diamonds; ABN AMRO/Barclays; and many others.

They signalled that this would be used in a special task force for investigation.

John was explicitly told that:

* Blue File had been transferred to a special task force comprising SARS, NIA and others.

* The GM of NIA would contact him to discuss “the way forward”.

Early meetings with Mandisa included discussions of “joint collaboration” and “numerous protocols” which, as John notes, “never materialized”.

There was at least tacit acceptance that John’s work pointed toward intervention via the Master of the Supreme Court over the Glazer Will Trust, and that this was a route the state could pursue.

4.2 Blue File Side (John D. N. Schoeman)

John’s explicit and implicit commitments included:

* ~14 years of foundational research (GF & BF).

* Daily submissions for 2 years, with further periodic updates thereafter.

* Acquisition of difficult‑to‑obtain title deeds and archival records across jurisdictions.

* Continuous monitoring of corporate events (M&A, stock market announcements, regulatory filings) and integrating them into a coherent historical and structural analysis.

In the 6 Nov 2007 email, John offers to cede/assign/transfer any entitlement by virtue of his records, effectively offering a full transfer of his IP into state hands, in return for the outcomes listed.

He consistently frames any gains or recognition as being channelled into:

* The community‑benefit nature reserve near George (potential national heritage site, Khoe heritage analog to Australian aboriginal heritage references).

* Sustainable ‘green footprint’ projects (e.g. wind power for George).

* Educational or research institutions (an Academy or Research Institute based on Blue File).

4.3 The Explicit Request Package (6 Nov 2007)

The 6 Nov 2007 “special favor” request to Andrew Trainor is the clearest articulation of what John expected in return for his work and for fully transferring his IP to the state. In condensed form:

  1. Recognition – formal recognition of the BF intellectual property.
  2. Service to Country – acknowledgment that he has served South Africa.
  3. Terry’s Residence Visa – support for regularising/confirming visa status.
  4. Compensation for Costs – at least partial reimbursement of direct costs incurred.
  5. Clean Record – explicit confirmation that he is not a suspect or tainted by the matters he uncovered.
  6. Support for a Nature Reserve & Green Project – sanction/assistance from central government and OPIC financing for a wind‑power project in George.
  7. Clearance – formal closure that allows him to move on personally and professionally.

This constitutes, in effect, the moral and practical “contract” underpinning his collaboration.

5. Non‑Performance, Breakdown and Aftermath

5.1 Silence and Lack of Feedback

Despite:

John experiences:

His May and July 2007 emails repeatedly ask what has happened to Blue File, and whether SARS still has any interest in it.

5.2 Task Force and NIA Changes

By June 2007, John learns from Karen L that there have been “dramatic changes” at NIA affecting both her and the GM who was to meet with him. As a result:

This is recorded in an email of 4 June 2007 where John writes that he expected Andrew’s call (which did not come) and recounts Karen’s update on NIA’s internal upheavals.

5.3 Non‑payment and Prejudice

Subsequent documents and PDFs (e.g. “BF E Trent SARS Update on non payment for service rendered during the blue file investigation Aug [2008]” and later correspondence with I. Pillay in January 2009) indicate that:

While the exact wording of those scanned documents is not reproduced here, their titles and positioning in the archive make it clear that non‑payment and lack of recognition became formal disputes pursued through other channels (e.g. via BF E Trent, parliamentary or political appeals).

5.4 Failure to Honour Non‑Monetary Undertakings

The record also shows a failure to honour the non‑monetary aspects of the informal contract:

Given John’s repeated emphasis on these points, their absence is itself historically significant.

5.5 Termination and Closure

The combination of:

indicates that, from John’s perspective, the state effectively walked away from:

6. Historical Significance

From a historical and archival perspective, the SARS (BIU) / Blue File story illustrates several key themes:

  1. Citizen‑initiated intelligence vs. institutional inertia

A private individual, drawing on years of research, built a sophisticated mapping of transnational mineral and financial structures and handed it to the state. The state’s partial, fragmented, and ultimately inconclusive response is part of the historical record.

  1. Windows of opportunity

Events like the LionOre–Norlisk/Xstrata battle, ABN AMRO transactions, and Botswana restructuring created fleeting legal and political openings for South Africa to assert its interests (e.g. via the Master of the Supreme Court, Competition Tribunal, or cross‑border tax cooperation). Blue File attempted to sound the alarm in real time.

  1. Risk, sacrifice and recognition

Blue File entailed personal risk, financial sacrifice and sustained effort over more than a decade. The email record makes clear that recognition and protection were not luxuries but integral to any fair arrangement between citizen and state.

  1. Archival value

Even where institutions failed to act, the compiled evidence and this narrative offer future investigators, historians and legal teams a road map: names, dates, companies, transactions, and specific points where public authority could have intervened.

7. Next Steps for This Thought

To deepen this Notes section over time, you can:

* LionOre / Xstrata / Norilsk

* Tati Concessions & Botswana mineral rights

* Glazer Will Trust / Master of the Supreme Court

* ABN AMRO / Barclays / global banking consortium loans to SA

and reference this SARS (BIU) thought from each as the “SARS/NIA response” node.

This preserves not only what was sent to SARS BIU, but also how the state did or did not respond, which is central to the historical record you’re building here.

Attachments