Nick Anderson Cisa

this is post krebs cisa?

SEE GOP STEAL ELECTION TINA PETERS EMERGNCY VOTING MACHINE CONSPIR

7 26 cisa cut now being beefed up?!

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an pp 10 26

A few months into President Donald Trump’s second term, political appointees at the Department of Homeland Security made an unusual request of its agency focused on cybersecurity: Secretly acquire a voting machine and hack it.

The appointees wanted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to procure the machine, examine it and report back the findings so they could be given to the White House, according to two former administration officials with knowledge of the request.

The proposition was shocking to CISA’s career staffers, according to one of the former officials. CISA typically worked to thwart hackers. Moreover, the agency had been directed not to alert the voting machine company if it uncovered flaws, contrary to its standard practices. The request made the CISA employees fear they were being asked to take part in political interference.

“My thought was they could keep it in their back pocket to invalidate any [election] results they don’t like,” one of the former officials said. “This goes against everything CISA represents.”

The CISA employees repeatedly told the political appointees that their request was impossible, in part because the agents capable of pulling off such an operation had just been laid off by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency initiative. The appointees eventually stopped pressing CISA.

Though not acted on, the request shows how the Trump administration has tried to use the agency for its own ends while draining it of resources for one of its critical missions: protecting the nation’s voting systems.

In Trump’s second term, his administration has laid off or pushed out more than 1,000 CISA employees, shrinking the agency by about one-third. The president’s 2027 budget proposal would reduce funding for the agency by another $700 million, which could necessitate 900 additional layoffs.

In response, Democratic lawmakers have called for an investigation into CISA’s ability to do its job and demanded answers as to why federal funds are not being used to support election security as directed by Congress.

Since Trump signed the CISA Act in 2018, the agency has worked with state authorities and voting machine vendors to help protect election infrastructure from cyberattacks. During Trump’s second term, though, CISA has abandoned much of this work. Several state election authorities said the agency provided them no assistance — and no explanation for its absence — during the most critical planning stages for the upcoming midterms.

“There is a difference between deprioritizing and being nonexistent,” said Ryan Macias, an election technology and cybersecurity expert who has worked as a consultant for CISA. In 2025 and through mid-September 2026 — when the bulk of preparations for the election typically would have been completed — “they were nonexistent. Literally nonexistent.”

While Trump has repeatedly warned that America’s elections are vulnerable to hacking, in some cases repeating disproven claims, experts said his administration is undermining the federal government’s role in helping secure them.

Though CISA re-emerged in September with a last-minute security plan for the election, some state officials told ProPublica they fear that what is left of the agency has been compromised by a conspiracy-obsessed presidential administration. In recent months, in reviving debunked theories about the 2020 election, the Trump administration has declassified troves of records, including sensitive material that state officials provided to CISA. Some state authorities said they no longer trusted the administration enough to share information with CISA, a key to the agency’s success in past elections.

“They’ve violated the entire premise of that information-sharing relationship,” said one former high-ranking federal cybersecurity official who now advises state governments on national security. “There’s no fucking way they’re ever going to give any information to CISA. And it’s unclear if they ever will in the future.”

A spokesperson for the White House declined an interview request but defended Trump’s handling of election security in an emailed statement. “President Trump has done more than any other President to ensure we have free and fair elections,” said Lauren Bis.

Bis referred specific questions about CISA’s handling of elections to DHS. DHS and CISA did not respond to interview requests or to a detailed list of questions.

“There’s no fucking way [state governments are] ever going to give any information to CISA. And it’s unclear if they ever will in the future.”

A former federal cybersecurity official who advises state governments

Current and former CISA employees and state election officials describe an agency that has become significantly less equipped to help states fight legitimate cyber threats. State leaders say they have used their own resources to shore up gaps left by CISA, such as paying for sensor technology that can detect unusual activity in election networks. But some services, like intel on foreign actors, can’t be replicated. Some people interviewed said they were worried that Trump and his allies continue to ratchet up rhetoric about voting security, particularly about threats to voting machines. Officials in one large voting jurisdiction said they have met privately with machine vendors to come up with a contingency plan if the federal government seizes their machines or declares them unusable.

“I don’t pay attention to what the president says. I pay attention to what his administration does,” Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes said. “And what they’ve done is basically cut us off and left us on our own.”

Defending elections from hackers wasn’t always part of DHS’s remit.

Throughout the mid-1990s and 2000s, a series of cyberattacks rocked the federal government, demonstrating the emerging threat. In 2007, hackers broke into the Pentagon and stole terabytes of sensitive data. The digital heist, by an unknown foreign adversary, was so damaging that one intelligence leader later described it as an “espionage Pearl Harbor.”

Under George W. Bush, DHS underwent a reorganization to more effectively combat terrorism and respond to disasters like Hurricane Katrina. The department dedicated resources under an office called the National Protection and Programs Directorate to help fortify advanced cyber defense systems and important infrastructure. The office’s work ranged from helping secure events like the Super Bowl to protecting chemical plants to issuing cybersecurity warnings to the private sector and the public. In 2018, Trump signed a bill making the office a stand-alone agency, allowing for more federal funding and transforming it into, essentially, the ultimate tech support desk for anything DHS designated “critical infrastructure.”

The bill renamed the agency CISA.

Though Trump helped create CISA, he didn’t much appreciate the work the agency did under its old name to expose the extent of Russia’s meddling in the 2016 presidential election. Russian agents had unleashed a massive disinformation campaign, with a Kremlin-backed troll farm creating thousands of social media accounts posing as Americans and promoting Trump, according to bipartisan reports from the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released before the 2020 election. A dozen Russian military agents were indicted for what the Justice Department described as “a sustained effort to hack into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the Democratic National Committee, and the presidential campaign of Hillary Clinton.”

Trump publicly downplayed this interference, but DHS leadership saw the Russia attack as an escalation. In January 2017, before Trump took office, DHS upgraded America’s elections to the status of critical infrastructure. This placed the polls and all voting technology used in federal elections under the watch of what would soon become CISA.

To carry out this function, CISA needed help. But states and voting machine vendors were wary about sharing data on weaknesses in voting systems, fearing it could be exploited if certain details were to become public. State officials were also reluctant to cede any role in election preparation to the federal government.

Gradually, though, CISA and state election officials negotiated a fragile trust. At its center was a commitment: The sensitive information states and vendors shared with CISA would be kept confidential.

“It took years and years of building trust, of talking to election officials, of hiring people with elections experience who could be validators for the work that CISA wanted to do, before they finally built strong working relationships,” said Derek Tisler, who specializes in election security as counsel for the nonprofit Brennan Center for Justice, a nonpartisan institute based out of New York University School of Law.

Under Director Chris Krebs, CISA hosted penetration testing in which its agents would try to hack into a state’s system to locate weaknesses that could then be patched, along with tabletop exercises simulating a series of potential catastrophes around elections. CISA also offered regular secret-level briefings to secretaries of state to share federal intelligence. And CISA paid for sensor technology that looked for potential malicious online activity on election networks, notifying officials about emerging threats.

“The staffing was there, the expertise was there, the visibility was there, the funding was there,” Macias said.

The consortium shared data as run of the mill as spambots as well as more serious threats. If Virginia caught unusual activity in its system, it could let other states know to be vigilant.

While CISA had prepared for attacks from the Chinese and Russian governments, or lone wolf hackers, few there had expected the threat to elections would come from inside the White House. But when Trump refused to concede to Joe Biden in 2020, claiming the vote had been rigged, CISA became a key component of the guardrails that ultimately led to the election results being certified.

The agency, in a statement co-signed by secretaries of state and voting machine vendors, vouched for the election’s integrity, calling it “the most secure in American history.” When Krebs publicly rebutted claims amplified by the White House as “unsubstantiated” or “technically incoherent,” Trump fired him over Twitter.

As Congress prepared to vote on certifying the election results, it was members of CISA, along with the FBI, who convinced then-Attorney General Bill Barr that the conspiracy theories embraced by the president could be explained by human error, not systemic fraud or hacking.

When Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, his administration immediately started to dismantle CISA. The administrative notices were sent out just a couple of weeks after the inauguration and included the team in charge of dispelling disinformation.

For the employees under the DOGE microscope, work became impossible, said one former senior CISA employee. “Those groups couldn’t even order a pizza.”

DOGE laid off people critical to the agency’s election work, including those who’d worked closely with states. The Trump administration cut funding for the technology that monitored web and election servers, blinding the federal government to breaches it had detected.

When it came time for states to prepare for the 2026 midterms, CISA had disappeared.

On the evening of July 16, in the Black Hills of South Dakota, dozens of election officials and their staffs gathered for a reception near Mount Rushmore. It was the third night of an annual conference for secretaries of state, drawing participants from red and blue states. They’d spent the week discussing state voter roll maintenance and voter ID — issues that at times made for disagreements.

At about 8 p.m., a wave of discomfort swept through the crowd, visible on attendees’ faces as they glanced frequently at their phones, according to people at the event. Any minute now, Trump was going to address the nation on election security. Some at the reception worried he would declare a national emergency, as his allies had urged him to do months earlier, and use it as a pretext to direct the government to seize voting machines.

Then reports on the speech began rolling in, and the mood shifted. The claims Trump was making were unsubstantiated and outlandish. Many had been examined ad nauseam, including by those at the reception, and roundly debunked. The collective anxiety that was palpable moments earlier melted away, as many saw the speech as another attempt to revive disproved theories unlikely to be taken seriously by most voters.

“Everyone just sort of guffawed and put their phones away and went to the bar,” recalled Quinn Raymond, co-founder of VoteShield, a nonprofit that works with states to help monitor voter registration data, who was at the event.

Still, if the speech made little impact, records published by the Trump administration to support the president’s claims damaged the already eroding relationship between CISA and state election officials. The material included raw information states had shared with the agency that was supposed to remain private, such as a log of communications from Election Day 2020 detailing activity being monitored in several states.

“It betrayed the trust of all partners who were willing to share information at the time,” said Geoff Hale, who worked on CISA’s elections team from the agency’s inception until last year. Now he specializes in election security at the Center for Democracy & Technology, a nonprofit that advocates for digital and civil rights.

Bis, the White House spokesperson, denied that the Trump administration broke any agreements in releasing the information. “The release of such information is exactly the sort of transparency news organizations should applaud,” she said. Bis also defended Trump’s speech, saying it had been fact-checked “by the agencies whose evidence was released and did not mischaracterize any information.”

Hale and others said the speech was one of several instances demonstrating the Trump administration’s reckless attitude toward sensitive data collected by CISA. Earlier this year, Politico reported that acting CISA Director Madhu Gottumukkala had uploaded records to ChatGPT, even though DHS had barred its employees from using the unsecure program. A CISA spokesperson told Politico that Gottumukkala had been permitted to use the technology for a “short-term and limited” basis.

Last May, an independent journalist named Brian Krebs exposed that CISA published private data, including passwords, cloud keys and other information, on its public GitHub page, in a folder labeled “Private-CISA.” A CISA spokesperson told the journalist there was no indication that sensitive data was compromised.

Some state election authorities were also alarmed to see the lengths to which the Trump administration went to legitimize the president’s fixation on the 2020 race.

In fall 2025, Missouri election officials produced a memo stating Andrew McCoy Warner, a Department of Justice official and prominent 2020 election conspiracy theorist, had called several clerks asking for access to voting machines. Tulsi Gabbard, then the director of national intelligence, had also led an operation in Puerto Rico to seize election machines. When the private cybersecurity contractor hired to examine the machines, Mojave Research Inc., failed to find evidence supporting claims about 2020, the federal government became “dissastified” with its services and stopped renewing its contract, its CEO later told reporters.

A spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence told reporters in August that Mojave’s work ceased because it had completed its contract. Testifying before Congress in March, Gabbard said the seizing of voting machines came at the request of an assistant U.S. attorney in Puerto Rico.

“What happened in the second Trump administration is from almost day one — I mean, literally the first two months — they took all that was built up by Trump 1 and just decimated it,” said David Becker, founder of the nonpartisan Center for Election Innovation and Research, a nonprofit that works with state election authorities. “Election officials lost trust in the federal government.”

It didn’t help that, in his speech, the president mocked CISA’s defense of the 2020 election, calling the statement about it being the most secure in history a “very pat line” concocted as part of a deep-state cover-up. One former career CISA employee described being crestfallen at the Trump administration’s erosion of all they’d accomplished.

“We worked so hard to build that trusted relationship,” said Caitlin Durkovich, former DHS assistant secretary for infrastructure protection and co-founder of the cybersecurity firm Civira Partners. “I don’t know how you put it back together.”

A few weeks after Trump’s speech, the state election officials gathered once more, this time for a video call with Nick Andersen, who had replaced Gottumukkala as CISA’s acting director.

Though the primaries were already under way, this was the first time many had met Andersen, a former cybersecurity adviser to Trump’s White House who had joined CISA a year earlier. Andersen is also a district representative for the Republican Party in Virginia, according to the party’s website. In March, he gave a speech to the Fairfax GOP chapter titled “Fighting Democrat Redistricting.”

Speaking over video in August, the boyish-faced former Marine Corps engineer announced that DHS was preparing to release a plan on how it would work together with state officials to secure the election, according to five people who were present at the video meeting, some of whom shared notes with ProPublica.

Many on the call were stunned at what they perceived as a lack of understanding of election planning. Early voting for the general election was just around the corner. They had spent over a year preparing for the midterms, and there was no more time for ambitious work.

Some peppered Andersen with questions: Where had CISA been when there was still time to make improvements?

Andersen blamed any lapses or perceived breaches in trust on the federal government shutdown in fall 2025, twirling his pen uncomfortably and sipping from a Monster energy drink.

Fontes, Arizona’s secretary of state, was blunt about his feelings regarding working with Andersen and CISA, according to several of the people on the call.

“I told him I didn’t trust him,” Fontes recalled in an interview. “I did raise my voice a little bit, because I’m frustrated — very frustrated — that they would have the temerity to come in, clear the entire deck of competent professionals, stop supporting the states, eviscerate the coordination efforts that they had and then suddenly come in and say: ‘Oh, we’re from the federal government. We’re here to help.’”

Indeed, one recently departed CISA official said attempting to do the agency’s typical election work now would be futile. In previous years, CISA had finished almost all its preparations with the states by Labor Day.

“That ship has sailed,” the official said.

CISA published its security plan for the 2026 election on Sept. 24. The 13-page document describes how, over the past two years, CISA has “recommitted to its statutory mission and remains resolute in strengthening the security of elections.”

State officials said their planning will ensure a secure election, even without help from CISA. Yet they and cybersecurity experts worry that Trump will say the election was hacked if Republicans don’t win in November.

The security plan calls for “leveraging collaborative partnerships” with states the agency has abandoned since Trump took office. Shenna Bellows, Maine’s secretary of state, said she’d welcome that but was skeptical of the agency’s motivations.

“For CISA to promise election officials now, at this point in time, that they are going to be a resource for the 2026 election is too little, too late,” she said.

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MMA

Tina Peters allegedly met with Trump to discuss election plans. Here's what that could mean for the midterms.

Written by Kayla Gogarty & John Whitehouse

Research contributions from Alex Kaplan & John Knefel

Published 10/06/26

Former Mesa County, Colorado, clerk Tina Peters, who was released from prison on June 1 after being sentenced to nearly nine years for actions related to tampering with voting machines following the 2020 election, allegedly met with President Donald Trump on October 5 to discuss the midterm elections.

Tina Peters allegedly met with President Trump – again.

Speaking on Eric Bolling’s Real America’s Voice show, former Trump Justice Department official Ed Martin said that Peters was “in the Oval Office meeting with the president on election integrity” hours earlier.
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From the October 5, 2026, edition of Real America's Voice's Bolling!

ED MARTIN (GUEST): Well, let me break some news. This is a big deal, Eric, and I'm — you're the first person that knows. I'm going to say something — just hours ago, maybe two hours ago. Tina Peters, you know, from Colorado, was in the Oval Office meeting with the president on election integrity, and they were talking about the plans.

And the one thing that they know is that Secretary Mullin of the Department of Homeland Security came out in late August and conceded and said, as a matter of law, a finding that there is — the machines for voting, the election voting machines use parts from China and Russia and foreign places and are therefore compromised. That's what Mullin said. That finding, when he finished that finding, he then said, and I have a billion dollars to help you states to do something other than use machines that are compromised. And, again, my point is this.

You talk about local. It is a local election. I ran the election board in St. Louis. There is local control. However, the laws that govern the system, like safety and national security, are federal laws.

And so when Tina Peters, you know, famous Colorado clerk, was in the Oval Office today just two hours ago talking about this question, the president's taking it seriously. If the Congress won't pass the SAVE America Act, and they won't, then the president's going to have to do what he's going to do. And it is not a local issue when it's national security, and it's clearly national security. So we'll see how it plays out.

Peters has claimed to regularly be in contact with Trump administration officials, including by text, and said in late August that she has been to the White House six times. She also has thanked White House staff for facilitating her release from prison. In July, Peters claimed that Trump ordered his staff to do what she recommended, saying on a livestream, “Yesterday, when I was with the president, he talked — and I can’t get into the plan — but we talked, he basically said to his lead counsel to do what I was asking.”

Peters has also recently claimed to have been in contact with White House chief of staff Susie Wiles, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, Attorney General Todd Blanche’s deputy chief of staff Shane Hedges, and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Harmeet Dhillon.

Martin recently left Trump’s DOJ to — at least according to the president in a Truth Social post — “fight Legal Battles” related to the midterms. Martin and Peters have a history together. In 2025, Martin told Steve Bannon that he had been working for two months to find “a path” to her release. He also reportedly “discussed election security issues last year” with Peters’ associates and forwarded their pitch for a ban on voting machines to another senior Justice Department official.

What is Tina Peters’ plan for the election?

Peters has been vocal in far-right circles about her election plan. As Media Matters’ Alex Kaplan documented in late July:

The new proposal, dated July 22 and called the “100-Day Risk Mitigation Election Plan” and “Operational Guidance for the November Federal Election – 2026,” urges the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency — an agency housed under the Department of Homeland Security that is “one of the main federal partners for states on election security, sharing intelligence on potential threats to voting infrastructure and providing quick regional support,” per MS NOW — to “concentrate on six achievable measures,” including “transition[ing] the general electorate away from ballot-marking devices (BMD) to hand-marked paper ballots” and “insisting that the official count can only be certified after a full hand-count of every ballot.”

It also lays out an implementation framework that would involve classifying all counties based on current election processes and their ability to transition ahead of the midterms and then providing each county with implementation plans. During a podcast interview discussing the plan, Peters acknowledged that “CISA is not a forceful body that they can make people do things, but they can actually make recommendations,” and suggested that DHS could use a recently announced grant for states “that comply with certain things like paper ballots and so on and so forth” as an “incentive.”
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Peters released the new proposal, which she called a “practical election-security plan,” on her website along with a July 24 letter to the acting director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency thanking him “for meeting with us … and for giving us the opportunity to present our concerns and proposed path forward for the 2026 federal election.”

Peters’ plan also requires that jurisdictions must “apply the ‘Bank-Teller Method’: independently hand-count every ballot for federal contests before certification and reconcile that count with the tabulator result.”

As the midterms approach, Peters has continued to promote versions of her plan and give additional details, such as arguing that Trump already has the power to involve DHS and the Commerce Department through an executive order on critical infrastructure. Election deniers like Peter Ticktin, Jerome Corsi, Cleta Mitchell, and Wayne Allyn Root have made similar arguments about Trump already having authority.

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From a video uploaded on Tina Peters' website on August 26, 2026
TINA PETERS: Mr. President, it is time to treat America’s elections like the critical infrastructure that they are. We do not have months. We have days. Mr. President, our own government and your administration has documented vulnerabilities in election systems and identified foreign adversary threats. Voter databases, poll books, election networks, and voting technology are all at risk.

The authority already exists. The national emergency under Executive Order 13873 is already in place. What is needed now is cabinet-level direction, direction of DHS, CISA, the EAC, FEMA, the intelligence community, and Commerce to immediately execute the 2026 mitigation plan.
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The goal is simple and absolutely achievable, Mr. President: Secure and reduce electronic dependence, wherever possible, preserve physical paper evidence, and independently verify electronic results before certification. CISA should issue immediate cybersecurity guidance and assistance to transition all counties to handmark paper ballots, and make sure every electronic tabulation is human verified. FEMA should identify available funding for securing the elections.
High-risk jurisdictions should receive rapid technical assistance, and Commerce should begin a foreign adversary election technology review. Please, Mr. President, set September 8 as the first deadline and make every electronic result independently checkable.

This is a known national security issue. The complete risk mitigation plan is available.
...
We still have time to act, but the clock is running. Please direct your cabinet to move now. Our team stands ready to help.
God bless you, Mr. President. This plan — I’m confident — will save our country.

What has Peters said about the president having authority to intervene in the midterms?

Peters has been vocal that the president has the power to intervene in the midterms through executive power. (Experts have harshly criticized this analysis.)

Peters said during a June 14 stream following her release from prison that she had spoken with the president and she believes “Trump could sign an executive order to get rid of the machines and say that they are — that a vendor cannot have that much influence over our elections.” She also said on June 25 that “we’ve got to get rid of the machines” and “mail-in ballots,” and Trump “needs to sign an executive order ... saying it’s unconstitutional that these things are allowed to be done.” Election denial activist Jerome Corsi has claimed that Peters will “play a major role in one of the key factors in Trump ultimately declaring the need for the elections to be supervised by the federal government.”

Similar to what Martin told Eric Bolling on October 5, Peters has grounded her election rhetoric in terms of foreign interference and national security, saying, “There’s no security threshold when you have foreign agents that have proprietary authority, power, over the things that are used for our most sacred right, which is to vote who we want to represent us.”
She has also claimed that Trump should take action against voting machines because some of the parts are “made in China.” Notably, Peters has also urged the military to get involved, saying: “It's very important to — for the Department of War — now I'm saying the Department of War because this is an international event that is going on with stealing our elections. Pete Hegseth needs to go in and demand to have these machines in their custody, and also the Mesa County machines. They're still out there.”

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MMA

Tina Peters and other election deniers claim they've pitched the Trump administration on a midterm “election-security plan”

07/30/26

Multiple figures behind the proposal have also urged Trump to declare a “national emergency” over the midterm elections

Written by Alex Kaplan

Published 07/30/26

A group of activists in the election denial community — including Tina Peters, a former Colorado election official convicted of charges related to the 2020 election, and Clay Parikh, who has served as a “special government employee” for the Trump administration — claim they presented a key government agency responsible for protecting elections with “operational guidance” for the midterms in the form of a “risk mitigation” and “practical election-security plan” to implement in the 100 days before the elections. The proposal appears to be the latest attempt to push the Trump administration to take over election processes ahead of the midterms.

The new proposal, dated July 22 and called the “100-Day Risk Mitigation Election Plan” and “Operational Guidance for the November Federal Election – 2026,” urges the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency — an agency housed under the Department of Homeland Security that is “one of the main federal partners for states on election security, sharing intelligence on potential threats to voting infrastructure and providing quick regional support,” per MS NOW — to “concentrate on six achievable measures,” including “transition[ing] the general electorate away from ballot-marking devices (BMD) to hand-marked paper ballots” and “insisting that the official count can only be certified after a full hand-count of every ballot.”

It also lays out an implementation framework that would involve classifying all counties based on current election processes and their ability to transition ahead of the midterms and then providing each county with implementation plans. During a podcast interview discussing the plan, Peters acknowledged that “CISA is not a forceful body that they can make people do things, but they can actually make recommendations,” and suggested that DHS could use a recently announced grant for states “that comply with certain things like paper ballots and so on and so forth” as an “incentive.”

Voting machines and tabulators have been the target of election conspiracy theories for years, sparking campaigns to replace them with full hand-counts. As experts have explained, a system of hand-counted paper ballots would be less accurate, more expensive, impractical, and “potentially riskier than the current system of machines with auditable paper trails that almost all cities and states use.” Studies have actually shown that “hand-counting ballots produces more errors than machine tabulation,” and as the Brennan Center for Justice has explained, “Many checks exist to ensure that voting machines count ballots correctly and produce accurate election results.”

Peters released the new proposal, which she called a “practical election-security plan,” on her website along with a July 24 letter to the acting director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency thanking him “for meeting with us … and for giving us the opportunity to present our concerns and proposed path forward for the 2026 federal election.”

These are the figures who signed the letter to CISA:

Peters, who publicly released the plan, is the former county clerk of Mesa County, Colorado, and was “convicted in 2024 for her role in a brazen plot to examine voting machines under her control after the 2020 election” before Democratic Colorado Gov. Jared Polis commuted her sentence. She met with Trump at the Oval Office in late June, later claiming that she told him, “If we don’t fix these machines, if we don’t get rid of these machines, we’re going to lose the next election.”

Parikh, who has served as a “special government employee” in the Trump administration and who was cited in the FBI’s warrant for its raid of a Fulton County, Georgia, election facility. Parikh was also involved in Kari Lake’s unsuccessful legal effort to claim fraud was involved in her 2022 Arizona gubernatorial election defeat and has reportedly “served as a witness in other cases … challenging the use of voting machines.”

Conrad Reynolds, a podcast host who reportedly ”thinks Arkansas voting machines could be flipping votes” and who was involved with Restore Election Integrity Arkansas and its push for an amendment “aimed at requiring all elections in Arkansas to be conducted with paper ballots and removing language in the Arkansas Constitution that permits elections to be conducted by voting machines.” Reynolds has also run the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative, which has aimed for “getting rid of voting machines” in favor of paper ballots.

Will Huff, who often co-hosts Reynolds’ podcast and has pushed election-related conspiracy theories about “dirty voter rolls” and “the mail-in ballot scheme.” Huff has also been involved with Restore Election Integrity Arkansas and the Arkansas Voter Integrity Initiative.

Peters also explained the proposal during a July 27 podcast appearance, claiming that Trump's July 16 speech indicated “a lot has come out about the vulnerabilities of our election infrastructure.”

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From the July 27, 2026, edition of America, Can We Talk?, streamed on Rumble

TINA PETERS (GUEST): Now, so — and that’s in that 14-page memo to CISA. But here’s what you can do. If we cannot physically get rid of the machines before November, then having — you know, taking the preliminary count that comes from the machines, but not certifying the election until — and however long it takes — until finishing up the hand-count. Then, if those two things don’t meet, then then you know.

So it’s a way if you’re — if you use that as your preliminary results and then you have — I’m going to say it again — then you have an actual hand-count, however long it takes to get it done, and then you have the certification. The thing of it is is that a lot of the judges that are put in the place to certify the results are taking the word of an electronic device. They can't actually see that, yes, we had a group of people, Democrat and Republican, that have checked this out.

It’s just like, you would always check your bank ledger, right? You just, you know, check, make sure everything is, you know, before you realize that it’s valid. That’s what we need. And if it take — right now, they’re taking how many weeks to finish an election anyway, right?

Additionally, Peters said on the podcast that she had urged Trump during their Oval Office meeting to fire members of the Election Assistance Commission — which Trump subsequently did.

Trump has taken actions to expand his control over election processes, and election deniers have been proposing policies for even more power ahead of the midterms

In recent months, Trump and his right-wing media allies have advocated for passage of the SAVE America Act and other policies to increase federal control of the midterms. As USA Today reported, “Trump is working to gain unprecedented control of the 2026 U.S. midterm elections” with “a series of new assertions of presidential power.”

These actions have included firing key leaders of the federal Election Assistance Commission, putting election deniers in administration positions that oversee elections, and issuing executive orders that would tighten rules for mail-in voting and create a federal list of U.S. citizens eligible to vote.

ProPublica also noted that Trump “eviscerat[ed] CISA” at the start of his second term, replaced career election specialists at the Department of Homeland Security with his allies, including some who have ties to the election denial movement, and “discarded or diminished other federal initiatives with roles in protecting election integrity or blocking foreign interference.”

Right-wing media and election deniers have called for the president to further expand his power by issuing a national emergency executive order that would supposedly give Trump “essentially king-like powers” over the midterms. Two of the signatories of the letter to CISA — Reynolds and Huff — have called for the declaration of such a “national emergency,” and Peters has said she believes “Trump could sign an executive order to get rid of the machines and say that they are — that a vendor cannot have that much influence over our elections.”

As part of those calls, election deniers reportedly circulated a draft of a proposed executive order within the administration, and right-wing media figures appear to be weaving together a narrative about foreign interference in American elections by countries like China and Venezuela that could be used as a “predicate” for a national emergency.

The new proposal to CISA from Peters and the others in the election denial community appears to be the latest attempt to control election processes for the midterms.

Election deniers reach a fever pitch calling for a “national emergency” declaration so Trump can give himself “king-like powers” over the midterms

06/30/26 10:00 AM EDT

The plot to subvert the midterms is getting stranger and more dangerous

07/02/26 10:05 AM EDT

Election deniers have reportedly coordinated with the Trump White House on a draft executive order declaring a “national emergency” over elections

02/26/26

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REF CISA LTR

https://cloudfront.mediamatters.org/static/D8File/2026/07/30/CISA-Cover-Letter-Reynolds-Peters-Parikh-Huff-2026-07-24.pdf

July 24, 2026 Nicholas M. Andersen, Acting Director Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Department of Homeland Security Thank you for meeting with us on Monday and for giving us the opportunity to present our concerns and proposed path forward for the 2026 federal election

The November election is rapidly approaching, there is little time for solutions that require years of study, wholesale replacement of existing infrastructure, or complicated changes that state and local election officials cannot realistically implement before Election Day. A practical risk-mitigation plan must be executed quickly—one that meaningfully improves election security while recognizing the political, legal, logistical, and operational realities on the ground. With that objective in mind, we have developed the enclosed “2026 Risk Mitigation Election Plan (RMEP).” RMEP is designed as a politically practical and operationally achievable approach that will work within a short-timeframe.

It does not assume that every electronic component of the current election system can be eliminated before November. Instead, it focuses on reducing unnecessary electronic dependence, moving voters to hand-marked paper ballots wherever possible, strengthening ballot reconciliation and chain of custody, maintaining resilient paper voter records, improving the cybersecurity of systems that must remain in use, and independently verifying electronic tabulation through a full human count before certification. The objective is clear: reduce the opportunity for cheating. We do this by insisting the steps outlined in this plan are enacted by every state. Acting quickly, will give states more time to make the transition as manageable as possible for the local officials who must carry it out.

Also included in this packet are three separate letters from three of the most knowledgable cybersecurity professionals in America: Dr. Andrew W. Appel, Eugene Higgins Professor Emeritus & Senior Research Scientist, and Dr. Philip B. Stark, Distinguished Professor of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley and a former Election Assistance Commission Advisor, and lastly from Dr. J. Alex Halderman, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan and Director of Michigan’s Center for Computer Security and Society. All three letters are independent, stand-alone communications and were not written as endorsements of, or in support of, the enclosed RMEP. They should be considered entirely on their own merits.

However, the technical concerns and recommendations raised independently by their authors reinforce several of the same underlying risks that the RMEP is intended to address— particularly the use of ballot-marking devices (BMDs) and the limitations of relying on a fixed-percentage manual audit as the primary verification of electronic election results. We believe the remaining time before the 2026 election should be treated as an opportunity for immediate, practical risk reduction.

Not every long-term election-security issue can be resolved before November, but significant improvements can still be made if action begins now. Our hope is that the enclosed plan provides CISA with a clear, workable framework that can be quickly evaluated, refined where necessary, and translated into guidance and assistance for state and local election officials. Time is of the essence - we stand ready to assist you and your staff any way possible.

Respectfully, Colonel Conrad Reynolds (USA Ret.), Ms. Tina Peters, Mr. Clay Parikh, Mr. Will Huff

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REF2 MSNOW

Jul. 22, 2026,

By Laura Barrón-López and David Rohde

President Donald Trump says he is worried about foreign interference in U.S. elections. That was the reason he gave when he released declassified intelligence documents last week that ended up undercutting his own baseless claims about rigged elections.

In his primetime address on July 16, Trump said the U.S. “must take urgent action” to protect voting infrastructure against foreign actors. But shortly after taking office last year, Trump gutted a key agency designed to protect America’s elections from exactly that.

It’s called the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency — an office created during Trump’s first term. CISA is one of the main federal partners for states on election security, sharing intelligence on potential threats to voting infrastructure and providing quick regional support.

After Trump returned to office, the cyber agency housed under the Department of Homeland Security took a major hit. Elon Musk’s DOGE fired more than 100 workers, including election security advisers. More than 600 others were placed on administrative leave, were reassigned or took buyouts.

Now the Trump administration is telling states they will only receive resources if they hand over voter rolls to be screened through a new federal database that a judge recently deemed unlawful in its current form.

That database is known as the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements, or SAVE, which experts and a federal judge are concerned has a high error rate that could disenfranchise voters.

Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said CISA will release an “election infrastructure plan” in the next 30 days — barely three months out from the midterms, which will determine which party controls Congress.

“If they participate in the SAVE program, we’ll provide the resources and training to support state election integrity,” Mullin said last week. “We’re not trying to change the outcome.”

‘They’re flying blind’

Multiple current and former senior election and national security officials told MS NOW that they could not recall a time when the federal government held back resources and money meant to secure America’s elections.

And multiple state election officials have said they are not receiving any briefings on possible foreign threats to election security from the federal government. Such briefings were once a regular occurrence, they said.

“They’re flying blind,” said a former senior national security official, who served during Trump’s first administration and was granted anonymity given the sensitivity of the subject. “It is late July and there is no CISA election security plan for the 2026 midterms.”

During the first Trump administration, “we were collaborative — carrots rather than sticks,” said the former official. The second Trump administration is “very much focused on sticks.”

One election official in a swing state said the difference from 2024 is stark, saying that “it’s every state for themselves.” The official spoke on the condition of anonymity over concerns about retaliation from federal officials. During the last cycle, the state official said they had a regional federal cybersecurity expert “on speed dial” who could “see the whole puzzle.”

That doesn’t exist anymore, and without it, the state election official said, “we’re less informed on the pattern of the attackers and are slower to respond.”

“I’ve literally never heard anybody effectively say ‘to keep you safe, you have to give me what I want,’” said the swing state election official, referring to DHS threats to withhold resources if states don’t hand over sensitive voter data.

The risks compound at the local level, they added: “Does [a clerk’s] laptop have the IT infrastructure to defend against an attack from Iran? That’s what keeps me up at night.”

Cait Conley, a West Point graduate and combat veteran who served as the senior adviser to the director of CISA during the Biden administration, accused Trump of gutting the agency and sowing doubt about the security of U.S. elections in his speech last week.

“If Donald Trump were truly concerned about election security, he would not have fired hundreds of federal workers whose jobs were to secure our elections,” she said. Conley is now running for Congress in New York as a Democrat.

“His lies and misrepresentations are very clearly trying to lay the groundwork for calling this November’s election results into question when his party loses,” she said.

When asked about election officials telling MS NOW that they have received no intelligence briefings on possible foreign threats to election security, and have no access to regional cybersecurity advisers, DHS did not respond. DHS also did not respond directly to questions about the agency withholding resources unless states hand over voter data.

Instead, they provided a statement from acting CISA Director Nick Andersen, which said CISA “works with critical infrastructure owners and operators to assist them in securing both the physical security and cybersecurity of the systems and assets that support the nation’s elections.”

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When an election infrastructure plan is done in the next 30 days, it will “offer to states the cyber resources they need, including information about available no-cost voluntary services such as the sharing of threat information, technical expertise, vulnerability scanning, and other risk mitigation support,” Andersen said.

Under Trump, CISA halted its funding of the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which provides local governments with free access to election security operations centers, election security training, technical support and threat monitoring.

Tim Harper, who leads the elections team at the nonpartisan Center for Democracy and Technology, said teams across the FBI, the State Department and the Justice Department that worked on countering foreign influence have also been eliminated or sidelined.

But CISA was key to sharing and compiling intelligence across the federal government.

Parts of CISA’s election work, Harper explained, included granting security clearances to state election officials to give them real-time information to stop threats before they spread. His organization has direct knowledge of officials receiving no response when they have asked the federal government to provide assistance on cyber and physical security.

“Expecting local election officials to handle nation-state cyberattacks without federal support isn’t commonsense policy,” Harper said. “It’s a national security failure.”

States are trying to fill the gap with outside vendors and networks of cyber experts.

“It has taken a lot of work, and it shouldn’t have to be this hard, but the states are ensuring the 2026 election is secure despite federal withdrawal,” said David Becker, executive director of the Center for Election Innovation and Research, which works with elections officials from both parties on ways to build trust with voters in election results.

Becker said that the Trump administration’s near-weekly threats to arrest election officials have “become a running joke among election officials,” adding that they find it “laughable.”

Protecting elections

Established in 2018 during Trump’s first administration, CISA initially enjoyed sweeping bipartisan support. But Trump attacked the agency after Chris Krebs, then the director, said the 2020 election was “the most secure in American history.” Trump, who lost the election, immediately fired Krebs.

After Trump returned to office in 2025, his administration proposed a 17% cut — roughly $500 million — to CISA’s budget. It also proposed mass layoffs that would cut CISA staff nearly 30%, eliminating 1,083 of its 3,732 staffers. The plan was paused after almost 600 people accepted a buyout offer from the administration, Politico reported at the time.

Trump and members of his new administration have also accused CISA of undermining democracy instead of defending it. As DHS secretary, Kristi Noem, in a surprise keynote speech at a major cybersecurity conference last year, said CISA’s efforts to counter the spread of misinformation from America’s enemies, such as Russia and China, was an infringement on free speech.

“They were deciding what was truth and what was not,” she said of CISA. “And it’s not the job of CISA to be the Ministry of Truth.”

Former CISA officials called those claims patently false. And they warned that tech firms were hiring top CISA leaders, as well as CISA staffers, for their cybersecurity skills, and that the agency was being gutted.

“I’ve personally seen how CISA has lost its very best,” Jack Cable, a former CISA employee who left the agency in January, told lawmakers in a June hearing. “In the face of increasing threats, we can’t undermine the capacity of America’s cyber defense agency and its ability to attract and retain the best technical talent.”

Laura Barrón-López

Laura Barrón-López covers the White House for MS NOW.

David Rohde

David Rohde is the senior national security reporter for MS NOW and a two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. Previously he was the senior executive editor for national security and law for NBC News.

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NO TLK Madhu Gottumukkala - Wikipedia

Gottumukkala began working in information technology for the private sector in 2000, prior to which, he worked at an Indian call center.^[8]^ He later married Vasantha, with whom he had two children.^[9]^ Gottumukkala began working for Sanford Health as its senior director of business solutions in December 2019. In April 2024, he was appointed to the advisory committee of Dakota State University.^[10]^

Government of South Dakota (2024–2025)

In August 2024, South Dakota governor Kristi Noem announced that Gottumukkala would serve as the state's chief technology officer; he was sworn in on August 5.^[10]^ The following month, Noem named him as the state's chief information officer and the commissioner of the South Dakota Bureau of Information and Telecommunications.^[7]^ Gottumkkula began serving in both positions on September 9.^[11]^

Acting Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

In April 2025, secretary of homeland security Kristi Noem named Gottumukkala as the deputy director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; he began serving in the position on May 16.^[12]^ That month, Gottumukkala told personnel at the agency that much of its leadership was resigning and that he would serve as its acting director beginning on May 30.^[13]^ He spoke at the Black Hat Briefings conference on critical infrastructure that August.^[14]^

In December 2025, Politico reported that Gottumukkala had requested to see access to a controlled access program—an act that would require taking a polygraph—in June. Gottumukkala failed the polygraph in the final weeks of July. The Department of Homeland Security began investigating the circumstances surrounding the polygraph test the following month and suspended six career staffers, telling them that the polygraph did not need to be administered.^[15]^

In January 2026, Politico reported that over the prior summer, Gottumukkala had uploaded at least 4 documents marked as "for official use only" to a public instance of ChatGPT. While the department was generally blocked from accessing ChatGPT on government networks and devices, Gottumukkala had received special access to the service not available to others at CISA. A routine audit of the prompts Gottumukkala had transmitted to the service detected the violations.^[16]^

In February 2026, it was announced that he would be taking on a new role at DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer as director of strategic implementation, a job he held until March 2026.^[17]^

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March 13, 2026

A letter penned by House Democrats indicates CISA’s former acting director failed a second polygraph examination during his tenure.

CISA
Congress
Leadership

A group of House lawmakers is asking federal watchdogs to investigate how officials handled an incident involving former acting Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Director Madhu Gottumukkala after he failed a required counter-intelligence polygraph. In a Friday letter requesting the probe, lawmakers said Gottumukkala also failed a second polygraph examination while serving in the role.

The letter was led by Rep. James Walkinshaw, D-Va. and signed by four others, asking the Department of Homeland Security and Intelligence Community inspectors general to conduct an investigation into the matter. The lawmakers said the development raises questions about whether officials adhered to established intelligence security rules and whether career CISA staff were improperly targeted after administering the exams.

“We write with deep concern regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s investigation into whether cybersecurity staff provided false information to the former Acting Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,” the letter says. Reps. Suhas Subramanyam, D-Va., Shontel Brown, D-Ohio, Eric Swalwell, D-Calif. and D.C. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton also signed on.

Extensive Politico reporting late last year indicated that, in July 2025, Gottumukkala requested access to a Controlled Access Program, or CAP, a category of highly sensitive intelligence programs that require officials to demonstrate a specific need-to-know and pass a counter-intelligence polygraph before being granted access. He did not pass, and CISA staff involved in the polygraph administration were subsequently placed on leave.

The letter, however, indicates Gottumukkala failed two polygraph exams. House Homeland Security Committee staff were informed about the second polygraph exam and its results by one of the individuals placed on leave, a person familiar with the matter told Nextgov/FCW.

Under intelligence community procedures, failing such a polygraph typically triggers a security review process overseen by agency security officials and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The letter, citing procedural documentation, states that CISA’s chief security officer is required to notify ODNI and initiate a review of the individual’s clearance. The lawmakers said it remains unclear whether those steps were taken.

“We are concerned that Dr. Gottumukkala failed to adhere to established Intelligence Community and Security Executive Agent directives after failing a CAP,” they wrote.

At least five career CISA staff members and one contractor involved in scheduling or approving the polygraph examinations received letters from DHS Acting Chief Security Officer Michael Boyajian informing them their security clearances were suspended, according to the lawmakers. Boyajian’s notice reportedly accused those staff members of misleading Gottumukkala about the requirement to complete a polygraph examination before accessing the controlled program.

Three days later, the employees received additional notification from CISA’s acting chief human capital officer that they had been placed on administrative leave pending an investigation, lawmakers wrote. As of February, their clearances had remained suspended and they were still on administrative leave, the letter says.

The lawmakers also asked the watchdogs to examine whether the suspension of staff could constitute retaliation or a prohibited personnel practice under federal law governing whistleblower protections within the intelligence community.

A spokesperson for DNI Tulsi Gabbard referred Nextgov/FCW to the ODNI IG office, which did not immediately respond to a request for comment. DHS has also been asked for comment.

The polygraph incident was among a smattering of other matters reported in recent months by Politico about Gottumukkala’s tenure. Last month, Gottumukkala was moved into a strategic implementation role in DHS, and executive assistant director for cybersecurity Nick Andersen took his place leading CISA in an acting capacity.

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CISA leadership shakeup comes amid ‘pressure’ moment for cyber agency

Nick Andersen, executive assistant director for cybersecurity, will now serve as acting CISA director after Madhu Gottumukkala was moved to different DHS role.

Justin Doubleday @jdoubledayWFED

February 27, 2026

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency continues to face leadership uncertainty, after CISA’s acting director was moved to another Department of Homeland Security position following a rocky tenure.

A senior DHS official confirmed that Madhu Gottumukkala will now serve as DHS’s “director of strategic implementation.” CISA’s acting executive assistant director for cybersecurity Nick Andersen will now serve as acting CISA director, the senior DHS official confirmed.

“Madhu Gottumukkala has done a remarkable job in a thankless task of helping reform CISA back to its core statutory mission,” the senior official said. “He tackled the woke, weaponized, and bloated bureaucracy that existed at CISA, wrangling contracts to save American taxpayer dollars.”

Gottumukkala was named deputy director at CISA last May after serving as the chief information officer for the state of South Dakota. He immediately took over the agency’s top role in the absence of a permanent CISA director.

Discover how federal agencies are applying AI to strengthen cybersecurity, improve operational efficiency and deliver measurable mission outcomes while balancing innovation, governance and human expertise.

Gottumukkala’s tenure was marked by a wave of departures that has led to deep uncertainty at the nation’s top cyber defense agency. His departure comes as CISA also navigates a government shutdown, with more than two-thirds of its staff furloughed.

In recent months, Gottumukkala had faced increasing congressional scrutiny after reports that he failed a polygraph test and uploaded sensitive documents to a public version of ChatGPT. Gottumukkala most recently reportedly attempted to force out CISA’s long serving CIO.

“I think most people aren’t surprised and will not miss him,” a current CISA employee told Federal News Network. “He was ineffective and out of touch with the mission. Nick will be a welcomed change.”

In a Friday evening email to CISA employees, Andersen thanked Gottumukkala for his service at the agency. He also announced that Chris Bhutera, Andersen’s deputy, will serve as acting executive assistant director for cybersecurity, as he did for several months last year.

Nick Andersen also acknowledged the “dedication” of the CISA workforce during the ongoing shutdown.

“Amid the ongoing lapse in federal appropriations for DHS, our team has continued to demonstrate professionalism, resilience and unwavering commitment to the mission,” he wrote. “Your service to the nation has not gone unnoticed, and I’m deeply grateful for your continued focus on protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure and the American people.”

‘On the right track’

House Homeland Security Committee Ranking Member Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.) said “CISA’s staff has been decimated and it has lost capacity to conduct critical missions” over the past year.

“Time and again, I have made clear my concerns about Dr. Gottumukkala’s ability to effectively lead CISA and reporting earlier this week revealed Republican officials and private sector stakeholders shared these concerns,” Thompson said, referring to a recent CyberScoop story. “Ultimately, however, the responsibility lies with Secretary Noem, who put Dr. Gottumukkala in the position in the first place. I look forward to working with Nick Andersen to get CISA back on the right track as the component awaits senate confirmed leadership.”

During a House Homeland Security Committee hearing last month, lawmakers repeatedly pressed Gottumukkala on CISA’s reorganization plans. The acting director said CISA did not have any plans to reorganize. But some lawmakers left frustrated with his responses to those questions and others about the ongoing changes at CISA.

Current and former officials are also hopeful Andersen – who served in senior cyber roles during the first Trump administration – can help stabilize CISA.

A former CISA official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the agency is “absorbing pressure from multiple directions right now.” The official pointed to the leadership turnover, the ongoing shutdown, the “aggressive implementation” of executive direction like CISA’s recent emergency directive, and uncertainty in the agency’s workforce.

Meanwhile, the “geopolitical environment” with Iran and other tensions could lead to “retaliation against U.S. infrastructure,” the former official said.

“My concern isn’t the drama or the org charts — it’s continuity of mission and maintaining trust among a diverse set of stakeholders across Washington, throughout the country, and with partners around the world,” they added.

The lack of a Senate-confirmed CISA director is especially challenging for a cyber agency that relies on partnerships across government and critical infrastructure. The cyber agency is responsible for spearheading the federal government’s cyber defenses, while also collaborating with state and local governments and critical infrastructure organizations that are often targeted by nation-state threats.

“Having the director of CISA be able to talk to his or her peers across agencies is a way to help ensure the prioritization of cybersecurity within those other agencies,” the former official said.

President Donald Trump nominated Sean Plankey to serve as CISA director, but he has yet to receive a vote in the Senate. Plankey is a widely respected Coast Guard veteran and senior government leader. But his nomination has been held up by multiple senators for various reasons unrelated to concerns about him serving as CISA director.

Nick Anderson Cisa

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‘On the right track’