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Open in TheBrain

Baker, JAMES SoS

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carbon tax w/ schultz

backed IPCC

no merri

Bush v Gore 2000

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see losing Earth Rich:

FORK ONE: BUSH 41

1968 Paul Ehrlich Population Bomb (says later should have factored consumption in more? but it's in the formula?)  Reagan "Doomsday Prophet" vs Morning in America.

Donella Meadows et al. The Limits to Growth. 1972 computer model, busines as usual scenario dead on?  Hightlight a debate between Dennis Meadows and Herman Kahn, one of the models for Dr Strangelove (Megadeath from the BLAND Corporation).

In 1975 Margaret Mead helped organize a conference on the atmosphere, analgous o the Traety of the Seas that had been hammered out at supra-national level for the benefit of all to protect the commons.  She pointed out that humans tend to be short-sighted and we forget pai quickly, once biologoval necessary/helpful but not so much in the modern world; also noted conflicting needs/groups, but we need rational/scientific long term plan (relationships, Macy System thinking).

{{ she freaked out Sununu and Larouche

[global cooling, Sagan...] Sununu had suspected that the greenhouse effect belonged to this nefarious cabal since 1975, when the anthropologist Margaret Mead convened a symposium on the subject at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. “Unless the peoples of the world can begin to understand the immense and long-term consequences of what appear to be small immediate choices,” Mead wrote, “the whole planet may become endangered.”

Her conclusions were stark, immediate and absent the caveats that hobbled the scientific literature. Or as Sununu saw it, she showed her hand: “Never before have the governing bodies of the world been faced with decisions so far-reaching,” Mead wrote. “It is inevitable that there will be a clash between those concerned with immediate problems and those who concern themselves with long-term consequences.” When Mead talked about “far-reaching” decisions and “long-term consequences,” Sununu heard the marching of jackboots. }}:

Hansen testified twice, 1988 [Wirth opened window to mess with AC during a heat wave] second time 1989 in front of Gore Committee, complained for being muzzled, Sununu told Richard Darman OMB to do it

Gore went to NYT.

During the 1988 campaign (against Dukakis, Willie Horton, Boston Harbor?] Bush 41 Lake Erie Metro park "The agenda will be clear," Bush said. "We will talk about global warming. We will talk about saving our oceans and preventing the loss of tropical forests. And we will act."  And he said, you know, those who think we can't solve the greenhouse effect haven't heard about the White House effect. And when I'm in the White House, you know, we'll solve it.

Rio Earth Summit established framework  --> IPCC (Montreal Protocol on CFC? CTT like CEI and Cato moved him on GHG but not CFC's).  Pat Michaels at Cato influenced Sununu.  Michaels first two degrees were in biology, but managed to gin up some climatology cred (at some point, presumbly because denial embarassing, the governor of Delaware told him to stop calling himself the state climatologist?]  Stalwart attacks on Mann (hockey Stick, his cred historical?), Hansen, climate models, "nail in the coffin" on Climategate.  Cato shutdown his science shop (because no leverage with Trump admin cs Ebell CEI?)

[[Still, the administration underscored uncertainties in the science, specifically over sources of greenhouse gases, sea-level rise, and connections between power plants and carbon emissions.

"Significant scientific uncertainty still attends global climate change," the White House said.]]

Ozone Man?

Sununu was the first White House Chief of Staff for George H. W. Bush, serving from 1989 to 1991.  Assignd a handler to E.P.A. administrator, William K. Reilly at Netherlands conference.

{{In his reportLosing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change, Nathaniel Rich wrote that in November 1989 Sununu prevented the signing of a 67-nation commitment to freeze carbon dioxide emissions, with a reduction of 20 percent by 2005, and singled him out as a force starting coordinated efforts to bewilder the public on the topic of global warming and changing it from an urgent, nonpartisan and unimpeachable issue to a political issue, and an increasingly intractable one}}:

Sununu PhD mechanical/fluid engr MIT 1966 had done some compuer modeling; Mead did not refer to models?  Meadows?

Secretary of State James Baker backed setting up IPCC, but told Reilly he could not beat White House (Sununu and Darman).

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baker inst rice u houston tx

Science Under Siege: A Conversation With Dr. Peter Hotez & Dr. Michael Mann

Find tickets & information for Science Under Siege: A Conversation With Dr. Peter Hotez & Dr. Michael Mann. happening at Rice Universitys Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, TX on Tue, 09 Sep, 2025 at 12:00 pm. Register or Buy Tickets, Price information.

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https://www.desmogblog.com/2015/12/18/bush-sr-cabinet-was-worried-about-climate-change-27-years-ago

12/15

The agreement that was hammered out in Paris at the recent climate talks will be a great step forward towards addressing the growing threat of climate change. But lost amongst the applause for the accord is a question that needs to be answered: Why did it take so long, and are we too late?

Two weeks ago, memos from the George H.W. Bush administration were released that detailed conversations between Bush Sr.’s cabinet members, where they discussed the growing threat of global climate change…27 years ago.

The Hill has posted parts of those conversations:

“Global climate change is the most far reaching environmental issue of our time,” a 1989 memo from Acting Assistant Secretary of StateRichard J. Smith said. “If the climate change within the range of current predictions actually occurs, the consequences for every nation and every aspect of human activity will be profound.”

Writing to Secretary of State James Baker, Smith said, “As you yourself stated we cannot wait until all the uncertainties have been resolved before we act to limit greenhouse gas emissions and to prepare for whatever climate change we are already committed to.”

Those conversations took place over 27 years ago, and in the present day, leaders in the United States are still having debates about climate change. And not just about how to act, but we’ve regressed to the point that we are still debating whether or not the problem even exists.

But Bush Sr. was not the first Republican president to understanding the growing threat of climate change. The newly released memos also tell us that the problem was discussed among Ronald Reagan’s cabinet members.

These two Republicans were then followed by Democrat Bill Clinton (whose vice President, Al Gore, has been one of the leaders in the United States pushing for action on climate change), then by Republican George W. Bush, and finally by Democrat Barack Obama.

And it wasn’t until the summer of 2015 — more than 30 years after the first U.S. presidents were warned about the dangers of growing emissions — that we got our first real set of rules to reduce our carbon emissions in a meaningful way.

So why did it take so long when both Reagan and Bush Sr. were advised of the threats?

The memos shed some light on the fact that both men, and their respective advisors, were actually trying to accomplish something with regards to climate change action:

In connection with the Montreal Protocol (negotiated in 1987 and put into effect in 1989), both Reagan and Bush 41 showed a clear desire to tackle environmental concerns and to lead the global community in that effort, according to the documents. Protests by the Domestic Policy Council, led by Attorney General Edwin Meese, and other agency heads led Reagan to step in to ensure adoption of the final set of U.S. objectives for the treaty. Bush basically shared his predecessor’s views on entering office in January 1989.

Both presidents’ secretaries of state, George P. Shultz and James A. Baker III, played key roles in blocking efforts by other Cabinet secretaries to frustrate implementation of more environmentally friendly policies. For example, memos for senior State Department officials in today’s posting note that “Global climate change is the most far reaching environmental issue of our time” and that notwithstanding the need for continued research, “We simply cannot wait – the costs of inaction will be too high.”

Republicans have rightfully taken a lot of heat for their refusal to accept the science behind climate change, but clearly this wasn’t always the case.

Unfortunately, this new information only raises more questions than it answers. For example, Bush Sr. built on the success of Reagan’s Montreal accord, so why did Bill Clinton drop the ball?

George W. Bush’s father believed in climate change, so why did he refuse to acknowledge the threat until his last few years in office, and then he still refused to act? (He also pulled us out of the Kyoto Protocol.)

And most importantly, why did Barack Obama — the first president to address climate change in both campaigns and since taking office — take seven years to give us an emissions reduction rule?

We can blame obstruction from deniers or the influence of fossil fuel money all day long, and they do deserve a large share of the blame. But the politicians are not the main problem. The real problem lies with American voters. They are the ones who put science deniers in office, and they are the ones who are not demanding action.

Voters hold all of the power in the United States, and until they realize this, we will continue to get watered down safety standards that pay lip service to the problem while the planet continues to burn.

MONTREAL

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB536-Reagan-Bush-Recognized-Need-for-US-Leadership-on-Climate-Change-in-1980s/

Climate Change Policy in the 1980s

GOP Presidents Recognized Need for U.S. Leadership on Ozone Depletion and Climate Change

Reagan Overruled Cabinet Members Opposed to Montreal Protocol on Ozone Layer

Bush 41's State Department Warned "We Simply Cannot Wait" to Take Action on Climate Change

Stances Are at Odds with 2015 GOP Presidential Candidates

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book #536

Edited by Robert A. Wampler, PhD

December 2, 2015

For more information contact: Robert A. Wampler, 202/994-7000 or wampler@gwu.edu

Related links

Reagan, Bush 41 memos reveal sharp contrast with today’s GOP on climate and the environment

The Washington Post

December 3, 2015

[related: The evolution of the GOP’s approach to a crisis

MSNBC

By Steve Benen

December 3, 2015

Memos show Bush advisers worried about climate change

The Hill

December 3, 2015

Kyoto Redux?

Obama's Challenges at Copenhagen Echo Clinton's at Kyoto

by Robert Wampler

December 18, 2009]

Washington, D.C., December 2, 2015 – Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush actively promoted measures to combat climate change, with Reagan in 1987 overruling objections within his own Cabinet to a major proposed treaty to protect the ozone layer, according to recently declassified records posted today by the George Washington University-based National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org). As world leaders, including President Barack Obama, meet in Paris for the latest round of climate talks, the posting reveals a desire by the two Republican leaders from the 1980s for strong American leadership on climate issues that sometimes resembles the Obama White House view more than that of many of today’s top GOP officials – or presidential candidates.

In connection with the Montreal Protocol (negotiated in 1987 and put into effect in 1989), both Reagan and Bush 41 showed a clear desire to tackle environmental concerns and to lead the global community in that effort, according to the documents. Protests by the Domestic Policy Council, led by Attorney General Edwin Meese, and other agency heads led Reagan to step in to ensure adoption of the final set of U.S. objectives for the treaty. Bush basically shared his predecessor’s views on entering office in January 1989.

Both presidents’ secretaries of state, George P. Shultz and James A. Baker III, played key roles in blocking efforts by other Cabinet secretaries to frustrate implementation of more environmentally friendly policies.For example, memos for senior State Department officials in today’s posting note that “Global climate change is the most far reaching environmental issue of our time” and that notwithstanding the need for continued research, “We simply cannot wait – the costs of inaction will be too high.”

Today’s posting features documents obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). A follow-up posting on the Clinton administration’s climate policies will appear later this month.

...

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which entered into force on January 1, 1989, stands as the most successful and widely ratified international environmental agreement. The U.S. lead negotiator, Richard Elliot Benedick, authored a comprehensive history of the negotiations that is critical for understanding the underlying scientific issues as well as the complex domestic politics and international diplomacy surrounding the talks.[[4]](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB536-Reagan-Bush-Recognized-Need-for-US-Leadership-on-Climate-Change-in-1980s/#_edn4) As Benedick discusses, and as the documents posted today illustrate, U.S. leadership was vital to the successful negotiation of a strong ozone treaty with a clear and firm timetable for reducing production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons that degrade atmospheric ozone. This leadership, however, was not unanimously supported within the Reagan administration, and the State Department, working with the Environmental Protection Agency, had to fight back attempts to weaken the agreement.[[5]](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB536-Reagan-Bush-Recognized-Need-for-US-Leadership-on-Climate-Change-in-1980s/#_edn5)

The U.S. goals for the ozone treaty as it entered the final talks are laid out in Documents 1 and 4 in this compilation. These goals can be summarized as a near-term freeze on emissions of the key ozone-depleting substances, combined with subsequent reductions to near zero, with the interim targets subject to revision based on periodic review incorporating reassessments of the underlying science. The need for continued U.S. leadership to secure an ozone treaty that embodies these goals is discussed in Documents 2, 3and 6. These latter documents address the battle waged by the State Department within the Domestic Policy Council (DPC), chaired by Attorney General Ed Meese, against a rear-guard effort bySecretary of the Interior Donald Hodel, the office of the Special Trade Representativeand the Office of Management and Budget [who?  ] to scale back the commitments made under the proposed treaty, based on questions about the underlying science and the impact on U.S. industry. 

As the documents show, State was concerned that if a “dysfunctional” DPC resulted in an about-face by the U.S. regarding the goals it had pressed for in the negotiation, it “would damage our international credibility, unleash major domestic criticism, and probably result in unilateral U.S.” controls on ozone-depleting chemicals. The last point was driven by the likelihood that if an international agreement was not reached, the courts would compel EPA to impose unilateral reductions, which would hurt U.S industry. (SeeDocument 5 on this concern.) To head off this possibility, Under Secretary of State John Negroponte successfully urged Secretary of State George P. Shultz to write to Attorney General Meese laying out the serious repercussions from such a reversal. (Document 3; a copy of Shultz’s letter, presenting the points outlined by Negroponte, can be found in Document 6.)

...

Document 3. Memorandum, John Negroponte to Secretary of State George Shultz, May 29, 1987, Subject: Ozone Negotiations: Letter to Attorney General Meese.

Source: Department of State FOIA

The internal debate over the proposal ozone agreement came to a head in the summer of 1987, leading Negroponte to urge Secretary of State Shultz to write to Attorney General Ed Meese (the Chairman of the Domestic Policy Council) expressing his strong support for the established U.S. position in the negotiations, and to propose securing a Presidential decision to close the debate. Negroponte writes that “Many regard this issue as the most important priority on the global environmental agenda,” and highlights the role played by the State Department, and the EPA to bring the other governments to follow the U.S. position, which had been developed through “intensive interagency deliberations” leading up to approval of the U.S. negotiating authority in November 1986. 

Now, however, some agencies, in particular Interior and OSTP, had raised questions about the scientific basis for the agreement and the effects of the proposed CFC reductions on U.S. industry. Negroponte warns Shultz that “The positions proposed by Interior and OSTP would undo the progress achieved to date and make the Administration appear less serious about protecting the ozone layer” than other countries supporting the protocol. Such an about-face “would damage our international credibility, unleash major domestic criticism, and probably result in unilateral U.S.” controls on ozone-depleting chemicals. By contrast, the U.S. current position is “responsible and pragmatic, prudently addressing the environmental risks, while providing a market stimulus and a reasonable time-frame for industry to develop alternate products.” All in all, Negroponte warns that the DPC process is “dysfunctional” on this matter, and if not addressed, “could cause needless embarrassment to the Administration on an issue which is attracting growing attention from Congress and public interest groups,” a judgment which is shared by the National Security Council...

Document 6. Memorandum, Richard E. Benedick (OES) to the Deputy Secretary, June 9, 1987, Subject: Domestic Policy Council Meeting on Protocol to Control Ozone-Depleting Chemicals – 11:00 a.m., Thursday, June 11 [with attached documents].

Source: Department of State FOIA

The State Department’s ongoing struggle within Reagan’s Cabinet with opponents of the proposed ozone protocol is the focus of this memorandum from the chief U.S. negotiator. The DPC meeting on the topic on May 20 had failed to resolve these deep divisions, and, as Negroponte recommended (see Document 3), Secretary Shultz had written to Attorney General Meese on June 1 pressing the urgent need to sustain U.S. support of the ozone agreement (see Shultz letter attached to this document). Now, Benedick recommends that Deputy Secretary Whitehead should push for DPC agreement that the U.S. continue to negotiate for a strong ozone agreement, or failing this, to put the matter before President Reagan as soon as possible for his decision.

The attached talking points stress the “risks of loss of international credibility, domestic political backlash, and undesirable unilateral regulation if we fail to continue the . . . successful U.S. leadership role” in the talks. Other attachments include the key points in the Circular 175 memorandum setting down the U.S. negotiating objectives for the ozone talks; a November 28, 1986 memorandum from Negroponte to Acting Secretary Wallis seeking approval of Circular 175; and a May 18, 1987 memorandum for the Domestic Policy Council from the Energy, Natural Resources & Environment Group discussing the key issues surrounding the proposed agreement in detail.

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https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07032019/carbon-tax-proposals-compare-baker-shultz-exxon-conocophillips-ccl-congress

Not long ago, a carbon tax was the untouchable third rail of climate politics.

"We have done extensive polling on carbon tax. It all sucks," John Podesta, Hillary Clinton's campaign chairman, wrote to another adviser in a memorable January 2015 email from the Wikileaks stash.

But four years later, amid the political upheaval wrought by President Donald Trump, several carbon tax proposals are getting a serious look on Capitol Hill. Ironically, the president's rejection of climate science and his fossil fuel-focused agenda may have helped usher in an era when carbon taxation is politically thinkable.

One carbon fee-and-dividend plan has already been introduced in Congress and more are expected. Editorial pages and conservative pundits are talking about carbon taxes as a pragmatic way to achieve the goals of the Green New Deal. And the opinion polls look a lot different than the ones that caused Podesta to recoil.

A plurality of Americans—44 percent—say they support a policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by taxing carbon-based fuels, according to a poll conducted last November by the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and the Associated Press. (Only 29 percent said they were opposed, while 25 percent were neutral.) A surveyof registered voters by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and George Mason University found that 58 percent said they would favor a Republican-proposed carbon tax that would return all revenue to households in the form of monthly rebate checks.

More and more states and local governments are jumping in with carbon pricing plans of their own to fill the climate leadership void that Trump has created.Energy companies face the prospect of 50 different regulatory approaches on greenhouse gases in the United States—a powerful incentive for them to seek one uniform, predictable, national approach. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips are among the oil companies backing a campaign to get their favored version of a carbon tax introduced in the Senate this year, one that would also protect them from other climate regulations and lawsuits.

There are significant differences between the carbon tax proposal backed by Big Oil and the approaches backed by environmental activists. And while carbon pricing could help put the U.S. on track to zero emissions by mid-century, experts warn that a poorly designed plan could be too weak to get the job done.

A close look at two economy-wide carbon tax proposals—the oil industry-backed plan, developed by former Republican Secretaries of State James Baker and George Shultz, and legislation backed by a grassroots environmental group, Citizens' Climate Lobby—highlights some of the key questions that policymakers will face as they weigh competing carbon tax plans.

How High a Carbon Tax?

Baker-Shultz proposal:Although its plan has not been formally introduced yet, the framework laid out by the Climate Leadership Council, a coalition of industry and environmental groups that support the Baker-Shultz proposal, would start a carbon tax at about $40 per ton, escalating by 2 to 5 percent annually, and reaching as high as $65 per ton by 2030.

Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act:The bipartisan measure sponsored by Rep. Ted Deutch (D-Fla.) and Rep. Francis Rooney (R-Fla.) would levy a carbon tax beginning at $15 per ton, escalating by $10 annually, and reaching $115 a ton by 2030. That averages out to a 24 percent annual increase—higher than any other recent climate proposal.

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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-17/from-greenspan-to-yellen-economic-brain-trust-backs-carbon-tax

An all-star lineup of economists, from Alan Greenspan to Paul Volcker, is endorsing a plan to combat climate change by slapping a tax on greenhouse gas emissions and then distributing the revenue to American households.

All living former Federal Reserve chairs, several Nobel Prize winners and previous leaders of the president’s Council of Economic Advisers have signed on to a statement asserting that a robust, gradually rising carbon tax is “the most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions at the scale and speed that is necessary.”

“A carbon tax will send a powerful price signal that harnesses the invisible hand of the marketplace to steer economic actors towards a low-carbon future,” the 45 economists say in the opinion piece, published by the Wall Street Journal late Wednesday.

The missive is a rare case of the economic establishment speaking with a single voice on a pressing social issue, albeit one that faces political challenges from conservatives, Republicans and the current White House. The signers include economists who have served every president going back to Jimmy Carter.

“This is one of the few ideas of economic policy that commands broad, bipartisan support,” former Harvard University President and U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers said in an interview. “Nowadays on economic policy, we don’t see much of that.”

Other signers include former Fed Chairmen Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke as well as former White House economic advisers Austan Goolsbee and Christina Romer.

The economists’ endorsement could deliver momentum to a carbon tax-and-dividend plan devised by two former secretaries of state --James Baker and George P. Shultz -- that has already drawn financial support from :{Exxon:(style="background-color:#ffcc66;"):}::{ Mobil Corp:(style="background-color:#ffff66;"):}:., ConocoPhillips and Exelon Corp.

Pressure is already mounting in Congress to take aim at climate change, following dire warnings about the growing consequences from a United Nations panel and the U.S. government. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat from California, has promised the chamber will take up climate legislation. And some Democrats, led by freshman Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, are advancing a so-called Green New Deal that calls for phasing out fossil fuels by 2030.

That effort may not get far in the current political dynamic, with Republicans controlling the Senate and the White House. President Donald Trump said he opposed taxing greenhouse gas emissions while campaigning for the White House.And House Republicans voted in July to condemn the very idea of a carbon tax as “detrimental” to the U.S. economy, with only six Republicans breaking ranks to vote against the measure.

Advocates of the proposal say they are trying to build momentum for action two years from now.

The economists’ statement includes proclamations that could have broad appeal to Republicans. For instance, the group highlights the importance of keeping the tax “revenue neutral” by giving rebates to all Americans, a tactic the economists say will “avoid debates over the size of government.” They also tout the promise that by replacing inefficient “cumbersome regulations” with a carbon tax, the government can “promote economic growth and provide the regulatory certainty companies need for long-term investment in clean-energy alternatives.”

“This is a turning point in Republican climate policy, where the GOP economic brain trust unites behind the Baker-Shultz carbon dividends plan,” said Republican Trent Lott, the former Senate majority leader helping push the proposal.

Many economists have favored a carbon tax as the most effective strategy for discouraging greenhouse gas emissions and combating climate change. But the economists now are going further by stressing that the revenue should be rebated to citizens, instead of being used to reduce the deficit, fund government or pare income taxes.

“For the first time, there’s consensus among economists on what to do with the money, and the answer is to give it back to the American people,” said Ted Halstead, head of the Climate Leadership Council backing the plan.

That approach is key to ensuring it is a progressive tax that ends up helping the poor, instead of just hiking their energy bills. The premise is that periodic dividend checks could more than make up for the hike in costs for poor- and middle-income Americans.

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still kickin

Denial in the White House

Trump's top advisers—none of whom are at the Bonn talks—now include Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who has said that America should not "bow down to radical environmentalists"; chief economic adviser Larry Kudlow, who praised Trump's retreat from Paris as ending "the war on fossil fuels"; and national security adviser John Bolton, who views the accord as a threat to U.S. sovereignty. Trump's entire cabinet is overwhelmingly hostile to the climate treaty, but these three newcomers hold special sway.

Until recently, hope ran high among other delegations that Trump's previous top economic and foreign advisers would persuade the president to keep the U.S. commitment to Paris.

Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, well-acquainted with the history of climate negotiations as former chief executive of Exxon, had told Congress he believed that the U.S. should keep "a seat at the table." Former economic adviser Gary Cohn had given a warm hearing to former Secretary of State James Baker and allies who came to the White House early on to make the conservative case for a carbon tax—earning him the derogatory nickname "Carbon Tax Cohn" among his opponents on Trump's staff. And although Brig. Gen. H.R. McMaster, the previous national security adviser, muted his views on the Paris Agreement, many close observers, including President Obama's climate envoy Todd Stern, said they had expected him to be an advocate for the U.S. to stay in the agreement, a high priority for military allies in NATO and for possible adversaries like China.

Graduated from Princeton University in 1952. Attended Cap & Gown events, according to Kay Griggs, just as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Carlucci, James Baker, George Griggs, and George P. Shultz (August 3, 2005, Rense). Houston lawyer. Friend of the Bushes. Undersecretary of commerce 1975–1976. Deputy manager of the 1976 and 1980 Ford and Bush presidential campaigns. Joined the Reagan administration in 1981. White House chief of staff 1981–1985. Treasury secretary 1985–1988. Planned the 1988 campaign that won George H.W. Bush the presidency. Secretary of State 1989–1992. Played a prominent role in the Gulf crisis and the subsequent search for a Middle East peace settlement.

Again White House Chief of Staff 1992-1993. United Nations special envoy to try and broker a peace settlement for the disputed territory of Western Sahara 1997. As an adviser to George W. Bush in the November 2000 presidential elections, he was influential in helping Bush secure the presidency by manoeuvring the disputed vote count in Florida to the Republican-leaning Supreme Court. Baker was the manager of the foreign debts of occupied Iraq since 2003. Senior counselor for the **Carlyle Group** and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Also a member of the Atlantic Council of the United States, theBohemian Grove, and the Pilgrims Society. Honorary trustee of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. 

James Addison Baker, III is a senior partner in Baker Botts LLP and most recently served as Co-Chairman of the Iraq Study Group.

Contents [hide]

Controversy

With the bin Laden family on September 11, 2001

As the events of the September 11, 2001, "unfolded", Baker was present at the Ritz-Carlton in Washington, D.C., "the plush setting for the annual investor conference of one of the most powerful, well-connected, and secretive companies in the world: the Carlyle Group." Also present with Baker were Carlyle dignataries Frank Carlucci, whose resume includes government service as Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of the CIA, Deputy Director in the Office of Management and Budget, and an ambassadorship to Portugal, and "representatives of the bin Laden family." [1]

Baker Botts: Saudi Arabia, 9/11 and the Funding of Islamic Charities

"Baker's law firm, Baker Botts, was founded by Baker's grandfather, James A. Baker, and has offices in Houston, Washington DC, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Baker Botts is the legal council defending the Saudi Arabian government in a lawsuit filed by families of those killed and injured in the 9/11 attacks. Affidavits and copies of cancelled checks suggest that Saudi Arabian Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have funneled millions of dollars to assorted Islamic charities that U.S. officials and others suspect have covertly financed the operations of al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups." [2]

Conflicts of Interest as Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq

"The appointment of James Baker, a senior partner at Baker Botts, the big Houston law firm, ought to be a reassuring sign to Big Oil and other Bush-Cheney cronies trying to divvy up the spoils in Iraq,'" James Ridgeway, wrote in the December 10, 2003, Village Voice.

"Until now," Naomi Kelin wrote October 12, 2004, in The Nation, "there has been no concrete evidence that Baker's loyalties are split, or that his power as Special Presidential Envoy--an unpaid position--has been used to benefit any of his corporate clients or employers. But according to documents obtained by The Nation," Klein wrote, "that is precisely what has happened. Carlyle has sought to secure an extraordinary $1 billion investment from the Kuwaiti government, with Baker's influence as debt envoy being used as a crucial lever.

"The secret deal involves a complex transaction to transfer ownership of as much as $57 billion in unpaid Iraqi debts. The debts, now owed to the government of Kuwait, would be assigned to a foundation created and controlled by a consortium in which the key players are the Carlyle Group, the Albright Group (headed by another former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright) and several other well-connected firms. Under the deal, the government of Kuwait would also give the consortium $2 billion up front to invest in a private equity fund devised by the consortium, with half of it going to Carlyle."

Conflict of Interest: Bush 2000 Recount and the Baker/Carter Commmission on Elections

"Scores of voting rights and electoral reform organizations nationwide have united to demand real electoral reform proposals from the private, blue ribbon Baker/Carter Commission on Elections," Ilene Proctor reported April 17, 2005, in The Free Press.

The groups were "opposed to the inclusion in any form of James Baker III on the Commission. Baker was the lead attorney in Florida for the 2000 Bush/Cheney campaign who engineered Bush's selection as President by five Supreme Court justices who demanded that America's votes NOT be counted," Proctor said.

Profiles

Biography

According to his Baker Botts LLP profile, James A. Baker, III "has served in senior government positions under three United States presidents. He served as the nation's 61st Secretary of State from January 1989 through August 1992 under President George H.W. Bush. During his tenure at the State Department, Mr. Baker traveled to 90 countries as the United States confronted the unprecedented challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War era. In 1995, Mr. Baker published The Politics of Diplomacy, his reflections on those years of revolution, war, and peace.

"Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 to 1988 under President Ronald Reagan. As Treasury Secretary, he was also chairman of the President's Economic Policy Council. From 1981 to 1985, he served as White House Chief of Staff to President Reagan. Mr. Baker's record of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary of Commerce to President Gerald R. Ford. It concluded with his service as White House Chief of Staff and senior counselor to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993.

"Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker led presidential campaigns for Presidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush over the course of five consecutive presidential elections from 1976 to 1992.

"A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton University in 1952. After two years of active duty as a lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps, he entered The University of Texas School of Law at Austin. He received his LL.B. with honors in 1957, and practiced law with the Houston firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975. ...

"He is honorary chairman of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and serves on the board of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. From 1997 to 2004, Mr. Baker served as the personal envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in seeking a political solution to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoy for President George W. Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt."

Timeline

Other Affiliations

Contact Information

Baker Botts LLP

The Warner

1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20004-2400

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Profiles

Articles by James A. Baker, III

Articles & Commentary

1989
2000
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2006

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