Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

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</div><div>=</div><div>divest ESG turncoat or realist?</div><div>
</div><div><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/09/18/esg-stakeholder-governance-and-the-duty-of-the-corporation">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/09/18/esg-stakeholder-governance-and-the-duty-of-the-corporation</a></div><div>
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</div><div>tags</div><div><div id="post-150136" class="post-150136 post type-post status-publish format-standard hentry category-esg category-insights-from-practice tag-corporate-purpose tag-esg tag-shareholder-value tag-stakeholders tag-stewardship tag-sustainability lawfirm-wachtell-lipton contributors-adam-emmerich contributors-anna-dginto contributors-kevin-schwartz contributors-martin-lipton contributors-sabastian-niles" style=""><div class="entry-content" style="float: left; margin-bottom: 10px; border-bottom: 1px dotted gray;"><div class="top-tags" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px;"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/corporate-purpose/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Corporate purpose</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/esg/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">ESG</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-value/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Shareholder value</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/stakeholders/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Stakeholders</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/stewardship/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Stewardship</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/sustainability/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Sustainability</a>
More from: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/adam-emmerich/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Adam Emmerich</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/anna-dginto/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Anna D'Ginto</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/kevin-schwartz/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Kevin Schwartz</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/martin-lipton/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Martin Lipton</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/sabastian-niles/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Sabastian Niles</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/lawfirm/wachtell-lipton/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Wachtell Lipton</a></div><div class="editors_note" style="background-color: rgb(236, 236, 232); margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px; padding: 7px;"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton/" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/AOEmmerich/" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=http://www.wlrk.com/AOEmmerich/&source=gmail&ust=1663425375052000&usg=AOvVaw01XCYvg5NAW1nq5hIYBh4Q" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Adam O. Emmerich</a>, <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/ksschwartz/" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/ksschwartz/&source=gmail&ust=1663425375052000&usg=AOvVaw1FTqqY0y8FnxiL5szLDUTg" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Kevin S. Schwartz</a>, <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/svniles/" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=http://www.wlrk.com/svniles/&source=gmail&ust=1663425375052000&usg=AOvVaw1QLBIj4cK1VYesPKKXXzvG" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Sabastian V. Niles</a> and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/amdginto/" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/amdginto/&source=gmail&ust=1663425375053000&usg=AOvVaw3fvDzwE99fbPGNSEB9lST8" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Anna M. D’Ginto</a>.</div><div class="editors_note" style="background-color: rgb(236, 236, 232); margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px; padding: 7px;"><div style="text-align: justify;">
</div>Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a>) and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899421" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/05/23/will-corporations-deliver-value-to-all-stakeholders/" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a>), both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749654" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/07/restoration-the-role-stakeholder-governance-must-play-in-recreating-a-fair-and-sustainable-american-economy-a-reply-to-professor-rock/" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4026803" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="4" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID</a>, by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/02/22/stakeholder-capitalism-in-the-time-of-covid/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="7" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a>).</div><div itemscope="" itemtype="https://schema.org/Article" style=""><div class="post-body" style="">Recently, there has been much confusion and misinformation about (1) environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations, (2) the ways in which companies, boards, asset managers, investment funds, and other market participants can, do, and should factor such considerations into their decision-making processes, and (3) the need for companies to consider, balance, advance, and appropriately protect stakeholder interests in order to create value, generate sustainable returns, and guard against downside risks to value and corporate health. This cloud of confusion stems, in part, from nascent efforts to politicize ESG. Consider the Trump administration’s proposed rulemaking in the Department of Labor that would have required fiduciaries of retirement plans making investment decisions to focus solely on “pecuniary” factors (and, in turn, would have burdened the ability of fiduciaries to appropriately take ESG factors into account in selecting investments and engaging in risk-return analyses). And consider the <a href="https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/executive-management/BlackRock%20Letter.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/executive-management/BlackRock%2520Letter.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw27McmUdBZNEIiSpAGTJYnN" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">letter</a> sent to BlackRock last month by 19 Republican attorneys general, accusing the asset manager of prioritizing its “climate agenda” over the interests of pensioners’ investments. These developments unfortunately fail to appreciate that ESG, properly understood, is merely a collection of quite disparate risks that corporations face, from climate change to human capital to diversity to relations among the board, management, shareholders, and other stakeholders. We write to resituate the role of ESG and stakeholder governance within the well-established legal framework of corporate fiduciary duties.Dating back to the 1932 law review exchange between Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle, there has been a long-running debate over whether the purpose of the corporation is to maximize short-term profits for shareholders or, instead, to operate in the interest of all of its various stakeholders to promote the long-term value of the corporation. For several decades, the predominant view among corporate leaders, practitioners, academics, investors, and asset managers was that the role of the corporation was solely to maximize profits for shareholders. This theory, which came to be known as shareholder primacy, is epitomized by Milton Friedman’s seminal 1970 essay, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw1KleVxUcJtnXWmwVpf_nNU" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">The Social Responsibility Of Business Is to Increase Its Profits</a>, in which he argued that every corporation should seek solely to “increase its profits within the rules of the game.”  Friedman’s shareholder-centric view of corporate purpose posited that a corporation that “takes seriously its responsibilities for providing employment, eliminating discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may be the catchwords of the contemporary crop of reformers” would undermine “the basis of a free society.”We long have advocated for a broader view of corporate purpose than that espoused by Friedman — initially, as we wrote in 1979 in <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.14259.79.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.14259.79.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw006482whFgWorDXJt0g44E" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom</a>, to empower boards to take into account the interests of all stakeholders, including the communities in which corporations operate, in repudiating takeover bids by opportunistic raiders; and later, to ensure that directors are encouraged to resist short-termist pressures and can exercise their business judgment to consider the variety of stakeholder interests essential to promoting sustainable success and growth in long-term corporate value. The 2008 financial crisis laid bare the dangers of the Friedman doctrine and marked the decline of shareholder primacy, exposing the reality that an exclusive focus on short-term maximization of shareholder value came at the expense of sustainable growth and innovation. Business leaders, policymakers, and investors have since increasingly advocated for a broader view of corporate purpose, one that promotes the long-term value of the corporation.The growing acceptance of stakeholder corporate governance is captured by, among other developments, the World Economic Forum’s publication of <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw3DjrQFkMMHaLAgS_votCVx" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth</a>; the <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw2vZKLWlhXs5EsXAPtskYDk" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Davos Manifesto 2020</a> (see our prior memo <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26645.19.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26645.19.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw044yEoiZNByzaPq7s4tRMi" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a>); and the Business Roundtable’s 2019 <a href="https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw3dv78xcCtiWQhxq-PUUDIx" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">rejection</a> of the shareholder-centric view to which it had held firm over the prior two decades (see our prior memo <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26511.19.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26511.19.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw0BpW2RiM-YvSguaNIy9enz" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a>). Stakeholder corporate governance’s acceptance is also seen in the many actions and investments by corporations intended to benefit stakeholders, including investors and non-investor constituencies, and to reduce negative externalities.The term “ESG” was popularized in the early 2000s following the publication of the UN Global Compact’s report, <a href="http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2004/stocks/who_cares_wins_global_compact_2004.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/events/2004/stocks/who_cares_wins_global_compact_2004.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw0z70B3TROPRYQfrlgqNjYj" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Who Cares Wins</a>. Today, the concept of ESG is multifaceted: companies and boards take into account ESG and stakeholder considerations when developing and delivering products and services, making business decisions, managing risk, developing long-term strategy, recruiting and retaining talent and investing in the workforce, implementing compliance programs, and crafting public disclosures. Many major asset managers, including BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard as well as actively managed funds, consider ESG issues in formulating investment strategies, serving their clients, and exercising their fiduciary responsibilities. This encompasses investors being able to exercise their professional judgment in considering ESG-related information when evaluating the risk and return profile of portfolio holdings. Certain ESG investment funds may also invest exclusively in companies that satisfy predetermined ESG standards. And regulators and enforcement authorities develop principles to promote consistency and reliability across ESG disclosures, and scrutinize such disclosures in companies’ public filings.The phenomenon of ESG is prevalent not only in the United States but around the world, as companies, policymakers, global leaders, academics, and investors debate how best to promote sustainability over the long term. ESG, properly understood, is not a unitary principle or even a collection of a fixed set of particular principles. Rather, ESG encapsulates the range of risks that all corporations must carefully balance, taking into account their specific circumstances, in seeking to achieve long-term, sustainable value. It is thus no surprise that asset managers and asset owners, too, are expecting well-run companies to incorporate ESG matters into their business decisions appropriately. Although the ESG moniker is relatively recent, corporate boards and management have long considered ESG factors and risks in setting and executing strategy. As <a href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/09/14/people-trust-executives-to-intervene-in-social-issues-says-jeffrey-sonnenfeld" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/09/14/people-trust-executives-to-intervene-in-social-issues-says-jeffrey-sonnenfeld&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw3uopxuzOAJuPoB0ecoFnYf" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Jeffrey Sonnenfeld</a> recently pointed out, doing so is associated with superior financial results, and consistent with long-accepted norms as to the place of business in society.To be sure, not all market participants embrace ESG principles. Recently, an anti-ESG movement has emerged, one opposed to consideration of ESG factors in investment decision-making in favor of a Friedmanist exclusive focus on shareholder primacy. This false dichotomy between ESG and shareholder value mirrors the confusion sewn by critics of stakeholder governance who pit shareholders against other stakeholders through the misleading allure of an existential conflict that requires directors to choose between value for one versus the other. But as we have previously explained <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.27092.20.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.27092.20.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw2d98TY2qCcCHTp2CoFj9Mo" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a> and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.27701.21.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.27701.21.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw30Rno9_AlfH-RiwjJ2Imdj" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">here</a>, the law of corporate fiduciary duties nowhere demands that choice — and opponents of stakeholder governance know it, as do critics of ESG. The purpose of a corporation is to conduct a lawful, ethical, profitable, and sustainable business in order to ensure the success and grow the value of the corporation over the long term. This requires consideration of all of the stakeholders critical to the success of the business (shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and communities), as determined by directors based on their business judgment and informed by regular engagement with shareholders. Such consideration includes ensuring that a company avoids ESG blindspots.The first principle of corporate law is that a corporation must conduct lawful business by lawful means. To honor this axiom, the Caremark <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26628.19.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26628.19.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw1-iPNggp0S8ghr7cE54Xet" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">doctrine</a> requires that companies have in place information and reporting systems reasonably designed to provide timely, accurate information to allow management and the board to reach informed judgments about the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance. The stakeholder governance model aligns closely with Caremark — for example, environmental risks have long been a core focus of compliance programs, and to the extent a company adequately addresses these risks through comprehensive compliance programs and operational adjustments, it will be well-positioned to meet the demands of the environmental component of ESG. As we recently <a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.28180.22.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.28180.22.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw1i9DvSvqHIu3buLQasgsTi" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">wrote</a>, it is important for companies to have high-quality risk management policies and processes, and for boards to oversee the monitoring and management of risk, to protect the long-term value of the company, and to fulfill Caremark duties. Risk management policies and oversight must reach ESG and sustainability-related risks that can damage and disrupt a company’s strategies, business positioning, operations, and relations with stakeholders, including over the long term.A holistic, stakeholder view of corporate purpose does not exalt ESG as the sole or weightiest consideration — to the contrary, it recognizes that the various elements of ESG are among numerous considerations that are essential to a company’s sustainability and that must be carefully balanced by the board and management, in consultation with shareholders, to ensure the long-term health and prosperity of the business. One example, highlighted by BlackRock in its written <a href="https://thetexan.news/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/BlackRock-Response-to-AGs-09062022_Final.pdf" target="blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&q=https://thetexan.news/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/BlackRock-Response-to-AGs-09062022_Final.pdf&source=gmail&ust=1663427121064000&usg=AOvVaw1wWIpy2NUtVJGY2qvnMt79" class="external" style="text-decoration-line: none;">response</a> to the attorneys general, is the long-term risk to companies posed by climate change and the economic opportunities from the energy transition. By engaging with shareholders and thought leaders on these complex topics, management teams and boards can arm themselves with the knowledge necessary to understand the relevant risks and to develop strategies to support sustainable growth.The unfortunate confusion that has entered the contemporary debate regarding ESG misunderstands the fundamental purpose of the corporation. We continue to believe it is essential that boards operate under a governance model that permits consideration of ESG principles and sustainable investment strategies, with the support of investors and asset managers, to promote long-term corporate value and to fortify the enterprise against relevant risks. There should be no doubt that the law in Delaware and in every other U.S. jurisdiction empowers boards to follow this course for responsible corporate stewardship and corporate success.</div></div></div></div><div class="entry-utility" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><div id="meta-tags" style="clear: both; margin-bottom: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;"><div class="top-tags" style="margin-top: 10px; margin-bottom: 10px;"><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/corporate-purpose/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Corporate purpose</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/esg/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">ESG</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/shareholder-value/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Shareholder value</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/stakeholders/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Stakeholders</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/stewardship/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Stewardship</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/tag/sustainability/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Sustainability</a>
More from: <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/adam-emmerich/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Adam Emmerich</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/anna-dginto/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Anna D'Ginto</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/kevin-schwartz/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Kevin Schwartz</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/martin-lipton/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Martin Lipton</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/sabastian-niles/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Sabastian Niles</a>, <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/lawfirm/wachtell-lipton/" rel="tag" style="text-decoration-line: none;">Wachtell Lipton</a></div></div></div></div><div>
</div>=<div><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Wachtell,Lipton,Rosen%26_Katz">http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Wachtell,Lipton,Rosen%26_Katz</a>

Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz is a law firm for <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Philip_Morris" title="Philip Morris" class="mw-redirect">Philip Morris</a> of New York, New York. They were the major law firm used by Philip Morris Cos. Inc., circa 1993.(NLJ 5/9/94) Attorney <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=John_M._Richman&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="John M. Richman (page does not exist)">John M. Richman</a> was on board of directors of Philip Morris Cos. Inc., circa 1993. (NLJ 5/9/94)

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</a><h2><a name="Resources_and_articles" id="Resources_and_articles">Resources and articles</a></h2>

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<ul><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><li><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles"></a><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a name="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" id="Related_Sourcewatch_articles" /><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Drum_Major_Institute" title="Drum Major Institute">Drum Major Institute</a></li><li><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Bernard_Nussbaum" title="Bernard Nussbaum">Bernard Nussbaum</a></li><li><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Norman_Redlich" title="Norman Redlich">Norman Redlich</a></li></ul>

</a><h3><a name="References" id="References">References</a></h3>

<div id="catlinks" class="catlinks"><a name="References" id="References" /><div id="mw-normal-catlinks"><a name="References" id="References"></a><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a name="References" id="References" /><a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Special:Categories" title="Special:Categories">Categories</a>: <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Category:Tobaccowiki" title="Category:Tobaccowiki">Tobaccowiki</a> | <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Category:Stubs" title="Category:Stubs">Stubs</a> | <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Category:Tobacco_documents_organizations" title="Category:Tobacco documents organizations">Tobacco documents organizations</a> | <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Category:United_States" title="Category:United States">United States</a>

-[--

Bernard Nussbaum "is a senior litigation partner at the New York law firm, <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Wachtell,Lipton,Rosen_%26_Katz" title="Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz">Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz</a>.

From 1993-94, Mr. Nussbaum served as Counsel to the President of the

United States, and was particularly involved in assisting President

Clinton with his law enforcement and judicial nominations. Mr. Nussbaum

has known the President and Mrs. Clinton for twenty-five years, having

worked with <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Hillary_Clinton" title="Hillary Clinton" class="mw-redirect">Hillary Clinton</a>

in 1974 when he served as Senior Counsel to the House Judiciary

Committee, which conducted the impeachment inquiry of President Nixon.

Prior to this, Mr. Nussbaum was Assistant United States Attorney in the

Southern District of New York. He has served as President of the Federal

Bar Council, and Vice President and member of the Executive Committee

of the <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Association_of_the_Bar_of_the_City_of_New_York&action=edit&redlink=1" class="new" title="Association of the Bar of the City of New York (page does not exist)">Association of the Bar of the City of New York</a>.

Among others, his community and philanthropic affiliations include

Brandeis University and Mount-Sinai-NYU Medical Center in New York where

he is a Trustee." <a href="http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/board.php" class="external autonumber" title="http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/board.php" rel="nofollow">[1]</a>

<ul><li>Director, <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Humanity_In_Action" title="Humanity In Action">Humanity In Action</a></li><li>Director, <a href="http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Drum_Major_Institute" title="Drum Major Institute">Drum Major Institute</a></li></ul>==

wiki

The firm is known for its skill in <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mergers_and_acquisitions" title="Mergers and acquisitions">mergers and acquisitions</a>. One of the founding partners, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Lipton" title="Martin Lipton">Martin Lipton</a> invented the so-called "<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poison_pill" title="Poison pill" class="mw-redirect">poison pill</a> defense" during the 1980s to foil <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takeover" title="Takeover">hostile takeovers</a>. Working both sides of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mergers_and_acquisitions" title="Mergers and acquisitions">mergers and acquisitions</a> game, Wachtell Lipton has represented blue-chip clients like <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT%26T" title="AT&T">AT&T</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kraft_Foods" title="Kraft Foods">Kraft</a>, and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JP_Morgan_Chase" title="JP Morgan Chase" class="mw-redirect">JP Morgan Chase</a>.

The firm is also known for its skill in business <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Litigation" title="Litigation" class="mw-redirect">litigation</a>. It has handled many of the precedent-setting Delaware corporate governance cases. One of their most recent clients was <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Silverstein" title="Larry Silverstein">Larry Silverstein</a>, owner of the two 110-story towers of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Center" title="World Trade Center">World Trade Center</a>. Videos of another one of the founding partners, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herb_Wachtell" title="Herb Wachtell" class="mw-redirect">Herb Wachtell</a>, arguing cases in the courtroom are shown in law school classes as examples of effective trial advocacy.

<h2>Contents</h2>

[<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wachtell,Lipton,Rosen_%26_Katz#" class="internal" id="togglelink">hide</a>]
=

Conway’s New York law firm bio says he “has been a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz since January 1994. He joined the firm in September 1988.”
The law firm describes his litigation experience as including “a variety of high-profile matters spanning many areas of law in federal and state courts throughout the country. He has extensive experience in securities litigation, mergers and acquisitions litigation, contract litigation, antitrust litigation, and other litigation, both at the trial and appellate levels.”
One of those high-profile suits involved representing tobacco company Philip Morris. “Mr. Conway played a substantial role in prosecuting one of the most prominent defamation cases in recent memory (Philip Morris v. American Broadcasting Cos.),” said the law firm.
The New York Times said of that suit’s result, “In an extraordinary act of contrition, ABC News publicly apologized last night for asserting in a news program that two giant tobacco companies add extra nicotine to their cigarettes.” That apology was criticized by anti-smoking advocates, with The Times quoting one professor as saying, “Philip Morris has bullied a major television network into apologizing for what was essentially a true story.”
<div id="divNarrativeContainer" class="narrative">

                
                
                
                    <p class="largeP"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><b>George T. Conway III</b> has been a

partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &

Katz since January 1994. He joined the firm in September 1988.  His

litigation experience has included a variety of high-profile matters

spanning many areas of law in federal and state courts throughout the

country. He has extensive experience in securities litigation, mergers

and acquisitions litigation, contract litigation, antitrust litigation,

and other litigation, both at the trial and appellate levels.

In the area of securities litigation, he <a href="http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_Respondent.authcheckdam.pdf" target="blank">briefed</a> and <a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1191.pdf" target="blank">argued</a> the case for respondents in <a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1191.pdf" target="_blank">Morrison v. National Australia Bank</a>,

in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that Section 10(b)

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not apply

extraterritorially to claims of so-called <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/bp-vivendi-among-companies-that-may-save-billions-after-high-court-ruling.html" target="blank">"foreign-cubed"</a> plaintiffs -- foreign investors who purchased securities of foreign issuers on foreign exchanges.  He also recently argued and <a href="http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/EADSDismissal.pdf" target="blank">won</a> a precedent-setting motion to dismiss so-called <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/26/eads-lawsuit-idUSN2623920020100326?type=marketsNews" target="_blank">"foreign-squared"</a> claims against EADS brought by American plaintiffs who purchased that foreign company's shares on foreign exchanges.

Mr. Conway also recently argued and won an important <a href="http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/08-2199P-01A.pdf" target="blank">appeal</a> under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 on behalf of the Swiss installation artist Christoph Büchel in the artist’s <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/arts/design/16robe.html?r=2" target="blank">highly publicized</a> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/arts/design/29artist.html" target="blank">dispute</a> with the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art. He also <a href="http://devwlrkweb:10000/files/Uploads/Documents/887_N_Y_S_2D_772_10-14-11_1454.pdf" target="blank">successfully represented</a> the Chief Judge of the State of New York and the New York Unified Court System in historic constitutional <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/nyregion/24pay.html" target="blank">litigation</a>

over the State of New York’s extended failure to adjust judicial

salaries. Mr. Conway also played a substantial role in the successful

defense of Kenneth Langone’s Invemed Associates in a <a href="http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@adj/documents/ohodecisions/p017082.pdf" target="blank">disciplinary proceeding</a> before the NASD (now FINRA) that resulted in what the New York Times called a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/business/21wall.html" target="blank">"withering," "high-profile defeat"</a> for the regulators.

Mr. Conway’s work in mergers and acquisitions litigation includes the

representation of Rohm and Haas Co. and ADVO, Inc., in, respectively, Rohm and Haas v. Dow Chemical Co., and <a href="http://advolassis.com/viewnews.php?nid=19" target="_blank">Valassis Communications v. ADVO</a>,

two Delaware Chancery Court cases involving claims to enforce merger

agreements, as well as two historic cases in the development of Delaware

corporate law governing mergers and acquisitions, <a href="http://devwlrkweb:10000/files/Uploads/Documents/635_A_2D_1245_10-14-11_1447.pdf" target="blank">QVC v. Paramount Communications</a> and <a href="http://devwlrkweb:10000/files/Publication/52bc765b-41a9-4735-b5f8-022d1768a63b/Preview/PublicationAttachment/53d8769b-873a-41e4-86d6-072344dda171/571_A_2D_1140_10-14-11_1448.pdf" target="blank">Paramount Communications v. Time Inc. and Warner Communications</a>,

in addition to many other cases involving contests for corporate

control in the Delaware courts and elsewhere over the past two decades.

In addition, Mr. Conway played a substantial role in prosecuting one of the most prominent defamation cases in recent memory (<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/22/us/the-media-business-abc-news-settles-suits-on-tobacco.html" target="_blank">Philip Morris v. American Broadcasting Cos</a>.).

He has extensive experience in merger-related private antitrust

litigation and government antitrust investigations, including the

defense of Cardinal Health in the preliminary injunction proceedings

before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in FTC v. Cardinal Health. He also represented the National Football League in trademark and antitrust litigation against the Dallas Cowboys in <a href="http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/texas/txndce/3:2006cv01906/161473/117/0.pdf?1270791436" target="blank">NFL Properties v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club</a>. His pro bono work includes his successful <a href="http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/449/449.F3d.371.html" target="blank">representation</a> in the Second Circuit of crime victims and public-interest groups as amici curiae in opposing claims that federal law requires the State of New York to allow felons to vote while still incarcerated.

Mr. Conway is a graduate of Harvard College, where in 1984 he received an A.B. magna cum laude in Biochemical Sciences. He received his J.D. in 1987 from Yale Law School, where he was an editor of the Yale Law Journal.

In 1987 and 1988, he served as a law clerk to Circuit Judge Ralph K.

Winter, Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit.

                                
            </div>

    <div class="heading"><h2><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">Recent Publications</font></h2></div>
    <div class="content">  
        
        <ul><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23597.14.pdf" target="_blank">Morrison at Four: A Survey of Its Impact on Securities Litigation,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Federal Cases from Foreign

Places: How the Supreme Court Has Limited Foreign Disputes from Flooding

U.S. Courts (U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 2014)</div>

               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23168.14.pdf" target="_blank">A Response to Bebchuk and Jackson's "Towards A Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill",</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, March 13, 2014.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25086.16.pdf" target="_blank">Supreme Court to Decide Scope of Insider-Trading "Tippee" Liability,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, January 22, 2016.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23989.15.pdf" target="_blank">New York's Highest Court Holds that Six-Year Statute of Limitations on RMBS Repurchase Claims Runs from Time of Securitization,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, June 15, 2015.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23699.14.pdf" target="_blank">Current and Former SEC Commissioners Question Legality of Harvard Declassification Proposals</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, December 15, 2014.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23508.14.pdf" target="_blank">Back-to

Back Court of Appeals Decisions Apply Morrison Vigorously to Dodd-Frank

Whistleblower Claims and to Rule 10b-5 Claims Involving Derivative

Securities,</a>

    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, August 19, 2014.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23451.14.pdf" target="_blank">Federal District Court Holds That U.S. Bankruptcy Code Does Not Permit Recovery of Extraterritorial Transfers,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, July 15, 2014.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23269.14.pdf" target="_blank">Observations on the Halliburton Argument: Are Some Justices Searching for a "Midway Position" That Isn't There?</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Bank and Corporate Governance Law Reporter Interim Report, March 28, 2014.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23037.14.pdf" target="_blank">New York Appellate Court Holds That Claims for Breach of RMBS Representations and Warranties Accrue on Issuance,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, January 14, 2014.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.22980.13.pdf" target="_blank">Supreme Court Agrees to Decide Whether the Fraud-On-The-Market Presumption of Reliance Should Be Overruled,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, November 22, 2013.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.22961.13.pdf" target="_blank">Federal

Court of Appeals Holds that Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the

Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Apply in Criminal Cases,</a>

    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Bank and Corporate Governance Law Reporter Volume 51 Number 2, October 2013.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.22735.13.pdf" target="_blank">Federal

District Court Expresses Skepticism That Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial

Jurisdiction Provision Overturns Morrison in Government Enforcement

Actions,</a>

    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Columbia Law School's Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets,  August 13, 2013.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.22595.13.pdf" target="_blank">The Impact of 'Kiobel' Curtailing the Extraterritorial Scope of the Alien Tort Statute,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Wall Street Lawyer Volume 17 Issue 7, July 2013.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.22604.13.pdf" target="_blank">When Corporate Defendants Go on Offense,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in The Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2013.</font></div>  
               </li><li>
                    
        <font size="4" face="Times New Roman"><a href="http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.22413.13.pdf" target="_blank">Applying Morrison v. National Australia bank, the Supreme Court Rejects Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute,</a>
    
                    </font><div class="source"><font size="4" face="Times New Roman">in Columbia Law School's Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets,  April 18, 2013.</font></div>  
               </li></ul>            
    </div>

</div>==
</div>
</div></div>
</div>