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Stare, F

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http://www.ecowatch.com/sugar-industry-2004899240.html

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Next year will mark 50 years since the sugar industry initiated and funded a literature review absolving sugar of its association with chronic heart disease, without disclosing the industry's role in the study.

What we now know as the Sugar Association began as the Sugar Research Foundation (SRF) in 1943. Researchers Cristin Kearns, Laura Schmidt and Stanton Glantz of the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) combed through hundreds of SRF documents and found evidence that the sugar industry had manipulated the science to exonerate sugar as a dominant cause of heart disease—an action that shifted the direction of scientific research for decades.

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One particularly jarring quote they found was from the president Henry Hass's 1954 speech to the American Society of Sugar Beet Technologists in which he said, "if the carbohydrate industries were to recapture this 20 percent of the calories in the US diet (the difference between the 40 percent which fat has and the 20 percent which it ought to have) and if sugar maintained its present share of the carbohydrate market, this change would mean an increase in the per capita consumption of sugar more than a third with a tremendous improvement in general health."

The sugar industry was interested in increasing sugar consumption by funding science that would urge Americans to decrease calories from saturated fats and hopefully replace them with sugar.

The UCSF analysis reveals that SRF employed the following tactics the Union of Concerned Scientists previously identified in *Added Sugar, Subtracted Science* in order to undermine public health policy on sugar. Our work shows that SRF's successor the Sugar Association and its counterpart in the corn syrup industry, the Corn Refiners Association, took pointers from SRF:

Attacking the Science

Just as the Corn Refiners Association planned to "bury the data" when it was inconvenient, when the sugar industry got word that researchers like John Yudkin at Queen Elizabeth College were challenging the maxim that sugar calories were more desirable than fat calories, the SRF's vice president and director of research called on the organization in 1964 to "embark on a major program" to counter the science coming from Yudkin and others representing "negative attitudes toward sugar."

This program would include issuing a public opinion poll to find out what messages would resonate with consumers and decision makers, opening up a venue to publicly call out scientists for their undesirable results regarding sugar, and finally, pushing out studies funded by the sugar industry that look at the causes of chronic heart disease.

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Spreading Misinformation

Similar to the sugar industry's recent misinforming in order to fight labeling policies, as a part of its campaign to increase sugar consumption in the 1960s, it began to fund its own literature review on sugars, fats, and chronic heart disease in an obvious attempt to dispel the rumors that calories from sugar were at least part of the problem. The SRF paid Dr. Mark Hegsted and Dr. Robert McGandy, under the supervision of Harvard University's Fredrick Stare, a total of nearly $50,000 (in 2015 dollars) for their work. And theSRF was heavily involved throughout the review process, urging the scientists to focus on the perils of fat consumption.

The SRF vice president and director of research, John Hickson, emphasized in 1965, "Our particular interest had to do with that part of nutrition in which there are claims that carbohydrates in the form of sucrose make an inordinate contribution to the metabolic condition, hitherto ascribed to aberrations called fat metabolism. I will be disappointed if this aspect is drowned out in a cascade of review and general interpretation."

The study authors discounted research showing sugar's impact on chronic heart disease in a number of ways, focusing especially on possible bias within individual studies instead of looking at the consensus across studies. The conclusion of the literature review was that there was "no doubt" that the one way to prevent chronic heart disease was through a reduction of dietary cholesterol and replacing saturated fats with unsaturated fats. And the SRF was content with these findings, telling the lead authors, "this is quite what we had in mind."

Deploying Industry Scientists/Influencing Academia

Just as the Sugar Association and Corn Refiners Association today work with academic scientiststo advance their talking points, when the literature review was published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1967, the authors did not disclose the funding or close involvement of the SRF in the review. Dr. Fredrick Stare, the founder and chairman of the nutrition department at the Harvard School of Public Health, had an extended history of funding from the sugar and food industry: over 30 papers authored by members of his department were funded by the SRF just between 1952 and 1956. Stare's department at Harvard is a key example of how industry funding can influence academic science, with dangerous consequences for public discourse and public policy.

Undermining Policy

The manipulation of science doesn't happen in a vacuum. Often, it serves to change the conversation and impact policy, as well. Similar to today's efforts by the sugar industry to undermine public health policies, in 1986, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Sugars Task Force assessed the scientific evidence around sugar, leaning heavily upon the industry's 1976 review, titled "Sugar in the Diet of Man." The FDA report said that "no conclusive evidence on sugars demonstrates a hazard to the general public when sugars are consumed at the levels that are now current." The agency's study was influenced by industry sponsorship, as the chair of the study later went on to work at the Corn Refiners Association, a trade group that represents the interests of high-fructose corn syrup manufacturers.

This agency study, which had clear influence form the sugar and food industry, has been responsible for the determination of GRAS status for several added sugars, and has largely set the precedent for the resulting years of denial about the health impacts of sugar-laden diets.

The Sugar Industry's Role in Today's Chronic Disease Epidemic

It is no wonder that even today, our food policies are only just beginning to adequately address the association between added sugars and chronic disease. The sugar industry has magnificently managed to delay the inevitable knowledge about the dangers of excessive sugar consumption for a half century. And they are still employing this same behavior. Just last month, the American Heart Association released added sugar consumption guidelines for children, recommending that children under two consume no added sugars and that all other children consume less than 10 percent of calories from sugars, because "there is minimal room for nutrient-free calories in the habitual diets of very young children." The Sugar Association responded by accusing the American Heart Association of a lack of scientific integrity.

Luckily the tide is beginning to turn in spite of the industry's best efforts. FDA's label will soon include added sugars information on food packages. More and more local resolutions are popping up to place taxes on sugary beverages. School meal policies are adding variety and improving the nutritional quality of kids' diets. And exposés like this one are revealing the truth about how the food industry has manipulated science to influence our diets for the worse.

Still, the aforementioned research points to some interesting scientific integrity issues that remain today, including the rigor of conflict-of-interest policies at scientific journals and the ethical questions involved with the ability of decision makers to use industry-funded research to shape policies. My colleague, Gretchen Goldman, explains more about how we should be dealing with conflicts of interest in science funding here. We need greater transparency around the sugar industry's role in scientific studies, including funding but also identification of the nature of the relationship between the industry and the science. Independent science should inform policies that protect public health from the adverse impacts of added sugar.

Genna Reed is a science and policy analyst in the Center for Science and Democracy at the Union of Concerned Scientists.

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Frederick John Stare M.D. (1911–2002) was a prominent American nutritionist.[1]

Stare was born in Columbus, Wisconsin, and educated in chemistry and medicine at the University of Wisconsin and the University of Chicago.[2] In the aftermath of the second world war, he worked in the Netherlands on devising a dietary regime to cope with the malnutrition facing the Dutch people.[1]

In 1942, Stare founded the Department of Nutrition at Harvard which he led as a professor of nutrition until his retirement in 1976.[2][1] He was a firm believer in the essential goodness of the typical American diet, holding that "prudence and moderation" were the key to healthy eating.[1] An adviser to the US government, Stare eschewed faddish notions holding, for example, that food additives were harmless, that sugar and Coca-Cola were acceptable parts of the diet, and that water flouridation benefited public health.[1] He was an early advocate of the benefits of regularly drinking water throughout the day.[2]

References

  1. ^ :{Jump up to::(style="-webkit-user-select:none;top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^a b(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_J.Stare#cite_ref-econ_1-1) c(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_J.Stare#cite_ref-econ_1-2) d(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_J.Stare#cite_ref-econ_1-3) e(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_J.Stare#cite_ref-econ_1-4) "Frederick J. Stare, defender of the American diet, died on April 4th, aged 91". The Economist (Obituary). April 18, 2002.
  2. ^ :{Jump up to::(style="-webkit-user-select:none;top:-99999px;clip:rect(1px 1px 1px 1px);overflow:hidden;position:absolute !important;padding:0px !important;border:0px !important;height:1px !important;width:1px !important"):}:^a b(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_J.Stare#cite_ref-nyt_2-1) c(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_J.Stare#cite_ref-nyt_2-2) Wolfgang Saxon (April 11, 2002). "Fredrick J. Stare, 91, Dies; Influential Early Nutritionist". The New York Times (Obituary).

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DDT

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ACSH was founded by Whelan and Dr. Frederick Stare in March 1978, with the assistance of her father and husband as legal advisers."With assistance from former Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, ACSH was introduced to the Scaife Foundations and John M. Olin Foundation which provided ACSH with its first financial support," Whelan explained in a retrospective on the organization's 25th anniversary. [2]

Frederick J. Stare (d. 2002-04-04[1]) was an industry-friendly, industry-funded Professor of nutrition and head of the Department of Nutrition at the Harvard School of Public Health, who also took money from the tobacco industry. From 1945 to 1980, Stare wrote a nationally syndicated newspaper column, "Food and Your Health." He also wrote many popular books on nutrition, and had a regular syndicated radio showalong with an ex-student Elizabeth Whelan promoting his nutritional ideas and lambasting anyone who thought chemicals in food, or excessive sugars in the diet, could be a health problem.

In 1950, Dr. Stare assisted in establishing the Food Protection Committee (FPC) of the National Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences with grants from the food industry and the government. The committee's first report assured the country that DDT and other pesticides were safe.

Stare served as Chairman of the Board of Directors for the American Council on Science and Health in 1980, at which time he sought funding from Philip Morris for ACSH's activities.[2][3]

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Food lobbyist

The April 1973 Harvard's student publications The Present Illness carried a diagram of Stare's industry links. It says he had been director of Continental Can Co.since 1964. It also revealed that Harvard University held $8.737 million worth of shares in the family(?) company. According to this article, Stare also had retainers from Nabisco, Kellogg and Cereal Institute.(See The Present Illness page 18 -21.[4])

The Kelloggs were eventually persuaded to fund him $2 million to set up the Nutrition Foundation at Harvard, and his family associations provided excellent connections to other large organisations in the food processing business willing to provide funds. The Nutrition Foundation is independent of the university (except for the use of the Harvard name) and it published a journal Nutrition Reviews which he edited for 25 years.[1]

A book jointly written with Whelan, Panic in the Pantry, carried the jacket message, "Eat your additives, they're good for you"; that, along with Stare's support for the sugar industry, earned him the sobriquet at Harvard University of "The Sugar King."

Tobacco helper - cut-out for Carl Seltzer

Despite the virulent anti-smoking campaign carried on by his associate Elizabeth Whelan through their shared industry-friendly group the American Council on Science and Health (ACSH), Stare worked for the tobacco industry as a cut-out for Carl C. Seltzer. [2], who Stare protected for many years. He also organised a lecturing position for Seltzer at Tufts University (through a close associate) which allowed Seltzer to use the title of "Professor"; Seltzer thereupon offered voluntary statistical services to the American Heart Foundation, Kaiser Permanente, and to other genuine research institutes, using his Harvard School of Public Health and Tufts University credentials.

The tobacco industry was then able to utilize this entirely-artificial status by promoting Seltzer as an independent "Professor" from the "Harvard School of Public Health" who was an "expert on cardiac (heart) diseases" and a "consultant to the American Heart Foundation."

Over a number of decades, more than $2 million in tobacco money (via a secret Special Projects #4 A/c) was channeled to Seltzer via Stare through the law firm Shook, Hardy & Bacon. Yet both Seltzer and Stare publicly maintained that he was totally independent and never took a penny from the tobacco industry.

They were able to expoit the Harvard name and maintain they had "never taken a penny from the industry" without fear of prosecution, because this last statement was correct; the money had all come from lawyers, and it was passed to them via Stare's department, which theoretically decided what research would be done.

After constant claims about his Department's funding sources, on January 28, 1972, Stare made a written public statement which said:

"I don't recall that any individual tobacco company has ever contributed any money directly to the department." [3]

These were weasel words intended to deceive: he was himself a recipient of a couple of tobacco grants from the joint tobacco industry body (via the secret CTR (Council for Tobacco Research) Special Account #4 held by a Kansas City law firm), and his department systematically laundered payments for the notorious Dr Carl Seltzer and a half-dozen other Harvard scientists, for a couple of decades. [4]

In mid 1973, Stare was exposed as a scientific lobbyist for the food, chemical, and pharmaceutical companies by Harvard students in the campus magazine (The Present Illness),(See student magazine claims about Stare: page 19-20 [5]) and also at the same time the student body attacked the support being given to the university scientists by the tobacco industry. Dr Gary Huber, and a couple of other Medical faculty members were eventually driven out of the university, but Seltzer, Stare and many others survived.

SourceWatch Resources

External resources

References

  1. ↑ Newsletter May/June 2002 - Remembering Fred Stare. National Council Against Health Fraud (2002-05). Retrieved on 2010-01-12.
  2. ↑ Fred Stare, American Council on Science and Health Untitled letter to Helmut Wakeham of PM Letter. December 5, 1980. Bates No. 1000283163/3165
  3. ↑ John L. Hess, Saturday Review Issues Harvard's Sugar-Pushing Nutritionist Article. Estimated date August, 1978. Bates No. 10413210/3217
  4. ↑ L.R. Berger, Harvard Medical Alumni Bulletin The Present Illness Magazine/newsletter. January, 1974. Bates No. 2001210704/0754

Categories: Tobaccowiki | Sugar industry | Tobacco industry | Corporations | Health

obit dist bw pix

http://www.economist.com/node/1086689

http://www.economist.com/node/1086689

THE United States has become a land of behemoths. Enormous rumps overhang bar-stools, and wheezing giants attempt to cram their blubber into little seats on aeroplanes. One in five Americans is now classed as obese. Genetic misfortune, cries the lobby of the larger-sized. Others spot the reason elsewhere, in soft-drink cups the size of small buckets, sacks of potato chips and all-you-can-eat food counters. In this welter of obesity, Frederick Stare played a role that was both vital and, at times, contradictory.

Dr Stare could be judged as America's top nutritionist. He founded the Department of Nutrition at Harvard's School of Public Health in 1942, when the science was still young, and ran it for 34 years. In his long career, he wrote 18 books and more than 400 articles on how Americans should eat, and frequently advised the government. His founding premise, however, was not that the American diet was bad, but that it was the best in the world. What Americans ate, he believed, could not possibly harm their health.

Not for Dr Stare, therefore, the faddish diets by which the Callista Flockharts and Jennifer Anistons of this world reduce themselves to wraiths. To give up all carbohydrates or all proteins was, he believed, both ridiculous and dangerous. Vitamin supplements were unnecessary for any normal healthy person. Fruits and vegetables were good, but there was no virtue in trying to sustain life on three slices of apple and a lettuce leaf. Nor should any part of the American diet be demonised. Dr Stare leapt to the defence of sugar (“a quick energy food...put a teaspoon in [your] coffee or tea three or four times a day”), Coca-Cola (“a healthy between-meals snack”) and all those nasty Es (“Eat your additives. They're good for you”).

Dr Stare's delight in, and defence of, the American cornucopia sprang partly from staring malnutrition in the face. At the end of the second world war, he was sent to the Netherlands with two mobile laboratories to determine how best to feed a country where 10,000 had died of starvation. The guidelines for “refeeding” he drew up then recognised the potential goodness of any sort of food, and this common-sense approach stayed with him.Small wonder, then, that the American food industry thought it had a friend in Dr Stare. Any recommendation he made was bound to please some lobby or other. Manufacturers of corn oil and margarine much appreciated his intervention in the Great Lipids Controversy of the early 1960s, when Dr Stare decided, untypically, to demonise butter, and recommended that all Americans should drink a cup of corn oil a day. The United Egg Producers rejoiced when the doctor, well known for his pioneering studies into the link between diet and heart disease, decreed that a little cholesterol, too, was no bad thing. The American Heart Association, he believed, was “unnecessarily scaring” the public. An egg a day would do no harm.

His own background, one could say, was the fat and sweetness of the land. He was born in Wisconsin, America's top dairying state, which has a dairy cow as one of the state animals and a sugar maple as the state tree. As a student of chemistry he was precocious, and it was at Harvard's invitation that he set up his department. Once his interest shifted definitively to food and nutrition, he was seldom out of the public eye. In radio shows and newspaper columns, as well as in projects abroad, Dr Stare kept fighting the faddists and the scaremongers.

In the late 1950s Dr Stare became a leading campaigner for the fluoridation of public drinking water—the natural flipside, his critics would say, of his embrace of sugar. He was mocked for maintaining that fluoride was not merely a useful chemical, but a nutrient essential to the diet. However, his view prevailed to the extent that 66% of America's drinking water is now fluoridated, adding extra resistance to the country's already perfect teeth.

Water, fluoridated or not, was heavily promoted by Dr Stare. He was the first to recommend the drinking of six to eight glasses a day, to protect the joints from stiffness, aid digestion and keep wrinkles at bay. He had much to do, therefore, with turning blue plastic bottles into fashion accessories. Yet this recommendation, like the daily cup of corn oil, has still not quite entered the mainstream of good health habits. On one website dedicated to health hints, it appears between an assertion that drinking one's morning urine helps jet-lag, and the claim that nasal sprays cause impotence.

In the end, Dr Stare's two watch-words were prudence and moderation. Unfortunately, America does not apply either word to the taking in of food. Shortly before Dr Stare died, the Harvard School of Public Health produced a study definitively linking a diet full of red meat, high-fat dairy products and refined grains to type-II diabetes, which now affects about 16m Americans. It recommended that its subjects—most of them inactive and fat already—should switch to fish, whole grains and fruit. Dr Stare, who understood human nature well, would have recommended a more mixed diet, and one that people were likely to eat. But his reasonable ?! voice was that of the lonely prophet crying on a mountain of burgers, buns and fries, washed by rivers of sticky drink.

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JAMA sued 1959 by health food store front? white bread

http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=665151

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laudatory obit /dept

http://jn.nutrition.org/content/134/5/1007.full

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wiki

Continental Can Company (CCC) was an American producer of metal containers and packaging company.

The Continental Can Company was founded by Edwin Norton[1] T.G. Cranwell in 1904,[2] three years after the formation of its greatest rival, American Can Company.[2] Continental acquired the patents of United Machinery Company, one of the few companies producing can-making machinery that had not been bought by American Can. CCC began shipping product in 1905.[2]

During World War II, Continental Can Company helped the war effort by building aircraft parts and bombs in their manufacturing plants.[2] The United Steelworkers of America was the union representing hundreds of manufacturing workers at Continental Can Company.[2]

In 1956, CCC acquired the Hazel-Atlas Glass Company, the third largest producer of glass containers, which led to the United States v. Continental Can Co.Supreme Court ruling in 1964.

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History

The company bought the Standard Tin Plate Company in 1909 to ensure that they would have a steady supply of tin. Continental's original business consisted only of packers' cans for fruits and vegetables. Given the seasonal nature of this work, the company decided to expand to general canning in 1912. By 1913 the company had acquired all of the interests of a New Jersey corporation also called Continental Can Co., as well as the Export & Domestic Can Co. and the Standard Tin Plate Co. The same year, Continental was incorporated in the state of New York.[2]

During the 1920s Continental expanded rapidly, purchasing almost twenty competing companies. It opened its first West Coast plant in 1926. In 1928 Continental acquired the third-largest can company in the country, the United States Can Company. By 1934 Continental and its rival, American Can, were producing approximately two-thirds of the 10 million cans made annually in the country. At this time, the company was operating thirty-eight plants in the United States andCuba. Continental suffered a drop in its income during the Depression; even so, by 1932 the company had never reported a money-losing year.[2]

By the mid-1930s, with 38 plants nationwide, the company employed about 1,800 men and 1,200 women around the Chicago area.[1]

Continental bounced back from the Depression years, and by 1940 its operating revenue had increased to $120.7 million from $80.9 million in 1935. In 1940 the company built plants in Canada as well. Continental continued to expand during the following decade through acquisitions, and the company entered the fields of paper and fiber containers, bottle caps, and synthetic resins. By the end of the 1940s, the company had sixty-five plants, including eight plants producing fiber and paper containers, four plants producing crown caps, and one plant producing plastics. By 1954 the company's gross sales reached $616 million, and its net income was approximately $21 million. At that time, Continental was operating eighty-one plants.[2]

During the company's first fifty years of existence, it had purchased and absorbed twenty-eight independent can companies, as well as other concerns producingfiber drums, paper containers, and bottle tops. In 1956 Continental acquired Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., the third-largest U.S. manufacturer of glass containers. Continental then became the first company with a full line of containers in metal, paper, and glass. It also purchased Cochrane Foil Company, a manufacturer and distributor of aluminum plates and rigid foil packages for the frozen-food industry and other food suppliers. The company also bought Robert Gair Company, a leading producer of paperboard products, that same year. Due to such acquisitions, Continental briefly surpassed American Can's annual sales, topping $1 billion in 1957. By 1960 the company operated 155 plant facilities.[2]

The introduction of the easy-to-open metal can top in 1963 led to an increase in the use of metal cans rather than glass bottles for beverages. By the end of 1966 over 45 percent of U.S. beer and over 15 percent of U.S. soft drinks were packaged in metal cans. That same year Continental introduced the first commercially practical welded can. In 1969 the company acquired Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke A.G., the largest packaging producer in the European community. By that time, Continental had 228 manufacturing plants.[2]

By 1973 the metal can industry was in a crisis due to oversupply and tough competition. Both Continental and American Can were said to have made the wrong decisions in the previous decade by adding capacity for both tin plate and tin-free steel production while the aluminum can was gaining popularity. Another problem was growing public opposition to throwaway cans. Continental's profits from domestic can-making dropped from $115 million in 1969 to $52 million in 1973. The company then closed many old-style integrated manufacturing plants in favor of large automated metal-processing centers and separate can-assembly operations situated near its customers' plants. In 1973 the company developed a system for the ultraviolet curing of inks and coatings on metal plate, and installed a number of such systems.[2]

Continental Group

In 1976, CCC changed its name[3] to the Continental Group, a conglomerate with operations in many countries,[1] but kept "Continental Can" as its packaging unit within Continental Group.[4] In 1987,[5] the remnants of Continental Can became part of the United States Can Company[1] (a subsidiary of Inter-American Packaging)[5] and two of its executives left to form Silgan Holdings. Continental Group was dismantled in 1991 and, in early 1991, Continental Can Company was ordered to pay out $415 million to some 3,700 former employees and members of the United Steel Workers of America, when the courts found that the company had attempted to defraud the employees of pensions during the late 1970s.[4] The rights to the name "Continental Can Company" name and logo were sold in 1991 and renamed to the Viatech Continental Can Company, Inc. in October 1992.[4] In June 1998 Suiza Foods Corporation completed its acquisition of Continental Can.[4] In July 1999, Suiza sold all of Continental Can's U.S. packaging operations in partial exchange for a minority interest in the purchaser, Consolidated Container Company.[6] As of 2000, the only remaining business of Continental Can is Dixie Union, a small flexible film business based in Kempten, Germany.[6]

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