Buckley v Valeo 1976
:{:{---}:
NO MERRI
see lever master plan
---
AN 5 26
When liberals and progressives argue that the ultra-rich have way too much power in U.S. politics, the Supreme Court case they often attack is 2010's Citizens United v. FEC. That hotly debated ruling equated campaign contributions with free speech, drawing strong criticism by then-Rep. Alan Grayson (the Florida Democrat who called it as "the worst Supreme Court decision since the Dred Scott case"), activist Ralph Nader and many others. On the right, conservative Sen. John McCain (R-Arizona) said he was "disappointed" by the ruling.
But the New York Times' Danny Hakim, in an article published on May 6, examines a different High Court case that affected the amounts allowed with political campaign contributions — and it came 36 years before Citizens United.
The case was Buckley v. Valeo, decided by the Burger Court in 1976.
"For a brief moment in American history," Hakim recalls, "the rich didn't control politics. Back in 1974, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress passed new campaign finance restrictions that would have largely eliminated the ability of wealthy people to buy elections…. David Koch, a wealthy industrialist, was enraged. 'I have the right to spend whatever I choose to promote what I believe,' he later wrote, adding that the law 'makes my blood boil.'"
Hakim adds, "Flash forward to the 2024 presidential campaign. Six of the nation's wealthiest billionaires spent more than $100 million apiece to help get another billionaire, Donald J. Trump, elected president."
According to Hakim, Buckley v. Valeo helped pave the way for Citizens United. The Gerald Ford-era ruling, Hakim notes, "upheld many aspects of the post-Watergate campaign finance law" but "eviscerated other parts of the law, leaving the rich with their own set of rules."
"Later cases, like the better-known Citizens United decision, opened the doors even further," Hakim explains. "But it was Buckley that established the nation's modern, muddled campaign finance system, and Buckley that allowed the Koch brothers to build a right-wing political money machine that rivaled that of the Republican Party itself. The case is as relevant as ever. Since taking office, Mr. Trump has celebrated billionaire donors at a White House dinner and raised unprecedented sums for a lame-duck president."
The "Buckley" in Buckley v. Valeo wasn't the National Review's William F. Buckley, but then-Sen. James L. Buckley (a member of the Conservative Party of New York). And the "Valeo" was Francis R. Valeo (secretary of the U.S. Senate).
University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey Stone argues that Buckley v. Valeo opened a Pandora's box, although the Burger Court justices didn't necessarily realize it at the time.
Stone told the Times, "If those justices had been aware then of what we now face, my guess is that we would have had the opposite result. They weren't imagining the current world."
---
American Conversations: Jeff Clements on Citizens United and Campaign Spending Reform
Streamed live on Jan 28, 2026
Jeff Clements is a former Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts and the co-founder and CEO of American Promise, a nonprofit advancing a constitutional amendment to restore lawmakers’ authority to set the rules for money in politics. He’s also the author of "Corporations Are Not People."
1:01
Jeff Clemens is a former assistant attorney general of Massachusetts. He is the co-founder and CEO of a group called
1:09
American Promise. That is a nonprofit that wants to amend the Constitution to
1:16
uh get rid of Citizens United and restore the ability of lawmakers to set
1:21
the rules for money in politics. and he's got a really interesting story about that that actually starts before
1:28
Citizens United. Um, so welcome Jeff. Thank you for being here today.
1:33
Thanks Heather. So good to be here with you. So let's start off here. You know, all
1:39
of us have heard about Citizens United, but I wonder if you could just take us
1:44
through the history of that a little bit. So what is Citizens United, but then where did it come from and why is
1:52
that court case so important? Yeah. So the you know we hear a lot
1:57
about Citizens United around money and politics. Um and you know Citizens United sounds like a good thing, right?
2:03
We want to be united citizens. Here's the thing though. Um, it actually refers to a Supreme Court case in January 2010,
2:12
um, in which the Supreme Court struck down the federal bipartisan campaign reform act. That law in the early 2000s
2:20
had been intended to close some loopholes that corporations and some unions were using and and and wealthy
2:26
donors to end around the limits that Americans wanted on spending in campaigns on on contributions in
2:32
campaigns. Um, which had historically been something Americans had wanted and had passed at the state and federal
2:39
level. Well, in Citizens United, the court heard argument that the uh McCain
2:44
fineold, as it was called, the bipartisan campaign reform act after senators John McCain and Senator Fineold
2:51
of Wisconsin. Um the court held in Citizens United that
2:56
that law was unconstitutional. And then the because a violation of free speech according to the court that
3:03
spending money in elections is a free speech right. And in doing so, the court overturned several previous decisions,
3:10
including one from just a few years before when Justice Okconor was still on the court, in which the court had upheld
3:17
the exact same law. So now that law was unconstitutional and the backstory of the Citizens United
3:25
decision is interesting because uh the court said and it seemed like they were
3:30
making it up to many Americans that yeah campaign contribution limits are still
3:35
okay because that could cause corruption. So you know many of us know that the limit on contributions directly
3:42
to a candidate's campaign is $3,500 at the federal level. Um, and then you're
3:48
scratching your head, well, how come Elon Musk can spend $300 million to influence the election? And the reason
3:54
is the Supreme Court said those are independent expenditures. They're not going directly to the campaign.
4:01
Therefore, they don't violate free uh therefore we're not allowed to limit those because that would violate free
4:06
speech. And the court cited a case called Buckley versus Valo 1976. And for
4:13
many Americans, Citizens United is famous for opening the floodgates of uh
4:19
of money in politics. It's why we have 20 billion dollar elections and all the corruption we see now. But Buckley
4:26
versus Valo 50 years ago is what rewrote the first amendment, rewrote the
4:32
constitution, resulted in a massive transfer of power to the wealthy interests that Citizens United depended
4:38
on. Okay. So, I've heard of Buckley V. Vallejo and it is as you say coming up
4:43
on its right right within two days coming up on its 50th anniversary. Uh
4:48
can you talk us talk to us about that and then I want to come back to what it means to have money in politics to this
4:54
extent. What is Buckley vale? Why is it important and what did it say?
5:00
Well, the major import of Buckley versus Valo, another Supreme Court case, 1976, as I said, is that for the first time in
5:08
American history, and remember 1976 was the bicesentennial, 200 years of American independence, not once had the
5:16
Supreme Court said that money in politics is free speech or ever intervened to stop the people, the
5:24
American people, from having campaign spending rules and limits. the states
5:30
had them for decades and and from the in the 1800s in the in the 20th century. Um
5:37
the federal laws had gone back at least to the Teddy Roosevelt days when corporations were prohibited from
5:42
spending money in federal elections. Not once had the Supreme Court said the first amendment free speech has anything
5:48
to do with that. People knew we needed those. It got us out of the guilded age. It got us out of other times of
5:54
concentrated power threatening the very foundation of democracy. Here we are now, 19 early 1970s, the 72 election, um
6:03
massive campaign spending scandals, um eventually leading to the resignation of President Nixon uh under a um
6:11
impeachment threat because of the scandals and the coverups. And bear in
6:16
mind, vice president, his vice president, Agnu, had already resigned because he'd been indicted for bribery.
6:23
So the corruption was rampant. The American people demanded a response. The American people got a response. Congress
6:29
passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act. It created the Federal Elections Commission. It put limits on spending
6:35
for campaigns. It put limits on, you know, self-funding of campaigns from if
6:41
you're rich enough, just ignore the limits and spend all your own money and buy the office. This law said you can't
6:47
do that. It it basically stopped the kind of scandals that had resulted in
6:52
the resignation of a president and vice president, much more. So, first time in
6:58
history, it goes up to the United States Supreme Court under an argument that that law violates the free speech rights
7:04
of those who want to spend unlimited money to get elected or to elect their
7:10
favorite candidate. Um, the decision came down and and as I said,
7:16
unprecedented, the court said that that federal law is unconstitutional in
7:21
several respects. It upheld the Federal Election Commission. and it upheld the contribution limits directly to the
7:27
campaign as I mentioned. But then as Citizens United would note almost almost 50 years later, the court invented a
7:35
rule. The court simply announced that independent spending cannot be limited.
7:41
Um you cannot limit the spending of wealthy candidates. You cannot limit the spending of um of wealthy donors if it's
7:48
going into certain independent things that now we see are super PACs. uh we'd
7:54
call them today, but that kind of way of spending. And so the the Supreme Court essentially moved the constitutional
8:01
rule about who decides the rules for anti-corruption laws away from the
8:06
American people and the states and Congress to itself. And we had 50 years
8:11
of dozens and dozens of cases because the lawyer, I'm a lawyer, believe me, the message went out. If you got a
8:17
clever theory that can strike down any limits, any rules about how you want to use money to influence elections, take
8:24
it to the Supreme Court. You got a pretty good chance. They'll vi they'll they'll just knock down the law and decide for themselves a new rule that
8:30
says you're that we're not allowed to limit that money. So, scores of cases went up to the Supreme Court. They made
8:36
a mess of it because judges aren't they don't know that much about politics really and that's how it should be. And
8:42
they took it away from the people who do know about politics and money and politics. the legislators, the people,
8:47
and they took it to themselves and they've made a mess of it. And that's what Citizens United really put on steroids in 2010.
8:54
So, I understand uh if I'm correct, that that it has always been tradition in the
9:01
American court system to have at least one person on the Supreme Court who has served an elected office. We don't have
9:07
someone like that now. I believe Sander Day Okconor was the last person who' had to run for an election. and and as a
9:13
result, exactly as you say, there's a divorce between an understanding of the actual political system and the theory
9:18
behind it. Now, um listen, I we don't really have the time for this, but I but I got to ask two things and then I do
9:25
want to get into the implications of this. First of all, what was the case Buckley vallejo? Um you know, why did
9:32
they push that? And why did the courts make such a dramatic statement? Because of course, the parallel to that, it
9:38
seems to me, is their acceptance. um you know quite out of the blue in the late 19th century of the idea that
9:44
corporations are people which you know at first they completely ignored when um
9:49
when actually was the case with Rosco Conkling brought it forward and then you know a few years later they just said oh
9:55
this is settled law when in fact it wasn't settled law at all it was completely made up so the what was the Buckley vallejo
10:03
decision I mean a court case and why did they make such an astonishing change
10:10
yeah well you In the 1970s, the court generally was incredibly activist as uh
10:15
and and they had gotten used to kind of deciding that that they were the decision makers about the constitutional
10:21
rules and they didn't particularly worry about how sound the grounding of the
10:27
different rules are across many different areas. Some of them they they got right. You know, certainly nobody
10:32
would, I hope, would want to question, you know, Brown versus Board of Education and the long delayed
10:38
enforcement of the 15th Amendment and the right to vote and so forth. But on this one, they really got it wrong. And,
10:45
you know, there's some interesting stories. I I tell it in my book, Corporations Are Not People. Now, 10 years ago, that on that that book, but
10:51
you know, Justice Powell uh had gone on the Supreme Court appointed by Richard Nixon. um the famous author of the
10:58
Powell memo outlining to the US Chamber of Commerce how an activist Supreme Court can be the best tool to basically
11:06
rest power away from what he perceived as the mob of of Americans, what many of
11:12
us would have called democracy, um and move it to the courts and impose these
11:17
constitutional restraints on democracy. So he basically invented the theory um
11:24
that had been dusted off from the 1800s as you said Heather back in the when they invented the theory that
11:30
corporations h are like people in in the in the guilded age. He dusted that off
11:36
put it into the first amendment and created the the corporate speech theory. The theory that corporations have free
11:41
speech rights too. And then Buckley versus Valo was an application of that in the campaign finance world but not
11:48
just for corporations. It applied to basically any concentrated wealth. Um
11:54
and and the rule by this court for some of them certainly like Justice Powell
11:59
intentional uh to transfer a massive transfer of power from the American
12:05
people to the judiciary. So you're killing me here and wealthy interest. I say toalthy interest.
---
2 25
ai
What is the major significance of the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo? Quizlet
AI Overview
The Supreme Court's 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo established that limits on campaign spending violate the First Amendment's right to free speech. This ruling had a major significance because it:
Increased the power of state political parties
By removing federal restrictions on independent spending, state parties could raise more money and spend more on campaigns.
Set a framework for future campaign finance decisions
The ruling established a framework for how Congress should regulate campaign finance.
Inspired future campaign spending cases
The ruling in Buckley v. Valeo inspired later cases such as Citizens United v. FEC (2010) and McCutcheon v. FEC (2014).
Explanation
The ruling in Buckley v. Valeo struck down parts of the Federal Election Campaign Act that limited how much individuals could contribute to their own campaigns. The Court also ruled that the limitations on a candidate's use of personal funds were unconstitutional.
===
wiki belotti Background}:
Corporate funds and federal elections
Since the early 1900s, federal law has prohibited the use of corporate funds to influence federal elections.[2] In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, prohibiting corporations and national banks from contributing to federal campaigns.[3][4][5] Forty years later, the Taft-Hartley Act banned direct election contributions by labor unions and corporations to federal elections.[5][6]
In 1971, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) initiated sweeping reforms by requiring full reporting of contributions to federal elections.[5][7][8]
POST WATERGATE?
In 1974, amendments to the FECA created the Federal Election Commission and enacted stricter limits on election contributions and expenditures.[5][7]}:
That same year, Buckley v. Valeo challenged the 1974 FECA amendments in the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that theyviolated the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech.[5][9][10] The Court, introducing the concept of spending money as a form of unrestricted political speech, overturned limits on campaign expenditures.[5][11] However, it upheld contribution limits because such limits served the government’s interest in reducing election corruption.[5][11]
wiki
| Majority | Per curiam, joined by Brennan, Stewart, Powell; Marshall (in part); Blackmun (in part); Rehnquist (in part); Burger (in part); White (in part). |
|---|---|
| Concur/dissent | Burger |
| Concur/dissent | White |
| Concur/dissent | Marshall |
| Concur/dissent | Blackmun |
| Concur/dissent | Rehnquist |
| Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. |
ciarra torres s
Chapter 5 · This Politician Was Brought to You By . . . 101
2009 18 corps had 36% of all wealth 1.5Trill$; 18 corps had 500B$;J Powell sneaky in Bellotti protect speech not spkr,Rehnquist dissent; Memo;
Buckley Valeo (8 magic words) plus Bellotti--> CU
BCRA Bipart electioneering communications, upheld by McConnell but ~ 7 yrs later in 2010; Acting Solic gen'l Malcolm Stewart messed up saying applied to 500 pg book hypo; [Kagan walked back 2nd round] what CU did vs did not p 114; key change is allowed corp $ for indep expenditures [ 501c4?] and electioneering comm = pol ads; pretended to empower "disfavored assoc of cits" while rich ppl can spend as much as they want? 115 Justice JP Stevens passionate dissent " 115; later bk same opinion;Lessig 500% increase in Neg ads 117; depress turnout; ~ BO in 1st SOU ~, foreign $, Alito "not true" [russian $ yes jesse benton at least , rudy pals?]
---
===
7 24 corp person tag
Corporate Personhood
yikes wow thom says corp person is fundamental clevAGE
Trump's Far-Right Army Is Threatening Bloodshed. Believe Them.
We must not only resist, but prevail. If we do not, it will be nearly impossible to reverse the course that America’s right-wing billionaires have set us on.
Thom Hartmann
Jul 05, 2024
KEEP READING
OPINION
PROJECT 2025
Trump's Far-Right Army Is Threatening Bloodshed. Believe Them.
We must not only resist, but prevail. If we do not, it will be nearly impossible to reverse the course that America’s right-wing billionaires have set us on.
Jul 05, 2024Common Dreams
Kevin Roberts, who heads the Heritage Foundation (largely responsible for Project 2025) just implicitly threatened Americans that if we don’t allow him and his hard-right movement to complete their transformation of America from a democratic republic into an authoritarian state, there will be blood in the streets.
“We’re in the process of taking this country back,” he told a TV audience, adding:
“The reason that they are apoplectic right now, the reason that so many anchors on MSNBC, for example, are losing their minds daily is because our side is winning. And so I come full circle on this response and just want to encourage you with some substance that we are in the process of the second American Revolution, which will remain bloodless if the left allows it to be.”
He’s not wrong. America has been changed as a result of a series of corrupt rulings by Republicans (exclusively; not one of these rulings has been joined by a Democratic appointee) which have changed America’s legal and political systems themselves.
As Roberts notes, this is really the largest issue we all face, and our mainstream media are totally failing to either recognize or clearly articulate how radically different our country is now, how far the Republicans on the Court have dragged us away from both our Founder’s vision and the norms and standards of a functioning, modern democratic republic.
These actions — corporate personhood, money as speech, ending the Chevron deference to regulatory agencies, and giving the president life-and-death powers that historically have only been held by kings, shahs, mullahs, dictators, and popes — have fundamentally altered the nature of our nation.
First, in a series of decisions — the first written by that notorious corporatist Lewis Powell (of “Powell Memo” fame) — Republicans on the Court have functionally legalized bribery of politicians and judges by both the morbidly rich and massive corporations.
This started with Powell’s 1978 Bellotti opinion, which opened the door (already cracked a bit) to the idea that corporations are not only “persons” under the Constitution, but, more radically, are entitled to the human rights the Framers wrote into the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments).
Using that rationale, Powell asserted that corporations, like rich people (from the Buckley decision that preceded Belottiby two years), are entitled to the First Amendment right of free speech. :{But he took it a radical step farther, ruling that because corporations don’t have mouths they can use to speak with, their use of money to spend supporting politicians or carpet-bombing advertising for a candidate or issue is free speech that can’t be tightly regulated.}:
SEEMS ODD, THEY CANNNOT SPEAK BUT THEY CAN WRITE A CHECK?
Citizens United, another all-Republican decision with Clarence Thomas the deciding vote (after taking millions in bribes), expanded that doctrine for both corporations and rich people, creating new “dark money” systems that wealthy donors and companies can use to hide their involvement in their efforts to get the political/legal/legislative outcomes they seek.
Last week the Republicans on the Court took even that a huge step farther, declaring that when companies or wealthy people give money to politicians in exchange for contracts, legislation, or other favors, as long as the cash is paid out after the deed is done it’s not a bribe but a simple “gratuity.”
So, first off, they’ve overthrown over 240 years of American law and legalized bribery.
Last week they also gutted the ability of federal regulatory agencies to protect average people, voters, employees, and even the environment from corporations that seek to exploit, pollute, or even engage in wage theft. This shifted power across the economic spectrum from a government elected by we the people to the CEOs and boards of directors of some of America’s most predatory and poisonous companies.
Finally, in the Trump immunity case, the Court ruled that presidents are immune from prosecution under criminal law, regardless of the crimes they commit, so long as they assert those crimes are done as part of their “official” responsibilities. And who decides what’s “official”? The six Republicans on the Supreme Court.
These actions — corporate personhood, money as speech, ending the Chevron deference to regulatory agencies, and giving the president life-and-death powers that historically have only been held by kings, shahs, mullahs, dictators, and popes — have fundamentally altered the nature of our nation.
It’s almost impossible to overstate the significance of this, or its consequences. We no longer live in America 1.0; this is a new America, one more closely resembling the old Confederacy, where wealthy families and giant companies make the rules, enforce the rules, and punish those who irritate or try to obstruct them.
In America 2.0, there is no right to vote; governors and secretaries of state can take away your vote without even telling you (although they still must go to court to take away your gun).
They can destroy any politician they choose by simply pouring enough cash into the campaign system (including dark, untraceable cash).
The president can now go much farther than Bush’s torturing and imprisoning innocent people in Gitmo without legal process: he can now shoot a person on Fifth Avenue in plain sight of the world and simply call it a necessary part of his job. Or impoverish or imprison you or me with the thinnest of legal “official” rationales.
We no longer live in America 1.0; this is a new America, one more closely resembling the old Confederacy, where wealthy families and giant companies make the rules, enforce the rules, and punish those who irritate or try to obstruct them.
America 2.0 is not a democracy; it’s an oligarchy, as I wrote about in The Hidden History of American Oligarchy. The South has finally — nearly — won the Civil War.
While it will be months or more likely years before all of these new powers the Republicans on the Court have given the president, rich people, and corporations begin to dawn on most Americans, they will, step-by-step transform this country into something more closely resembling Hungary or Russia than the democracies of Europe and Southeast Asia.
The only remedy at this late stage in this 50+ yearlong campaign to remake America is a massive revolt this fall at the ballot box, turning Congress — by huge majorities — over to Democrats while holding the White House.
If we fail at this, while there will be scattered pockets of resistance for years, it’ll be nearly impossible to reverse the course that America’s rightwing billionaires have set us on.
There has never been a more critical time in the history of our nation outside of the last time rich oligarchs tried to overthrow our democracy, the Civil War. Like then, the stakes are nothing less than the survival of a nation of, by, and for we the people.
---
{===}:
9 24 the lever podcast series
RR promo for pacific legal
trailer: Master Plan | Listen Now
ep 3 ken sTARR, BOPP AND ABRAMS BELOTTI AND BUCKLEY
---
precedent: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buckley_v._Valeo
http://www.enotes.com/buckley-v-valeo-reference/buckley-v-valeo
Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a federal law which set limits on campaign contributions, but ruled that spending money to influence elections is a form of constitutionally protected free speech, and struck down portions of the law. The court also ruled candidates can give unlimited amounts of money to their own campaigns.
Facts
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buckley_v._Valeo#Facts){nl}* 2 Decision{nl}* 3 Criticism{nl}* 4 See also{nl}* 5 Further reading{nl}* 6 External links|
Facts
In 1974, over the veto of President Gerald R. Ford, the Congress passed significant amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Actof 1971, creating the first comprehensive effort by the federal government to regulate campaigncontributionsand spending. The key parts of the amended law did the following
- limited contributions to candidates for federal office (2 USC §441a)
* required the disclosure of political contributions (2 USC §434),
- provided for the public financing of presidential elections (IRC Subtitle H),
- limited expenditures by candidates and associated committees,
- except for presidential candidates who accepted public funding (formerly 18 U.S.C. §608(c) (1)(C-F)),
- limited independent expenditures to $1000 (formerly 18 U.S.C. §608e),
- limited candidate expenditures from personal funds (formerly 18 U.S.C. §608a),
- created and fixed the method of appointing members to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §437c(a) (1)(A-C)).
A lawsuit was filed in the District Court for the D.C., on January 2, 1975, by Senator James L. Buckley of New York, former Senator, 1968 presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, and others. The suit was filed against Francis R. Valeo, the Secretary of the Senate and ex officio member of the FEC who represented the U.S. federal government. The court denied plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Thepetitionerssought for thedistrict courtto overturn the key provisions outlined above. They argued that the legislation was in violation of the1stand5th Amendmentrights tofreedom of expressionanddue process, respectively.
Decision:
In a lengthyper curiamdecision issued on January 30, 1976, the Court:{:{ sustained: the Act's limits on individual contributions, as well as the disclosure and reporting provisions and the public financing scheme. :{However, the limitations on campaign expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from personal funds were struck down.}:
The Court also held that the method for appointments to the Federal Election Commission was an unconstitutional violation of Separation of Powers.
...
==
wiki 1 25
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on campaign finance. A majority of justices held that, as provided by section 608 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, limits on election expenditures are unconstitutional. In a *per curiam* (by the Court) opinion, they ruled that expenditure limits contravene the First Amendment provision on freedom of speech because a restriction on spending for political communication necessarily reduces the quantity of expression.
It limited disclosure provisions and limited the Federal Election Commission's power. Justice Byron White dissented in part and wrote that Congress had legitimately recognized unlimited election spending "as a mortal danger against which effective preventive and curative steps must be taken".[1]
Buckley v. Valeo was extended by the U.S. Supreme Court in further cases, including in the five to four decision of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti in 1978[2] and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010.[3] The latter held that corporations may spend from their general treasuries during elections. In 2014, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission held that aggregate limits on political giving by an individual are unconstitutional.[4]
By some measures, Buckley is the longest opinion ever issued by the Supreme Court.[5]
Facts
Congress had made previous attempts to regulate campaign finance. It passed the Tillman Act of 1907, and then the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947. Neither was well enforced.
Then, in 1974, Congress passed significant amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), creating the most comprehensive effort by the federal government to date to regulate federal campaign contributions and spending. President Gerald Ford signed the bill into law on October 15. The key parts of the amended law did the following:
- limited contributions to candidates for federal office (2 USC §441a)
- required the disclosure of political contributions (2 USC §434),
- provided for the public financing of presidential elections (IRC Subtitle H),
- limited expenditures by candidates and associated committees,
- limited independent expenditures to $1,000 (formerly 18 U.S.C. §608e),
- limited candidate expenditures from personal funds (formerly 18 U.S.C. §608a),
- created and fixed the method of appointing members to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §437c(a) (1)(A–C)). Eight members of the commission were to be chosen as follows: the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives were ex officio members of the Commission without a right to vote; two members would be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendations of the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; two would be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives upon recommendations of the majority and minority leaders of the House, and two would be appointed by the President. The six voting members would then need to be confirmed by the majority of both Houses of Congress. In addition, there was a requirement that each of the three appointing authorities was forbidden to choose both of their appointees from the same political party.
The lawsuit was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia, on January 2, 1975, by U.S. Senator James L. Buckley (a member of the Conservative Party of New York State), former U.S. Senator and 1968 presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy (a Democrat from Minnesota), the New York Civil Liberties Union,[6] the American Conservative Union, the Peace & Freedom Party, the Libertarian Party, and numerous other plaintiffs. The named defendant in the caption was Francis R. Valeo, the Secretary of the Senate, an ex officio member of the FEC who represented the U.S. federal government. The trial court denied plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals and finally to the Supreme Court.
The plaintiffs argued that the legislation violated the 1st and 5th Amendment rights to freedom of expression and due process, respectively.
Judgment
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that several key provisions of the Campaign Finance Act, § 608(a), which limited expenditure by political campaigns, are unconstitutional and contrary to the First Amendment. The major holdings were as follows:
- The Court upheld limits on contributions to candidates.
- The Court upheld limitations on volunteers' incidental expenses.
- The Court upheld the aggregate limit on an individual's total contributions to all candidates and committees in a calendar year.
- The Court struck down limits on expenditures by candidates.
- The Court struck down limits on independent expenditures (i.e., expenditures by other groups or individuals than candidates and political parties).
- The Court upheld mandatory disclosure and reporting provisions, but it narrowed the types of speech to which they could apply.
- The Court upheld a system of voluntary government funding of campaigns, including limits on spending by candidates who choose to accept government subsidies.
- The Court struck down the system by which members of Congress directly appointed Federal Election Commission commissioners.
The Court's opinion begins by stating certain "General Principles", and then dealing with individual parts of the law in turn.
General principles
- First, the Court cited the importance of the First Amendment issues at stake: "The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.'" The Court stated that these issues include "political association as well as political expression."
- The Court rejected the idea that limits on campaign contributions and spending merely limited conduct: "[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to ... reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." The opinion cited New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and it noted that sending a telegram to a public official—a clearly protected activity—costs money.
- Further, even if considered "conduct", the Court found that "it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged 'conduct' of giving or spending money 'arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful.'"
- The restrictions were not justified under the "times, places, and manner" clause giving the government the authority to regulate elections: The restrictions were "direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties."
- The Court affirmed a First Amendment interest in spending money to facilitate campaign speech, writing, "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Further, the law's "$1,000 ceiling on spending 'relative to a clearly identified candidate,' would appear to exclude all citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the institutional press from any significant use of the most effective modes of communication." (citations omitted).
- However, "limitation[s] upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication", because such persons or groups are free to communicate directly with voters. Nevertheless, "[g]iven the important role of contributions in financing political campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy."
- "The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge on protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate."
- Finally, the Court concluded this section by stating, "In sum, although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions."
Contribution limits
- The Court held that restrictions on "large campaign contributions" are justified by the state's interest in "the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office." The Court further defined "corruption" to mean "large contributions ... given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders."
- The Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that all "contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with 'proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements.'"
- Thus the Court upheld the limits on contributions to candidates and their campaign committees, and to parties and political action committees, in the Act.
Expenditure limits
- The Court first reiterated that "[t]he Act's expenditure ceilings impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech." It reviewed the sweeping scope of the law, noting, "The plain effect of [the Act] is to prohibit all individuals, who are neither candidates nor owners of institutional press facilities, and all groups, except political parties and campaign organizations, from voicing their views 'relative to a clearly identified candidate' through means that entail aggregate expenditures of more than $1,000 during a calendar year. The provision, for example, would make it a federal criminal offense for a person or association to place a single one-quarter page advertisement 'relative to a clearly identified candidate' in a major metropolitan newspaper."
- The Court held that the "key operative language of the provision ... [—]"any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate"—was unconstitutionally vague, for it "fails to clearly mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech, unless other portions of [the Act] make sufficiently explicit the range of expenditures covered by the limitation. The section prohibits 'any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures ... advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds, $1,000.' (Emphasis added.) This context clearly permits, if indeed it does not require, the phrase "relative to" a candidate to be read to mean 'advocating the election or defeat of' a candidate." The Court elaborated in a footnote that "[t]his construction would restrict the application of [the law] to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.'"
- Even after narrowing the scope of the provision, however, the Court found that limits on expenditures are unconstitutional. "We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify s 608(e)(1)'s ceiling on independent expenditures... First, assuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions, Sec. 608(e)(1) does not provide an answer that sufficiently relates to the elimination of those dangers. Unlike the contribution limitations' total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to candidates, Sec. 608(e)(1) prevents only some large expenditures. So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his views. The exacting interpretation of the statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert improper influence upon a candidate or office-holder."
- "Second, quite apart from the shortcomings ... in preventing any abuses generated by large independent expenditures, the independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions ... The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. Rather than preventing circumvention of the contribution limitations, Sec. 608(e)(1) severely restricts all independent advocacy despite its substantially diminished potential for abuse."
- The Court rejected the notion that a "governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates imposed by Sec. 608(e)(1)'s expenditure ceiling ... [T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was designed 'to secure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,"' and '"to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."'"
- Thus, the Court struck down limits on both candidate and independent spending as unconstitutional.
Reporting and disclosure requirements
- The Court recognized that reporting and disclosure requirements infringe on First Amendment rights. "[W]e have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment."
- However, the Court held that the government has a vital interest in "provid[ing] the electorate with information 'as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate' in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office", a vital interest in allowing "voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches." These interests are a result of the fact that "the sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office." Further, "disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." Finally, "recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations described above."
- However, the Court again found the statute's reach, as written, to be unconstitutionally overbroad. It thus ruled that the Act's disclosure requirements apply to "individuals and groups that are not candidates or political committees only in the following circumstances: (1) when they make contributions earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political committee, and (2) when they make expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate."
- MAGIC WORDS
Public funding of campaigns
- The Court ruled that the government can directly subsidize political campaigns, but that it cannot require candidates to forego private fundraising if they choose the subsidy instead.
- The Court held that the government can condition receipt of the campaign subsidy on a candidate's voluntary agreement to limit his or her total spending.
Make-up of FEC
- The Court held that the method for appointments to the Federal Election Commission was an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers.[7] The Court opined that these powers could properly be exercised by an "Officer of the United States" (validly appointed under Article II, Section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution) but held that the Commissioners could not exercise this significant authority because they were not "appointed". Id. at 137. Burger and Rehnquist agreed that limits on expenditure are unconstitutional, but dissented otherwise, stating that they would have held much larger parts of the Act to be unconstitutional.
Dissents
Justice White (above) would have upheld the law's limits on expenditures and contributions.
Although Justice Douglas took part in oral arguments, his resignation intervened and he cast no official vote in the case. Thus, eight justices decided the case. The opinion was a per curiam opinion, that is, not authored by a single justice, but an opinion for the Court. Several justices dissented from portions of the opinion.
**Justice White would have upheld all the restrictions on both contributions and expenditures, striking down only the FEC's appointment process. He said the following:[8]
Concededly, neither the limitations on contributions nor those on expenditures directly or indirectly purport to control the content of political speech by candidates or by their supporters or detractors. What the Act regulates is giving and spending money, acts that have First Amendment significance not because they are themselves communicative with respect to the qualifications of the candidate, but because money may be used to defray the expenses of speaking or otherwise communicating about the merits or demerits of federal candidates for election.
The act of giving money to political candidates, however, may have illegal or other undesirable consequences: it may be used to secure the express or tacit understanding that the giver will enjoy political favor if the candidate is elected. Both Congress and this Court's cases have recognized this as a mortal danger against which effective preventive and curative steps must be taken.
[...]
I also disagree with the Court's judgment that § 608(a), which limits the amount of money that a candidate or his family may spend on his campaign, violates the Constitution. Although it is true that this provision does not promote any interest in preventing the corruption of candidates, the provision does, nevertheless, serve salutary purposes related to the integrity of federal campaigns. By limiting the importance of personal wealth, § 608(a) helps to assure that only individuals with a modicum of support from others will be viable candidates. This in turn would tend to discourage any notion that the outcome of elections is primarily a function of money. Similarly, § 608(a) tends to equalize access to the political arena, encouraging the less wealthy, unable to bankroll their own campaigns, to run for political office.
Since the contribution and expenditure limitations are neutral as to the content of speech and are not motivated by fear of the consequences of the political speech of particular candidates or of political speech in general, this case depends on whether the nonspeech interests of the Federal Government in regulating the use of money in political campaigns are sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that the limitations visit upon the First Amendment interests of candidates and their supporters.
Justice Marshall dissented on the point of limiting personal contributions and expenditures by a candidate to his or her own campaign – he would have upheld that provision, which was stricken by the Court.[9]
One of the points on which all Members of the Court agree is that money is essential for effective communication in a political campaign. It would appear to follow that the candidate with a substantial personal fortune at his disposal is off to a significant "headstart." Of course, the less wealthy candidate can potentially overcome the disparity in resources through contributions from others. But ability to generate contributions may itself depend upon a showing of a financial base for the campaign or some demonstration of preexisting support, which, in turn, is facilitated by expenditures of substantial personal sums. Thus, the wealthy candidate's immediate access to a substantial personal fortune may give him an initial advantage that his less wealthy opponent can never overcome. And even if the advantage can be overcome, the perception that personal wealth wins elections may not only discourage potential candidates without significant personal wealth from entering the political arena, but also undermine public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process.
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the application of the public funding provisions to minor parties, believing that it was unconstitutional as applied to them.
Justice Blackmun would have held that contribution limits are unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Burger would have held that contribution limits are unconstitutional, that the government financing provisions are unconstitutional, and that disclosure of small contributions to campaigns is unconstitutional.
Justice Stevens arrived on the Court after argument so he did not participate in the decision. However, he said later that he 'always thought that Byron [White] got it right'. Stevens would go on to write the dissent in Citizens United and called for a constitutional amendment to overturn the Court's campaign finance decisions.[10]
See also
- List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 424
- Bowman v United Kingdom [1998] ECHR 4,[11] (1998) 26 EHRR 1
- Harper v Canada (AG) [2004] SCR 827
===
https://theintercept.com/2019/12/06/kamala-harris-bloomberg-billionaire-buckley-valeo-supreme-court}:}:
no lnx
SUPREME COURT CASE THAT MADE MICHAEL BLOOMBERG’S CAMPAIGN POSSIBLE — AND DOOMED KAMALA HARRIS
Jon Schwarz
December 6 2019,
DEMOCRATIC SEN. KAMALA HARRIS of California suspended her presidential campaign on Tuesday. Why? Because, she said, she did not “have the financial resources we need to continue. I’m not a billionaire. I can’t fund my own campaign.”
Meanwhile, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who definitely is a billionaire, has spent at least $57 million of his own money since he jumped into the race on November 24. Harris, by contrast, raised $36 million as of her last campaign filing in October. Of that, she’d spent almost $26 million since she announced her campaign last January 21.
The divergence in the fates of the two candidates can be traced back to a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of campaign finance law. But the case involved is not Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, from 2010. It’s a far less famous one: Buckley v. Valeo, from 1976. The decision opened the door for billionaires — and, more generally, the ultra-rich — to spend as much as they want on their own political campaigns.
The divergence in the fates of Harris and Bloomberg can be traced back to a Supreme Court decision — not from Citizens United in 2010, but Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.
One of the main forces behind the case was a young Republican lawyer named John Bolton, later to become President Donald Trump’s national security adviser for a time. In Bolton’s memoir, he proudly states that “Everyone knew the decision in Buckley v. Valeo could determine … the future shape of American politics.” Bolton was right — and his long-ago efforts continue to bear fruit today.
No Limits
Watergate was, among other things, a scandal about money in politics. President Richard Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign had accepted bribes, including $200,000 from the chairman of the board of McDonald’s in return for permission from the federal government to raise the price of their Quarter Pounder cheeseburger. (You can read about this here; it’s #21 in the bill of particulars supporting the articles of impeachment against Nixon.)
Soon after Nixon resigned in 1974, Congress responded with significant amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act. This included a new limit of $50,000 per calendar year on what presidential candidates could spend of their own money on their campaign. Adjusting for inflation, that’s about $275,000 today.
Just two years later, however, the Supreme Court struck that limit down in the Buckley case. Those running for political office could now spend any amount of their own fortune they wanted. In fact, the court stated, it could be good for the wealthy to self-fund runs for office, because “the use of personal funds reduces the candidate’s dependence on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse.”
The result of the case is a presidential field where billionaires can hang on seemingly forever without batting an eye and other competitors must strain to keep up by raising funds the old fashioned way: through regular, limited donations and by getting billionaires to give to their dark-money groups.
Kamala Can’t Compare
Kamala Harris is quite rich. Forbes estimates the net worth of her and her husband at $6 million, putting them in the top 2 percent of U.S. households. But in 2016, the campaigns of Hillary Clinton and Trump raised $564 million and $333 million, respectively. As Harris said, she can’t fund that by herself.
Bloomberg’s $57 million in ad buys in the 11 days since he announced are already more than twice as much as all Harris’s reported expenditures.
She also can’t get it funded by one super-wealthy supporter. This isn’t because she’s unpopular among billionaires — just the opposite, in fact. Harris has received donations from 46 billionaires and their spouses, more than any other candidate. But while the Supreme Court struck down limits on how much any politician could spend of their own money, it simultaneously upheld limits on donations to candidates from others. The maximum anyone can give to a presidential campaign this cycle is $2,800 for the primaries, and $2,800 for the general election. Through these comparative drips and drabs, Harris raised her relatively paltry $36 million.
By contrast, Bloomberg has an estimated net worth of $54 billion — 9,000 times that of Harris. His $57 million in ad buys in the 11 days since he announced his candidacy are already more than twice as much as all Harris’s reported expenditures.
Viewed another way, Bloomberg so far has spent about $5 million per day. CNBC estimates that Bloomberg may pour $500 million into his campaign by the February 3 Iowa caucuses (Bloomberg plans to skip Iowa as well as the New Hampshire primary). That would be almost 2,000 times more than he could have spent if the Buckley decision had upheld the annual $275,000 limit on a candidate’s donations to his or her own campaign.
Billionaires Everywhere
Bloomberg isn’t the first billionaire to fund his own presidential campaign; he’s not even the only billionaire running in the Democratic primaries. As of October, former hedge fund manager Tom Steyer had given $48 million to Tom Steyer for President. His campaign shows no sign of slowing down, even as the most recent national poll showed him to be the choice of zero percent of voters.
Then there’s obviously Trump, who did not totally self-fund his 2016 campaign. He provided $66 million, or one-fifth, of its total cash, but his campaign likely would never have gotten off the ground if he’d been forced to abide by the pre-Buckley laws.
Money isn’t everything. It seems likely that the main result of Bloomberg’s candidacy will be several fancy new beach homes for his consultants. Mitt Romney spent $45 million of his fortune on his 2008 presidential bid, but lost the Republican nomination to the late Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz. (Romney subsequently spent just $52,000 of his own money in 2012 and did become the nominee.) Steve Forbes expended about $100 million on two humiliating races for president in 1996 and 2000. Even the most successful super-rich candidate before Trump, Ross Perot, came up short.
Nonetheless, there’s no question that Harris would still be in the race if she were a billionaire and, conversely, that the political landscape would look far different if this aspect of the Buckley decision had gone the other way.
==
wiki
Significance
Although the decision upheld restrictions on the size of campaign contributions, because it struck down limits on expenditures some argue that this precedent allows those with great wealth to effectively drown out the speech of average citizens. Among those criticizing the decision on this line was philosopher John Rawls, who wrote that the Court's decision "runs the risk of endorsing the view that fair representation is representation according to the amount of influence effectively exerted."[5]
From the other side, some disagree vigorously with Buckley, arguing that it sustained limits on campaign contributions which are protected by the First Amendment as free speech. This position was advanced by Chief Justice Warren Burger whose dissenting opinion argued that individual contributions and expenditures are protected speech acts.
In recent years, Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, who were not on the Court at the time of Buckley, have unsuccessfully argued for overturning Buckley on these grounds.
Despite criticism ofBuckley from both sides, the case remains the starting point for judicial analysis of the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions, as in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.
:{In 2008, the Court further restricted attempts to equalize spending in elections for the U.S. House and Senate when it struck down the "Millionaires Amendment" in FEC v. Davis (originally Davis v. FEC). That case overturned legislation that allowed candidates to accept larger contributions if their opponent spent substantially from personal wealth. In 2010, the Court overturned* Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) and part ofMcConnell v. Federal Election Commission in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
In Citizens United, the Court, following Buckley's holding providing more expansive First Amendment protections for independent expenditures made on a candidate's behalf, held that Congress could not ban independent expenditures by corporations.
:{The next year, in Arizona Free Enterprise PAC v. Bennett (2011) the Court further restricted state authority to regulate campaign finance restrictions, striking down provisions of Arizona's public financing system that gave extra government money to candidates who faced high spending opponents or high levels of independent expenditures.
---
IRATE
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
In Buckley, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),which limits campaign contributions, but also ruled that spending money to influence elections is constitutionally protected free speech, and struck down portions of the law (e.g., candidates can give unlimited amounts of money to their own campaigns).
Issue: FECA set up rules in the wake of the Watergate era electoral corruption, limiting and requiring disclosure of campaign contributions and spending, creating the Federal Election Commission (FEC), and establishing an optional system of public financing for presidential elections. Are these a violation of First Amendment free speech protections?
Rule: First Amendment freedom of speech (expression) and Fifth Amendment due process of law.}:
Application: In 1975, former NY Senator James Buckley, presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy and others sued Francis Valeo, the Secretary of the Senate and FEC.
The Court upheld the $1,000 limit because it prevents "the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions” and explicitly rejected that contribution limits violate First Amendment free speech rights.
The Court stated "To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential officeholders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined."
Moreover, such limits ". . . serve the basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion."
However, the majority ruled that spending money to influence elections is a form of constitutionally protected free speech, and that candidates can give unlimited amounts of money to their own campaigns since they could not be corrupted by spending their own money and that equalizing candidates’ resources was not sufficient to override the candidate’s free speech right.
Transformation: Buckley provided some loopholes and precedents that were expanded in later cases, virtually eliminating it. Notably, Citizens United references Buckley several times, but vastly expands its protections on "money as speech."
Moreover, it allowed rich individuals and corporations to give large amounts of money to 501(c)(4) SuperPACs, which do not have to say where it came from.
Effect: Negative attack ads, some even containing factual misrepresentations, are allowed.
Because of corruption, the financial system became deregulated, leading to both the 2007 financial collapse and the largest wealth inequality since the 1929 stock market crash. Very wealthy candidates can fund their own campaigns, and several candidates are able to stay in the race thanks to a single billionaire.
Fictional Representational Story: I'm Valerie Valenzuela. After I joined the PTA to raise
money to keep music in the schools my three children attend, I realized the problems were
substantial. I served two terms on the school board and as a replacement appointment on the
county board of supervisors. I've been an effective advocate for my constituents, an innovative
problem solver, and adept at building coalitions. Even so, I was surprised when my party asked
me to run for state assembly. To get our local and regional projects approved, I have built
strong relationships at the state capitol and a good working knowledge of how it works.
Running against a former dot.com executive with no public service experience, and an
incumbent with significant corporate and PAC funding, would mean endless ads attacking my
character. The only way I could survive this would be to sell out to special interest donors.
Written by: Patrick McKercher Disclaimer: For educational purpose only.
---==
brennan ctr long
AM PROSPECT 2014
When it comes to campaign finance, the Roberts Court and the American public have settled into a grim routine. Every few years, the Court-usually in the voice of Chief Justice John Roberts-strikes down another restriction on campaign expenditures or contributions. With each decision, a disappointed majority of Americans puzzle over the notion, apparently embraced by the Court’s conservatives, that “money equals speech.”
That idea is usually attributed to Buckley v. Valeo,the landmark 1976 case in which the Supreme Court for the first time considered the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions. But the Court never said money isspeech. The Buckleydecision was more complicated and subtle than the “money equals speech” slogan for which it’s misremembered. It was also very much a product of its time. Understanding why sheds light on how campaign finance law could be rescued in the digital age.
Buckleywas decided in the shadow of Watergate, which was in many ways a campaign finance scandal. The 1972 election and its ugly aftermath revealed how easy it had been for the re-election campaign of President Richard Nixon to solicit and extort corporate money for its slush fund in exchange for promises of favorable treatment. Much of this was flatly illegal, but some of it was in a gray area of nonetheless unsavory influence-peddling.
Suddenly, there was widespread recognition that existing campaign law allowed undue influence for wealthy corporations and individuals. In response, Congress in 1974 passed a number of strong amendments to the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act. The 1974 amendments placed hard limits on expenditures and contributions, strengthened disclosure requirements, created a public finance system for federal elections, and established the Federal Election Commission to enforce the law.
In Buckley, the Court upheld the limits on direct contributions to political campaigns but struck down the limits on expenditures by campaigns or supporters.
The Court held that although contribution limits did restrict the First Amendment right of free association, that limitation was relatively small.
Individuals could still express their support for candidates, and the effect on overall political speech would be minor since the vast majority of campaign funds already came from small donations. On the other hand, the Court found that the government’s interest in preventing “the reality or appearance of corruption in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions” was important enough to outweigh the limited First Amendment harm.
Expenditure limits were a different story. It wasn’t that money was itself speech. Rather, the Court reasoned that because all campaign speech costs money, limiting the amount candidates and supporters could spend would necessarily limit the overall quantity of political speech. That imposed a much more significant burden than the limitation on contributions.
“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached,” the Court wrote. “This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.” The government’s interest in preventing corruption or its appearance-which the Court found to be less applicable to limits on spending, as opposed to contributions-couldn’t outweigh the First Amendment burden.
The Court wasn’t wrong in its factual premise: capping the total amount people could spend on campaign advocacy would have indeed limited the overall quantity of communication. In 1976, a candidate or activist who wanted to get his message out had no choice but to spend money. Print, television, or radio ads; speeches and rallies; direct mailing, pamphlets, even lawn signs: all these forms of communication cost money, and the cost increased with the number of possible listeners.
In Buckley, the Court made much of the fact, highlighted in the appellants’ brief, that the individual spending cap under FECA was far below the cost of a quarter-page ad in the New York Timesor Washington Post.Its fear was that spending limits would keep certain ideas from being expressed, or certain speakers from expressing them, thus preventing the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate it saw the First Amendment as protecting.