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Void Judgment

See also: Kangaroo Court : Jurisdiction : Subject Matter Jurisdiction : Personal Jurisdiction

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Void Judgments
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Notice of Void Judgment Traffic
If you do a plea bargain:

Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of. the subject matter, or of the parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due. process, Fed. Rules Civ.

Additionally, a judgment is a void judgment if fraud was perpetrated upon the court.

If a court is without subject matter jurisdiction, it doesn’t matter if you take a plea in abeyance, it’s still a void judgment.

Inferior courts have no jurisdiction over common law issues, if we bring up common law issues it puts a defect in the case.

The law of void judgements and decisions. The Supreme Court on void orders; A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections. The validity of a judgment may be affect by a failure to give a constitutionally due process and opportunity to be heard. Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503 (1875). See also Prather vs. Loyd . Limitations inherent in due process and equal protection of law extend to judicial as well as political branches of the government so that a judgment may not be rendered in violation of those constitutional limitations and guarantees. Hanson vs Denckla

“A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect: Lubben v Selective Service system Local Bd. No. 27 ; Hobbs v U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 45 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980)

“Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked directly but may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed.” City of Lufkin v. McVicker This means you don’t have to appeal it, you can attack it and bring up the issue at any time or place.

“Void order may be attacked, either directly or collaterally, at any time” In re Estate of Steinfield, 630 N.E. 2d 801, certiorari denied, See also Steinfeld v. Hoddic, 513 U.S. 809, (Ill. 1994)

“A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of enforcement in any manner or to any degree.” Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)

“Not every action by any judge is in exercise of his judicial function. It is not a judicial function for a Judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the Courthouse, when a judge acts as a Trespasser of the Law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject matter jurisdiction and The Judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect.” Yates vs. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. III. 1962)

The Courts have decreed, that Want of Jurisdiction makes:

“… all acts of judges, magistrates, U.S. Marshals sheriffs, local police, all void and not just voidable.” Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F2d 504

Fraud

Why is there fraud?

”It is a fundamental right of a party to have a neutral and detached judge preside over the judicial proceedings.” Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62, 93 S. Ct. 0, 83, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1972); Tumey v Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 5209, 47 S. Ct. 437, 440, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)

“My opinion is and long has been that the mayor and aldermen of a city corporation, or the president and directors of a bank, or the president and directors of a railroad company and of other similar corporations, are the true parties that sue and are sued as trustees and representatives of the constantly changing stockholders…A corporation, therefore, being not a natural person, but a mere creature of the mind, invisible and intangible, cannot be a citizen of a state, or of the United States, and cannot fall within the terms or the power of the above mentioned article, and can therefore neither plead nor be impleaded in the courts of the United States.” Rundel v Delaware & Raritan Canal Company 55 U.S. (1852)

For any court case to have a plaintiff like;

STATE OF ARKANSAS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES, etc. (any corporation) – is a FRAUD.

Bills of attainder are fraud.

Attacking a Void Judgment

Judgments may be attacked at any time a defect has been realized, even in subsequent proceedings. All proceedings based on a void judgment are likewise void.

“And a remedy may be had by a writ of prohibition”; 3 Bla. Com. 12

The judgment of conviction pronounced by court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. Johnson v. Lewis, 144 U.S. 653

See also: Rule 60

A judgment that is "void" may be attacked by motion under rule 60(b), regardless of whether the motion is made within one year or is made later[1], by an independent suit in equity if for some reason the motion under 60(b) would not provide adequate relief[2]; or by denying the validity of the judgment when it is relied on in a subsequent action.

Many decisions characterize a judgment that has been procured by fraud as "void," though more often such a judgment is characterized as "voidable." The distinction has never been very clear, and the purpose of making it not consistently articulated. One purpose of the distinction is to give effect to the concept that the person seeking to nullify the judgment should ordinarily do so by going into the court that rendered the judgment rather than attempting to do so in an independent suit. Hence, it has been said that a "void" judgment can be attacked in an independent suit but a "voidable" one must be attacked by a 60(b) type of motion. But if the proposition is accepted that the applicant for relief should always be required to use a 60(b) motion unless it would not provide adequate relief[3], then the distinction is unnecessary.

At any rate, a judgment rendered by a court that lacks jurisdiction is universally characterized as "void."[4] Traditional doctrine had been that such a judgment is a legal nullity. In modern decisions, however, the problem is recognized as being more complicated[5]. That is, there may be situations in which a court lacking jurisdiction has rendered a judgment that should nevertheless be given effect. In this regard, it is important to distinguish between jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Jurisdiction over the person may be lacking because the process employed did not give adequate notice to the person against whom judgment was rendered[6], or because that court lacked the required contacts with the case[7], or because, although jurisdiction was secured over a party purporting to represent the person, the representation was fundamentally inadequate[8]. Unless the party somehow learned of the action and made an appearance to contest the exercise of jurisdiction over his person[9], the judgment is void on Due Process grounds in all these circumstances. Many decisions also hold a judgment void where the party obtained actual notice from a court that had sufficient contacts with the case but the process was not in technical compliance with the rules governing mechanics of service[10]. Inasmuch as the party in that situation had actual notice and could have raised his technical objection by special appearance, however, it is not at all clear why the judgment should be treated as void, particularly if the statute of limitations has run on the claim by the time the judgment is attacked.

The problem of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is more complicated. The old vintage rule was that a judgment of a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction was a legal nullity[11]. This rule was subject to various saving qualifications, e.g., that jurisdiction was presumed if the rendering court was one of general jurisdiction, that evidence outside the record was inadmissible to prove lack of jurisdiction, etc. But it had the effect of making judgments potentially vulnerable if any substantial question of subject matter jurisdiction was presented.

The modern view, not yet fully accepted, takes a different approach, at least where the lack of jurisdiction was not entirely obvious. In this approach the critical questions are, first, whether the party against whom the judgment was rendered had opportunity to do so. The questions present themselves in three contexts: where the question of jurisdiction was actually raised in the original action; where the party charged with the judgment appeared in the action, thereby having an opportunity to challenge jurisdiction, but did not raise the jurisdictional question; and where the judgment was rendered by default.

If the question of jurisdiction was raised and adjudicated in the original action, the modern view is that the judgment is not subject to subsequent attack, on the premise that a court has an auxiliary jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction[12]. Although some authorities suggest that this rule is inapplicable to courts of limited jurisdiction, there seems no reason why it should not be. An erroneous determination of the jurisdictional question can be remedied by review through appeal or extraordinary writ, and failure to pursue such a remedy should foreclose subsequent disputation of the issue.

If the party charged with the judgment appeared in the action, there is almost equally strong reason for holding that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may not be raised by subsequent attack on the judgment[13]. By hypothesis the party had opportunity to raise the jurisdictional defense. There is little reason for saying it should survive the judgment when defenses on the merits would not. Moreover, the party who obtained the judgment may be assumed to suppose it is valid and justifiably guide his subsequent conduct accordingly. Nevertheless, many authorities still adhere to the view that the jurisdictional question can be subsequently raised, by motion under Rule 60(b) or its analogues, by separate suit in equtiy, or by attacking the judgment when it is relied upon by an opponent. However, most of the cases in which such an attack has been allowed have involved no intervening reliance interests and either a judgment of a tribunal of limited jurisdiction or grounds of attack having Constitutional implications[14]. Even in these situations the tendency sems to be to sustain the judgment except when its enforcement would affect the government itself or the administration of a scheme of remedies having significance beyond the immediate parties.

When the judgment has been entered by default, the judgment is usually regarded as open to attack if rendered without subject matter jurisdiction. When the default was entered without Constitutionally adequate notice, the judgment is in any event infirm on Due Process grounds[14]. If notice was adequate, however, it can be said that the party had opportunity to raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction and should be foreclosed from subsequent opportunity to do so. On the other hand, default judgments are in any case disfavored[16], the more so if the rendering court apparently lacked the authority it purported to exercise. The better rule would seem to be to hold such a judgment void, except when it has given rise to substantial interests of reliance of which the person against whom it was rendered was aware[17]. Binding the person to the judgment in the latter situation can be justified not so much on a principle of res judicata as upon one of equitable estoppel[18], for a judgment is not the only basis upon which one's rights may be treated as finally concluded.

  1. See Fed. R. Civ. P 60(B)(4).
  2. See Sec. 13.15 supra.
  3. See Sec. 13.15 at note 2 supra.
  4. See 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure sec. 2862.
  5. See Boskey and Brauncher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 1006 (1940).
  6. E.g., Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 77 S. Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed. 2d 178 (1956). See also United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y 1970) (injunction by the United States against procuring judgments on the basis of "sewer service"); see Tuerkheimer, Service of Process in New Youk City: A Proposed End to Unregulated Criminality, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1972).
  7. E.g., Hanson v. Dencla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958).
  8. See Restatement of Judgments Second sec. 86(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
  9. If he made an appearance and contested jurisdiction, the determination of that issue is res judicata. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. Ed. 1244 (1931); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1963).
  10. See, e.g., Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of America, 491 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1974).
  11. See Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 49 (1961).
  12. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S. Ct. 242, 11 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1963).
  13. See generally Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 Minn. L. Rev. 491 (1967). See Restatement of Judgments sec. 10.
  14. Ibid. See, e.g., United States v. Unites States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S. Ct. 653, 84 L. Ed. 894 (1940); Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974).
  15. See notes 6-8 supra.
  16. See sec. 13.14 text following note 5 supra.
  17. See Restatement of Judgments sec. 117.
  18. See sec. 11.31 supra.

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