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McCarthy, Joe huac

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promoted to 2ndary on anti-commie socialist lang big in trump 2020

uber1

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nixon pinochet joe mc dod nothing wrong alt rt troll provocateur

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mma 6 24

Former Trump adviser Steve Bannon and others in MAGA media have recently praised disgraced Sen. Joe McCarthy and his blacklists, a tactic that Project 2025 partner organization the American Accountability Foundation is attempting to bring to the White House should Donald Trump win in November.

According to The Associated Press, AAF is planning to create and publicly post a list of “100 names of government workers to a website this summer to show a potential new administration who might be … ripe for scrutiny, reclassifications, reassignments or firings,” with a focus on “those in senior executive positions who could put up roadblocks to Trump’s plans for tighter borders and more deportations.”

The plan is reportedly underwritten by a $100,000 grant from conservative think tank The Heritage Foundation as part of Project 2025, its far-reaching and extreme effort to provide policy and personnel recommendations for a potential second Trump administration. One of Project 2025’s top priorities is the implementation of “Schedule F,” a scheme to remove job protections from federal workers by reclassifying career staffers as political appointees — a direct attack on federal unions that could be used to fire civil servants deemed insufficiently pro-Trump.

AAF is one of more than 100 conservative organizations on Project 2025’s advisory board, and its initiative — synergistically dubbed Project Sovereignty 2025 — is the latest broadside against the 2.2 million people who work for the federal government. The AP article notes that the group’s list of what Heritage referred to as “anti-American bad actors” echoes the blacklist era of McCarthy, the disgraced anti-communist crusader whose name became synonymous with one of the most repressive periods in U.S. history.

Notably, MAGA media have been attempting to rehabilitate McCarthy’s illiberal tactics and goals using rhetoric that often dovetails with justifications for AAF’s project.

In a December,

vid]

Project 2025’s Schedule F and AAF’s proposed blacklist are clear, direct descendants of the literal McCarthyism that MAGA media figures are so quick to praise. The McCarthy era saw massive purges of left-wing federal employees as part of the Cold War’s rightward shift in national politics, halting the potential for American social democracy and helping to plant the seeds for the neoliberal turn of the 1970s and the ensuing rise in inequality that accompanied it.

McCarthy and fellow anti-communists like FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover also directed their oppressive tactics toward gay people — and those suspected or accused of being gay — who worked for the federal government during a period known as the Lavender Scare. McCarthy “directly linked homosexuality and Communism,” depicting gay people working in government as a national security threat. Historians estimate that between 5,000 and 10,000 federal workers were forced to resign during this period, often behind closed doors for fear of their gay identity — real or perceived — becoming public.

McCarthyist attacks on workers extended far beyond federal government employees. The broader Red Scare was disastrous for unions and the working class, hollowing out organized labor’s power and setting the stage for the wage stagnation and exploding wealth inequality that have defined the United States since the early 1980s. As leading historian of McCarthyism Ellen Schrecker writes, “labor's declining percentage of the workforce” had its “roots in that grim moment."

MAGA media’s celebration of that “grim moment” for workers further highlights the superficial rhetoric of right-wing populism.

Now, Project 2025 has taken up the mantle of targeting the federal workforce — and the working class at large— with effects that could be just as long lasting. As Roberts told Bannon in June, “What we're doing here is building not just for 2025, Steve, but for the next century in the United States."

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knee jerk algo?

https://www.mediamatters.org/steve-bannon/steve-bannon-says-mccarthy-hearings-should-have-gone-further-and-were-extremely

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https://www.mediamatters.org/steve-bannon/steve-bannon-sen-joe-mccarthy-one-greatest-americans-history-country

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCarthyism#Blacklists

...the film industry, more than 300 actors, authors, and directors were denied work in the U.S. through the unofficial Hollywood blacklist. Blacklists were at work throughout the entertainment industry, in universities and schools at all levels, in the legal profession, and in many other fields. A port-security program initiated by the Coast Guard shortly after the start of the Korean War required a review of every maritime worker who loaded or worked aboard any American ship, regardless of cargo or destination. As with other loyalty-security reviews of McCarthyism, the identities of any accusers and even the nature of any accusations were typically kept secret from the accused. Nearly 3,000 seamen and longshoremen lost their jobs due to this program alone.[85]

Some of the notable people who were blacklisted or suffered some other persecution during McCarthyism include:

In 1953, Robert K. Murray, a young professor of history at Pennsylvania State University who had served as an intelligence officer in World War II, was revising his dissertation on the Red Scare of 1919–20 for publication until Little, Brown and Company decided that "under the circumstances ... it wasn't wise for them to bring this book out." He learned that investigators were questioning his colleagues and relatives. The University of Minnesota press published his volume, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920, in 1955.[134]

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joe mccarthy blacklist witch academic professor faculty college ggl srch 920

"Political Tests for Professors: Academic Freedom during the McCarthy Years"

October 7, 1999

Ellen Schrecker

loyalty oath 50th anniv

https://www.lib.berkeley.edu/uchistory/archives_exhibits/loyaltyoath/schrecker.html

...Both in the academy and elsewhere, it took several years for the witch hunt to develop. From Harvard to Hollywood, the process followed the same trajectory -- from initial tolerance for dissent and hesitations about violating people's civil liberties to the conviction that Communists were so uniquely dangerous that their rights could be ignored. And from a narrow definition of the communist menace to a broader one.

In almost every instance, the process of eliminating communism from the nation's public and private institutions followed a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the alleged subversives were identified, usually by an official body like HUAC or the FBI. In the second stage, they were punished, usually by the imposition of economic sanctions.

Certainly compared to what happened in Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia, the political repression of the McCarthy period was tame indeed. Only two people -- Julius and Ethel Rosenberg -- were killed and only a few hundred went to prison or were deported. Most of the victims simply lost their jobs. But mild as it was, McCarthyism worked. Not only did it help destroy whatever influence communism had within American society, but it silenced the rest of the left as well. For over a decade, at the height of the Cold War, meaningful dissent had been all but eliminated.

The bifurcated structure of the purge contributed to its success. It enabled the moderate and often liberal men and women who handled the second stage to participate in the process of political repression without having to admit it. By identifying McCarthyism -- which they no doubt sincerely deplored -- only with the first stage of identification, as exemplified in HUAC hearings or the bizarre antics of Senator McCarthy, they were able to distance themselves from it while at the same time imposing the second-stage economic sanctions that ensured its effectiveness.

The academic community was as deeply involved in this process as any other segment of American society. In their willingness to punish the men and women who were fingered by the anticommunist professionals during the first stage of the operation, the nation's educational leaders differed little from the movie moguls who imposed the Hollywood blacklist or the state and federal bureaucrats who fired people on the word of anonymous informers.

Academic freedom was no protection. As we shall see, it proved to be a highly malleable concept that could be manipulated to justify the exclusion of alleged Communists from the nation's campuses. To be sure, it took several years for the academic community to redefine academic freedom so that Communists and other political undesirables could be exempted from its protection. The controversy over the California loyalty oath was an important turning point in that process. It helped the nation's colleges and universities reach a consensus about the boundaries of political acceptability at a time when they felt under heavy pressure from outside politicians and others.

Communists had never been welcome on America's campuses. Even during the height of the Popular Front in the 1930s and 40s, when the Communist party embraced the New Deal and espoused a near-liberal agenda, the students and faculty members who gravitated into its orbit often got into trouble with their institutions. They tended to be the most energetic political activists on campus -- the folks who were always organizing demonstrations and handing out leaflets.

Today, after the fall of the Soviet Union, it's hard to understand why anyone, especially anyone within the academic community, would have been attracted to the Communist party. But in the 1930s and 40s, communism was the most dynamic movement on the left. And an entire generation of students and teachers joined up. Some were intellectuals who found Marxism compelling. Others were idealistic souls who viewed the party as the most effective vehicle for achieving their political goals. They were attracted by its support for the labor movement and racial equality and by its energetic opposition to fascism and war. Though many of them later deplored its rigidity and unquestioning support for Stalin's Russia, because the Communist Party gave its academic adherents more autonomy than its other members, they did not feel themselves unnecessarily constrained by its dictates. They were radicals, not robots -- and, in any event, by the time the academy fully enlisted in the anticommunist crusade, most of them had long since severed their formal connections with the party.

It took a few years for the academic community to reach the consensus that Communists did not belong on the nation's campuses. The intensifying Cold War and the Truman administration's adoption of a loyalty-security program for federal employees legitimized the process, while outside politicians supplied the motivation, especially at the more vulnerable public colleges and universities.

The first steps involved banning left-wing student groups and Communist speakers. By the middle of 1947, most schools that had previously allowed such activities were cracking down. They either imposed outright bans or else placed such onerous restrictions on allegedly communist organizations and speakers that they were forced off the campus. Few faculty members objected.

There was more opposition to firing Communist professors. Asked to formulate a policy on the matter, the AAUP's ruling council endorsed the 1947 Report of its Committee A on academic freedom that reiterated the organization's traditional stance. Professors might legitimately incur dismissal if they advocated the forcible overthrow of the American government or misused their classrooms, but as long as the Communist party was legal, "affiliation with that party in and of itself should not be regarded as a justifiable reason for exclusion from the academic profession." Though the AAUP repeatedly endorsed that statement throughout the late 1940s and fifties, other academics began to have second thoughts.

A combination of outside political pressures along with the increasing demonization of domestic communism induced the academic community to countenance the dismissal of Communist professors. The events that precipitated this violation of academic freedom occurred in Seattle, where the state legislature's Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by a card-carrying anticommunist named Albert Canwell, investigated the University of Washington in the summer of 1948. Insisting that the campus was a hotbed of subversion, Canwell subpoenaed eleven faculty members.

Like most of the other investigations of the period, the hearings featured a mélange of professional witnesses, local informers, and alleged Communists. Canwell's agenda was twofold: first, to educate the public about the evils of communism by having expert witnesses describe the party's activities and then, to identify its members. Unless a witness refused to answer its questions, the committee did not punish these alleged communists. The University of Washington did that.

Both the university's Board of Regents and its president Raymond B. Allen had promised to cooperate with Canwell. And so, a few weeks after the hearing ended, the university brought charges against six tenured professors -- three who had refused to tell Canwell if they were Communists and three who had admitted past membership but would not name names. Two of the recalcitrants, Joseph Butterworth and Herbert Phillips, then revealed that they were in the party, while the third, Ralph Gundlach, refused even to cooperate with the faculty committee that was handling the case.

Significantly, in making its argument that Communists were unfit to teach, the administration presented no evidence that the professors had deformed their scholarship or indoctrinated their students. Instead, it relied on some of the nation's top professional witnesses to explain how the Communist party -- with its demands for secrecy and obedience -- disqualified its members from academic positions.

That presentation was convincing. Though the committee voted to retain everyone but Gundlach, most of its members would have fired Butterworth and Phillips had they believed that the university's regulations allowed it. President Allen ignored that ruling and recommended that the two Communists go as well. Though he admitted that Butterworth and Phillips were competent scholars who had never abused their classrooms, he nonetheless explained that, by virtue of their party membership, they were, in his words, "incompetent, intellectually dishonest, and derelict in their duty to find and teach the truth." The Regents agreed and fired the three men in January 1949.

As the rest of the academy began to debate the ramifications of what had happened in Seattle, it was clear that the academic establishment would no longer allow Communists to teach. The intellectuals and administrators who elaborated on that policy justified it by invoking the demonized portrayal of communism that had by then become widespread. Since the party did, in fact, expect its members to follow the current line on major issues and conceal their political affiliation, the image of Communists as conspiratorial robots was plausible, even if it bore little resemblance to what academic Communists actually thought and did.

In a rather stunning display of the intellectual conformity that they were accusing the party of imposing, many leading educators ignored the perfectly acceptable research and teaching of the Communist professors on their campuses and claimed that because party members, were, by definition, unable "to speak and think independently," they could not be objective scholars and were thus, in the words of Harvard president James Bryant Conant "out of bounds as members of the teaching profession."

It was, however, one thing to make a policy statement, as almost every leading educator did, and something else to implement it. And it seems clear that the academic community, though willing to eliminate Communists, would have been quite happy to abide by a "don't ask, don't tell" scenario. Such, alas, was not to be.Outside political pressures forced the nation's educators to put their money where their mouth was -- and then escalated the inquisition by expanding the definition of politically undesirable professors from Communist party members to other kinds of dissenters. The California loyalty oath controversy illustrates how this process operated.

When the Regents adopted the anticommunist disclaimer in the spring of 1949, they did so because they wanted to show that the university was on top of the communist issue. Since the university had enacted a ban on communist teachers in 1940 and had imposed an oath to uphold the Constitution in 1942, it was clear that the new disclaimer was an essentially symbolic gesture. Loyalty oaths, though hardly efficacious, were a cheap and convenient way to crack down on political dissenters. By the mid-50s, most states had some kind of anticommunist oath or disclaimer on the books. Teachers were the most common targets, not only because of their allegedly sensitive duties, but also because education was one of the few functions that state legislatures could control.

Other states copied Washington and mounted investigations or else, like New York, passed laws requiring schools and universities to purge their faculties of reds. Though ubiquitous, most of these measures had only a minor impact on the academic community, in large part because few states devoted much in the way of resources to their enforcement.

California, as we know, was different, for the controversy over the loyalty oath dominated the nation's leading system of public higher education for nearly three years and drew nationwide attention. I'm not going to discuss the controversy here in any detail, since the other panelists will, I am sure, do that far more effectively than I can. But I do want to point out that though the struggle showed that most of California's faculty members supported the anticommunist policy the oath was designed to enforce, that struggle also revealed the limits of the Cold War political repression.

It showed that imposing sanctions on people who were not accused of communism remained beyond the pale. The non-signers, though temporarily forced off the California faculty, were not forced out of the academy. Their fate contrasts sharply with that of the three professors fired from the University of Washington who never returned to academe. In a sense these two cases defined the parameters of McCarthyism within the academic community: Communists were expelled, people who had no connection with communism could remain.

But most of the publicly identified academic victims of the McCarthy era were neither principled liberals like the California non-signers nor card-carrying members of the Communist party like Joseph Butterworth and Herbert Phillips. Instead they were former Communists who had refused to name names before a congressional investigating committee. Removing these people from their teaching positions forced the academic community once again to revise its political tests for employability.

Though a few academics had been questioned during the late 1940s, congressional investigators were more interested in Communists in government and the entertainment industry.As a result, HUAC and the other congressional investigating committees did not turn to the academy until late in 1952. By that point, they had refined their procedures and it was clear what subpoenaed witnesses could expect. If they were to avoid a prison sentence for contempt of Congress and keep their jobs as well, they would have to cooperate with the committees and name names. Because the Supreme Court would not extend the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and association to a witness's refusal to answer questions about communism, people who did not want to become informers had to rely on the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. No one, the Court maintained, had to give testimony that could be used in a criminal case against him or herself. Invoking the Fifth, therefore, enabled witnesses to avoid prosecution for contempt of Congress, but it looked bad. Because it was known that the party expected its members to use the Fifth, the investigators claimed that a witness's refusal to testify was, in Senator McCarthy's words, "the most positive proof obtainable that the witness is a Communist."

Many of those witnesses, however, were not Communists. They were ex-Communists who would have been quite willing to answer most of the committees' questions if they did not have to name names. But because of what came to be called the "waiver" doctrine, they would risk a contempt citation if they talked about themselves and then refused to talk about other people. The Supreme Court had ruled that once witnesses answered any questions about themselves, they had waived their privilege against self-incrimination. The committees recognized their witnesses' dilemma and sought to heighten their difficulties by asking especially embarrassing questions. Scientists, for example, were asked if they had been involved with espionage, and everyone, of course, was asked about membership in the Communist party.

But embarrassment was hardly the worst problem Fifth Amendment witnesses faced, most of them also lost their jobs. By the early fifties, most public and private employers automatically fired anybody who took the Fifth before a congressional investigating committee. College professors, however, were protected by tenure and it was clearly incompatible with traditional notions of academic freedom to dismiss them simply because they had invoked their constitutional rights.....[quite long]

More and more academics are being forced to think like business men, to consider the bottom line, treat students as customers, and incorporate technology in order to remain competitive.

Yet for all the talk about "accountability," the corporate influence within academe manifests itself mainly as carrots, rather than sticks. The outcome, however, is often the same. As David Hollinger pointed out in a paper he delivered here a few months ago, the organized business community intervened quite consciously to divert the nation's intellectual discourse away from what it considered to be a dangerously radical academic profession. But it didn't press to fire lefties. Instead it established conservative think tanks and subsidized pundits to amplify the pro-business messages that emerged from those venues. It also began to fund new academic programs and professorships to give those messages greater scholarly cachet.

And while the corporate trough expanded, the public one contracted, also in keeping with the business community's larger agenda of privatization. Support for public higher education has eroded drastically. We've seen rising numbers of adjunct and part-time instructors, larger classes, higher demands for productivity. At the same time, we're experiencing a diminution of American intellectual life, which for the past two generations has been largely centered in the nation's colleges and universities. Not only has it become increasingly more difficult for serious scholars who are not in economically lucrative areas of inquiry to find adequate support for their work, but, because of bottom-line pressures within the publishing world, it has also become harder for them to disseminate it. These difficulties are enhanced by the fact that the public no longer respects the work that academics do. Whatever we may think about multiculturalism, poststructuralism, and the turn toward theory within contemporary scholarship, it is quite clear that the hostility with which the mainstream media treated the culture wars during the early 90s delegitimized much recent scholarship within the humanities -- and by extension the rest of the university as well.

As a result, the academic community faces the new millennium increasingly marginalized and on the defensive in a society so permeated by corporate values that the university's traditional mission is simply irrelevant. It doesn't pay, why bother with it? Or, as my own students tell me, "I'd like to take more history courses, but they won't help me get a job."

Tenured faculty members today still have plenty of academic freedom in the traditional sense. They can propound whatever unconventional and radical ideas they want. It's just that nobody seems to be listening.

If we are to preserve academic freedom, real academic freedom, we need to reassert the value and the relevance of what we do. We need to convince the American public -- and ourselves -- that ideas matter and that universities have a mission that transcends the marketplace. In a world where it seems that only money talks, we need to hear other voices. We need to hear voices that assert the value of social responsibility, of community, of something beyond unfettered individualism. However we define the common good -- and I leave that for another convocation -- it is clear that the academy remains one of the few places within our so-called civil society where a discussion about that common good can take place. But the space for such a discussion is shrinking fast.

In the 1950s the academic community needed to protect its individual members from pressures for political conformity, today it needs to protect its own institutional autonomy from pressures for commercialization. It didn't do a great job then, let's hope it does a better one now.

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Ellen Wolf Schrecker is a professor of history at Yeshiva University, and, since 1998, editor of , the magazine of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). She has written several books on academic freedom and the McCarthy era, including (1986) and most recently, (1998). She received her B.A. from Radcliffe College and her M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Harvard University.

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aha: 620 part of GOP long game is to take out dem up and comers (trending in webodec is mostly gop?]

eg (also clinton, gray davis) turnipseed jumper cables?

ivy meerpol the nation 6/20

EG: How do you think Cohn was affected by the homophobic and anti-Semitic environment of Washington, D.C.?

IM: Do you know the story of Lester Hunt? He was a senator from Wyoming. Around the time that Cohn was in Washington, Hunt was a very popular Democrat. The Republicans, including McCarthy, were always trying to figure out how to get him out of the way, because he was powerful, beloved, and very progressive. At one point, Hunt’s son was arrested for propositioning a male undercover police officer for sex, and this was discovered by McCarthy and some other senators. They confronted Hunt, saying they’d go public with this story if Hunt didn’t pull out of his race for reelection. Hunt tried to stay strong and fight back, but they threatened again, and rather than face that kind of humiliation and the humiliation of his son, Hunt committed suicide.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lester_C._Hunt

Lester Callaway Hunt, Sr. (July 8, 1892 – June 19, 1954), was a Democratic politician anddentistfrom the state of Wyoming. Hunt was the first to be elected to two consecutive terms as Wyoming's governor, serving as its 19th Governor from January 4, 1943, to January 3, 1949. In 1948, he was elected by an overwhelming margin to the U.S. Senate, and began his term on January 3, 1949.

Hunt supported a number of federal social programs and advocated for federal support of low-cost health and dental insurance policies. He also supported a variety of programs proposed by the Eisenhower administration following the Republican landslide in the 1952 elections, including the abolition of racial segregation in the District of Columbia, and the expansion of Social Security.

An outspoken opponent of Senator Joseph McCarthy's anti-Communist campaign, Hunt challenged McCarthy and his senatorial allies by championing a proposed law restricting Congressional immunity and allowing individuals to sue members of Congress for slanderous statements.

In June 1953, Hunt's son was arrested in Washington, D.C., on charges of soliciting sex from an undercover male police officer (homosexual acts were prohibited by law at the time). Several Republican senators, including McCarthy, threatened Hunt with prosecution of his son and wide publication of the event unless he abandoned plans to run for re-election and resigned immediately, which Hunt refused to do. His son was convicted and fined on October 6, 1953.

On April 15, 1954, Hunt announced his intention to run for re-election. He changed his mind, however, after McCarthy renewed the threat to use his son's arrest against him. On June 19, 1954, Hunt committed suicide in his Senate office; the suicide dealt a serious blow to McCarthy's image and was one of the factors that led to his censure by the Senate later in 1954.[1]

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https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/senator-who-stood-joseph-mccarthy-when-no-one-else-would-180970279/

The Senator Who Stood Up to Joseph McCarthy When No One Else Would
Margaret Chase Smith was the first woman to serve both the House and the Senate and always defended her values, even when it meant opposing her party

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supported RMN CA sen run.

The liberal icon Robert Kennedy also had close ties to the anti-communist witchhunter Joseph McCarthy, who hired Kennedy as assistant counsel to his Senate committee, the counterpart to HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee). Robert Kennedy even made McCarthy godfather to his first child.

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https://www.c-span.org/video/?459039-4/jesse-jarnow-tim-mohr-imani-perry-music-social-movements

March 22, 2019

Jesse Jarnow, Tim Mohr and Imani Perry on Music and Social Movements

Authors Jesse Jarnow (Wasn’t That a Time: The Weavers, the Blacklist, and the Battle for the Soul of America), Tim Mohr (Burning Down the Haus: Punk Rock, Revolution, and the Fall of the Berlin Wall), and Imani Perry(May We Forever Stand: A History of the Black National Anthem) talked about music and social movements in the United States.

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