Surprise Inspection Marshall V Barlow

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

Argued:January 9, 1978

Decided:May 23, 1978

Syllabus

U.S. Supreme Court

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.

No. 76-1143

Argued January 9, 1978

Decided May 23, 1978

436 U.S. 307

Syllabus

Appellee brought this action to obtain injunctive relief against a warrantless inspection of its business premises pursuant to § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), which empowers agents of the Secretary of Labor to search the work area of any employment facility within OSHA's jurisdiction for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations. A three-judge District Court ruled in appellee's favor, concluding, in reliance on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 528-529, and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 387 U. S. 543, that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for the type of search involved and that the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional.

Held: The inspection without a warrant or its equivalent pursuant to § 8(a) of OSHA violated the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 436 U. S. 311-325.

(a) The rule that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable applies to commercial premises as well as homes. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, and See v. Seattle, supra. Pp. 436 U. S. 311-313.

(b) Though an exception to the search warrant requirement has been recognized for "closely regulated" industries "long subject to close supervision and inspection," Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72, 397 U. S. 74, 397 U. S. 77, that exception does not apply simply because the business is in interstate commerce. Pp. 436 U. S. 313-314.

(c) Nor does an employer's necessary utilization of employees in his operation mean that he has opened areas where the employees alone are permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents. Pp. 436 U. S. 314-315.

(d) Insofar as experience to date indicates, requiring warrants to make OSHA inspections will impose no serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts. The advantages of surprise through the opportunity of inspecting without prior notice will not be lost if, after entry to an inspector is refused, an ex parte warrant can be obtained, facilitating an inspector's reappearance at the premises without further notice; and appellant Secretary's entitlement to a warrant will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions on the premises

Page 436 U. S. 308

violate OSHA, but merely that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment. Pp. 436 U. S. 315-321.

(e) Requiring a warrant for OSHA inspections does not mean that, as a practical matter, warrantless search provisions in other regulatory statutes are unconstitutional, as the reasonableness of those provisions depends upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. Pp. 436 U. S. 321-322.

424 F. Supp. 437, affirmed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 436 U. S. 325. BRENNAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Page 436 U. S. 309

Opinions

Opinions & Dissents

Hear Opinion Announcement - May 23, 1978

U.S. Supreme Court

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.

No. 76-1143

Argued January 9, 1978

Decided May 23, 1978

436 U.S. 307

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Syllabus

Appellee brought this action to obtain injunctive relief against a warrantless inspection of its business premises pursuant to § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), which empowers agents of the Secretary of Labor to search the work area of any employment facility within OSHA's jurisdiction for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations. A three-judge District Court ruled in appellee's favor, concluding, in reliance on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 528-529, and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 387 U. S. 543, that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for the type of search involved and that the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional.

Held: The inspection without a warrant or its equivalent pursuant to § 8(a) of OSHA violated the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 436 U. S. 311-325.

Page 436 U. S. 308

violate OSHA, but merely that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment. Pp. 436 U. S. 315-321.

424 F. Supp. 437, affirmed.

Page 436 U. S. 309

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA or Act) [Footnote 1] empowers agent of the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to search the work area of any employment facility within the Act's jurisdiction. The purpose of the search is to inspect for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations. No search warrant or other process is expressly required under the Act.

On the morning of September 11, 1975, an OSHA inspector entered the customer service area of Barlow's, Inc., an electrical and plumbing installation business located in Pocatello, Idaho. The president and general manager, Ferrol G. "Bill" Barlow, was on hand; and the OSHA inspector, after showing his credentials, [Footnote 2] informed Mr. Barlow that he wished to conduct

Page 436 U. S. 310

a search of the working areas of the business. Mr. Barlow inquired whether any complaint had been received about his company. The inspector answered no, but that Barlow's, Inc., had simply turned up in the agency's selection process. The inspector again asked to enter the nonpublic area of the business; Mr. Barlow's response was to inquire whether the inspector had a search warrant. The inspector had none. Thereupon, Mr. Barlow refused the inspector admission to the employee area of his business. He said he was relying on his rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Three months later, the Secretary petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Idaho to issue an order compelling Mr. Barlow to admit the inspector. [Footnote 3] The requested order was issued on December 30, 1975, and was presented to Mr. Barlow on January 5, 1976. Mr. Barlow again refused admission, and he sought his own injunctive relief against the warrantless searches assertedly permitted by OSHA. A three-judge court was convened. On December 30, 1976, it ruled in Mr. Barlow's favor. 424 F. Supp. 437. Concluding that Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 528-529 (1967), and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 387 U. S. 543 (1967), controlled this case, the court held that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for the type of search involved here [Footnote 4] and that the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional. An injunction against searches or inspections pursuant to § 8(a) was entered. The Secretary appealed, challenging the judgment, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 430 U.S. 964.

Page 436 U. S. 311

IThe Secretary urges that warrantless inspections to enforce OSHA are reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, he relies on § 8(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a), which authorizes inspection of business premises without a warrant and which the Secretary urges represents a congressional construction of the Fourth Amendment that the courts should not reject. Regrettably, we are unable to agree.

The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the American colonial experience. An important forerunner of the first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Virginia Bill of Rights, specifically opposed "general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed." [Footnote 5] The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution. [Footnote 6] The particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists. [Footnote 7]

"[T]he Fourth Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the colonists' experience with the writs of assistance . . . [that] granted sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods."

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 433 U. S. 7-8 (1977).

Page 436 U. S. 312

....

comm dr greg c 2024

let’s Wish Corporate Constitutional Rights a Very Unhappy Birthday

The actual “birth” of corporate constitutional rights, often referred to as “corporate personhood,” wasn’t Citizens United; it dates to May 10, 1886 in the Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company ruling.

GREG COLERIDGE JENNIE SPANOS

May 10, 2024Common Dreams

The origins of the current political influence by weapons corporations to profit from perpetual wars, occupations, and arm sales; the fossil fuel industry to continue burning oil, gas, and coal in the face of irrefutable evidence that it’s overheating the planet; and insurance and pharmaceutical corporations to prevent the enactment of Medicare for All aren’t any law, regulation, or executive decision. Rather, they’re Supreme Court rulings that define corporate entities as legal “persons” with many of the same rights as human beings under the U.S. Constitution.

This reality didn’t begin with the Citizens United v. FEC 2010 decision, contrary to common belief. Citizens United simply expanded corporate First Amendment “free speech rights” to directly donate (or, more accurately, invest) in elections that originated with the First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti case in 1978

The actual “birth” of corporate constitutional rights, often referred to as “corporate personhood,” dates to May 10, 1886 in the Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company ruling. The summary of the tax case, called the “headnotes”—not the actual decision—granted the railroad corporation with “equal protection rights” under the 14th Amendment.

All the good work by individuals and organizations to legalize protections of individuals, communities, and nature and hold corporate entities accountable for their harms will never be systemically achieved as long as we continue to constitutionalize corporate rights as equivalent to the rights of human persons.

The 14th Amendment granted citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the U.S, including former enslaved human beings. Although it was not intended to apply to corporations, they hijacked the Amendment for their political and economic benefit. As former Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black declared, “Of the cases in this court in which the 14th Amendment was applied during the first 50 years after its adoption, less than one half of 1% invoked it in protection of the negro race, and more than 50% asked that its benefits be extended to corporations.”

Human persons are grossly unequal to corporations. Bankruptcy, tax, and criminal laws are more favorable to “corporate persons” than human beings. Corporations can write off certain legal expenses; real people can’t. Laws increasingly allow corporations to design arbitration rules that force employees and customers to settle disputes over unsafe products, consumer fraud, employment discrimination, nonpayment of wages, and other instances of corporate malfeasance. And unlike human persons with limited lifespans and physical mobility, corporations can live forever and legally and quickly move assets between physical locations to evade accountability.

The Santa Clara corporate perversion of the 14th Amendment profoundly shifted how corporations were defined. Until then, state legislatures granted individuals a corporate charter, or license, to conduct business. The charter established specific standards for a limited period, after which in many instances the business became public. The charter’s terms were privileges, not rights. If the business violated the charter’s terms, it was revoked by state legislatures or courts, which frequently occurred, and the company was dissolved. The same occurred following the shift from individually granted charters to the creation of state laws addressing entire categories of corporations, such as banks, railroads, and canals.

Santa Clararepresented a tectonic antidemocratic shift in the authority to define corporate entities—from the state legislative arena to federal courts, specifically the U.S. Supreme Court, which was beyond the direct reach of citizens and elected officials. It unleashed business corporations to massively plunder, profit, and protect themselves from democratic accountability, resulting in the declining protection of people, communities, and the ability to ensure a livable natural world.

Corporate First Amendment political “free speech” rights to invest money in elections, including the Citizens Uniteddecision, is the most recent constitutional descendant of the Santa Claraprecedent. There are many others.

√ First Amendment Right Not to Speak, Negative Speech Rights and Commercial Speech Rights

The Supreme Court overturned a California state law allowing a ratepayer advocacy group to enclose information in the utility corporations’ billing envelopes calling for regulations that would lower utility rates and a New York law that would save energy by banning the promotion of the use of electricity by a utility corporation.

A court also overturned a Vermont law mandating the disclosure of a dangerous synthetic growth hormone on dairy products.These court-invented rights have been used by corporate entities to defy the legitimate rights of people to know factual information; the authority of government to protect the health, safety, and welfare of residents; the provision of basic health needs of employees; and the ability to hold corporations publicly accountable.

VS TWITTER FILES BS?

√ Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Rights

The Supreme Court overturned laws mandating routine surprise inspections of corporate property, claiming the “right of the people to be secure in their persons [and] houses... against unreasonable searches and seizures” applied to corporations. These judicial decisions treat corporate entities like human persons, even though the Fourth Amendment’s original language applies only to human beings, their homes, and personal effects. Governmental attempts to protect the public from the dangers stemming from commercial activities like food contamination, drug impurities, automobile defects, and environmental hazards are thwarted by removing surprise inspections, thus allowing businesses to hide, alter, or disguise dangerous conditions.

link: Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. :: 436 U.S. 307 (1978) :: Justia US Supreme Court Center

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

Argued:January 9, 1978

Decided:May 23, 1978

BOEING DOOR 737 MAX?

√ Fifth Amendment Takings Rights

The Supreme Court has struck down regulatory laws protecting homeowners and workers from corporations, claiming the laws are a “taking of property without just compensation.” This includes a Pennsylvania law regulating the mining of coal beneath homes to prevent their sinking and a California law allowing union organizers from having access to agricultural employees at worksites under certain conditions.

Public laws to protect residents, communities, and the natural world should supersede legally mandated compensation of lost present and future corporate profits. This is especially urgent as it becomes more evident that to tackle climate change, fossil fuels must be kept in the ground. This may simply not be possible as long as corporations can assert Fifth Amendment “takings rights.”

Corporate constitutional rights transcend Citizens United and corporate First Amendment political “free speech” rights. All the good work by individuals and organizations to legalize protections of individuals, communities, and nature and hold corporate entities accountable for their harms will never be systemically achieved as long as we continue to constitutionalize corporate rights as equivalent to the rights of human persons.

The We the People Amendment (HJR54) is the only current proposal that seeks the abolition of all corporate constitutional rights. More support is needed to add co-sponsors. The amendment, however, will never achieve sufficient power to make change until we decolonize our minds from believing that corporate rule and rights are inevitable and irreversible. A good place to start, especially on this day, is to internalize the statement: “Slavery is the legal fiction that a person is property. Corporate personhood is the legal fiction that a property is a person.”

It’s time we quickly end the life of constitutional corporate persons.

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