Rehnquist wm justice

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merri ok

bush v gore win (dtr worked for jeb?]

mysterious 180? on KASKY?

like powell nixon appt but went the other way

surprise inspection osha 4th amend

HE OPPOSED 1886 CASE?

kasky:

But something caught in the Court’s throat. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, with six of his colleagues, decided that the Court had made a big mistake when it granted a writ of certiorari, the declaration that the case was legitimate and appropriate for the Court to hear.

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John G. Roberts, Jr. was confirmed September 29, 2005, by the U.S. Senate as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in a 78-22 vote. Roberts replaces Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who died on September 3, 2005. [1]

President George W. Bush nominated Roberts to be Supreme Court Chief Justice on September 5, 2005.

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https://truthout.org/articles/unequal-protection-protecting-corporate-liars/

the first direct shot across the bow of the doctrine of a corporation’s “right to lie” by using its “personhood” to claim First Amendment “free speech” rights came in April 1998, when Mark Kasky, a California political activist, noticed that Nike was engaged in what he considered to be a deceptive greenwashing campaign. Kasky had long been a runner and wore Nike shoes, so he was particularly distressed when he saw Nike’s communications director, Lee Weinstein, publish a letter in the San Francisco Examiner in December 1997 that said, in part, “Consider that Nike established the sporting goods industry’s first code of conduct to ensure our workers know and can exercise their rights.”2

This letter was just a small part, it turned out, of a national campaign by Nike to convince the American public that it was making sure that its contractors and subcontractors were treating their employees in Asia well. The year before, Steve Miller, Nike’s sports marketing director, pledged in a letter to athletic program directors and presidents of U.S. universities that Nike’s manufac turers complied with “government regulations regarding minimum wage and overtime as well as occupational health and safety, environmental regulations, workers’ insurance, and equal opportunity provisions.”3

What Nike wasn’t mentioning, but which was leaked to the press in 1997, was a 1996 audit of one of the company’s overseas factories (this one in Vietnam) by Ernst & Young. The audit, which Nike had commissioned but then tried to keep secret, documented how workers in the Vietnamese factory were exposed to cancer-causing solvents like acetone and toluene in ways that would have been flatly illegal in the United States and were not protected from deafening levels of noise; it also raised a series of questions on other workplace issues. As Mother Jones documented in a February 2001 article (“Greenwashing on Trial” by Josh Richman), “another Nike-funded study found evidence of physical and verbal abuse and sexual harassment at nine of its contract factories in Indonesia.”4

kasky was outraged that Nike held itself out as the model corporate citizen. He told filmmaker Lori Cheatle (for her movie This Land Is Your Land, which also features Naomi Klein, Thomas Frank, Jim Hightower, and me, along with seven others):“The Nike code of conduct stated that they maintained the highest standards of health, worker safety, and compensation, and they used that to market their products. So I felt very upset when I realized that a lot of the representations they were making might not be true.”

He and a lot of people in California were buying Nike products under false assumptions or misrepresentations, so he called an attorney and decided to take the company to court.

Kasky went to attorney Alan Caplan (of the “Joe Camel” cigarette lawsuit fame), and together they invoked a rather unique California law that allowed individuals to behave as if they were the state’s attorney general and sue companies for fraudulent or other illegal practices, producing what would ultimately become the Supreme Court case Kasky v. Nike.

[vid 404 The Daily Take: Why Fox News has the Right to Lie to Us]

in 1999 the case was dismissed by San Francisco Superior Court Judge David Garcia, who suggested that Nike’s right to lie—to “free speech”—was protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Kasky and Caplan appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, where, in March 2000, that court ruled against Kasky again, with Justice Douglas Swager arguing that Nike was only promoting its products, as any company would, could, and should be able to do in a world of corporate “persons” endowed with free-speech rights.

His comment specifically noted that Nike’s use of inaccurate letters to the editors in newspapers across America, letters telling untruths to university presidents, and other false statements to the press were “within the core area of expression protected by the First Amendment.”

Undeterred, Kasky carried his suit to the California Supreme Court, which ruled in May 2002 (by one vote, 4 to 3) that Nike had violated the California laws against unfair competition and false advertising. The Supreme Court justices didn’t, however, challenge the notion that First Amendment protections didn’t extend to commercial “speech” by corporations; instead they suggested that such rights should be limited to the commercial interests of the corporation and that the action of Nike in this case “bears only a tangential relation to commercial transactions.”

At that point Nike decided that, rather than pay the fine and change its business practices, it would take the case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where a very curious thing happened.

The Supreme Court typically gets more than ten thousand requests every year to hear cases. It has a small army of clerks and lawyers (usually including clerks for the justices—Samuel Alito chooses not to have his clerks participate—known as the “cert pool”)who filter through them to find the ones that have reasonable merit and which the justices may be interested in hearing. The Court as a whole then considers the thousand or so that survive the culling process, further reducing the caseload for the year to a number typically around one hundred total cases (it takes the votes of four justices to grant certiorari, allowing the case to be argued before the Court).

After the Court has gone through all this work to whittle down its case-load, each case comes before the justices in two ways. First, both parties to the case file their own legal briefs or arguments in writing.Second, interested parties—“friends” of either side (by virtue of association or concern for the issue behind the case)—file Friend of the Court, or amicus curiae, briefs, adding their voices to the arguments. Then the justices hear oral arguments, which these days are limited to thirty minutes for each side, after which each justice and his or her staff retire to their offices to consider the arguments, more carefully look over the amicus briefs, and correspond with other justices about each case.

Eventually—typically over a period of a few months—a consensus emerges or a vote is taken, and on each case the Court decides who wins or loses. The justices then write agreements or dissents with or from the majority opinion, and when all is ready for the public they announce their decision.

Except in the Kasky case.

The Court did agree to hear the case, in the 2003 session. The justices heard the oral arguments on June 26. They accepted the amicus briefs—including filings from companies that included ABC, Inc.; the American Society of Newspaper Editors; the Associated Press; Forbes, Inc.; Fox Entertainment Group; Gannett Company; the Hearst Corporation; the McClatchy Company; the National Association of Broadcasters; the National Broadcasting Company (NBC); National Public Radio, Inc.; the New York Times Company; Newsweek, Inc.; PR Newswire; the Seattle Times Company; Time, Inc.; Tribune Company; U.S. News & World Report; and the Washington Post Company—all agreeing with Nike.

ExxonMobil, Bank of America, and Microsoft filed their own three-company brief on behalf of Nike, and similar separate filings came from the National Association of Manufacturers, Pfizer, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, among others.

Even the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a brief defending Nike’s right to “free speech” as a “person” in America.The legal department of the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) filed a brief defending Nike’s “right to lie” (it is true that as persons we have a “right to lie” except in particular cases such as when under oath). Even the very liberal New York Times columnist Bob Herbert wrote an impassioned op-ed supporting Nike’s right to deceive the public. All three mistakenly believed that corporations had had First Amendment rights since 1886, and all three were strong advocates of the First Amendment. And the AFL-CIO, of course, was a corporation itself, albeit a unique nonprofit form of incorporation.

There was also a loud public debate on the issue. Citizen activist groups picketed the Supreme Court, decrying corporate personhood and the entire idea that constitutional protections like free speech should be granted to corporations instead of being the exclusive province of humans, while the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post (among others) ran shrill editorials warning of dire consequences for the future of capitalism and democracy if corporations weren’t finally and fully granted the constitutional right of free speech.

The Court then heard the oral arguments, in which Kasky’s lawyers, Alan Caplan and Philip Neumark, revisited the series of very specific lies that they asserted Nike had told the American public in their original lawsuit. They said that Nike:

In order to maintain and/or increase its sales, made misrepresentations by the use of false statements and/or material omissions of fact, including but not limited to the following:

(a) claims that workers who make NIKE products are protected from and not subjected to corporal punishment and/or sexual abuse;

(b) claims that NIKE products are made in accordance with applicable governmental laws and regulations governing wages and hours;

(c) claims that NIKE products are made in accordance with applicable laws and regulations governing health and safety conditions;

(d) claims that NIKE pays average line-workers double-the-minimum wage in Southeast Asia;

(e) claims that workers who produce NIKE products receive free meals and health care;

(f) claims that the GoodWorks International (Andrew Young) report proves that NIKE is doing a good job and “operating morally”; and

(g) claims that NIKE guarantees a “living wage” for all workers who make NIKE products.5

Nike, for its part, argued that when it hired former UN ambassador and Atlanta mayor Andrew Young to check them out, he found that everything was hunky dory: “Although some news organizations concluded that some allegations against Nike had merit, former United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young concluded in an independent review commissioned by Nike that the charges were largely false.”6

Further, Nike’s lawyers said that when the California Supreme Court concluded that it was okay for Marc Kasky to use the consumer protection laws to hold Nike accountable for what it said to the public, it was way too broad a use of the laws against fraud or deception in commerce. Nike’s lawyers wrote: “The California court’s conclusion that government may regulate all statements of fact by commercial entities that could influence consumers sweeps far too broadly…”

Nike’s lawyers also didn’t like the law in California that let an individual act as if he were the attorney general: “The private attorney general provisions of the UCL and FAL thus violate the First Amendment because they omit not only any requirement that the plaintiff have suffered harm, but also any other meaningful constraint on the ability of private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits…” which could impose a “crushing burden” on a multibillion-dollar corporation like Nike.

And, finally, calling implicitly on the doctrine that a corporation is a person protected by the Bill of Rights, Nike argued: “Even if petitioner’s [Nike’s] statements could be characterized as ‘commercial speech,’ the legal regime approved by the California Supreme Court violates the First Amendment.” In other words, “We’re a company, which is the same as a person, and so we have the First Amendment right to say whatever we want, just like anybody else. To say that we have to only say things that are accurate violates our First Amendment right of free speech.”

All of this was laid before the Court. There were multiple dimensions to the case, but at its heart was the issue of whether a corporate “person” had the same “right to lie,” guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as you and me. If I can tell my wife that she looks great in a dress that I really think is ugly (but know she loves), Nike had the right to tell Americans that it was treating its workers well (even though it wasn’t and knew it).

Remember that it was Rehnquist who, in the earlier First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti case (mentioned in chapter 1), had said that he disagreed with what he believed was the decision of the Supreme Court in 1886, that corporations were persons. And, interestingly, the attorneys who crafted the amicus brief on behalf of Marc Kasky took special pains to point out—with the hope that Rhenquist would read it and have a “EUREKA!” moment—that the Court had actually never created corporate personhood in 1886.

Quoting from the first edition of this very book, Kasky’s attorneys wrote directly to Rehnquist in their brief:

Indeed, the initial grant of “personhood” under the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations was, to a certain extent, a judicial mistake. Corporate person-hood is generally attributed to the Court’s decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), although the Court in that case specifically declined to address the issue. In Santa Clara County, Santa Clara County sued the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for failure to pay taxes, and the railroad presented the Court with six defenses, including the argument that corporations were persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because one of the other five defenses was successful, the Court had no occasion to decide the question of corporate personhood and specifically declined to do so:

If these [other] positions are tenable, there will be no occasion to consider the grave questions of constitutional law upon which the case was determined below; for, in that event, the judgment can be affirmed upon the ground that the assessment cannot properly be the basis of a judgment against the defendant.

As the judgment can be sustained upon this [other] ground, it is not necessary to consider any other questions raised by the pleadings and the facts found by the court.

Id. at 411, 416. Indeed, in a companion case, Justice Field in a concurring opinion lamented that the “tax cases from California” did not “decide the important constitutional questions involved.” County of San Bernardino v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 417, 422 (1886) (Field, J., concurring).

Nevertheless, it appears that the court reporter, J.C. Bancroft Davis, included a headnote stating, “The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See Thom Hartmann, Unequal Protection: The Rise of Corporate Dominance and the Theft of Human Rights 107 (2002) (quoting J.C. Bancroft Davis, 118 United States Reports: Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court at October Term 1885 and October Term 1886 394 (Banks & Brothers Publishers).7

In other places in the brief, its authors took special pains to point out how Santa Clara had been misinterpreted over the years. (One sentence, for example, begins, “Notwithstanding the mistaken ‘personification’ of corporations in Santa Clara, the Court’s subsequent rulings reveal that this Court has not consistently applied the implications…”)

Every step along the way helped telegraph to Rehnquist that his dislike of what he thought had been decided in 1886 in Santa Clara was a good gut instinct because he was right. Corporations aren’t persons, and the Court had not said they were in 1886!

Nobody knows what happened when this bombshell hit Rehnquist’s desk,as the Court is notoriously secretive. But something big happened because Rehnquist leapt into action—and that action was to decide not to decide the Kasky case. Inexplicably, astoundingly, and virtually without precedent, Rehnquist and most of his colleagues issued a very, very terse statement.

The single sentence the Court issued said only: “The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.”

In other words, “When we decided to listen to these arguments and look over this case, granting it legal certification before us, we screwed up. Therefore we’re tossing out the certification and going to pretend we never even heard this case or read its briefs.”

While this dismissal represented the thinking of the majority of the Court, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer were incensed. Breyer wrote: “In my view…the questions presented directly concern the freedom of Americans to speak about public matters in public debate, no jurisdictional rule prevents us from deciding those questions now, and delay itself may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of free speech without making the issue significantly easier to decide later on.”

But regardless of Breyer’s or O’Connor’s concern that the Court was kicking the can down the road, the case came to a halt, and Kasky and Nike settled out of court almost immediately when the California courts granted Kasky the legal right to access Nike’s internal files(known as a grant of discovery). The amount of money Nike paid Kasky’s lawyers to stop at that point and not pursue discovery, rather than legally riffle through Nike’s internal papers, was never disclosed, and Kasky, for his part, agreed with the decision to stop discovery when Nike made a seven-figure gift to an organization that worked to help sweatshop workers around the world.

The world was safe for corporate liars (although California’s citizens were still free to go after them in a limited fashion). Corporate personhood hadn’t been challenged. And the weird coalition of liberals (Bob Herbert and the ACLU) and conservatives (NBC, ABC, the Chamber of Commerce, and others) who worried that ending a corporation’s right to call on the First Amendment would be a disaster for America all breathed a sigh of relief.

Until 2010.

Notes:...

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ciarra torres s

Chapter 5 · This Politician Was Brought to You By . . . 101

2009 18 corps had 36% of all wealth 1.5Trill$; 18 corps had 500B$; J Powell sneaky in Bellotti protect speech not spkr, Rehnquist dissent; Memo;

Buckley Valeo (8 magic words) plus Bellotti--> CU

BCRA Bipart electioneering communications, upheld by McConnell but ~ 7 yrs later in 2010; Acting Solic gen'l Malcolm Stewart messed up saying applied to 500 pg book hypo; [Kagan walked back 2nd round] what CU did vs did not p 114; key change is allowed corp $ for indep expenditures [ 501c4?] and electioneering comm = pol ads; pretended to empower "disfavored assoc of cits" while rich ppl can spend as much as they want? 115 Justice JP Stevens passionate dissent " 115; later bk same opinion;Lessig 500% increase in Neg ads 117; depress turnout; ~ BO in 1st SOU ~, foreign $, Alito "not true" [russian $ yes jesse benton at least , rudy pals?]

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Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

Argued:January 9, 1978

Decided:May 23, 1978

Syllabus

U.S. Supreme Court

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.

No. 76-1143

Argued January 9, 1978

Decided May 23, 1978

436 U.S. 307

Syllabus

Appellee brought this action to obtain injunctive relief against a warrantless inspection of its business premises pursuant to § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), which empowers agents of the Secretary of Labor to search the work area of any employment facility within OSHA's jurisdiction for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations. A three-judge District Court ruled in appellee's favor, concluding, in reliance on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 387 U. S. 528-529, and See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541, 387 U. S. 543, that the Fourth Amendment required a warrant for the type of search involved and that the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional.

Held: The inspection without a warrant or its equivalent pursuant to § 8(a) of OSHA violated the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 436 U. S. 311-325.

(a) The rule that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable applies to commercial premises as well as homes. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, and See v. Seattle, supra. Pp. 436 U. S. 311-313.

(b) Though an exception to the search warrant requirement has been recognized for "closely regulated" industries "long subject to close supervision and inspection," Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72, 397 U. S. 74, 397 U. S. 77, that exception does not apply simply because the business is in interstate commerce. Pp. 436 U. S. 313-314.

(c) Nor does an employer's necessary utilization of employees in his operation mean that he has opened areas where the employees alone are permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of Government agents. Pp. 436 U. S. 314-315.

(d) Insofar as experience to date indicates, requiring warrants to make OSHA inspections will impose no serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts. The advantages of surprise through the opportunity of inspecting without prior notice will not be lost if, after entry to an inspector is refused, an ex parte warrant can be obtained, facilitating an inspector's reappearance at the premises without further notice; and appellant Secretary's entitlement to a warrant will not depend on his demonstrating probable cause to believe that conditions on the premises

Page 436 U. S. 308

violate OSHA, but merely that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment. Pp. 436 U. S. 315-321.

(e) Requiring a warrant for OSHA inspections does not mean that, as a practical matter, warrantless search provisions in other regulatory statutes are unconstitutional, as the reasonableness of those provisions depends upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute. Pp. 436 U. S. 321-322.

424 F. Supp. 437, affirmed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 436 U. S. 325. BRENNA

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http://www.nndb.com/people/984/000022918/

William Hubbs Rehnquist

Born: 1-Oct-1924

Birthplace: Milwaukee, WI

Died: 3-Sep-2005

Location of death: Arlington, VA

Cause of death: Cancer - other

Remains: Buried, Arlington National Cemetery, Arlington, VA

Gender: Male

Religion: Lutheran

Race or Ethnicity: White

Sexual orientation: Straight

Occupation: Judge

Party Affiliation: Republican

Nationality: United States

Executive summary: US Chief Justice, 1986-2005

Military service: US Army Air Corps (1943-46)

William Rehnquist grew up in a staunchly Republican household in Shorewood, a suburb north of Milwaukee. His parents often discussed politics at the dinner table, and voted for Republican standard bearers such as Alf Landon, Wendell Willkie, and Herbert Hoover. William served three years in the US Army Air Corps, rising to the rank of Sergeant. He then earned two degrees in Political Science and one in Government, before graduating at the top of his class at Stanford Law School. Sandra Day O'Connor was third in the same class, and long after both had been appointed to the Supreme Court it was revealed that they had briefly dated in school.

In 1952, Rehnquist clerked for Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, and wrote a memo arguing that Brown v. Board of Education, then pending before the court, should be decided against the plaintiffs, in favor of allowing so-called "separate but equal" schools for black and white students.

Rehnquist was a lawyer in private practice in Phoenix for 16 years, and became well-known among local Republicans for his outspoken opposition to school integration. He worked on the campaigns of Richard M. Nixon in 1960, Barry Goldwater in 1964, and Nixon again in 1968. When Nixon was elected, Rehnquist was hired to work in the White House Office of Legal Counsel. After two years answering Nixon's legal questions, he was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court to replace the terminally ill John Marshall Harlan. It was Rehnquist's first and only judgeship.

As a Supreme Court Justice, Rehnquist's track record was dogmatically conservative. He was often in the minority in his early years, sometimes outvoted 8-1 by a liberal court. As the Supreme Court became more conservative, Rehnquist's opinions were often been decisive in 5-4 votes. In his better-known cases, he dissented in Roe v. Wade (1973), arguing that no "right of privacy" exists in the Constitution, and voted with the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), finding that homosexuals have no Constitutional right to have consensual sex with each other in the privacy of their own homes. His dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) argued that there is no Constitutional separation of church and state. Mapp v. Ohio (1961) was decided before Rehnquist was on the bench, and excludes evidence in criminal cases if the evidence was gathered illegally by police, but early in Rehnquist's tenure he urged his colleagues to overturn it.

When Chief Justice Warren Burger retired in 1986, President Ronald Reagan appointed Rehnquist as Chief Justice. In this position, Rehnquist had the Constitutional role of presiding over the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton in 1999. He had gold rings, derisively called "HMS Pinafore stripes", sewn onto his long black judicial robe for the occasion.

When Bush v. Gore changed from an election to a series of lawsuits in 2000, Rehnquist was instrumental in first delaying the Florida presidential recount of 2000, then ruling that time had run out. In stopping Florida officials from conducting a recount, Rehnquist's Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that a recount would "irreparably damage" the legitimacy of Bush's "probable" presidency. Months later, unofficial recounts conducted by several different newspapers showed that under almost any standard proposed at the time, Al Gore had won more votes than George W. Bush in Florida.

In 2003, a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report concluded that Rehnquist's daughter Janet, while serving as Health and Human Services Inspector General, had "created an atmosphere of anxiety and distrust" within her office, and used her position to delay an audit of Florida's pension fund, because it could have embarrassed Florida Governor Jeb Bush.

In the months before his death in September 2005, Rehnquist underwent a tracheotomy, radiation treatment, and chemotherapy for thyroid cancer. During this time the justice continued work on the bench, keeping details regarding his health scarce. Visibly frail, Rehnquist officiated at Bush's second inauguration. His death soon after the retirement of justice O'Connor left the court with a rare double vacancy; his seat as Chief Justice was filled within the month by John G. Roberts, Jr., another first-time judge who had clerked for Rehnquist in 1980-81.

More than a year after his death, portions of Rehnquist's FBI files were released under the Freedom of Information Act, revealing details of his long-term addiction to the sedative Placidyl. He was taking three times the number of pills his physician prescribed, and when he was hospitalized and denied the drug in 1981, he went into withdrawal. He started hearing imagined voices plotting against him, had "bizarre ideas and outrageous thoughts", and grew paranoid about a non-existent "CIA plot against him."

The FBI files also showed that in 1986, at the request of Sen Strom Thurmond and with the approval of then-assistant attorney general John Bolton, the feds conducted secret interviews with people who were expected to testify against Rehnquist's promotion to Chief Justice. High-level FBI officials protested that this was tantamount to intimidating witnesses.

Father: William Benjamin Rehnquist (paper salesman)

Mother: Margery Peck (housewife)

Girlfriend: Sandra Day O'Connor (dated in law school)

Wife: Natalie Cornell ("Nan", m. 29-Aug-1953, d. 17-Oct-1991, one son, two daughters)

Son: James Rehnquist (attorney, b. 1955)

Daughter: Janet Rehnquist (former HHS Inspector General, b. 1957)

Daughter: Nancy (b. 1959)

High School: Shorewood High School, Shorewood, WI (1942)

University: BA and MA Political Science, Stanford University (1948)

University: MA Government, Harvard University (1950)

Law School: LLB, Stanford University (1952)

US Supreme Court Justice Chief Justice (1972-2005)

Office of Legal Counsel Assistant Attorney General (1969-71)

Law Clerk for Robert H. Jackson (1952-53)

Supreme Court Historical Society Honorary Chair

Alfalfa Club 1978

American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2005

American Bar Association

American College of Trial Lawyers Honorary Fellow

John Carroll Society Honorary Member

Pilgrims Society

Phi Beta Kappa Society

Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society

Order of the Coif

Tracheotomy Oct-2004

Swedish Ancestry

Risk Factors: Thyroid Cancer, Smoking

Is the subject of books:

Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution, 1989, BY: Sue Davis

Author of books:

The Supreme Court: How It Is, How It Was (1987)

Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson (1992)

All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (2000)

Centennial Crisis: The Disputed Election of 1876 (2004, history, a lightweight treatment)

Stanford Law School’s Class of 1952 is the only one in history to have produced two U.S. Supreme Court justices

The years after World War II brought change to Stanford. Returning veterans on the GI Bill packed the campus. They and their classmates pursued their Stanford opportunity with the drive that would later mark them as the Greatest Generation.

Former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, ’48 MA ’48 LLB ’52, himself an Army Air Corps veteran, and former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, ’50, LLB ’52, are the only Supreme Court justices in U.S. history to come from the same law school class.

Both were brilliant and hard-working, said fellow students contacted for a class history in the 1980s. Moreover, the Class of 1952 began law careers at an ideal place and time. The 1950s and 1960s saw tremendous growth, especially in California, and the state’s economic and political fortunes soared. For two Californian U.S. presidents, wrote David Lempert, JD/MBA ’83, the author of that history, “Stanford Law School and the West were logical places to search for Supreme Court nominees.”

Among Stanford’s law students in the postwar years were Shirley Hufstedler, LLB ’49, who became the first U.S. secretary of education; future senator Frank Church, ’47 JD ’50; John Ehrlichman, JD ’51, later adviser to President Richard Nixon; William Baxter, ’51 JD ’56, President Ronald Reagan’s antitrust chief in the Department of Justice; future Rep. Pete McCloskey, ’50 JD ’53, who co-authored the Endangered Species Act; and Warren Christopher, JD ’49, who became President Bill Clinton’s secretary of state.

Ironically, said the Class of 1952 alums, the legal education they received at Stanford was not yet geared toward jurisprudence, social or political issues, or ethics. Rather, it trained them for practice. The horizons of Stanford legal education had just begun to rise with the advent in 1946 of law school Dean Carl Spaeth, a former diplomat whose many institutional enhancements included the founding of the Stanford Law Review two years later. Both O’Connor – then Sandra Day – and Rehnquist served on the Review.

They studied, thanks to Spaeth, in a newly refurbished building opened in July 1950 on the Quad whose stained-glass windows and marble trim were replaced with fluorescent lighting and linoleum. The curriculum was traditional and rigorous. Rehnquist told Stanford Lawyer in 2005 that “that first year generally just enlarged my mind.”

“To the extent I ever had an intellectual awakening – and there may be some people who doubt the underlying premise – it was that first year of law school,” he told law students and alumni in 1973, a year after joining the high court.

Rehnquist entered Stanford as a transfer undergraduate in 1946 after war service in North Africa as a weather forecaster. He’d learned he liked warm weather, and Ohio’s Kenyon College didn’t fill the bill. Receiving Stanford aid as well as GI Bill funding,Rehnquist worked his way through via several jobs, including running the coffee stand in the law-student lounge and living as a resident assistant at nearby Menlo College for his room and board.

His classmate Allan Fink ’49 LLB ’52, had been command pilot of a B-24 Liberator with a dozen missions in Asia. As Stanford Lawyer remembered in 2013, Fink found the stress of law practice “nothing compared to being shot at.”

“We were very much in awe of the fact that we were freshmen in law school,” Rehnquist said. “A lot of us certainly weren’t young … We had been in the service in the Second World War, but this didn’t lessen our awe at the prospect of entering law school.”

He singled out for praise Professor John Hurlbut, who taught criminal law the first year and evidence in the third. While Rehnquist knew hard work and high standards, his third-year stint as Hurlbut’s assistant on an evidence text raised the bar.

In 1981, around the time of O’Connor’s nomination to the court, news sources reported that Rehnquist was No. 1 and O’Connor No. 3 in the historic class’s academic rankings. Several classmates claimed the No. 2 spot. According to the law school’s 60+ Moments in the History of Stanford Law School, “Despite many searches by many parties, no official records have been found, so the mystery lives on.”

What’s certain is that both belonged to the Order of the Coif, comprised of each class’s top 10 percent. Studying through the summers, Rehnquist graduated early in December 1951, but is still considered part of the 1952 class.

Despite competing for top marks, the two were friendly and went on picnics together.

“We dated some in the second year, and then we kind of went different ways,” Rehnquist told Stanford Lawyer in 2005.

O’Connor, who described herself in her 2004 Stanford University Commencement address as “a cowgirl from eastern Arizona,” boarded with Helen Cubberley, ’00, widow of the School of Education’s Ellwood Cubberley. She accelerated her studies under a program that then allowed Stanford students to complete a BA and a law degree in six years.

Later, O’Connor recalled the enormous influence imparted to her life by business-law Professor Harry Rathbun, ’16 Engr. ’20 JD ’29, who is today commemorated in the Stanford series “Harry’s Last Lecture,” and whose private teachings encompassed ethics, spirituality and the necessity of asking oneself “Who are we? Where are we going?”

“[Rathbun] was the first person ever to speak in my presence of how an individual could make a difference; how a single caring person can effectively help determine the course of events,” O’Connor said in May 2003. “I had not heard that before, really, and he put it forward in such a persuasive way that I think most of us came to believe it might be true, and to take seriously the notion that we could make a difference.”

After graduating as a star of the Class of 1952, however, O’Connor famously was unable to find any job in a private law firm except as a legal secretary.

“But the gender walls that blocked me out of the private sector were more easily hurdled in the public sector, ” she said in her 2004 Commencement address, “and I first found employment as a deputy county attorney of San Mateo County.

“While I was brought to the position by something short of choice, I came to realize almost immediately what a wonderful path I had taken. … Life as a public servant was more interesting. The work was more challenging. The encouragement and guidance from good mentors was more genuine. And the opportunities to take initiative and to see real results were more frequent.”

She became an assistant attorney general and an Arizona state senator and judge en route to the high court. “At every step of the way,” she said, “I felt the thrill of doing something right for a reason that was good.”

Appointed by Nixon, Rehnquist joined the high court in 1972 and became chief justice in 1986. He remained in that role until his death in 2005. When Reagan was searching for a Supreme Court appointee in 1981, Stanford Magazine later reported, Rehnquist “gave O’Connor, then an appellate judge in Arizona, his back-channel endorsement.”

The justices returned frequently to Stanford together, for example to preside over a 1997 moot-court dramatization that marked the establishment of the Judge John Crown Professorship in Law.

The Class of 1952 stayed loyal to Stanford as well. In 2002, 70 percent of the class attended its 50th reunion, setting an attendance record.

==-

1965 4? act?

just one year earlier, the same Congress had passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which prohibited wage differentials based on sex. The prohibition on sex discrimination was added to the Civil Rights Act by Howard W. Smith, a powerful Virginia Democrat who chaired the House Rules Committee and who strongly opposed the legislation. Smith's amendment was passed by a teller vote of 168 to 133. Historians debate Smith's motivation, whether it was a cynical attempt to defeat the bill by someone opposed to civil rights both for blacks and women, or an attempt to support their rights by broadening the bill to include women.^{[26][27][28][29]} Smith expected that Republicans, who had included equal rights for women in their party's platform since 1944,^[30] would probably vote for the amendment. Historians speculate that Smith was trying to embarrass northern Democrats who opposed civil rights for women because the clause was opposed by labor unions. Representative Carl Elliott of Alabama later claimed, "Smith didn't give a damn about women's rights...he was trying to knock off votes either then or down the line because there was always a hard core of men who didn't favor women's rights,"^[31] and the Congressional Record records that Smith was greeted by laughter when he introduced the amendment.^[32]

:{Smith asserted that he was not joking; he sincerely supported the amendment and, indeed, along with Rep. Martha Griffiths,^[33] he was the chief spokesperson for the amendment.^[32] For twenty years Smith had sponsored the Equal Rights Amendment (with no linkage to racial issues) in the House because he believed in it. He for decades had been close to the National Woman's Party and its leader Alice Paul, who was also the leader in winning the right to vote for women in 1920, the author of the first Equal Rights Amendment, and a chief supporter of equal rights proposals since then. She and other feminists had worked with Smith since 1945 trying to find a way to include sex as a protected civil rights category.

Now was the moment.^[34] Griffiths argued that the new law would protect black women but not white women, and that was unfair to white women. Furthermore, she argued that the laws "protecting" women from unpleasant jobs were actually designed to enable men to monopolize those jobs, and that was unfair to women who were not allowed to try out for those jobs.^[35] The amendment passed with the votes of Republicans and Southern Democrats. The final law passed with the votes of Republicans and Northern Democrats. Thus, as Justice William Rehnquist explained in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, "The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives... the bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'"^[36]}:

In 1977, the Supreme Court struck down state minimum height requirements for police officers as violating the Act; women usually could not meet these requirements.^[29]

On April 4, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago, sitting en banc, ruled that Title VII of the Act forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by a vote of 8–3.^[67][68] Over the prior month, panels of both the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City had reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Title VII sex discrimination does not include claims based on sexual orientation.^[69]

Influence

Despite its lack of influence during its time, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had considerable impact on later civil rights legislation in the United States. It paved the way for future legislation that was not limited to African American civil rights. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990—which has been called "the most important piece of federal legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964"—was influenced both by the structure and substance of the previous Civil Rights Act of 1964. The act was arguably of equal importance, and "draws substantially from the structure of that landmark legislation [Civil Rights Act of 1964]". The Americans with Disabilities Act paralleled its landmark predecessor structurally, drawing upon many of the same titles and statutes. For example, "Title I of the ADA, which bans employment discrimination by private employers on the basis of disability, parallels Title VII of the Act". Similarly, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, "which proscribes discrimination on the basis of disability in public accommodations, tracks Title II of the 1964 Act while expanding upon the list of public accommodations covered." The Americans with Disabilities Act extended "the principle of nondiscrimination to people with disabilities",^[70] an idea unsought in the United States before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Act also influenced later civil rights legislation, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Civil Rights Act of 1968, aiding not only African Americans, but also women.

Even conservatives sometimes have been skeptical of corporate rights. Then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist dissented in 1979 from a decision voiding Massachusetts's restriction of corporate political spending on referendums.[belotti?] Since corporations receive special legal and tax benefits, "it might reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere," he wrote. wsj

holy cow 2000 ted cruz clerk; worked for several pres, poll watcher (denied suppression) records on CR and __ gone after confirmation from nat'l archives.

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corp personhood:

But you can plainly see the weariness in Stevens eyes and hear it in his voice today as he is forced to contend with a legal fiction that has come to life today, a sort of constitutional Frankenstein moment when corporate speech becomes even more compelling than the "voices of the real people" who will be drowned out. Even former Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist once warned that treating corporate spending as the First Amendment equivalent of individual free speech is "to confuse metaphor with reality." Today that metaphor won a very real victory at the Supreme Court. And as a consequence some very real corporations are feeling very, very good.

slate

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rwhist

advised goldwater to vote no on CR act; as SC clerk wrote memo that Plessy (sep but =) shd be upheld;(perelstein page 363) BG got 2nd op from Bork, who wrote 75 pp brief that the question was not of civil rights but the freedom to assoc w/ whomerver (or not) [somebody argued it came down to taste?]

'62 Rehnquist allowed ppl dressed as cops to stop voters of color in Az and force to read Const 511

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Rehnquist

stanford SD Oconnor

Law clerk at the Supreme Court

Rehnquist went to Washington, D.C. to work as a law clerk for Justice Robert H. Jackson during the court's 1952â1953 term.^[10] There, he wrote a memorandum arguing against federal-court-ordered school desegregation while the court was considering the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, which was later decided in 1954. Rehnquist's 1952 memo, entitled "A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases", defended the separate-but-equal doctrine. In that memo, Rehnquist said:

I realize that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by "liberal" colleagues but I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed.... To the argument ... that a majority may not deprive a minority of its constitutional right, the answer must be made that while this is sound in theory, in the long run it is the majority who will determine what the constitutional rights of the minority are.^[11]

In both his 1971 hearing for Associate Justice and his 1986 hearing for Chief Justice of the United States, Rehnquist alleged that the memorandum reflected the views of Justice Jackson rather than his own views

...

Private practice

Rehnquist moved to Phoenix, Arizona, where he was in private law practice from 1953 to 1969. During these years, he was active in the Republican Party and served as a legal advisor to Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign.

Many years later, during the 1971 hearing for Associate Justice and later during the 1986 Senate hearings on his chief justice nomination, several people came forward to complain about what they viewed as Rehnquist's attempts to discourage minority voters in Arizona elections when Rehnquist served as a "poll watcher" in the early 1960s.^[24] Rehnquist denied the charges, and "Vincent Maggiore, then chairman of the Phoenix-area Democratic Party, said he had never heard any negative reports about Rehnquist's Election Day activities. 'All of these things', he said, 'would have come through me.'"^[25]

Justice Department}:

When President Richard Nixon was elected in 1968, Rehnquist returned to work in Washington. He served as Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel, from 1969 to 1971.^[26] In this role, he served as the chief lawyer to Attorney General John Mitchell. President Nixon mistakenly referred to him as "Renchburg" in several of the tapes of Oval Office conversations revealed during the Watergate investigations.^[27] Because he was well-placed in the Justice Department, Rehnquist was mentioned for many years as a possibility for the source known as Deep Throat during the Watergate scandal.^[28] Once Bob Woodward revealed on May 31, 2005, that W. Mark Felt was Deep Throat, this speculation ended. It was William Rehnquist who determined that Government National Mortgage Association guarantees constituted a full faith and credit promise of the United States.^[29]

Associate Justice}:

Nixon nominated Rehnquist to replace John Marshall Harlan II on the Supreme Court upon Harlan's retirement,

...

Also, during the Burger Court's deliberations over Roe v. Wade, Rehnquist promoted his view that court's jurisdiction does not apply over abortion.^[36]

He voted against the expansion of school desegregation plans and the establishment of legalized abortions, dissenting in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Rehnquist expressed his views about the Equal Protection Clause in cases like Trimble v. Gordon:^[35]

...

Chief Justice

When Chief Justice Warren Burger retired in 1986, President Ronald Reagan nominated Rehnquist to fill the position. Although Rehnquist was to the right of Burger,^[55] "his colleagues were unanimously pleased and supportive," even his "ideological opposites."^[44] The nomination "was met with 'genuine enthusiasm on the part of not only his colleagues on the Court but others who served the Court in a staff capacity and some of the relatively lowly paid individuals at the Court. There was almost a unanimous feeling of joy.'"^[44] Justice Thurgood Marshall would later call him "a great Chief Justice."^[21]

During confirmation hearings, Senator Edward Kennedy challenged Rehnquist on his unwitting ownership of property that had a restrictive covenant against sale to Jews ^[56] (such covenants are unenforceable under Shelley v. Kraemer). Despite this and other controversies, including a concern over his membership in the Alfalfa Club (which at the time did not allow women to join^[57]⁾, the Senate confirmed his appointment by a 65â33 vote, and he assumed the office on September 26. Rehnquist's seat as an associate justice was filled by newly appointed Antonin Scalia.

In 1999, Rehnquist became the second Chief Justice (after Salmon P. Chase) to preside over a presidential impeachment trial, during the proceedings against President Bill Clinton. In 2000, Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore, the case that effectively ended the presidential election controversy in Florida. He concurred with four other justices in that case that the Equal Protection Clause barred a "standardless" manual recount of the votes as ordered by the Florida Supreme Court.

...

Rehnquist's paternal grandparents immigrated separately from Sweden in 1880. His grandfather Olof Andersson, who changed his surname from the patronymic Andersson to the family name Rehnquist, was born in the province of VÃ¤rmland and his grandmother was born Adolfina Ternberg in Vreta Kloster (parish) in ÃstergÃ¶tland. Rehnquist is one of two Chief Justices of Swedish descent, the other being Earl Warren, who had Norwegian-Swedish ancestry.^[92]
Rehnquist's maternal lineage traces back via New York to the Pilgrims and other early New England settlers.^[93]

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As a Supreme Court Justice, Rehnquist's track record was dogmatically conservative. He was often in the minority in his early years, sometimes outvoted 8-1 by a liberal court. As the Supreme Court became more conservative, Rehnquist's opinions were often been decisive in 5-4 votes. In his better-known cases, he dissented in Roe v. Wade (1973), arguing that no "right of privacy" exists in the Constitution, and voted with the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), finding that homosexuals have no Constitutional right to have consensual sex with each other in the privacy of their own homes. His dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) argued that there is no Constitutional separation of church and state. Mapp v. Ohio (1961) was decided before Rehnquist was on the bench, and excludes evidence in criminal cases if the evidence was gathered illegally by police, but early in Rehnquist's tenure he urged his colleagues to overturn it.

When Chief Justice Warren Burger retired in 1986, President Ronald Reagan appointed Rehnquist as Chief Justice. In this position, Rehnquist had the Constitutional role of presiding over the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton in 1999. He had gold rings, derisively called "HMS Pinafore stripes", sewn onto his long black judicial robe for the occasion.

When Bush v. Gore changed from an election to a series of lawsuits in 2000, Rehnquist was instrumental in first delaying the Florida presidential recount of 2000, then ruling that time had run out. In stopping Florida officials from conducting a recount, Rehnquist's Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that a recount would "irreparably damage" the legitimacy of Bush's "probable" presidency. Months later, unofficial recounts conducted by several different newspapers showed that under almost any standard proposed at the time, Al Gore had won more votes than George W. Bush in Florida.

http://mapper.nndb.com/start/?id=22918

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asst AG to Nixon

appt OIC panel

assoc w/ JBS Hunt 130

appointed Sentelle (protege of helms and head of NC Republicans 131) oversee OIC with Sneed, nixon appointee. sentelle lunced with helms and faircloth 133

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nepotism Liz Cheney (husb OMB), Janet Rehn. (Insp Gen'l) Kristol, Podhoretz

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Archives | 2000

Liberties; The Bloom Is Off the Robe

By MAUREEN DOWD

DEC. 13, 2000

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST. We'll hear argument now on No. 00-949, President-Elect Bush and Vice President-Elect Cheney v. Albert Gore Jr. et al.

JUSTICE SCALIA. Mr. Olson, the legal predicate that seems to have slipped your muddled mind is that recounts are only triggered if there's a problem with the machinery, not in the case of voter error. Come on, Ted, do I have to plead your case for Bush as well as hear it?

JUSTICE O'CONNOR. Well, Mr. Boies, why can't those ninnies down in Florida simply follow the instructions for voting, for goodness' sakes? At the Chevy Chase Club, my friends have been asking me why people too stupid or slack to punch a hole through a piece of paper even deserve a vote.

JUSTICE SCALIA. That's it, Sandy, baby. Suffrage, shmuffrage.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST. Mr. Boies, you fail to grasp the concept of equal protection for the conservative justices who want to retire. I'm 76. Sandy is 70. We started out long ago, working our hearts out for Barry Goldwater, and we're pooped. My back is killing me! But we can't leave until we install a Republican president. Al Gore would replace us with that hippy-dippy Mario Cuomo or that flower child Larry Tribe, or some minority who actually cares about the rights of the dispossessed.

JUSTICE GINSBURG. Mr. Boies -- may I call you David? -- I love you.

JUSTICE SCALIA. Ruthie, zip it. Mr. Boies, as you surely have noticed by now, I am the Big Brain here. So I will explain what should be res ipsa loquitor, not to mention a priori. We stopped the vote-counting because if we did not, Al Gore might have won. Then I would never have had a chance to be chief justice.

I have put up with so much hokum. When they upheld Roe v. Wade. When they made all-male military academies admit women. I became bitter and marginalized. Never mind Al Gore's due process. What am I due in this process?

MR. KLOCK. If I may, Justice Brandeis --

JUSTICE SCALIA. I'm Scalia, dimwit. To continue, it may look hypocritical if the court's conservatives suppress the will of the people and install a states'-rights president by federal fiat. I know I have spent my career fighting against muscular assertions of judicial power. But now I see that judicial tyranny, judiciously used, can be a good thing. I don't believe in making laws from the bench. But making presidents? That's different. Hey, who ever said the Constitution is engraved in stone, anyhow? Text is important, but so is subtext. Why should I prop up a pathetic pol who vilified Clarence and me during his campaign?

This court is riddled with conflicts of interest. Clarence's wife, Ginny, is over at the Heritage Foundation gathering conservatives' resumes for possible appointments in the new administration. My son is a partner at Ted Olson's law firm. Another son just got hired by another law firm working for Bush. But if I had recused myself, there would have been a tie. And then those radicals on the Florida Supreme Court could have been affirmed. And President Gore might have made Ruthie the chief.

JUSTICE THOMAS (to himself). If this thing runs long, I'm going to miss ''Trailer Park Nurses'' and ''Room Servicing'' on the Spice channel.

JUSTICE STEVENS. De novo, de-lightful, de-lovely. Why don't we just devise a standard to count all the votes?

JUSTICE SOUTER. I know the Bushes are furious at me. That'll teach 'em to assume that a guy living like a monk in an isolated New Hampshire farmhouse is some kind of Live Free or Die nut.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR. Mr. Boies, while we are on the subject of irreparable harm, are you aware that if I side with you, it could put in jeopardy the membership of my husband, John, in the Bohemian Grove? He does so enjoy his week of stag frolicking and drag shows in the California redwoods with President Bush, Cap Weinberger, Bill Buckley, David Rockefeller and Henry Kissinger.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST. We're dropping in the polls on the question of our fairness, but we still need to anoint Bush president. It's best for us. We'll just have to work harder to hide the truth: that we are driven by all the same petty human emotions as everybody else in this town -- ambition, partisanship, political debts and revenge.

MR. KLOCK. How true, Chief Justice Holmes.

We are continually improving the quality of our text archives. Please send feedback, error reports, and suggestions to archive_feedback@nytimes.com.

A version of this op-ed appears in print on December 13, 2000, on Page A00035 of the National edition with the headline: Liberties; The Bloom Is Off the Robe.

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