Sunni

=see also shialost earlier=<div></div><div>aha: arabs saudi corrupt murderous monarchy, extreme unequal, bad to women and immigrant labor, slaughter civilians in yemen, and burning down the world, chummy with trump and all bushes, bandar bush, poppy gulf 1 nahyirah, gulf 2 wmd bush shrub.</div><div>
</div><div>extract oil from ground, then extract $ from US</div><div>
</div><div>"resource curse" leads to consolodation of power and then corruption; in saudi monarchy already consolidated, tho sometime you gotta get rid of excess princes.</div><div><div style="">
</div><div style="">PLUS indoctrinate wahabi jihadis?!</div></div>=<a href="https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/sunni-muslims-isis-iraq">https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/sunni-muslims-isis-iraq</a>The fall of Saddam’s regime has thrown the Iraqi Arab Sunni into a representation void. ISIS has ably ridden this wave, leaving the legacy, today, of a young generation that has been “militarized” and “sectarianized”This article was published in Oasis 27. Read the table of contentsLast update: 2018-11-30 11:03:23The collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime plunged the Iraqi Sunni Arabs into a void of representation. Although they cannot be considered a compact community, various political forces have tried to exploit electorally their resentment. However, it has been ISIS, first and foremost, that has ridden the wave of their malaise, offering the former Baathist officers the prospect of redemption. And now that the pseudo-Caliphate has been defeated, it is necessary to reckon with a young generation that has been “militarized” and “sectarianized.”While this essay deals with the crisis of Arab Sunni Islam in Iraq preceding and after the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it will first provide a critique of the essentialist notion of such a politico-religious configuration. Rather, it will examine the difficulties Iraqis, who happen to be Arab Sunni by accident of birth and geography, have had developing religious and political institutions, as well as the security concerns that happen to disproportionately affect this demographic.“Iraq’s Arab Sunnis” is an identity label that presupposes cohesion amongst this community, when in fact its divisions explain why no political or religious institution can claim to represent their political and religious aspirations. With regards to political narratives, a vague notion of “Iraqi Arab Sunniness” has developed in terms of victimization, but narratives do not necessarily translate into viable political or religious institutions. Rather, it is religious and political elites amongst Arab Sunnis in Iraq who invoke these tropes for the secular objective of political mobilization. ISIS’ success, therefore, can be attributed to the fact that it entered an institutional vacuum to recruit amongst this demographic.As argued by Fanar Haddad, while “sectarianism” as an analytical concept proves problematic,[1] it remains embedded amongst policy makers and mainstream media discourses, even internalized within Iraq. For example, in 2016 Kemal Kirkuki, a Kurdish politician said: ...=David ZucchinoOct. 26, 2017
KARMAH, Iraq — After the Islamic State was finally driven from the central Iraqi city of Karmah last year, Sirhan Sallom returned to his home to find it demolished.
Mr. Sallom, 70, has since waited in vain for help. In Iraq’s deeply sectarian system, he doesn’t expect much from the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. But he is angry that local and national Sunni politicians haven’t come to the aid of his Sunni Muslim city either.
“These politicians are Sunni — they are supposed to help us,” he said. “They’re useless.”
Fourteen years after the American invasion ended decades of Sunni dominance in Iraq, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs are struggling to reclaim relevance and influence. After they were ousted from government jobs and from the military by the post-Saddam Hussein government, their powerlessness and rage gave rise to Sunni militant movements like Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State.
Now that those militants are being driven from the Sunni heartland, how the government responds to Sunnis trying to rebuild their lives is likely to have long-term consequences for the country’s stability and security.
More than 3.1 million Iraqis, the vast majority Sunni, remain displaced from their homes after three years of occupation and battles with the Islamic State. Another 2.3 million have returned. As towns like Karmah await rebuilding, Sunni leaders have not received much help from a cash-strapped central government more focused on battling the militants and, more recently, the Kurds.
Since 2003, Sunnis, who make up about a quarter of the population, have lost out to Shiites and Kurds, who were both brutally repressed by an elite Sunni minority under Saddam Hussein. With Iraq’s government now controlled by Shiites, and the Kurds governing their own autonomous area in the north, the Sunnis are in a political no-man’s land.Image[A car destroyed during fighting between Iraqi government forces and the Islamic State last year remains on a Karmah street. Residents said rubble from the battle had not been cleared in the absence of aid from Sunni politicians or the Baghdad government.CreditDavid Zucchino/The New York TimesThere were high expectations when Haider al-Abadi became prime minister in 2014 that he could turn the page after the divisive sectarian rule of his predecessor, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, and win the confidence of the Sunnis.
Instead, Sunni leaders say, he has forsaken them while forging closer ties with Iran, the hard-line Shiite theocracy next door. Iran now wields tremendous influence over Iraq’s economy, military and government.
Hamid al-Mutlaq, who represents Karmah in Parliament, said the government was more focused on working with Iran and Iranian-armed Shiite militias than helping Sunnis rebuild.
“We are now a displaced people, a completely marginalized people — and it’s getting worse by the day,” he said.
“We have a corrupt government controlled by a foreign power, at the expense of Sunnis,” he added.
But Sunni politicians are mired in local feuds. They can hardly advance their own case when they can’t even agree on where to meet to patch up differences. At a Baghdad conference two years ago, Sunni politicians threw chairs at each other as their bodyguards traded punches.
“Our politicians do nothing for us,” said Ismail Jassim, 39, who relies on donations from neighbors in Karmah to survive in his home, which was burned by militants. “We never see them, except on TV at election time.”
The power of Sunni politicians was greatly diminished by the power-sharing agreement adopted after the American invasion. Under its formula, the prime minister’s post, along with the interior and foreign ministries, are reserved for Shiites. Kurds get the presidency and finance ministry. Sunni Arabs get Parliament speaker and defense minister, but the prime minister is commander in chief, and Shiite army commanders and militia leaders wield significant influence.

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[Members of a Shiite militia checked the identity of a Sunni villager in Saladin Province in June. Shiite militias, part of the Iraqi military, have been accused of committing atrocities against Sunnis.CreditSergey Ponomarev for The New York Times]Iranian-trained Shiite militias are part of Iraq’s armed forces and have battled Islamic State militants since they seized nearly a third of Iraq in 2014. The militias have been accused of atrocities against Sunni civilians, and their presence near Sunni areas has alarmed many residents. A Shiite religious flag fluttered last week at an Iraqi military checkpoint outside Karmah.
Kurds have their own army as well, known as the pesh merga. But Sunnis have no national armed force, only tribal militias blended into Iraqi security forces to fight the militants.
Some Sunni politicians have advocated an autonomous Sunni region, but those proposals have stalled amid partisan bickering.
“Sunnis have no unified leadership,” said Wathiq al-Hashimi, the head of the Iraqi Group for Strategic Studies, an independent research group in Baghdad. “And Sunni politicians seem to care only about narrow personal interests.”
A Kurdish referendum on independence last month further divided Sunnis. Most opposed it, preferring to keep Kurds inside Iraq as a counterweight against Shiite domination; virtually all Iraqi Kurds are Sunni. Many Sunnis cheered the government takeover of contested areas, where Sunni Arabs had seethed under Kurdish control.
But even Sunnis opposed to the Kurdish vote were alarmed when Iraqi forces conducted military maneuvers with Iranian troops inside Iran along the Iraq border.
“We won’t tolerate that kind of foreign interference on top of everything else,” said Sheikh Ahmed al-Karim, a Sunni lawmaker who generally supports the government of Mr. Abadi, the prime minister.

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[pix Lacking reconstruction aid, Sirhan Sallom, center, is rebuilding his home with his life savings and the help of his son, Ali Sirhan, right. They expect no help from the government.CreditDavid Zucchino/The New York TimesIn Parliament, the Sunni-led bloc has 78 seats, roughly proportionate to their share of the population, but is dwarfed by the Shiite bloc, with 182. The Kurdish bloc has 65 seats. Parliament has fallen increasingly under the sway of Iran, which is locked in a regional power struggle with Sunni countries led by Saudi Arabia.
Mithal al-Alusi, a Sunni lawmaker, has called the government “a cardboard state” because of its ties to Iran. He has asked, acidly, whether Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite overseas military forces who has advised Iraq’s Shiite militias, had a proper visa to enter Iraq.
Shiites seem driven by a sense of religious grievance and a pan-Shiite destiny. Kurds are motivated by nationalism and dreams of independence. And Sunnis?
“For the Sunnis, there’s a lack of political cohesion about exactly what they want,” said Maria Fantappie, a senior analyst for Iraq at the International Crisis Group.
David L. Phillips, a former adviser at the State Department who has worked on Iraq for 30 years, said Sunnis had failed to organize as effectively as Shiites and Kurds.
“Baghdad is perfectly content to see the Sunnis in disarray,” he said.
There are a few hopeful signs. Because some Shiite factions will oppose Mr. Abadi in April, and Kurdish politics are in upheaval, he will have to court the Sunni bloc to help ensure re-election.
“The Abadi government has never needed the Sunnis more than now,” Ms. Fantappie said.
But Sunnis could suffer political losses in April if hundreds of thousands of displaced Sunni constituents are unable to vote. If hard-line Shiite populists prevail, some reconstruction funds could end up going to poor Shiite regions rather than liberated Sunni areas.

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A displaced Sunni family from Muqdadiyah in a squatter camp in Diyala Province in 2013. More than three million Iraqis, most of them Sunni, remain displaced from their homes after fleeing the Islamic State.CreditAyman Oghanna for The New York Times]The post-Saddam era has proved ruinous for many Sunnis. After 2003, a de-Baathification program stripped hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civil servants of their jobs, including doctors and teachers. Many sacked Sunni army officers joined the Al Qaeda insurgency against American forces, though Sunni tribes later helped drive out the militants in the so-called Sunni Awakening.
Elements of de-Baathification continued, however. Mr. Mutlaq, the Sunni lawmaker who had been a general in Mr. Hussein’s army, said a de-Baathification commission had barred him three times since 2010 from running for Parliament. “Pure political harassment,” he said.
(He appealed, and now sits on Parliament’s security and defense committee.)
Under Mr. Maliki, who was prime minister from 2006 to 2014, many Sunnis who had reclaimed their jobs were purged from the military and government, some for the second time. Festering Sunni resentment helped spur the rise of the Islamic State and allowed its fighters to take over Sunni towns and cities in 2014 with relative ease.
The militants promised a new era of Sunni dominance, drawing widespread support from disenfranchised Sunnis. But they failed to deliver, and the reign of terror they imposed ultimately turned many Sunnis against them.
Now Sunni towns like Karmah, where residents initially welcomed the militants, feel abandoned by their politicians. Karmah, with a population of about 95,000, was liberated in May 2016. The United Nations has provided some aid, rebuilding schools and making emergency infrastructure repairs.
But the only sign in Karmah of the Iraqi agency charged with rebuilding liberated areas is the beginning of construction work on five schools. Mustafa al-Hiti, a Sunni pharmacist who directs the agency, said that just $140 million had been allocated by Baghdad this year for rebuilding all of the areas that had been under Islamic State rule. He estimated total costs for that job at more than $100 billion.
He said international donors had allocated billions of dollars, but much of that money has been slowed by audits amid donor concerns about Iraq’s reputation for corruption.
So Mr. Sallom is rebuilding his home in Karmah using his life savings and the help of his son, Ali Sirhan. Mr. Sirhan, 44, was asked whether he thought Sunni politicians would soon offer help.
“Help?” Mr. Sirhan asked. “Forget help. They don’t even come visit, even if it’s just to say, ‘God help you.’”
Falih Hassan contributed reporting.
<div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">=</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/kristian-coates-ulrichsen">https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/kristian-coates-ulrichsen</a></div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">sunni shia</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">shock of takeover of al maxra mosque?</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">modern saudi history (2nd hour?)</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">buying US arms one way to spend oil $ but did not have ppl to use it, lost, arab spring shock led to buildup and get saudi ppl to fight.</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><div>iran better at proxy eg hezbollah (and sort of houti in yemen) than saudis</div><div>
</div><div>uae also trying (// saudis) to professionalize army; grabbing territory in yemen, not really in coordination w/ SA, their interests may diverge?</div><div>overton chattam house</div></div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">
</div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><a href="https://kpfa.org/episode/upfront-june-24-2019/" style="text-decoration-line: none; font-weight: bold; outline: none;">https://kpfa.org/episode/upfront-june-24-2019/</a></div><div style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></div><div></div><div><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><div class="elements-TinyPromo-title" style="box-sizing: border-box; font-weight: 700; line-height: 1.1;"><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></a><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><h4 class="Heading-heading Heading-light Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-VoicesPromo-heading" style="box-sizing: border-box; line-height: 22px; margin: 0px;"><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></a><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);" /><a href="https://theintercept.com/2019/06/16/saudi-crown-prince-child-execution/" relay="[object Object]" class="PromoLink-link Homepage-HomepageMultimediaModule-voicesPromo" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Saudi Arabia May Execute Teenager for His Protests — Including When He Was 10</a></h4></div></div><div>
</div><div>IN 2011, as Arab Spring protests swept across the Middle East, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/11/saudi-arabia-police-quell-protests" style="letter-spacing: 0.01em; box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">demonstrations</a> also kicked off in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province. Members of the kingdom’s repressed Shiite minority took to the streets, calling for equal rights and a fairer distribution of oil revenues. The protesters included a group of around 30 kids on bicycles. As a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/06/middleeast/saudi-teen-death-penalty-intl/" style="letter-spacing: 0.01em; box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">video</a>released last week by CNN shows, those children were led by a smiling 10-year-old in flip-flops named Murtaja Qureiris.</div><div data-reactid="184" style="box-sizing: border-box;">“The people demand human rights!” the young boy can be seen shouting through a megaphone.Here’s the problem: Demanding human rights in Saudi Arabia lands you in prison. Even if you’re a kid.Three years later, in September 2014, 13-year-old Murtaja was arrested while on his way to neighboring Bahrain with his family.“At the time,” reports <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/06/middleeast/saudi-teen-death-penalty-intl/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">CNN</a>, “he was considered by lawyers and activists to be the youngest known political prisoner in Saudi Arabia.Over the past four years, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/world/middleeast/saudi-teenager-death-sentence.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">say</a> human rights groups, this teenager has been subjected to torture and intimidation, as well as a spell in solitary confinement. He has been denied access to a lawyer while interrogators try to get him to confess to the trumped-up charges against him. These include “participating in anti-government protests, attending the funeral of his brother Ali Qureiris who was killed in a protest in 2011, joining a ‘terrorist organization,’ throwing Molotov cocktails at a police station, and firing at security forces,” according to <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/saudi-arabia-authorities-must-not-resort-to-use-of-death-penalty-against-protester-arrested-aged-13/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Amnesty International</a>.Last week, we <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/saudi-teenager-faces-execution-for-alleged-crimes-committed-as-a-child/2019/06/10/b4b356cc-8b76-11e9-adf3-f70f78c156e8_story.html?utm_term=.a99386fd92b0" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">learned</a> that Saudi prosecutors are seeking the death penalty for 18-year-old Murtaja, who is being tried in an anti-terror court. <a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/06/middleeast/saudi-teen-death-penalty-intl/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">CNN</a> reports that the prosecutors want to “impose the harshest form of the death penalty, which may include crucifixion or dismemberment after execution.”Got that? The unelected government of a close ally of the United States is planning on brutally executing an 18-year-old member of a minority group, for crimes allegedly committed when he was 10 years old.Let me repeat: Ten. Years. Old.We shouldn’t forget the person who is primarily responsible for this outrage: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS. Since his father installed him in power, the violent crushing of political dissent has escalated. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/cia-saudi-crown-prince-khashoggi.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">According to the CIA</a>, MBS ordered the horrific murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. He is also behind the <a href="https://time.com/5585281/cia-warned-jamal-khashoggi-associates/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">targeting</a> of three Arab activists in Norway, Canada, and the United States.Much has (rightly) been made of the crown prince’s shocking record on extrajudicial killings. But what of the growing number of judicially sanctioned killings inside of Saudi Arabia on his watch? The planned execution of Murtaja Qureiris may be the most horrendous act yet.“There should be no doubt that the Saudi Arabian authorities are ready to go to any length to crack down on dissent against their own citizens, including by resorting to the death penalty for men who were merely boys at the time of their arrest,” <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/saudi-arabia-authorities-must-not-resort-to-use-of-death-penalty-against-protester-arrested-aged-13/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">says</a> Lynn Maalouf, Middle East research director at Amnesty International.The Gulf kingdom is one of the world’s <a href="https://www.independent.ie/world-news/death-penalty-report-reveals-which-country-is-the-worlds-top-executioner-36800409.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">top executioners</a> and, according to Maalouf, Saudi authorities have “a chilling track record of using the death penalty as a weapon to crush political dissent and punish anti-government protesters — including children — from the country’s persecuted Shi’a minority.”The majority of the country, and the ruling family, are from a strict school of Sunni Islam called Salafism. In April, 37 people were executed <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/23/middleeast/saudi-executions-terror-intl/index.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">in a single day</a> — the biggest mass execution in the kingdom since 2016 — and the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/saudi-arabia-37-put-to-death-in-shocking-execution-spree/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">vast majority</a> of them were believed to be Shiites. Three of them, according to human rights group <a href="https://reprieve.org.uk/update/saudi-arabia-executes-37-people-in-a-single-day-including-three-juveniles/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Reprieve</a>, were “minors at the time of their alleged offences.” Such executions, as both Reprieve and <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/death-penalty/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Amnesty International</a> have noted, are a brazen violation of international human rights law.Another <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/saudi-arabia-37-put-to-death-in-shocking-execution-spree/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">three Saudi Shiites</a> — Ali al-Nimr, Dawood al-Marhoon, and Abdullah al-Zaher — who were also below the age of 18 at the time of their alleged crimes, are still on death row and could be executed at anytime.</div><div data-reactid="194" style="box-sizing: border-box;">It isn’t just Shiites, either. MBS has also targeted Sunni clerics who have failed to fall into line. There have been <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-saudi-arabia-execute-three-prominent-moderate-scholars-after-ramadan" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">reports</a> that the belligerent and thin-skinned crown prince plans on executing three high-profile Saudi religious scholars — Salman al-Odah, Awad al-Qarni, and Ali al-Omari — all of whom have been held on multiple charges of “terrorism.” 62-year-old Odah is famous in the Arab world for his relatively progressive views on <a href="https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Saudi-cleric-Homosexuality-not-a-deviation-from-Islam-should-not-be-punished-452957" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Islam and homosexuality</a> and his <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21/opinion/21iht-edgerges.1.7596468.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">2007 denunciation</a> of Osama bin Laden. His actual “crime”? <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/07/saudi-arabia-cleric-held-4-months-without-charge" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Tweeting</a> a prayer for reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and its Gulf rival, the Emirate of Qatar. (Full disclosure: I host two <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">TV</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/headtohead/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">shows</a> for Qatar-funded Al Jazeera English.)Supporters of MBS often try and argue that these executions are the product of decisions made in court, not in the royal palace. This is a laughable defense. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy. There is <a href="https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/al-rasheed-saudi-arabia-needs-independent-judiciary/vi-AAAZ2As" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">no independent judiciary</a>. As <a href="https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/06/middleeast/saudi-teen-death-penalty-intl/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">CNN</a> reports, “The death penalty can only be enforced by order of King Salman or his authorized representative. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is frequently characterized as the King’s deputy.”Forget MBS <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/saudi-prince-mbs-arab-spring.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">the reformer</a>; meet MBS <a href="http://www.worldcoalition.org/Mass-executions-in-Saudi-Arabia-with-more-than-100-people-executed-since-January-2019-.html" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">the executioner</a>. The fact that he has been embraced closely by everyone from <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/trump-releases-statement-support-saudi-arabia/576436/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Donald Trump</a> to <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/09/emmanuel-macron-treats-saudi-crown-prince-private-dinner-louvre/" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Emmanuel Macron</a> to <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/saudi-prince-poses-with-pm-on-controversial-visit-11280077" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">Theresa May</a> should be a source of shame for those of us living in the West. To <a href="https://twitter.com/TVietor08/status/1136417531282018307" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; text-decoration-line: none;">quote</a> former Obama-era National Security Council spokesperson Tommy Vietor, MBS is “Kim Jong Un with oil money.”</div><div></div><div>=</div><div>new</div><div>
</div><div><a href="https://www.alternet.org/2019/05/saudi-arabia-beheaded-37-dissidents-last-month-and-u-s-media-called-them-terrorists/">https://www.alternet.org/2019/05/saudi-arabia-beheaded-37-dissidents-last-month-and-u-s-media-called-them-terrorists/</a></div><div>
</div><div>Saudi Arabia executed 37 men on April 23, as it announced in a <a href="https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/563984" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">press release</a> in its official gazette. The first line of the release read, “Saudi Arabia said it executed 37 citizens last Tuesday after they were convicted of terrorism.”<div class="p1_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;">A cursory Google search would have shown that this assertion was completely false. But many in the U.S. press dutifully stenographed this claim into a headline:<div class="p2_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><div class="alt_ad_block story-page-in-content-graph-2" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><div class="teadsNative" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;"><ul style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px 0px 20px; padding: 0px 0px 0px 50px; list-style: none;"><li style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px 0px 7px; padding: 0px; list-style: square; position: relative; line-height: 1.7;">“37 Saudis Executed for Terrorism-Related Crimes”: Time (<a href="https://time.com/5576102/saudi-arabia-execution-terrorism-crimes/" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">4/23/19</a>)</li><li style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px 0px 7px; padding: 0px; list-style: square; position: relative; line-height: 1.7;">“Saudi Arabia Executes 37 in One Day for Terrorism”: New York Times (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-executions.html" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">4/23/19</a>)</li><li style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px 0px 7px; padding: 0px; list-style: square; position: relative; line-height: 1.7;">“Saudi Arabia Beheads 37 Prisoners for Terrorism Crimes”: PBS NewsHour (<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/saudi-arabia-beheads-37-prisoners-for-terrorism-crimes" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">4/23/19</a>)</li></ul>In fact, by looking at court documents from the Saudi government, we know that of these 37 men, 11 of them were<a href="https://www.esohr.org/en/?p=519" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;"> accused of being “Iranian spies</a>,” and 22 were accused of participating in a demonstration during the Arab Spring. (These 33 belonged to the Shia minority; the others practiced Sunni Islam or could not be identified.)<div class="p3_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Of the 22 men accused of protesting, six were <a href="https://www.esohr.org/en/?p=2206" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">juveniles at the time</a>. Mujtaba Al Suweikat was on his way to study at Western Michigan University when the Saudi authorities arrested him and charged him with “inciting disloyalty to the king.”<div class="p4_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Saeed Mohammed Al Skafi was 17 during the protests. One of the charges against him was “posting pictures of other detainees.” Most of the others were convicted of offenses like “chanting disloyal slogans about the king” and “using social media to incite demonstrations.”<div class="p5_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Of the 11 convicted of being Iranian spies, they were also found guilty of farcical offenses such as “<a href="https://www.esohr.org/en/?p=1286" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">condemning the bloodshed</a>” (in February 2012, Saudi forces in the Shia-majority Saudi governorate of Qatif had sprayed protesters with bullets) and saving images and documents of the protests (which are also available on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/user/Revolution2East" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">YouTube)</a> on their hard drives.<div class="p6_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><div class="alt_ad_block story-page-in-content-graph-5" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><div class="connatix" cnx-creative-type="VideoMonetization" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px 0px 10px; position: relative;"><div id="cnx-adUnit-overlay" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; position: absolute; background-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0); left: 0px; top: 0px; width: 629.986px; height: 364.361px; cursor: pointer;">A</div><div id="cnx-video-image" cnx-video-ratio="16:9" cnx-video-width="undefined" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer; position: relative;"><div class="cnx-ratio" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px 0px 354.361px; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;"></div><div class="cnx-video-content" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer; position: absolute; top: 0px; left: 0px; width: 629.986px; height: 354.361px;">mong the other four people executed, Khaled Al Tuwairji, a Sunni, was <a href="https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2016/07/28/The-death-sentence-against-Othman-s-murderers.html" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">accused of killing Maj. Gen. Nasser Othman</a>. However, all three outlets repeated that he was a “Sunni extremist,” for which we have no other evidence. Al Tuwairji was tortured into a confession (Erem News, <a href="https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/saudi-arabia/1783964" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">4/23/19</a>).  But all three outlets justified his execution and subsequent crucifixion by insisting that he was a convicted Sunni militant.</div></div></div></div><div class="p7_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Another of the Sunnis executed, Khaled Al Farraj, was convicted on the vague charge of being affiliated with an outlawed terrorist organization. But even according to Saudi state media, he didn’t engage in any acts of terrorism. He is the only one of the 37 people executed who seems to have been charged with a terrorism-related offense.<div class="p8_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">PBS NewsHour (<a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/saudi-arabia-beheads-37-prisoners-for-terrorism-crimes" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">4/23/19</a>)<div class="p9_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Having false information in the headlines is extremely prejudicial. Studies have <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/19/americans-read-headlines-and-not-much-else/?utm_term=.fcab55e6bc8b" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">repeatedly</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/06/16/six-in-10-of-you-will-share-this-link-without-reading-it-according-to-a-new-and-depressing-study/?utm_term=.c2487f6dfe19" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">shown</a> that a large portion of readers do not read past the headlines — and those that do end up remembering the headline the most.<div class="p10_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">In its <a href="https://newsdiffs.org/diff/1934606/1934749/www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-executions.html" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">first version of the article</a>, which has changed since then, the New York Times wrote of Saudi Arabia, “It listed the 37 men by name but provided little information about what specific crimes had been committed by whom or when.” Instead of relying on a Saudi press release, the Times could have tried a cursory web search — or even searched its own archives. In an article by the Times editorial board (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/saudi-executions-salman-trump.html" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">8/3/17</a>) nearly two years ago, it had a short biography of Mujtaba Al Suweikat, the “disloyal” Western Michigan student, and the specific crimes he had been charged with.<div class="p11_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Though the Times article was edited after publication to include some information that didn’t come from the Saudi press release — citing a Human Rights Watch official’s concern that many of the cases “raised serious rights concerns,” for example — the revised article was still misleading. For example, in paragraph three, it stated, “Some men had been involved in bomb attacks on security headquarters that had killed officers, the [state news] agency said.” As far as we know, none of the 37 executed men had been involved in any bomb attacks, but the Times never challenged this Saudi government assertion.<div class="p12_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">Furthermore, the Times said that 14 of those killed had been arrested in relation to “sometimes violent protests.” It failed to mention that that violence came from the Saudi government. This video, from July 2012, clearly shows Saudi police <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=icdlBJ2KXzE" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">firing on unarmed protesters</a>. In searching through the news archives, articles have <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/9012686/Saudi-forces-shoot-dead-Shiite-protester.html" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">repeatedly</a> <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/07/saudi-arabias-shiite-problem/" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">mentioned</a> protesters being shot by the Saudi police. There appear to be no reports (outside Saudi propaganda statements) of violence emanating from the protesters.<div class="p13_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">The articles in the Times, Time magazine and the NewsHour all mentioned Saudi-Iranian relations, thereby <a href="https://fair.org/home/vox-cia-iran-saudi-arabia-middle-east-cold-war/" target="blank" rel="noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-decoration-line: none; transition: color 0.3s ease 0s; cursor: pointer;">amplifying longstanding Saudi propaganda</a> that accuses Shia of being naturally loyal to Iran, which is blamed for  “stoking unrest” to justify brutal crackdowns of the religious minority.<div class="p14_15" style="box-sizing: border-box; outline: none; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);">All three outlets also added gratuitous details about the attack in Sri Lanka and/or other ISIS-related attacks — attacks that there’s no suggestion any of the defendants were connected to. In fact, most of these defendants were arrested before ISIS existed. And a majority of those killed, being Shiites, would be viewed by ISIS as heretics. To bring up these attacks seems like a distraction from the topic of the stories, which is the Saudi government beheading people who have for the most part been accused mainly of being dissidents.</div><div></div>==2x down on MBS 4/19? but then<a href="https://www.alternet.org/2019/04/jared-kushner-talks-of-accountability-for-crown-prince-as-saudis-offer-egregious-display-of-brutality-with-mass-beheadings/">https://www.alternet.org/2019/04/jared-kushner-talks-of-accountability-for-crown-prince-as-saudis-offer-egregious-display-of-brutality-with-mass-beheadings/</a>
Just as Jared Kushner answered questions about the close ties between

the White House and Saudi Arabia in New York on Tuesday, the Middle

Eastern kingdom beheaded 37 people in its largest mass execution in at

last three years.

The executions, of mostly Shiite men accused of terrorism related

crimes, were part of what Washington’s Gulf Institute director Ali

Al-Ahmed <a href="https://apnews.com/e653f1326ece453d9c2b4a9a733042f7">called</a> “the largest mass execution of Shiites in the kingdom’s history.”<div class="alt_ad_block story-page-in-content-graph-2">

</div>

Al-Ahmed identified 34 of the 37 victims as Shiite.

According to reports, Saudi Arabian security services nailed one of

the heads to a poll as a warning and one victim was crucified after his

execution.

Saudi Arabia displays severed head on pole as a

warning after beheading 37 Saudi citizens, most of them minority

Shiites, in a mass execution across the country for alleged

terrorism-related crimes. Via ⁦<a href="https://twitter.com/AP?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@AP</a>⁩ <a href="https://t.co/J3yxex0VjA">https://t.co/J3yxex0VjA</a>

— BrinleyBruton (@BrinleyBruton) <a href="https://twitter.com/BrinleyBruton/status/1120755322744901634?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 23, 2019</a><div class="alt_ad_block story-page-in-content-graph-5">

</ins></div></blockquote>

The killings were <a href="https://www.spa.gov.sa/1916366">announced</a> by

Saudi state media Tuesday morning, Eastern time, right before Kushner,

President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and a senior advisor to the

president, <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/23/kushner-mueller-probe-russian-election-interference-1287654">took the stage</a> at the Time 100 Summit event honoring the magazine’s annual list of the 100 most influential people in the world.

Saudi Arabia confirms beheading 37 citizens, most

of them minority Shiites, in a mass execution for alleged

terrorism-related crimes. One body and its severed head was tied to a

pole as a public warning. <a href="https://t.co/ydFt8M3r0C">https://t.co/ydFt8M3r0C</a>

— Steve Herman (@W7VOA) <a href="https://twitter.com/W7VOA/status/1120758613436522501?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 23, 2019</a></blockquote>

During an interview at the event with Time White House

correspondent Brian Bennett, Kushner fielded questions on a number of

foreign policy questions, including the Israel/Palestine conflict and

the Trump administration’s closeness to Russia.

Kushner was also asked a series of questions on Saudi Arabia and the

relationship between the U.S. and the kingdom, especially in light of

the murder of Jamal Kashoggi in October 2018 and the war on Yemen.

Kushner doesn’t dispute U.S. intelligence

services’ conclusion that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was

behind murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi <a href="https://t.co/iVRb7y2A98">https://t.co/iVRb7y2A98</a> <a href="https://t.co/NjXhE77NlJ">pic.twitter.com/NjXhE77NlJ</a>

— CBS News (@CBSNews) <a href="https://twitter.com/CBSNews/status/1120712833572974592?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 23, 2019</a></blockquote>

In his replies, Kushner downplayed the significance of the murder,

pled ignorance on the details of the crime, and admitted that he offered

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman guidance as the world demanded

accountability.

Kushner seems to acknowledge he advised Saudi Crown Prince MBS after <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Khashoggi?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Khashoggi</a>‘s murder.

“The advice I gave was be as transparent as possible and that

obviously we have to make sure there is accountability for what

happened,” Kushner says at <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/TIME100?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#TIME100</a> summit

— Jennifer Hansler (@jmhansler) <a href="https://twitter.com/jmhansler/status/1120712854141898752?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 23, 2019</a></blockquote>

“Obviously, we have to make sure there’s accountability for what happened,” <a href="https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/white-house-aide-kushner-says-has-urged-saudi-prince-to-be-transparent-about-khashoggi-killing-1843164">said</a>Kushner, before pivoting to a series of remarks critical of Iran, the Palestinians, and the Yemeni Houthis.

In response to the beheadings, Maya Foa, director of the U.K.-based

human rights groups Reprieve, put the “egregious display of brutality”

squarely at the feet of MbS and the Kingdom’s western allies which have

shielded it from exactly the accountability Kushner says he supports.

“That the Saudi regime believes it has impunity to carry out such

patently illegal executions, without notice,” Foa said, “should shock

its international partners into action.”

Reprieve Director <a href="https://twitter.com/mayafoa?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@mayafoa</a>:

“This is another egregious display of brutality by Crown Prince

Mohammed Bin Salman. That the Saudi regime believes it has impunity to

carry out such patently illegal executions, without notice, should shock

its international partners into action.”

— Reprieve (@Reprieve) <a href="https://twitter.com/Reprieve/status/1120753793606590464?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 23, 2019</a></blockquote>

In March 2018, The Intercept <a href="https://theintercept.com/2018/03/21/jared-kushner-saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman/">reported</a> that Bin Salman bragged that he had Kushner “in his pocket.”
https://bracingviews.com/2015/01/23/fewer-american-snipers-more-american-workers-and-builders/
AstoreFormer Army Ranger Rory Fanning has a <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175942/tomgram%3A_rory_fanning%2C_unpacking_the_war_on_terror/" style="box-sizing: inherit; background-color: transparent; text-decoration-line: none;">thoughtful article</a> at TomDispatch.com on why young men should not join the Army to fight the war on terror in distant lands.Here’s an excerpt:<blockquote style="box-sizing: inherit; border-left: 3px solid rgb(0, 116, 217); line-height: 1.2; margin: 0px 0px 24px; padding: 0px 0px 0px 24px; quotes: ">Believe me, it [the Afghan War] was ugly. We were often enough targeting innocent people based on bad intelligence and in some cases even seizing Afghans who had actually pledged allegiance to the U.S. mission… I know now that if our country’s leadership had truly had peace on its mind, it could have all been over in Afghanistan <a href="http://us.macmillan.com/nogoodmenamongtheliving/anandgopal" style="box-sizing: inherit; background-color: transparent; text-decoration-line: none;">in early 2002</a>.If you are shipped off to Iraq for our latest war there, remember that the Sunni population you will be targeting is reacting to a U.S.-backed Shia regime in Baghdad that’s done them dirty for years. ISIS exists to a significant degree because the largely secular members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party were labeled the enemy as they tried to surrender after the U.S. invasion of 2003 … Given the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-baghdad-middle-class-sunnis-say-they-prefer-militants-to-maliki/2014/07/11/fa0b66a7-1b09-409a-a5ed-ab580bc93a4a_story.html" style="box-sizing: inherit; text-decoration-line: none;">reign of terror</a> that followed, it’s hardly surprising to find former Baathist army officers in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story" style="box-sizing: inherit; text-decoration-line: none;">key positions</a> in ISIS and the Sunnis choosing that grim outfit as the lesser of the two evils in its world.  Again, the enemy you are being shipped off to fight is, at least in part, a <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175888/tomgram%3A_engelhardt,_the_escalation_follies/" style="box-sizing: inherit; text-decoration-line: none;">product</a> of your chain-of-command’s meddling in a sovereign country. And remember that, whatever its grim acts, this enemy presents no existential threat to American security, at least so <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/international/219659-biden-terrorism-no-existential-threat-to-us" style="box-sizing: inherit; text-decoration-line: none;">says</a> Vice President Joe Biden. Let that sink in for a while and then ask yourself whether you really can take your marching orders seriously.</blockquote>Fanning makes persuasive points here: How the U.S. military bungled its wars of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan; how often Iraqi and Afghan innocents were killed due to bad intelligence and the usual deadly mistakes associated with war; how the wars fed, and continue to feed, a cycle of violence that is perpetuated by new U.S. troop deployments and weapons sales (with respect to weapons sales, see this <a href="http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175943/tomgram%3A_peter_van_buren%2C_the_military-industrial_complex_in_iraq/" style="box-sizing: inherit; background-color: transparent; text-decoration-line: none;">excellent article</a> by Peter Van Buren, which details how the U.S. is hawking M1 Abrams main battle tanks to the Iraqis)....<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations" style="text-decoration-line: none; font-weight: bold; outline: none;">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations</a>
<a href="https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/sunni---shia-divide-explained/article19337058/" style="text-decoration-line: none; font-weight: bold; outline: none;">https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/sunni---shia-divide-explained/article19337058/</a><h3>=</h3><div><a href="https://www.alternet.org/cia-coup-set-stage-conflict-iran">https://www.alternet.org/cia-coup-set-stage-conflict-iran</a></div><div>
</div><div>medea b:</div><div><div>Before the theocratic government of today's Iran, there was the brutal Shah. Before the Shah, the CIA overthrew a pro-Western government that had been democratically elected. Mohammad Mossadegh was the prime minister and his US-backed downfall in 1953 was the spark that set in motion the conflict with Iran today. In this interview, Medea Benjamin sheds light on this seminal incident with Iran. She also explores the nation's history and politics.</div><div>
</div><div>Mark Karlin: How did the 1953 coup that re-installed the Shah relate to keeping the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from being nationalized?</div><div>
</div><div>Medea Benjamin: In 1934, the Shah had signed a contract with the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company giving it exclusive rights over the nation's oil for the next 60 years. The public ire over the giveaway of the nation's resources culminated in 1951 with the election of Mohammad Mossadegh as prime minister. Mossadegh introduced a bill to nationalize the oil, a bill that was unanimously approved by Parliament. The British then convinced the US government that nationalization was unacceptable, leading to a CIA coup that reinstated the Shah and ensured that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later renamed BP) could continue to exploit Iran's resources.</div><div>
</div><div>
</div><div>What was the impact of the coup?</div><div>
</div><div>The CIA coup that overthrew Iran's democratically elected government, while deemed successful at the time, has had a tragic impact on the Iranian people and US-Iranian relations. The Shah was put back in charge with even more dictatorial powers. He built a terrifying internal security force called SAVAK that "disappeared," tortured and killed political dissidents. All the secular parties and organizations that had opposed the Shah were dismantled and banned. The only important institution that maintained some independence and could still speak with moral authority to the concerns of the public was the Shi'ite clergy, setting the stage for the 1979 Islamic Revolution. And thanks to the constant US meddling in Iran's internal affairs, the 1979 Revolution was not only anti-Shah, but anti-American.</div><div>
</div><div>Since then, the US policy has been one of trying to economically strangle the government through a variety of sanctions and trying to foment a counter-revolution. It was only during the Obama administration that there was some rapprochement with the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, but this deal was opposed by Donald Trump.</div><div>
</div><div>Can you briefly explain the conflict between Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia and Shi'ite Persian Iran?</div><div>
</div><div>The religious division between Sunni and Shia dates back to Islam's founding in the 7th century, but Sunni and Shia have coexisted without significant conflict for much of the history of the Middle East. It was only after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran that the rivalry exploded. The new Iranian leaders challenged the legitimacy of the Saudi royal family, claiming that Islam was incompatible with hereditary monarchies. The Saudi rulers' response was to denounce Iran's revolution as a power play by heretical Shi'ites. In essence, the Saudi-Iran rivalry is less about religion than it is about power and politics.</div></div>=

<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations"> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations</a>
Sunni Islam and Shia Islam are the two major <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_schools_and_branches" title="Islamic schools and branches">denominations of Islam</a>. Their division traces back to a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni_Islam" title="Sunni Islam">Sunni</a>–<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia_Islam" title="Shia Islam">Shia</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schism_%28religion%29" class="mw-redirect" title="Schism (religion)">schism</a> following the death of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prophets_in_Islam" class="mw-redirect" title="Prophets in Islam">Islamic prophet</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad" title="Muhammad">Muhammad</a> in the year 632. A dispute over <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Succession_to_Muhammad" title="Succession to Muhammad">succession to Muhammad</a> as a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliph" class="mw-redirect" title="Caliph">caliph</a> of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ummah" title="Ummah">Islamic community</a> spread across various parts of the world, which led to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jamal" class="mw-redirect" title="Battle of Jamal">Battle of Jamal</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Siffin" title="Battle of Siffin">Battle of Siffin</a>. The dispute intensified greatly after the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karbala" title="Battle of Karbala">Battle of Karbala</a>, in which <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hussein_ibn_Ali" class="mw-redirect" title="Hussein ibn Ali">Hussein ibn Ali</a> and his household were killed by the ruling Umayyad Caliph <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yazid_I" title="Yazid I">Yazid I</a>, and the outcry for revenge divided the early Islamic community.

The present demographic breakdown between the two denominations is difficult to assess and varies by source, but <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Muslim_population" class="mw-redirect" title="List of countries by Muslim population">a good approximation</a> is that 85–90% of the world's <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim" title="Muslim">Muslims</a> are Sunni<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-1">[1]</a> and 10–15% are Shia,<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-cia-2">[2]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-3">[3]</a> with most Shias belonging to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelver" title="Twelver">Twelver</a> tradition and the rest divided between many other groups.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-cia-2">[2]</a> Sunnis are a majority in most Muslim communities: in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southeast_Asia" title="Southeast Asia">Southeast Asia</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China" title="China">China</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Asia" title="South Asia">South Asia</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa" title="Africa">Africa</a>, and most of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_world" title="Arab world">Arab world</a>. Shia make up the majority of the citizen population in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq" title="Iraq">Iraq</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain" title="Bahrain">Bahrain</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanon" title="Lebanon">Lebanon</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran" title="Iran">Iran</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azerbaijan" title="Azerbaijan">Azerbaijan</a>, as well as being a politically significant minority in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan" title="Pakistan">Pakistan</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria" title="Syria">Syria</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen" title="Yemen">Yemen</a>. Azerbaijan is predominantly Shia; however, practicing adherents are much fewer.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-4">[4]</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia" title="Indonesia">Indonesia</a>

has the largest number of Sunni Muslims, while Iran has the largest

number of Shia Muslims (Twelver) in the world. Pakistan has the

second-largest Sunni. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India" title="India">India</a> has the second-largest Shia Muslim (Twelver) population in the world.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-5">[5]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-6">[6]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-7">[7]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-8">[8]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-9">[9]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-10">[10]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-11">[11]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-12">[12]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-13">[13]</a>

Today, there are differences in religious practice, traditions, and customs, often related to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiqh" title="Fiqh">jurisprudence</a>. Although all Muslim groups consider the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quran" title="Quran">Quran</a> to be divine, Sunni and Shia have different opinions on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadith" title="Hadith">hadith</a>.

In recent years, Sunni–Shia relations have been increasingly marked by conflict,<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-14">[14]</a> particularly the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Saudi_Arabia_proxy_conflict" title="Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict">Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict</a>. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sectarian_violence_among_Muslims" title="Sectarian violence among Muslims">Sectarian violence</a> persists to this day from Pakistan to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemen" title="Yemen">Yemen</a> and is a major element of friction throughout the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East" title="Middle East">Middle East</a>.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-auto-15">[15]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-scribd.com-16">[16]</a> Tensions between communities have intensified during power struggles, such as the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahraini_uprising_%282011%E2%80%93present%29" class="mw-redirect" title="Bahraini uprising (2011–present)">Bahraini uprising</a>, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War" title="Iraq War">Iraq War</a>, and most recently the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Civil_War" title="Syrian Civil War">Syrian Civil War</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-Nasr.2C_Vali_2006.2C_p.106-17">[17]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-Civil_War-18">[18]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-19">[19]</a> and in the formation of the self-styled <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_Syria" class="mw-redirect" title="Islamic State of Iraq and Syria">Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</a> that has launched a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genocide_of_Shias_by_ISIL" title="Genocide of Shias by ISIL">genocide against Shias</a>.

<h2>Contents</h2>

</div></div><div id="toc" class="toc"><ul><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-1"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Numbers">1 Numbers</a></li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-2"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Historical_beliefs_and_leadership">2 Historical beliefs and leadership</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-3"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Successors_of_Muhammad">2.1 Successors of Muhammad</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-4"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Mahdi">2.2 Mahdi</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-5"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Hadith">2.3 Hadith</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-6"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shiism_and_Sufism">2.4 Shiism and Sufism</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-7"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Pillars_of_faith">2.5 Pillars of faith</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-8"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Practices">2.6 Practices</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-9"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Salat">2.6.1 Salat</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-10"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Mut.27ah_and_Misyar">2.6.2 Mut'ah and Misyar</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-11"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Hijab_and_dress">2.6.3 Hijab and dress</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-12"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Given_names">2.6.4 Given names</a></li></ul>

</li></ul>

</li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-13"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#History">3 History</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-14"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Abbasid_era">3.1 Abbasid era</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-15"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shia.E2.80.93Sunni_in_Iraq">3.2 Shia–Sunni in Iraq</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-16"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shia.E2.80.93Sunni_in_Persia">3.3 Shia–Sunni in Persia</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-17"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#The_Shia_in_Persia_before_the_Safavids">3.3.1 The Shia in Persia before the Safavids</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-18"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shiism_in_Persia_after_Safavids">3.3.2 Shiism in Persia after Safavids</a></li></ul>

</li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-19"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shia.E2.80.93Sunni_in_Levant">3.4 Shia–Sunni in Levant</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-20"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shia.E2.80.93Sunni_in_South_Asia">3.5 Shia–Sunni in South Asia</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-21"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shia-Sunni_Relations_in_the_Mughal_Empire">3.5.1 Shia-Sunni Relations in the Mughal Empire</a></li></ul>

</li></ul>

</li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-22"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Modern_Sunni.E2.80.93Shia_relations">4 Modern Sunni–Shia relations</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-25"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Iraq">4.2.1 Iraq</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-26"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Iran">4.2.2 Iran</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-27"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Syria">4.2.3 Syria</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-28"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Saudi_Arabia">4.2.4 Saudi Arabia</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-29"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Lebanon">4.2.5 Lebanon</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-30"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Jordan">4.2.6 Jordan</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-31"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Egypt">4.2.7 Egypt</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-32"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Yemen">4.2.8 Yemen</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-33"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Bahrain">4.2.9 Bahrain</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-34"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Pakistan">4.2.10 Pakistan</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-35"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Afghanistan">4.2.11 Afghanistan</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-36"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Nigeria">4.2.12 Nigeria</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-37"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#South_East_Asia">4.2.13 South East Asia</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-38"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#United_States">4.2.14 United States</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-39"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Europe">4.2.15 Europe</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-40"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Australia">4.2.16 Australia</a></li></ul>

</li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-41"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant">4.3 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</a></li></ul>

</li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-42"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Efforts_to_foster_Sunni.E2.80.93Shia_unity">5 Efforts to foster Sunni–Shia unity</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-43"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Saudi-Iran_summit">5.1 Saudi-Iran summit</a></li><li class="toclevel-2 tocsection-44"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Some_opinions_about_unity">5.2 Some opinions about unity</a>

<ul><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-45"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Sunni_scholars">5.2.1 Sunni scholars</a></li><li class="toclevel-3 tocsection-46"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Shiite_scholars">5.2.2 Shiite scholars</a></li></ul>

</li></ul>

</li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-47"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#See_also">6 See also</a></li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-48"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#References">7 References</a></li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-49"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#Further_reading">8 Further reading</a></li><li class="toclevel-1 tocsection-50"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#External_links">9 External links</a></li></ul>

</div>

<h2>Numbers</h2>Sunnis

are a majority in most Muslim communities in Southeast Asia, China,

South Asia, Africa, most of the Arab World, and among <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslims_in_the_United_States" class="mw-redirect" title="Muslims in the United States">Muslims in the United States</a> (of which 85–90% are Sunnis).<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-20">[20]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-21">[21]</a>

This can also be confusing because of the fact that the majority of

Arab Muslims in the United States are Shia, while the majority of Arab

Americans are Christians, the conflation of Arab and Muslim being quite

common.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-22">[22]</a>

Shias make up the majority of the Muslim population in Iran (around 95%), Azerbaijan (around 90%),<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-23">[23]</a>

Iraq (around 75%) and Bahrain (around 70%). Minority communities are

also found in Yemen where over 47% of the population are Shia (mostly of

the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaidiyyah" title="Zaidiyyah">Zaidi</a> sect), according to the UNHCR.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-UNHRC-24">[24]</a> Others put the numbers of Shias at 30%.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-25">[25]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-cp-26">[26]</a> About 15–20% of Turkey's population belong to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alevi" class="mw-redirect" title="Alevi">Alevi</a> sect. The Shia constitute around 30–40% of Kuwait,<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-irfr2012-27">[27]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-ssi-28">[28]</a> 45–55% of the Muslim population in Lebanon, 25% of Saudi Arabia,<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-ssi-28">[28]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-29">[29]</a>

12% of Syria, and 20–25% of Pakistan. Around 15–20% of Afghanistan,

less than 75% of the Muslims in Nigeria, and around 5% of population of

Tajikistan are Shia.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-30">[30]</a>

...Shias are about 25-to-30 percent of the entire Muslim world. We

don't have accurate statistics because in much of the Middle East it is

not convenient to have them, for ruling regimes in particular. But the

estimates are that they are about 25 to 30 percent of the Muslim world,

which puts them somewhere between 230 and 320 million people....The

overwhelming majority of that population lives between Pakistan and

Lebanon. Iran always had been a Shia country, the largest one, with a

population of about 70 million. Pakistan is the second-largest Shia

country in the world, with about 30 million population. Also

potentially, there are as many Shias in India as there are in Iraq.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-31">[31]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-32">[32]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-TPF-33">[33]</a>

<div class="templatequotecite"><cite>— Vali Nasr, 18 October 2006</cite></div>

</blockquote>

[nice color map]
<h2>Historical beliefs and leadership</h2><h3>Successors of Muhammad</h3><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Further information: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descendants_of_Muhammad" class="mw-redirect" title="Descendants of Muhammad">Descendants of Muhammad</a></div>

Sunnis believe that <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Bakr" title="Abu Bakr">Abu Bakr</a>, the father of Muhammad's wife <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aisha" title="Aisha">Aisha</a>, was Muhammad's rightful successor and that the method of choosing or electing leaders (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shura" title="Shura">Shura</a>) guided by the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quran" title="Quran">Quran</a> is the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consensus_decision-making" title="Consensus decision-making">consensus</a> of the Ummah (the Muslim community).

Shias believe that Muhammad divinely ordained his cousin and son-in-law <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali" title="Ali">Ali</a> Ibn Abi Talib (the father of his grandsons <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hasan_ibn_Ali" title="Hasan ibn Ali">Hasan ibn Ali</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hussein_ibn_Ali" class="mw-redirect" title="Hussein ibn Ali">Hussein ibn Ali</a>) in accordance with the command of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allah_in_Islam" class="mw-redirect" title="Allah in Islam">Allah</a>

to be the next caliph, making Ali and his direct descendants Muhammad's

successors. Shias believe that Muhammad quoted this, in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadith_of_the_pond_of_Khumm" title="Hadith of the pond of Khumm">Hadith of the pond of Khumm</a>. Ali was married to <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatimah" title="Fatimah">Fatimah</a>, Muhammad's daughter by his wife <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khadijah_bint_Khuwaylid" class="mw-redirect" title="Khadijah bint Khuwaylid">Khadijah bint Khuwaylid</a>.

Aisha supported her father Abu Bakr as the successor to Muhammad. It

is important to note that Ali Ibn Abi Talib never raised any claim to

Caliphate himself, and remained totally loyal to all the three caliphs

elected before him.

Sunnis follow the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rashidun" title="Rashidun">Rashidun</a> "rightly guided Caliphs", who were the first four caliphs who ruled after the death of Muhammad: Abu Bakr (632–634), <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umar" title="Umar">Umar ibn al-Khattab</a> (634–644), <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uthman_ibn_Affan" class="mw-redirect" title="Uthman ibn Affan">Uthman ibn Affan</a> (644–656), and the aforementioned <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali" title="Ali">Ali</a> Ibn Abi Talib (656–661).

After the third caliph Uthman ibn Affan was assassinated by some

revolters, Ali Ibn Abi Talib was elected as the fourth caliph. Ali,

being more concerned about restoring peace in the land, stayed back from

taking any immediate action against the assassins of the previous

caliph, Uthman. In the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bassorah" class="mw-redirect" title="Battle of Bassorah">Battle of the Camel</a> (656), Aisha opposed her step son-in-law Ali outside the city of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basra" title="Basra">Basra</a>,

because she wanted justice on the assassins of the previous caliph,

Uthman. Aisha's forces were defeated and Muhammad's widow was

respectfully escorted back to Medina.

Shia theology discounts the legitimacy of the first three caliphs and

believes that Ali is the second-most divinely inspired man (after

Muhammad) and that he and his descendants by Fatimah, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imamah_%28Shi%27a_doctrine%29" class="mw-redirect" title="Imamah (Shi'a doctrine)">Imams</a>, are the sole legitimate Islamic leaders.

The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imamate" title="Imamate">Imamate</a> of the Shia encompasses far more of a prophetic function than the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caliphate" title="Caliphate">Caliphate</a>

of the Sunnis. Unlike Sunni, Shias believe special spiritual qualities

have been granted not only to Muhammad but also to Ali and the other

Imams. Twelvers believe the imams are immaculate from sin and human

error (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Fourteen_Infallibles" title="The Fourteen Infallibles">ma'sūm</a>), and can understand and interpret the hidden inner meaning of the teachings of Islam. In this way the Imams are trustees (wasi) who bear the light of Muhammad (Nūr Muhammadin).<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-34">[34]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-franc46-35">[35]</a>

<h3>Mahdi</h3>...<h3>Post-1980</h3><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">See also: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War" title="Iran–Iraq War">Iran–Iraq War</a></div>

</div></div></div><div class="thumb tright"><div class="thumbinner" style="width:222px;"><div class="thumbcaption">

Damage to a mosque in <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khoramshahr" class="mw-redirect" title="Khoramshahr">Khoramshahr, Iran</a></div>

</div>

</div>

Following this period, Sunni–Shia strife has seen a major upturn,

particularly in Iraq and Pakistan, leading to thousands of deaths. Among

the explanations for the increase are conspiracies by outside forces to

divide Muslims,<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-guardian-2007-87">[87]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-mideastwire.com-88">[88]</a> the recent Islamic revival and increased religious purity and consequent <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takfir" title="Takfir">takfir</a>,<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-nasr-2006-106-89">[89]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-nasr-2006-148-90">[90]</a> upheaval, destruction and loss of power of Sunni caused by the US invasion of Iraq, and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sectarianism" title="Sectarianism">sectarianism</a> generated by Arab regimes defending themselves against the mass uprisings of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring" title="Arab Spring">Arab Spring</a>.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-NYRB-Ruthven-91">[91]</a>

<dl><dt>Outside conspiracies</dt></dl>

Many explain the bloodshed as the work of conspiracies by outside

forces—"the forces of hegemony and Zionism which aim to weaken [Arabs]" (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akbar_Hashemi_Rafsanjani" title="Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani">Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yusuf_al-Qaradawi" title="Yusuf al-Qaradawi">Yusuf al-Qaradawi</a>),<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-mideastwire.com-88">[88]</a> unspecified "enemies" (Iran president <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahmoud_Ahmadinejad" title="Mahmoud Ahmadinejad">Mahmoud Ahmadinejad</a>),<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-iht-2007-92">[92]</a> or "oppressive pressure by the imperialist front." (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahmoud_Ahmadinejad" title="Mahmoud Ahmadinejad">Mahmoud Ahmadinejad</a>).<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-guardian-2007-87">[87]</a>

<dl><dt>Islamic revival</dt></dl>

Others lay the blame for the strife at a very different source, the unintended effects of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_revival" title="Islamic revival">Islamic revival</a>. According to scholar <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vali_Nasr" title="Vali Nasr">Vali Nasr</a>, as the Muslim world was decolonialised and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_nationalism" title="Arab nationalism">Arab nationalism</a>

lost its appeal, fundamentalism blossomed and reasserted the

differences and conflicts between the two movements, particularly in the

strict teachings of Sunni scholar <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Taymiyyah" title="Ibn Taymiyyah">Ibn Taymiyyah</a>.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-nasr-2006-106-89">[89]</a>

The Iranian Islamic revolution changed the Shia–Sunni power equation in

Muslim countries "from Lebanon to India" arousing the traditionally

subservient Shia to the alarm of traditionally dominant and very

non-revolutionary Sunni.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-nasr-2006-148-90">[90]</a>

"Where Iranian revolutionaries saw Islamic revolutionary stirrings,

Sunnis saw mostly Shia mischief and a threat to Sunni predominance."<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-93">[93]</a>

Although the Iranian revolution's leader, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayatollah_Khomeini" class="mw-redirect" title="Ayatollah Khomeini">Ayatollah Khomeini</a>,

was very much in favor of Shia–Sunni unity, he also challenged Saudi

Arabia, in his view an "unpopular and corrupt dictatorship" and an

"American lackey" ripe for revolution. In part because Saudi Arabia was

the world's major international <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamism#Saudi_Arabian_funding" title="Islamism">funder</a>

of Islamic schools, scholarships, and fellowships, this angered not

only Saudi Arabia but its many fundamentalist allies and benefactors

throughout the Arab world, according to Nasr.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-Nasr.2C_Vali_2006_p.143-4-94">[94]</a>

Another effect noted by political scientist <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilles_Kepel" title="Gilles Kepel">Gilles Kepel</a>, is that the initial attraction of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolution" class="mw-redirect" title="Islamic Revolution">Islamic Revolution</a>

to Sunnis as well as Shia, and Khomeini's desire to export his

revolution motivated the Saudi establishment to shore up its "religious

legitimacy" with more strictness in religion (and with jihad in

Afghanistan) to compete with Iran's revolutionary ideology.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-GKJTPI2002:137-95">[95]</a> But doing so in Saudi meant a more anti-Shia policies because Saudi's own native Sunni school of Islam is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism" title="Wahhabism">Wahhabism</a>,

which includes the prohibition of Shia Islam itself, as strict Wahhabis

do not consider Shia to be Islamic. This new strictness was spread not

only among Saudis in the kingdom but thousands of students and Saudi

funded schools and international Islamist volunteers who came to

training camps in Peshawar Pakistan in the 1980s to learn to fight jihad

in Afghanistan and went home in the 1990s to fight jihad. Both groups

(especially in Iraq and Pakistan) saw Shia as the enemy.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-GKJTPI2002:142-3-96">[96]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-Gonzalez-2009-78-97">[97]</a><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-Murphy-2013-97-98">[98]</a>

Thus, although the Iranian revolution's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was

very much in favor of Shia–Sunni unity, and "the leadership position

that went with it",<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-99">[99]</a> his revolution worked against it.

From the Iranian Revolution to 2015, Shia groups in Lebanon, Iraq,

Syria, Yemen, supported by Iran have recently won "important political

victories" which have boosted Iran’s regional influence.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-CFR-SSD-100">[100]</a> In Lebanon, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah" title="Hezbollah">Hezbollah</a>, the Lebanese Shia militia and political movement is the "strongest political actor" in the country. Since the 2003 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Iraq" class="mw-redirect" title="Invasion of Iraq">invasion of Iraq</a> removed <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein" title="Saddam Hussein">Saddam Hussein</a>

from power and instituted elected government, the Shia majority has

dominated the parliament and its prime ministers have been Shia.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-CFR-SSD-100">[100]</a>

In Syria, a Shia minority—the heterodox Alawi sect that makes up only

about 13 percent of the population—dominate the upper reaches of the

government, military and security services in Syria, and are the

"backbone" of the forces fighting to protect the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bashir_al-Assad" class="mw-redirect" title="Bashir al-Assad">Bashir al-Assad</a> regime in Syria’s civil war.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-CFR-SSD-100">[100]</a> In Yemen, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthis" title="Houthis">Houthi</a> rebels have expanded their territory south of Saudi Arabia, and become the country's "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Houthi_insurgency_in_Yemen" title="Houthi insurgency in Yemen">dominant power</a>".<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-CFR-SSD-100">[100]</a>

<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olivier_Roy_%28professor%29" title="Olivier Roy (professor)">Olivier Roy</a>, research director at the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_National_Centre_for_Scientific_Research" class="mw-redirect" title="French National Centre for Scientific Research">French National Centre for Scientific Research</a>,

sees the "Shia awakening and its instrumentalisation by Iran" as

leading to a "very violent Sunni reaction", starting first in Pakistan

before spreading to "the rest of the Muslim world, without necessarily

being as violent." According to Roy, "two events created a sea change in

the balance of power between Shia and Sunnis: the Islamic revolution in

Iran and the American military intervention in Iraq" in 2003. "Today,

Azerbaijan is probably the only country where there are still mixed

mosques and Shia and Sunnis pray together."<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-101">[101]</a>

From 1994 to 2014 satellite television and high-speed Internet has

spread "hate speech" against both Sunni and Shia. Fundamentalist Sunni

clerics have popularized slurs against Shia such as "Safawis" (from the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safavid" class="mw-redirect" title="Safavid">Safavid</a> empire, thus implying their being an Iranian agents), or even worse rafidha (rejecters of the faith), and majus (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zoroastrian" class="mw-redirect" title="Zoroastrian">Zoroastrian</a> or crypto Persian). In turn, Shia religious scholars have "mocked and cursed" the first three caliphs and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aisha" title="Aisha">Aisha</a>, Mohammed’s youngest wife who fought against <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali" title="Ali">Ali</a>.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-CFR-SSD-100">[100]</a>

<dl><dt>US invasion of Iraq</dt></dl>

Among those blaming the US invasion of Iraq are Fawaz Gerges, who writes in his book ISIS: A History,

By destroying state institutions and establishing a sectarian-based

political system, the 2003 US-led invasion polarized the country along

Sunni-Shia lines and set the stage for a fierce, prolonged struggle

driven by identity politics. Anger against the United States was also

fueled by the humiliating disbandment of the Iraqi army and the

de-Baathification law, which was first introduced as a provision and

then turned into a permanent article of the constitution.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-NYRB-Ruthven-91">[91]</a>

</blockquote>

Malise Ruthven writes that the post invasion <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-Ba%27athification" title="De-Ba'athification">de-Ba'athification</a>

by the US occupiers deprived Iraq of "the officer class and

administrative cadres that had ruled under Saddam Hussein, leaving the

field to sectarian-based militias".<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-NYRB-Ruthven-91">[91]</a> Many of officers joined the anti-Shia takfiri <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISIL" class="mw-redirect" title="ISIL">ISIL</a> group.

The US-led invasion also “tilted the regional balance of power

decisively" in favor of Shia Iran, alarming Sunni and leading to talk of

a “Shia Crescent”.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-NYRB-Ruthven-91">[91]</a>

<dl><dt>Counter-revolutionary tactic</dt></dl>

<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marc_Lynch" title="Marc Lynch">Marc Lynch</a> in his book The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East, argues that as old regimes or political forces sought to control "the revolutionary upsurge" of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring" title="Arab Spring">Arab Spring</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sectarianism" title="Sectarianism">sectarianism</a>

became “a key weapon” to undermine unity among the anti-regime masses.

Christians were pitted "against Muslims in Egypt, Jordanians against

Palestinians in Jordan, and, above all, Sunnis against Shi’ites wherever

possible.”<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-NYRB-Ruthven-91">[91]</a>

<h4>Iraq</h4><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main articles: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia_Islam_in_Iraq" title="Shia Islam in Iraq">Shia Islam in Iraq</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Iraq" title="Islam in Iraq">Islam in Iraq</a></div>

Shia–Sunni discord in Iraq starts with disagreement over the relative

population of the two groups. According to most sources, including the

CIA's <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Factbook" title="The World Factbook">World Factbook</a>, the majority of Iraqis are Shia <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Muslims" title="Arab Muslims">Arab Muslims</a> (60%-70%), and Sunni <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Muslims" title="Arab Muslims">Arab Muslims</a> represent between 32% and 37% of the population.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-102">[102]</a> However, Sunni are split ethnically between <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_people" class="mw-redirect" title="Arab people">Arabs</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_people" class="mw-redirect" title="Kurdish people">Kurds</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Turkmens" title="Iraqi Turkmens">Turkmen</a>. Many Sunnis hotly dispute their minority status, including ex-Iraqi Ambassador Faruq Ziada,<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-103">[103]</a> and many believe Shia majority is "a myth spread by America".<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-104">[104]</a> One Sunni belief shared by Jordan's <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdullah_II_of_Jordan" title="Abdullah II of Jordan">King Abdullah</a> as well as his then Defense Minister Shaalan is that Shia numbers in Iraq were inflated by Iranian Shias crossing the border.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-105">[105]</a> Shia scholar Vali Nasr believes the election turnout in summer and December 2005 confirmed a strong Shia majority in Iraq.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-106">[106]</a>

The British, having put down a Shia rebellion against their rule in

the 1920s, "confirmed their reliance on a corps of Sunni ex-officers of

the collapsed Ottoman empire". The British <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonialism" title="Colonialism">colonial</a> rule ended after the Sunni and Shia united against it.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-107">[107]</a>

The Shia suffered indirect and direct <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persecution_of_Shia_Muslims" class="mw-redirect" title="Persecution of Shia Muslims">persecution</a> under post-colonial Iraqi governments since 1932, erupting into <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Shia_revolts_1935%E2%80%931936" class="mw-redirect" title="Iraqi Shia revolts 1935–1936">full-scale rebellions</a> in 1935 and 1936. Shias were also persecuted during the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27ath_Party" title="Ba'ath Party">Ba'ath Party</a> rule, especially under <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein" title="Saddam Hussein">Saddam Hussein</a>. It is said that every Shia clerical family of note in Iraq had tales of torture and murder to recount.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-108">[108]</a> In 1969 the son of Iraq's highest Shia Ayatollah <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhsin_al-Hakim" title="Muhsin al-Hakim">Muhsin al-Hakim</a> was arrested and allegedly tortured. From 1979–1983 Saddam's regime executed 48 major Shia clerics in Iraq.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-109">[109]</a> They included Shia leader <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Baqir_al-Sadr" class="mw-redirect" title="Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr">Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr</a>

and his sister. Tens of thousands of Iranians and Arabs of Iranian

origin were expelled in 1979 and 1980 and a further 75,000 in 1989.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-110">[110]</a>

The Shias openly <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_uprisings_in_Iraq" title="1991 uprisings in Iraq">revolted against Saddam</a> following the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War" title="Gulf War">Gulf War</a>

in 1991 and were encouraged by Saddam's defeat in Kuwait and by

simultaneous Kurdish uprising in the north. However, Shia opposition to

the government was brutally suppressed, resulting in some 50,000 to

100,000 casualties and successive repression by Saddam's forces.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-111">[111]</a> The governing regimes of Iraq were composed mainly of Sunnis for nearly a century until the 2003 Iraq War.

Some of the worst <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sectarian_violence" title="Sectarian violence">sectarian strife</a> ever has occurred after the start of the Iraq War, steadily building up to the present.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-Civil_War-18">[18]</a> The war has featured a cycle of Sunni–Shia revenge killing—Sunni often used car bombs, while Shia favored <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_squad" title="Death squad">death squads</a>.<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia%E2%80%93Sunni_relations#cite_note-112">[112]</a>
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<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/q-and-a-how-do-sunni-and-shia-islam-differ.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/q-and-a-how-do-sunni-and-shia-islam-differ.html</a>

<a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/saudiarabia/index.html?inline=nyt-geo" title="More news and information about Saudi Arabia." class="meta-loc">Saudi Arabia</a>’s <a title="Related Times article." href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/03/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-executes-47-sheikh-nimr-shiite-cleric.html?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article">execution</a> of the Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr could escalate tensions in the Muslim world even further. In the Shiite theocracy <a title="More news and information about Iran." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html?inline=nyt-geo">Iran</a>, the supreme leader, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-execution-sheikh-nimr.html">Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,</a> <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabia-execution-sheikh-nimr.html"> said on Sunday</a> that Saudi Arabia, which is ruled by a Sunni monarchy, would face “divine vengeance” for the killing of the outspoken cleric, which was part of a mass execution of 47 men. Sheikh Nimr had advocated for greater political rights for Shiites in Saudi Arabia and surrounding countries. Saudi Arabia had accused him of inciting violence against the state.

Here is a primer on the basic differences between Sunni and Shia Islam.

What caused the split?

A schism emerged after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, and disputes arose over who should shepherd the new and rapidly growing faith.

Some believed that a new leader should be chosen by consensus; others thought that only the prophet’s descendants should become caliph. The title passed to a trusted aide, Abu Bakr, though some thought it should have gone to Ali, the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law. Ali eventually did become caliph after Abu Bakr’s two successors were assassinated.

<figure id="media-100000004122948" class="media photo embedded layout-large-horizontal media-100000004122948 ratio-tall" data-media-action="modal" itemprop="associatedMedia" itemscope="" itemid="https://static01.nyt.com/images/2016/01/04/world/04SHEIKH1/04SHEIKH1-master675.jpg" itemtype="http://schema.org/ImageObject" aria-label="media" role="group">Photo

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<figcaption class="caption" itemprop="caption description">Shiite pilgrims at the shrine to Imam Hussein in Karbala, Iraq, in December. Each year millions visit the city to mark Arbaeen, the end of the 40-day mourning period for Imam Hussein, one of Shiite Islam's most revered figures. Credit European Pressphoto Agency</figcaption>

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After Ali also was assassinated, with a poison-laced sword at the mosque in Kufa, in what is now <a title="More news and information about Iraq." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/index.html?inline=nyt-geo">Iraq</a>, his sons Hasan and then Hussein claimed the title. But Hussein and many of his relatives were massacred in Karbala, <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iraq/index.html?inline=nyt-geo" title="More news and information about Iraq." class="meta-loc">Iraq</a>, in 680. His martyrdom became a central tenet to those who believed that Ali should have succeeded the prophet. (It is mourned every year during the month of Muharram.) The followers became known as Shiites, a contraction of the phrase Shiat Ali, or followers of Ali.

<a class="visually-hidden skip-to-text-link" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/q-and-a-how-do-sunni-and-shia-islam-differ.html#story-continues-1">Continue reading the main story</a></div>

<h2 class="module-heading">Related Coverag</h2>

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<h2 class="headline">Saudi Arabia Cuts Ties With Iran Amid Fallout From Cleric’s Execution <time class="dateline">JAN. 3, 2016</time></h2>

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<h2 class="headline">Questions Rebels Use to Tell Sunni From Shiite JUNE 24,2014</h2>

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<h3 class="kicker">REFRESHER COURSE</h3>

<h2 class="headline">Sunni Muslims - Shiite Muslims - Silvestre Reyes - United States Congress <time class="dateline">DEC. 17, 2006</time></h2>

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<a class="visually-hidden skip-to-text-link" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/q-and-a-how-do-sunni-and-shia-islam-differ.html#story-continues-2">Continue reading the main story</a>

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The Sunnis, however, regard Ali as well as the three caliphs before him as rightly guided and themselves as the true adherents to the Sunnah, or the prophet’s tradition. Sunni rulers embarked on sweeping conquests that extended the caliphate into North Africa and Europe. The last caliphate ended with the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I.

How do their beliefs differ?

The Sunni and Shiite sects of Islam encompass a wide spectrum of doctrine, opinion and schools of thought. The branches are in agreement on many aspects of Islam, but there are considerable disagreements within each. Both branches include worshipers who run the gamut from secular to fundamentalist. Shiites consider Ali and the leaders who came after him as imams. Most believe in a line of 12 imams, the last of whom, a boy, is believed to have vanished in the ninth century in Iraq after his father was murdered. Shiites known as Twelvers anticipate his return as the Mahdi, or Messiah. Because of the different paths the two sects took, Sunnis emphasize God’s power in the material world, sometimes including the public and political realm, while Shiites value in martyrdom and sacrifice.

Which sect is larger, and where is each concentrated?

More than 85 percent of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims are Sunni. They live across the Arab world, as well as in countries like Turkey, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia. <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html?inline=nyt-geo" title="More news and information about Iran." class="meta-loc">Iran</a>, Iraq and Bahrain are largely Shiite. The Saudi royal family, which practices an austere and conservative strand of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism, controls Islam’s holiest shrines, Mecca and Medina. Karbala, Kufa and Najaf in Iraq are revered shrines for the Shiites.

Saudi Arabia and Iran, the dominant Sunni and Shiite powers in the Middle East, often take opposing sides in regional conflicts. In Yemen, Shiite rebels from the north, the Houthis, overthrew a Sunni-dominated government, leading to an invasion by a Saudi-led coalition. In Syria, which has a Sunni majority, the Alawite Shiite sect of President <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/bashar_al_assad/index.html?inline=nyt-per" title="More articles about Bashar Al-Assad." class="meta-per">Bashar al-Assad</a>, which has long dominated the government, clings to power amid a bloody civil war. And in Iraq, bitter resentments between the Shiite-led government and Sunni communities have contributed to victories by the Islamic State.

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