Climate Obstruct Roberts

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4. Networks of think tanks are spreading obstruction globally

A group of think tanks—public policy institutes that perform research and

advocacy—have promoted disinformation and misinformation about climate

science and contested climate policies via reports and presentations to leg-

islatures, news and social media, and other channels.49,50,51 They present

quasi-academic positions while shifting the framing of climate change from

a science-based issue to a matter of individual liberty and economic free-

dom (Chapter 5). They have also funded research reports and conferences to

challenge the IPCC consensus on anthropogenic climate change52 and have

networked transnationally to increase their capacity to promote or disrupt

specific political discourses on the topic.53 Their institutional structure is

shaped by the predominance of men, especially in the case of European think

tanks, illustrating a documented alignment between masculinity and climate

contrarianism.54 There is also a strong convergence between the far-right,

neoliberal thought advanced by these think tanks and resistance to climate

action (Chapter 5).55

Many of the most influential think tanks are based in the United States, but

the dominance of think tanks has spread globally, thanks in part to the Atlas

Network, a global network of such organizations that advocates free-market

(libertarian) and neoliberal policies (Chapter 5). The Heartland Institute in the

United States, the Free Market Foundation in South Africa, and the Global

Warming Policy Foundation in the United Kingdom all have worked to chal-

lenge climate policies and programs (Chapter 5). Similar ideas and practices

have also spread to think tanks in the Global South, such as Andes Libre in Peru

and the Instituto Liberdade in Brazil (Chapter 8). Funding flows around the

world to support these think tanks, which share information, tactics, events,

connections, experts, board memberships, and legal support.56...

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thirteen chapters developed by a global team of 110 scholars led by thirty-one

lead authors, the volume summarizes the current state of knowledge on who

is impeding action on climate change, and how. While it recounts the history

of that obstruction, we focus primarily on the period between 2015, when a

global climate treaty, the Paris Agreement, was negotiated, and 2024.

The assessment reviews obstruction efforts by the fossil fuel industries

(Chapters 2 and 3), as well as by utilities (Chapter 3), agribusiness (Chapter 4),

media and public relations (PR) firms (Chapter 6), and organizations on

:{:{the political far right (Chapter 5).}:

Research teams also explored the role}:

of the news and social media in disseminating climate disinformation and

misinformation (Chapter 6) and how these narratives potentially affected

:{:{public opinion on climate action (Chapter 7).}:

Other teams examined how}:

obstruction of climate action occurs across the Global South (Chapter 8),

at the subnational level (Chapter 9), at the United Nations and in the IPCC

(Chapter 10), and in the context of climate adaptation (Chapter 11). The final

chapters analyze the surge in regulatory and litigation efforts and civil society

movements around the world to curb climate obstruction (Chapters 12 and

:{:{13).}:

All chapters underwent peer review and reviews by the volume’s four coed-}:

itors. As with the IPCC reports, a free download of the assessment is available

online.

DEFINING OBSTRUCTION

We define climate obstruction as intentional actions and efforts to slow or

block policies on climate change that are commensurate with the current

scientific consensus of what is necessary to avoid dangerous human-caused

interference with the climate system.2 That scientific consensus is summarized

and brought up to date in the assessments by the IPCC.

Climate obstruction has existed since at least 1980, when the American

Petroleum Institute (API) began publicly downplaying the emerging threat of

global warming.3 Research into climate obstruction began in the early 1990s,

as civil society groups in the United States, such as the Sierra Club4 and Ozone

Action,5 helped journalists expose the links between coalitions of fossil fuel

companies and contrarian scientists who downplayed the unfolding realities

of climate change.6

The first scholarly articles on climate obstruction—on contrarian scien-

tists,7 conservative think tanks8,9, and the media10—were published in the late

1990s and early 2000s. In the 2010s, interest in the topic rose11,12,13 and soon

the research coalesced to form a picture: a complex network of organizations

supporting climate obstruction (Figure 1.1). A 2015 series of investigative

pieces by Inside Climate News brought to light the extent to which fossil fuel

giant Exxon knew about the science of climate change in the 1970s and 1980s

but suppressed it and moved aggressively to block climate-related policies.14

More than twenty-five years of scholarly attention, as well as a range of inves-

tigations by civil-society groups, social movements, and journalists, inform

this global assessment, the first attempt to summarize what we know—and

what we still need to find out—about obstruction of climate action around the

world.

The network of organizations and individuals fighting action on climate

change is substantial (for one representation, see Figure 1.1).15 Fossil fuel and

allied corporations and wealthy individuals use various channels to seek and

achieve policy outcomes that favor their fortunes: media ownership and influ-

ence, lobbying firms, campaign donations and organizations, advocacy groups

in national capitals and across countries, trade organizations, think tanks, and

funding funneled to researchers and centers at strategically selected univer-

sities.

This funding flows through family or corporate foundations as well as

through “donor advised funds,” which hide the funders’ identities from public

view. These influence groups target key politicians and other decision-makers

with the goals of instilling doubt about the need to act on climate and creating

uncertainty about the ability of renewable energy and other climate solutions

to meet society’s needs. By raising these doubts, network members hope to

achieve delays in rule-making, weak regulations, and postponement of the

transition away from their products and practices.

...

...

actors. For example, certain companies were aware that climate change existed

and was dangerous—and in some cases even participated in scientific research

on the subject. Yet they chose to challenge the reality of climate change to avoid

regulations that would affect their business operations.

Some obstruction is more consequential than others: not all participants in

climate obstruction are equally responsible for causing global warming. Attri-

bution science is a fast-growing field seeking to document how much of present

and future climate impacts are the result of various actors’ behavior.16 In legal

cases, scientific evidence can provide support for plaintiffs’ damage claims

from those who demonstrably contributed to the harm they experienced.17,18

However, attribution science must wrestle with many issues when determin-

ing what and whom to hold culpable, such as which gasses to count, from

which sources, and during what time frame.19,20,21 Attribution of responsibil-

ity for climate obstruction presents a similar set of nascent questions: How

is responsibility distributed across the known network of climate obstruction

organizations?22,23

To address that complexity, some researchers have proposed four argu-

ments that investor-owned fossil fuel producers have a unique liability for

anthropogenic climate change.24 First, these companies produced a large share

of the products whose use contributed substantially to climate change. Second,

they continued their business operations even after the danger of doing so was

:{scientifically established.

Third, they intend to continue expanding the produc-}:

tion and use of fossil fuels, even now that the science is clear that these fuels

have to be phased out rapidly. Finally, they have done all of this while working

to obstruct action on climate change. So while this assessment widens its lens

to capture the many other actors involved in blocking climate action nation-

ally and globally, we recognize that fossil fuel producers are one of the most

significant generators of climate obstruction.

In each chapter of this volume, the authors describe and analyze the range

of actors involved in climate obstruction and the contexts in which it occurs;

we summarize them in the following ten key findings.

TEN KEY FINDINGS

1. Climate obstruction is not just about denial

Since the Paris Agreement in 2015, public denial of the fact that climate change

exists, is human-caused, and is an existential threat has become far less preva-

lent.25 Rather, most actors involved in obstructing climate action today spend

less time on denying the scientific reality of climate change and more time on

creating doubt about the severity of climate change, challenging the viability

of certain climate solutions and policies,26 or “greenwashing” their products

or businesses by claiming that they are sustainable.27 Typologies have been

...

2. Big oil is a key player in obstruction, but only one of many

Most of the early literature on climate obstruction focused on the oil and gas

industry and the role corporations such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, and

Shell have played to slow or block action on climate change. But we now have

evidence that as climate science was developing in the 1970s and 1980s, some

major oil companies including Exxon also participated in research efforts that

documented the likely future trajectory of global warming if fossil fuel use

continued unabated.39 Under President Lee Raymond, the company later dis-

continued that research and shifted its position from undertaking to attacking

climate science (Chapter 2).

While the oil and gas industry led the way on climate obstruction,40 this

assessment shows that numerous other industries—coal companies, utilities,

car manufacturers, and meat and dairy producers—joined climate obstruction

efforts or deployed their own. Supply chains (both upstream and downstream)

:{create shared interests among corporations across sectors and industries.41

For}:

example, the aviation, maritime, trucking and railroad industries are all heavy

consumers of oil and gas fuels, and a major part of the latter three industries’

business is transporting their products. Utilities are still dependent mainly

on coal and gas to power their grids; some manufacturing and, increasingly,

computing require high volumes of electricity from these grids (Chapter 3).

The meat and dairy industries have also engaged in climate obstruction; this

sector is uniquely emissions-intensive compared with other agricultural indus-

tries due to methane emissions from livestock and deforestation to feed them

(Chapter 4). It is not only the largest greenhouse gas emitters that obstruct

climate action, but also the businesses in their supply chains.

One manifestation of this interdependency is economy-wide coalitions

of business interests that collectively oppose climate policies. In the United

States, the US Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manu-

facturers have a history of pooling resources, sharing information, and under-

taking joint political activities such as lobbying campaigns to block attempts

to legislate a nationwide emissions-trading program.42,43 Business coalitions

such as the European Roundtable of Industrialists (Chapter 3) and the Indone-

sian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Chapter 8) have also been involved

in weakening or obstructing climate legislation and directives. Industries with...

strong interests in avoiding regulation have often pushed these associations

to extreme anti-climate positions, even when many other member firms might

prefer ambitious climate action.

The preferences, strategies, and tactics of the variety of actors engaged in

climate obstruction are by no means uniform. For example, in the utility indus-

try, while many firms remain dependent on fossil fuels to generate electricity

and therefore tend to oppose climate policies, others hold a more diverse port-

folio of generation assets or purchase most of their electricity from renewable

energy sources, and hence take different positions (Chapters 3 and 9).44,45,46

In US states where utilities are permitted to own electricity-generating power

plants, those utilities are more likely to oppose climate and renewable-energy

legislation than in those where they are not (Chapter 9).47 Among automakers,

there are notable divisions between firms that have embraced manufacturing

electric vehicles and those who continue to focus on producing gas- and diesel-

engine cars; the latter have lobbied heavily against attempts to strengthen

emissions and fuel-efficiency standards (Chapter 3).

3. Trade associations are key agents of climate obstruction

Trade associations, which represent entire industries, and business associa-

tions (which represent national or local business interests) allow corporations

to “hide in the crowd” when engaging in obstructive actions; this reduces their

risk of reputational damage (Chapter 3). Firms in the fossil fuel industries

use trade associations as a “command center” for political campaigns to pool

resources and coordinate political activities. The API has been at the forefront

of climate obstruction for decades, coordinating the oil majors’ lobbying and

advertising campaigns and launching front groups such as Energy Citizens,

to delay US efforts to curb the oil and gas industry’s emissions (Chapter 2).

API maintains lobbyists in nearly all states, monitoring legislation and rou-

tinely meeting with members of Congress and state agency officials to oppose

unwanted legislation and programs. The same is true of trade associations

in the transport, utilities, coal, and meat and dairy industries. For example,

the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which represents airlines,

has opposed national climate regulations such as the inclusion of aviation in

emissions-trading schemes and international passenger levies for climate dam-

ages. Similarly, the Federation of Electric Power Companies in Japan continues

to promote coal and downplay the need to transition to renewable energy

(Chapter 3).

In the transport sector, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Asso-

ciation, the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association, and the Fed-

eral Chamber of Automotive Industries in Australia opposed fuel-efficiency

standards and a managed transition off internal-combustion engines. Mean-

while, the automakers were able to present their companies as climate leaders

(Chapters 3 and 13). Agricultural trade associations have also been involved

in climate obstruction: the American Farm Bureau Federation has denied the

science of climate change since the early 1990s, and the National Cattlemen’s

Beef Association has hired university experts to challenge the link between

cattle farming and climate change (Chapter 4). Overall, these are vast organiza-

tions. In the United States, about ninety trade associations working on climate

issues had total revenues of $25.6 billion between 2008 and 2018, with 13%

of that, or $3.4 billion, spent directly on political activities.48

4. Networks of think tanks are spreading obstruction globally

A group of think tanks—public policy institutes that perform research and

advocacy—have promoted disinformation and misinformation about climate

science and contested climate policies via reports and presentations to leg-

islatures, news and social media, and other channels.49,50,51 They present

quasi-academic positions while shifting the framing of climate change from

a science-based issue to a matter of individual liberty and economic free-

dom (Chapter 5). They have also funded research reports and conferences to

challenge the IPCC consensus on anthropogenic climate change52 and have

networked transnationally to increase their capacity to promote or disrupt

specific political discourses on the topic.53 Their institutional structure is

shaped by the predominance of men, especially in the case of European think

tanks, illustrating a documented alignment between masculinity and climate

contrarianism.54 There is also a strong convergence between the far-right,

neoliberal thought advanced by these think tanks and resistance to climate

action (Chapter 5).55

Many of the most influential think tanks are based in the United States, but

the dominance of think tanks has spread globally, thanks in part to the Atlas

Network, a global network of such organizations that advocates free-market

(libertarian) and neoliberal policies (Chapter 5). The Heartland Institute in the

United States, the Free Market Foundation in South Africa, and the Global

Warming Policy Foundation in the United Kingdom all have worked to chal-

lenge climate policies and programs (Chapter 5). Similar ideas and practices

have also spread to think tanks in the Global South, such as Andes Libre in Peru

and the Instituto Liberdade in Brazil (Chapter 8). Funding flows around the

world to support these think tanks, which share information, tactics, events,

connections, experts, board memberships, and legal support.56

5. PR firms enable corporate efforts to obstruct climate action

Public relations and strategic communications firms help companies and trade

associations conduct their climate obstruction efforts.57,58,59 These companies

and allied firms collect intelligence on opponents (such as environmental non-

governmental organizations, or NGOs), conduct industry-friendly research,

design advertising campaigns, launch front groups, and undertake opinion

polling, among other activities (Chapter 6). In the United States, PR firms such

as Edelman, the DCI Group, and the Hawthorn Group have run campaigns

such as “Advanced Energy for Life” in support of the coal industry (Chapter 3).

In Ireland, the PR firm Red Flag Consulting worked for the meat and dairy

industry to promote positive messages about animal products (Chapter 4).

The growing role of PR firms in blocking climate action has led to their

being named in public-interest lawsuits (Chapter 12),60 being criticized by the

United Nations secretary-general,61 and to the passage of new laws banning

advertisements promoting fossil fuels.62

PR firms’ climate obstruction efforts are facilitated by the characteristics

of the global media system. For example, many media companies rely on an

advertiser-based business model, which includes revenue streams from cor-

:{:{porations that obstruct climate action}: (Chapter 6).

Between 2020 and 2022,}:

Google reportedly received more than $23.7 million from oil majors such

as ExxonMobil and BP to purchase online advertising.63 Meta, the owner of

Facebook and Instagram, permitted fossil fuel companies to purchase mis-

leading advertisements despite the assessments of independent fact-checkers

that the spots were inaccurate (Chapter 6).64 PR firms design and place such

ads for their clients as part of complex information and influence campaigns

:{:{to burnish the companies’ image.65}:

In addition, advertising revenue may}:

also inhibit negative coverage of fossil fuel advertisers. Workers in the PR

industry have begun to organize against these practices, targeting the PR

firms that have run obstructive campaigns for the highest-polluting clients

(Chapters 6 and 13).

6. Some governments have taken leading roles in obstructing

climate action

Government interests often align with those of their major industries, includ-

ing fossil fuel–extracting firms, leading governments to take positions to

protect those industries (Chapters 8, 9, and 10). This stance is particularly

obvious in the case of state-owned oil and gas companies and when national

and local governments are heavily dependent upon one main polluting indus-

:{:{try as an income source.}:

Petro-state Saudi Arabia’s obstruction of climate}:

action at the UN climate negotiations over the last two decades is a clear

example (Chapter 10) but hardly unique: more than two dozen countries have

included oil- industry employees in their official delegations to the UNFCCC,

and others allow the industry to influence their national negotiating posi-

tions (Chapter 10). Many of these governments also seek to support their

fossil fuel industries by using public finance to secure export markets. For

example, China and Japan have promoted coal-fired power throughout Eurasia

by providing public subsidies to countries that import their technology, such

as Indonesia, India, and Vietnam (Chapter 8); they have a history of deflecting

criticism of such investments at the UN meetings

...

In addition, agribusiness and the meat-production industry in Brazil have

built strong political connections with government agencies at federal and

state levels (Chapters 4 and 8). In South Africa, coal mining is the historical

backbone of that nation’s economy and social order; in the case of some devel-

oped countries (e.g., the Netherlands) and developing ones, such as Venezuela,

Iran, and Mexico, the key industry is oil (Chapter 8). Therefore, a just tran-

sition away from fossil fuels will require rethinking the central role of the

state in promoting new development models and creating the means to make

these new models socially and environmentally sustainable in an era of climate

change.

Governments in heavily industrialized countries with more diverse

economies have also persistently taken obstructive action on climate. The

United States, for example, supported and then withdrew from the Paris

Agreement, again creating political whiplash in the global effort to address

climate change. While numerous governments have obstructed action in

the UN negotiations at one time or another, such moves have typically

:{received limited attention despite their substantial implications.

For example,}:

at COP 27 in 2022, New Zealand sought to weaken methane accounting rules

(Chapter 4); Uruguay has aligned with Argentina and Brazil (the ABU Coali-

tion) when its livestock interests were at stake. Understanding and overcoming

climate obstruction thus requires attention to national political economies,

and those are often built on local ones: subnational provinces and states

that are heavily dependent on fossil fuel extraction often seek to under-

mine national climate policy, as in the case of Canada and the United States

(Chapter 9).

7. Obstruction occurs within multilateral governance structures

The UNFCCC and the IPCC are global institutions that play key roles in

establishing priorities on the climate agenda by organizing major interna-

tional conferences at which multinational negotiations take place and by

highlighting areas for future action by governments, corporations, and soci-

eties. They are also arenas for establishing and enforcing norms and values

such as, for example, climate justice, fair governance, and suitable finance,

but they have been unable to respond rapidly and effectively to the climate

:{emergency (Chapter 10).66,67

Currently, national sovereignty (often defined}:

in opposition to responsibility) is the bedrock of the UN system, and thus

global governance institutions lack adequate enforcement and compliance

mechanisms. Similarly, international development banks and wealthy “donor

nations” inside and outside the UN system have failed to assist lesser devel-

oped countries with climate change adaptation (Chapter 11). World mar-

itime and aviation governance institutions face many of the same issues

(Chapter 3)

Multilateral forums’ tendency to slow and obstruct climate action make

them an easy target for polluting companies and trade organizations and allow

these groups to play a double-game. They can point to a lack of international

action as a reason for slowing action in their own countries. At the same time,

the fossil fuel industry, nation-states, and other economic actors employ a vari-

ety of diplomatic, procedural, and substantial strategies to obstruct progress in

international venues. They have secured a lack of political will to exclude the oil

industry, agribusiness, and other obstructionist actors from participating in

UN decision-making, a change some campaigning groups have unsuccessfully

advocated (Chapter 10).68

8. National and local contexts shape obstruction, particularly

in the Global South

Climate obstruction looks different depending on national and local contexts.

Consider the Global South, which encompasses a group of more than 130 coun-

tries outside the core of the global economy, with different trajectories in social

and state formation and economic and social development (Chapter 8)69,70,71.

The Global South’s greenhouse gas emissions are also heavily concentrated:

India and China alone account for some 60% of the region’s emissions, while

120 other Global South countries account for only 22%.72

Leaders from the Global South have argued that the Global North—due

to its historical responsibility for causing the most emissions—must be more

proactive in supporting developing countries in dealing with climate change.

Delivering the financing required to decarbonize and adapt to climate change

in the Global South is a topic still being negotiated and obstructed within

the UNFCCC (Chapter 10).73 But the Global South can also be an agent of

climate obstruction. Political representatives from the Global South often

use development priorities as a reason to sideline decarbonization goals, fre-

quently claiming that they have a “right to pollute” as part of their “right to

development,” and failing to question their own development models or to

consider helping the most vulnerable groups in their countries (Chapter 8).

Moreover, dominant ideologies can also feed into overt and extreme cli-

mate obstruction efforts, including religious influence in government and/or

right-wing legacies—be they neoliberalism, conservatism, or farther right.

Such trends can be seen in Brazil under former president Jair Bolsonaro, the

United States under President Donald Trump, Hungary under Prime Minis-

ter Viktor Orban, or Argentina under President Javier Milei (Chapters 5, 7,

and 8).74

The configuration of organized interests engaged in climate politics shapes

how obstruction occurs not just at the national level but also the local,

subnational, and international levels. For example, studies have shown that

distributive conflicts among energy interests, such as between coal and

gas, are vital to explaining climate policy outcomes.75,76,77,78 How those

industries are structured can also shape how obstruction unfolds. For example,

in the United States, many utilities hold a monopoly on providing electric-

ity to the city or region in which they are based; therefore, ratepayers may

unwittingly be funding the industry’s lobbying and advertising efforts to delay

and block climate policies (Chapters 3 and 9). Similarly, in countries where

media industries are highly concentrated, with a few firms or families owning

the majority of news outlets, collective goals including climate action can be

undermined (Chapter 6).

9. Obstruction starts at the top but requires social acceptance

As noted earlier, industries such as oil, gas, and coal, utilities, car manufactur-

ing, and meat and dairy production—as well as their trade associations and PR

firms—fund and implement climate obstruction from the top down. However,

for those efforts to be effective, their rhetoric must be accepted and adopted by

the media, political parties, politicians, and individual citizens. For example,

a study of more than 1,700 press releases about climate change found that

US newspapers covered messages from business coalitions and trade associa-

tions that opposed climate policy at double the rate they covered pro-climate

:{:{policy positions from other types of organization}:s (Chapters 6 and 7).79

In}:

addition, most media platforms have few, if any, effective policies in place to

prevent the spread of climate misinformation (Chapter 6). Obstructive forces

have been able to use social media to exponentially speed the spread of such

misinformation among the public.

Individuals are constantly exposed to climate obstruction content from a

variety of outlets. Scholars have identified the major categories of anti-climate

claims: (1) global warming isn’t real, (2) it isn’t human-caused, (3) climate

impacts aren’t bad, (4) climate solutions won’t work, and (5) experts are

unreliable (Chapter 7). More recently, studies show, attacks on the scien-

tists themselves and on renewable energy and other climate solutions have replaced the first three claims.80

Whether people are more or less receptive}:

to such rhetoric depends on various social and psychological factors.81 For

example, early research in this area documented how industrial companies targeted Republicans with influence campaigns that helped make climate change

a polarized issue in the United States (Chapter 6).82,83,84 Addressing such climate change misinformation requires systemic changes that make it more

difficult for misinformation to spread and that will ensure individuals are able

to discern misinformation from fact.

10. There are efforts to address climate obstruction through regulation,

litigation, and social movements

Some countries and communities are working to address climate obstruc-

tion in formal and informal ways. Options have included direct governmen

regulation and legislation, which attempt to restrict net-zero claims and

pledges made by corporations and financial firms, limit corporate influence

over climate policy, and prohibit greenwashing. To do so, governments have

used a variety of tools including shaming tactics and other forms of man-

dated disclosure (Chapter 12). They can also limit or prohibit the “revolving

door” through which industries co-opt regulators by hiring them, restrict lob-

byists’ access to key staff and legislators, and limit company or large-donor

contributions to political campaigns (Chapter 12).

About 1,500 climate-related lawsuits have been filed around the world; a

subset of these suits target climate obstruction, in particular the historical

and continuing deception of consumers (Chapter 12). The plaintiffs include

individuals (grandmothers in Switzerland, teenagers in Oregon, Indigenous

and quilombola groups in Brazil, and many others), subnational actors includ-

ing city and state governments, federal justices, and major climate organi-

:{:{zations.}:

Lawsuits targeting climate obstruction have been brought against}:

:{:{fossil fuel producers, including Exxon, Shell, BP, Peabody, and Total, but haverecently expanded to other firms.}:

Lawsuits have implicated trade associations,}:

such as the API (Chapter 12) and consulting firms, such as McKinsey & Company, which an Oregon municipality sued along with fossil fuel company tradegroups.

Lawsuits have also expanded beyond fossil fuel related cases. In 2021,

for example, three NGOs won the first climate lawsuit in Denmark against

the meat producer Danish Crown, which had claimed that its pork was

“climate friendly.”85 In 2024, the New York State attorney general filed

a lawsuit against beef producer JBS USA Food Co., alleging the com-

pany had misled consumers about its net-zero commitments (Chapters 4

and 12).

In the Global South, Brazil has one of the highest numbers of climate

cases, including 2023 litigation in which the federal environmental protection

agency, IBAMA, sued agribusiness leader Dirceu Kruger for climate damage

caused by illegal deforestation in the Amazon.86

Climate-focused NGOs are finding ways to challenge obstruction. These

efforts include social exposure (or “naming and shaming”) to shower nega-

tive publicity on obstruction activities, lobbying to advocate prevention of

obstruction, and campaigns and protests that mobilize citizens concerned

about blatant climate obstruction and deception. For example, BankTrack.org

monitors the financial activities of private-sector commercial banks around

the globe and feeds this information to campaigners who name and shame

banks in hope of strengthening their policies on investments that affect the

climate (Chapter 13). The record of wins from regulatory, litigative, protest,

and shaming campaigns against obstruction is still modest, but may be aided

by the broadening understanding of the problem and growing efforts to

address disinformation.

...

Journalists

Journalists, like NGOs, have played a significant role in exposing climate

obstruction and debunking misinformation. For example, investigative outlets

such as Inside Climate News and DeSmog have helped to expose misinformation

and obstruction campaigns in the oil, gas, and coal industries, among many

others. Their work has included revealing the role that “influencers” hired by

PR firms play to promote their oil and gas clients (Chapter 6). Other news orga-

nizations, such as The Guardian, have run series examining the political tactics

of fossil fuel corporations (from whom they have stopped accepting advertis-

:{ing; Chapter 13).

Early efforts by journalists to expose climate obstruction have}:

developed into coordinated actions to fight its spread. Groups such as Climate

Feedback, comprising science journalists, have emerged to fact-check climate

news stories and help readers evaluate the sources of these stories (Chapter 6).

As discussed, debunking misleading claims in this way is considered vital to

inoculating the public and making climate misinformation harder to spread.

Scholars

Academics, including scientists, also aid the efforts of policymakers, NGOs,

and journalists to expose and counter climate obstruction, and the results have

prompted legislative investigations, legal proceedings, newspaper reports, and

social media campaigns. CSSN,91 which includes 800 scholars worldwide,

encourages peer-reviewed research into obstruction. Some academics work

closely with journalists from organizations such as Climate Feedback to expose

and debunk misinformation. University researchers have also participated in

institutional campaigns to convince universities to disclose funding from the

fossil fuel industry, and more recently to “disassociate” from firms and indus-

tries that advance climate misinformation.92 While many of these campaigns

have been led by students, professors have also pressured their home institu-

tions to act. For example, campaigns by faculty at Brown University and the

University of California, San Diego in the United States and the University

Cambridge in the United Kingdom, among others, have sought to dissuade the

schools from engaging with companies that promote climate disinformation

by, for example, refusing their research funding (Chapter 13).

Students

Campuses around the world now face growing pressure to mitigate the risks

from taking industry funding, including its influence over research agendas

...

C H A P T E R 2

The Global Role of the Oil and Gas

Industry in Climate Delay and Denial

LE AD AUTHORS: GEOFF DEMBICKI, KRISTOFFER EKBERG,

AND KERT DAVIES

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ANN-KRISTIN BERGQUIST,

ADA NISSEN, AND STELL A LEVANTESI

INTRODUCTION: THE NET-ZERO OBSTRUCTION ERA

In the years leading up to and following the signing of the 2015 Paris Accords,

something significant changed within the oil and gas sector—at least, on the

surface. One major company after another began declaring themselves climate

leaders and loudly announcing net-zero targets, a process by which their vast

greenhouse gas (GHG) output would either be reduced to zero or neutralized

through reductions elsewhere. Companies had for years tried to “greenwash”

their images, but this was of another magnitude entirely. “The world’s carbon

budget is finite and running out fast; we need a rapid transition to net zero,”

declared BP’s CEO Bernard Looney in 2020, promising that the UK oil and

gas giant would become a net zero company within three decades. “This will

certainly be a challenge, but also a tremendous opportunity.”1

Similar state-

ments emerged from oil companies across the world, from Royal Dutch Shell

and Canada’s Suncor to Chevron and Saudi Aramco.2

We now know, due to the 2024 release of thousands of internal oil and

gas company documents obtained through a joint investigation by Democrats

in the US House and Senate, that these pledges were more about prolonging

the survival of fossil fuel production than fundamentally shifting the indus-

try’s business model. In private corporate communications, top oil and gas

executives appeared to state this explicitly. Supporting the goals of the Paris

Agreement, as well as US involvement in it, was “the most obvious course of

...

Building on a previous meta-analysis of industry communication,10 we

characterize obstruction by three distinct but interconnected tactics. The first

is denial, or emphasizing scientific uncertainty. Denial occurs when the indus-

try publicly questions the research of climate scientists and the work of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in order to hinder a tran-

:{:{sition.}:

The second tactic, delay, or the use of socioeconomic arguments to}:

stall regulations, is a strategy that emerged in tandem with the creation of

think tanks and the rise of neoliberal hegemony since the 1970s. Here, indus-

try lobbies against regulations and legislation by appealing to perceived costs

for society or citizens at large. The third tactic is industry co-optation of the

public policy process, or appearing to take the climate crisis seriously while

intervening in governing bodies to weaken, neutralize, or undermine potential

policy and technological solutions. Much literature assumes a chronological

evolution of these tactics moving from denial toward the others. While the

intensity with which specific arguments and tactics have been used certainly

:{:{has changed over time, this does not mean that efforts to delay and co-optthe policy arena are exclusive to the post-Paris period.}:

Rather, our focus on}:

the longer history of obstruction in this chapter demonstrates how all three

tactics—denial, delay, and co-optation—have been used by the oil and gas

industry throughout decades of environmental and climate governance.

The Oil and Gas Industry

The combustion of oil and gas is one of the most consequential contribu-

tors to climate change. But it is important to acknowledge that these fossil

fuels are very different from other polluting and hazardous substances such as

F-gases, asbestos, or lead. The existing global economic order has for more

than a century been built on the inexpensive and powerful energy provided

by oil and gas. The industry has also created energy path-dependencies—

examples include car-dependent urban design and national highway systems,

which disadvantage environmentally safer alternatives.11 This is not merely a

technological dilemma. The development of fossil fuels has shaped global capi-

talism, democracy, and modernity, and has been the cause of colonization, war

:{:{and international power struggles.12}:

Oil and gas industry leaders and political}:

supporters often argue that without continually expanding global production,

the developed world would neither be able to maintain current living standards

nor economic growth and stability.13

Despite the oil and gas industry’s vast global reach and influence, it is domi-

nated by a relatively small handful of private firms (investor-owned companies,

or IOCs) and state-owned companies (nationally owned companies, or NOCs).

These companies in turn are responsible for a large majority of the green-

house gas emissions released by humankind over the past century and a half.

...

OBSTRUCTION STRATEGIES

The oil and gas industry has deployed three distinct but interlocked

obstruction tactics: undermining or denying the growing scientific consen-

sus on the urgency and dangers of climate change; utilizing socioeconomic

scare tactics to delay action by governments; and co-opting or trying to

shape the environmental discourse and policies on terms favorable to the

industry.

Science Denial: Amplifying Uncertainty to Delay Policy

In the early years of the climate policy debate, which we define roughly as the

late 1980s through the early 2000s, the lead obstruction tactic deployed by

fossil fuel corporate interests was to downplay or deny the scientific consen-

:{:{sus, casting doubt in order to forestall action in the policy arena.}:

This tactic}:

continues intermittently in various forms to this day.

One recent example took place during the international climate negotia-

tions in Dubai in 2023, when COP28 president Sultan Al Jaber stated during

a panel discussion that there is “no science” supporting the idea that phasing

out fossil fuels is essential for restricting global warming to 1.5 degrees C, the

level agreed by scientists is a dangerous threshold. Al Jaber, who at the time

was also the chief executive of the United Arab Emirates’ state oil company,

Adnoc, faced backlash for the statement, which one scientist called “verging

on climate denial.”28 A large body of scientific literature—including a land-

mark 2021 report from the International Energy Agency29—has demonstrated

that managing a rapid decline of fossil fuel production is crucial for stabilizing

global temperatures.30

While Al Jaber’s comments were widely publicized and debated, denial

about the required pace of transition off of fossil fuels is so commonplace

within the oil and gas industry that it is often ignored. During the Dubai talks,

IPCC chair and former professor of energy Jim Skea noted that while a full

phaseout of oil and gas might not be required to achieve 1.5 degrees C, global

oil use by 2050 needs to be reduced by 60% and gas use must fall by 45%.31

Yet when researchers compared the production output of 142 coal, oil, and gas

companies against necessary fossil fuel reductions, they determined that from

2014 to 2020, 63% of the oil companies and 70% of the gas companies in their

study exceeded the production limits required for global temperature stabi-

lization. If the companies continued producing at these levels, the oil industry

would overshoot its cumulative production budget by 42% by 2050, while the

gas industry would overshoot its budget by 53%, vastly increasing the likeli-

hood that humankind would fail to meet the Paris climate targets.32 A 2011

study showed that keeping the Earth’s carbon budget within safe limits wou

...

CONCLUSION

On the surface it may seem like we are in a different era for climate action

following the Paris Agreement. Most major oil companies across the planet

now loudly tout their ambition of helping the world achieve net-zero emis-

sions by 2050, a requirement for avoiding global catastrophe. Yet the transi-

tionary rhetoric from oil companies is not matched by the necessary actions.

While companies have developed and touted projects to develop renew-

ables or address environmental pollution,126 the results have been marginal.

The ultimate impact of these activities has been to legitimize oil and gas

operations as well as keeping open the possibility for continued extrac-

tion.127 Production of the fuels at the center of our climate crisis continues

to rise.

The current net-zero pledges and solutions put forward by industry are the

latest phase in a process of climate obstruction going back at least to the 1970s.

During those decades, the oil and gas industry’s tactics have shifted depend-

ing on the political and economic context. The industry has alternately pushed

denial of the basic science on climate change, used economic scare tactics to

justify aggressive lobbying against solutions, and attempted to co-opt the pol-

icymaking process on terms favorable to its business model. Though each of

these tactics has risen and fallen in prominence at various times, we argue that

all three are currently in play.

While outright science denial from oil and gas companies has subsided since

its peak in the 1990s, it has since 2015 morphed into a subtler and less public

form of denial through fossil fuel expansion plans that seemingly ignore the

increasingly dire warnings of climate breakdown.

As we have shown, companies are ignoring and/or obstructing global efforts

to curb emissions to match the goal of the IPCC guidance defining 1.5 degrees

C of average warming as “dangerous” climate change. Similarly, the oil and gas

industry continues to frame climate action as destructive to the economy and

people’s livelihoods in its attack on national legislation in the US and European

Union. All the while, producers push false solutions such as carbon capture and

natural gas that merely prolong our reliance on fossil fuels.

Even though oil and gas producers are currently portraying themselves

as climate leaders, they could shift to cruder or more aggressive obstruction

tactics as the need arises. Companies, for example, may return to explicitly

backing and funding populist social movements questioning strong climate

action—a topic for future research to track. If far-right and authoritarian politics continue to gain hold, this trend may herald a new form of denial and

obstruction that is not passive or opaque but blatantly refuses to comply with

the scientific warnings about climate change.128 A potential return to more

overt anti-science politics and the impacts it could have on the oil and gas

industry’s tactics and rhetoric, could be a valuable research area

---

CH5 RGT AND FAR RT

...into a global network of think tanks.25 Several Mises Institutes in different

countries have been active in the Atlas network; according to the results of two

global surveys of both networks, about one-quarter of the individuals affiliated

with Mises Institutes are also affiliated with Atlas think tanks.26

In turn, leading intellectuals involved in Mises Institutes around the world,

including economist Hans Hermann Hoppe, founded the Property and Free-

dom Society. The Society advocates a new version of far-right neoliberalism

that opposes almost any state interventionism and supports radical privatiza-

tion and decentralization. The group’s rejection of global policy coordination

under the umbrella of the United Nations is similar to that of the anti-systemic

far right. Property and Freedom split away from the Mont Pèlerin Society in

2004; the latter supports both culturally progressive and conservative varieties

of neoliberalism and, in the context of climate change, is home to supporters

of global economic constitutionalism and both supporters and opponents of

international policy coordination.27

Discourses of Delay

Beyond their free-market rhetoric, a wide range of think tanks has developed

other discourses of climate delay,28 including promoting nontransformative

solutions and advocating limited responsibility for addressing climate change.

These strategies include the growing emphasis on achieving net-zero emis-

sions, a focus on carbon sequestration rather than de-carbonization, and an

emphasis on “discounting” in economic models (which asserts that mitigation

can wait because it will be less expensive in the future). These delay-focused

forms of discursive obstruction have not only been integrated across the

political and corporate policy spheres, but also accepted in the public mind.29

These narratives have been echoed by individual members of these think

tanks, who spread these ideologically supported positions on climate change

:{:{via public-facing media appearances.30}:

Murdoch media regularly feature con-}:

tent from both free-market conservative and hard-right climate denialist think

tanks, companies, and funders in North America, particularly those based in

the United States31 (e.g., the Heartland Institute). They also spotlight speak-

ers and content from think tanks based in Canada (Frontier Centre for Public

Policy), Australia (Institute of Public Affairs, Centre for Independent Studies),

Europe (Institute of Economic Affairs, the Austrian Economics Center), and

South Africa (Free Market Foundation, South African Institute of Race Rela-

tions), for example. Consequently, partisan think tanks have ultimately been

able to guide “public opinion, political debate, economic discourse and even

academic discussions on climate change mitigation” in several countries and

policy arenas.32

Financial Linkages

Scholarly research on the relationship between conservative foundations and

climate obstruction began with a seminal quantitative 2014 analysis of the

US Climate Change Countermovement (CCCM).33 The CCCM is a network of

organizations (including think tanks), individuals, and activities dedicated to

preventing ambitious climate policy. Since then, research on philanthropic

financial support within the political economy of climate obstruction has

revealed three themes.

The first theme is opacity: reliable data on foundation support are difficult

to obtain. When such data are gathered, it can be difficult to discern the intent

and influence of this type of financial support. For example, 74% of dona-

tions made through donor-advised funds come from unidentified sources.34

To learn more about funding patterns, it can be helpful to trace funding flows

and board membership. The Dunn Foundation, for example, has funded sev-

eral think tanks involved in climate denial, including the Heartland Institute

and the Cato Institute. Between 2002 and 2017, the latter received more than

$7 million from the Dunn Foundation;35 a foundation member also serves on

Cato’s supervisory board.

While some such think tanks in the United States reportedly benefit from

untraceable contributions from conservative family donations and the liber-

tarian/conservative Donors’ Trust,36 others lack even limited transparency

:{:{when it comes to their funding sources.}::{ }:

Recent research has documented the}:

funding patterns established by brothers Charles and David Koch of corporate

giant Koch Industries, who discreetly fund the climate change countermove-

ment by directing money through their family foundations (the Charles Koch

Foundation and the David H. Koch Charitable Foundation). The beneficiaries

are a network of conservative think tanks and advocacy groups that actively

promote climate change skepticism and oppose environmental regulations,

often funneling the funds through “dark money” organizations such as Donors

Trust to obscure the source of these donations. (This network is sometimes

referred to as the “Kochtopus” due to its extensive reach and influence.)37

The second theme is concentration. Despite the fact that many contribu-

tions to obstructionist think tanks and civil society groups are made anony-

mously, research has found that a small group of foundations tends to provide

the bulk of financial support for organizations involved in climate obstruc-

tion efforts:38 “The top 1% of grant makers account for 67% of grants, and

the top 10% of grant makers account for 95% of grants.”39 In Europe, the

number of foundations involved in promoting and/or funding climate change

denial is smaller than in the United States. To compare the two regions, one

can examine the foundations supporting think tanks that are partners of the

global Atlas Network. Many Atlas think tanks are involved in climate denial

and other forms of obstruction, as discussed earlier. While there is no infor-

mation on foundation funding in Europe comparable to that available in the

United States, a recent survey found forty-eight foundation representatives on

the boards of Atlas think tanks in Europe, compared with almost three hun-

dred individuals representing more than two hundred foundations who served

on the boards of Atlas think tanks in the United States.40

A few European

foundations in the survey sample are notable for funding Climate Counter-

movement organizations in Latin America, including the Fundación para el

Análisis y los Estudios Sociales in Spain, and the Friedrich Naumann Founda-

tion, for example, funds them in Germany. Both European foundations fund

Latin American think tanks. The European arm of the Atlas Network, the Inter-

national Policy Network, was involved in channeling US funding to European

denial organizations.41

The third theme is heterogeneity. Scholars have noted the variety of the cli-

mate obstruction actors funded. Foundation support flows to many different

organizations, with varied levels of focus on climate change; thus, scholars face

a challenge in isolating the impact of these flows on climate obstruction when

it is one among many issues of concern within the neoliberal and conservative

movement.42

Cultural Linkages: The Role of Religion

Many major religions embrace ambitious environmental action and endorse

climate mitigation, out of concern over, for example, protecting God’s cre-

ation. There are also some religious linkages to climate obstruction, especially

among rank-and-file adherents whose traditions are more closely aligned with

right-wing politics.43 In the United States and Australia, for example, reli-

giosity has been found to be a key factor in the popularization of climate

science skepticism.44,45 Research on spirituality on the Netherlands has mir-

rored American patterns.46 Other types of religious organization have been

involved in climate obstruction, notably the US-based Cornwall Alliance for the

Stewardship of Creation.

Its founder, E. Calvin Beisner of the Catholic Acton

Institute, described the group as a “network of evangelical theologians, sci-

entists, and economists.”47 Its activities have included organizing a seminar in

Rome with the Acton and Heartland institutes to mobilize against the language

of “environmental crisis” in Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si.48

Like the Cornwall Alliance’s, many of the best-studied Catholic denial-

ist activities have been traced to the United States. Their main themes are

reflected in the prominent blog and forum Catholic Answers: climate change

is natural, not anthropogenic; anthropogenic climate change is “prudential

judgment” (i.e., belonging to the scientific sphere, which is not infallible); cli-

mate concern reflects pantheism and neopaganism; support for subsidiarity

... RUSSIA ROMANIA

, and economists.”47 Its activities have included organizing a seminar in

Rome with the Acton and Heartland institutes to mobilize against the language

of “environmental crisis” in Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si.48

Like the Cornwall Alliance’s, many of the best-studied Catholic denial-

ist activities have been traced to the United States. Their main themes are

reflected in the prominent blog and forum Catholic Answers: climate change

is natural, not anthropogenic; anthropogenic climate change is “prudential

judgment” (i.e., belonging to the scientific sphere, which is not infallible); cli-

mate concern reflects pantheism and neopaganism; support for subsidiarity

... RUSSIA ROMANIA

...

are then translated into Romanian and published on right-wing Orthodox

websites such as Cuvˆantul Ortodox and those mentioned earlier.55 They also

quote renegade scientists such as climate change–denying physicists John

Clauser and Victor Manuel Velasco.56 Such views occasionally find an echo even

within the Church hierarchy. For example, in a pastoral letter from 2022, one

Romanian bishop stated that “planned pandemics” and “exaggerated climate

obsessions” are both instruments of “the great reset.”57

Latin America

In Latin America, research on religion and climate change is still in its early

stages. There currently exist no comprehensive studies on the transnational

dimensions of climate denialism among right-wing religious groups in Latin

America. A few studies focus on local networks of religious climate denialism

in Brazil and these groups’ relationships with the government of Jair Bol-

sonaro, which utilized climate denialism to foster a populist ideology.58

Much

of this work tends to focus on the linkages between recent conservative polit-

ical movements and the rise of Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal evangelical

movements.59 In Brazil, for example, the Bolsonarist right-wing movement

is supported politically and financially by a conservative network including

many Pentecostal evangelicals (a sector that has grown dramatically since the

1990s and today represents around 37% of the population). But the “strategic

role of climate denialism” in “blocking processes of environmental governmentalization in Brazil”60 has also involved the publication and distribution of

translated books by small Catholic publishers with ties to agribusiness.61

Individual government members, such as former Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo,

have used religion to deny climate change.62 Both Pentecostal and Catholic

groups have reinforced the broader climate countermovement in Brazil; for

example, the government refused to host COP 26, the annual international

UN climate conference, and withdrew key decision-making power from the

country’s environmental and climate governance institutions.63

The ideology behind such right-wing religious obstructionism in Latin

America lies at the intersection of markets and nature, postulating that “God

is in control,” meaning environmental issues should not be a concern for

Christians because the Earth’s fate is predetermined. Furthermore, the free

market is seen as a channel allowing people to “wisely use” nature, which in

its undeveloped state is considered savage. The denial discourses of Brazil’s

religious obstructionists thus differ only slightly from those in the United

States and Europe. However, the former is characterized by a stronger focus

on discrediting IPCC research and promoting the idea that environmen-

talism is a communist conspiracy that aims to destroy Western Christian

civilization.6

...

the United States since the 1990s, research shows that the mainstream Repub-

lican Party has continually sowed climate skepticism in order to maintain a

free-market status quo.68 In contrast, the far-right or “alt-right” movement

sees “the anti-environmentalism of the present conservative movement as

nothing but a modernist, capitalist . . . [and] Jewish conception that has found

fertile ground in the hands of billionaire plutocrats wiping out nature all over

the Earth for the sake of higher profit margins.”69

In the United States, the mainstream right consistently supports inter-

national cooperation in military, corporate, and humanitarian affairs, with

the exception of climate change. The European spectrum of conservative and

right-wing parties tends to be more diverse, but center-right parties typically

embrace international climate cooperation whereas Europe’s revolutionary far

right sees increased international cooperation negatively, advocating instead

for a disintegration of global solidarity.

Multiculturalism and Ethnopluralism

The revolutionary far right envisions a world grounded in “ethnopluralism,” in

which distinct racial or ethnic groups live in separate regions, preserving their

unique identities and rejecting global community connectivity.70 The slogan

of Arktos Media, “Making anti-globalism global since 2009,” succinctly cap-

tures how the revolutionary far right today expands on the idea of ethnically

homogeneous nations, as seen in contemporary movements such as Indian

Hindutva and Japanese Shinto nationalism. Arktos is known for distribut-

ing the work of figures in the global far-right movement and has published

books by the prominent American alt-right figure Richard Spencer, the Rus-

sian ultra-nationalist Aleksandr Dugin, Alain de Benoist of the French New

Right, and Brazilian right-wing philosopher Olavo de Carvalho.71 The rela-

tionship between these revolutionary far-right actors and climate obstruction

should thus be thought of as a rejection of the terms of the debate: the global

cannot exist.

The authors of the revolutionary far right are united in their critique

of what they see as an increasingly “multicultural” world, one where ethnic

and national distinctions have become less clear-cut. Eschewing a class-based

critique—which for many in the farthest reaches is seen as Marxist ideology

invented to sever people from their natural ethnic consciousness—the revo-

lutionary far right turns to cultural explanations for what they see as a trend

toward an indistinguishable and homogenous global community.72

For many global far-right movements, the supposed threat of a multicul-

turalist global community is often argued against using some variation on

the “Great Replacement Theory,” the belief that there is a deliberate effort by

obscure global elites, often imagined as Jewish and referred to as a “cabal,” tO

replace white populations in Western countries with non-white and/or immi-

grant populations. Today, a wide range of multisectoral actors—from Fox

News in the United States to the AfD party in Germany—have propagated

this belief.73 In recent years the revolutionary far right has linked the imag-

ined set of “Great Replacement” actors and relationships with climate change,

considering it to be one of the many artificial panics and false flags allegedly

precipitated by elites. In other words, the charge is no longer that science isn’t

right, but that climate change itself is part of a conspiracy. Additionally, the

basic logic of replacement has found resonance beyond Western contexts. Sim-

ilar narratives have surfaced within the right-wing Rashtriya Swayamsevak

Sangh (RSS), based in India, for example.74

Extremist Goals

Beyond advancing replacement theories, the broad global swath of far-right

actors exhibits varying responses to anthropogenic climate change. One such

approach is “accelerationism,” a radical theory of change advocating the delib-

erate intensification of forces that will destabilize existing systems and pre-

cipitate societal collapse, thereby hastening social transformation in line with

accelerationists’ own ideology and vision of society.75 Accelerationism is a

strategy adopted by radicals on both the left and right. Far-right and neo-

fascist accelerationists view climate collapse—ideally, cultural collapse—as a

means of transformation facilitating a return to traditional, often authori-

tarian, social structures. For example, a section of the manifesto released by

a mass shooter in an attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand

in 2019 is titled “Destabilization and Accelerationism: Tactics for Victory.”

It

attempts to justify the murder of fifty-one people as part of a strategy to trigger

broader conflicts and speed change. Similarly, a recent study from West Point’s

Combating Terrorism Center notes that multinational neo-Nazi groups like

The Base and Atomwaffen employ accelerationist strategies using extreme vio-

lence with the aim of destabilizing and toppling the US federal government.76

Extremist groups have always exploited vulnerabilities to shape grievance

narratives, but recent research suggests that climate crises (and local gov-

ernmental responses) provide new avenues for extremist exploitation. For

example, a recent study on climate-induced violent extremism in North Africa

found that

violent extremist (VE) groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State exploit

crises and conflicts resulting from environmental stress to recruit more followers,

expand their influence and even gain territorial control. In such cases, climate

change may be described as a ‘risk multiplier’ that exacerbates a number of conflict

drivers.7

These extreme perspectives thus diverge ideologically from climate obstruction

as it is typically understood on the mainstream right, which often employs it to

maintain the status quo, especially with regard to the regulatory environment.

Instead, the revolutionary far right has begun to integrate climate change into

a broader political ideology aimed at promoting far-right ecologies.

For the revolutionary far right, the problem lies not with climate science

but with its practical consequence: the need for more coordination between

multinational corporate capital and international policymakers.

In their logic,

the existing resource extraction and distribution networks of global capital-

ism will lead to a dystopia that will destroy all local ethnic connections to land

(“blood and soil”) and usher in a New World Order in which sovereign nations

are replaced with a totalitarian global government. In addition to examining

nonstate extremist actors, such as those involved in the Christchurch attack

and a similar 2019 race-based massacre in El Paso, Texas, research has also

examined far-right policy platforms related to climate change.78

Perhaps the

most famous example is the rise of “blood and soil” nationalist identities, such

as in Nazi Germany, which used the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture to

anchor an extremist ideology in agrarian connections to nature, place, and the

environment. Today, the link between the environment, climate, and nation-

alism still figures heavily in the rhetoric of French politician Marine Le Pen’s

Le Front National (FN), especially its emphasis on preserving environmental

heritage, or “patriotic ecology,” which it frames as a holistic approach to halt-

ing the collapse of the French way of life. In a 2022 debate, Le Pen emphasized

the urgency of environmental concerns, criticizing globalization for its detri-

mental impact on the planet and animal welfare and advocating “localism” and

“economic patriotism” to enhance the production and consumption of French

products.

Strategies and Tactics

An important distinction between mainstream right-wing social forces and

revolutionary far-right movements lies in their political strategy and tac-

tics. Whereas mainstream right-wing groups engage directly in policy pro-

cesses to obstruct climate action, revolutionary far-right movements are often

relegated to “metapolitical” strategies, leveraging online platforms, “news”

stations, and political spectacles such as rallies to foster skepticism toward

international cooperation and climate policies and thereby influence politics

indirectly. Internet-based metapolitical obstruction is not merely rhetoric:

such far-right ideology has inspired violent attacks on particular groups and

activists.

For example, the aforementioned El Paso massacre was a metapolitical spec-

tacle that illustrates how the system-attacking nature of the revolutionary fa

...

C H A P T E R 6

Steering the Climate Discourse

Legacy News, Social Media, Advertising,

and Public Relations

LEAD AUTHORS: MELISSA ARONCZYK

AND MAXWELL BOYKOFF

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: TR AVIS G. COAN,

MYANNA L AHSEN, HANNA E . MORRIS,

AND CHRIS RUSSILL

Introduction: Steering Obstruction

In the lead-up to the international treaty on climate change known as the Paris

Agreement, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released

its fifth report, describing the causes of climate change in unequivocal terms.

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), “together with those of

other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout the climate sys-

tem and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed

:{:{warming since the mid-20th century.”1}:

In 2017, New York Times opinion writer}:

Bret Stephens challenged those who claimed the “complete certainty” of cli-

mate causes. His piece was not meant “to deny climate change of the possible

severity of its consequences,” he wrote. “But ordinary citizens also have a right

to be skeptical of an overweening scientism.” Such framing may be perceived

as presenting a “balanced” opinion; it is also a way to retain skepticism as an

acceptable response to the climate crisis.

Since at least 2004, the pretext of balance in media coverage of global warm-

ing has exacerbated the disparity between scientific and public understandings

of climate change.2 Research published in 2004 examining peer-reviewed cli-

mate science found that experts had reached agreement (consensus) thaT

...

humans contribute to climate change.3 Another 2004 study found that 53%

of news articles published between 1988 and 2002 in major American news-

papers told a so-called “balanced” story whereby some scientists found that

humans contributed to climate change while others continued to argue that

humans’ role was in doubt.4 This study—and many others since then—offer

explanations for the outsized gap between scientific knowledge and public

understanding: the inappropriate deployment of the journalistic norm of bal-

anced reporting combined with the outsized influence of industry groups who

use anti-climate action think tanks and other strategies to shape public sto-

ries and those quoted in them.5

While this disparity has diminished (but not

disappeared) in these sources since then,6 it exposes one way in which casting

doubt about anthropogenic climate change is a form of climate obstruction.7

To be clear: the ongoing disparity between scientific and public understand-

ings of climate change is not a matter of happenstance. Oil and gas producers

and their collaborators actively work with legacy news (television, newspapers,

radio) as well as social media platforms and public relations and advertising

firms to promote disinformation that stymies climate policy. The deliberate

production and promotion of climate disinformation and climate obstruction

appears via news coverage, journalistic practices, public relations (PR) and

strategic influence campaigns, and social media posts as well as in other modes

of communication (e.g., blogs, instant messaging) in the public arena. Financial

motivations are part of the problem as a result of the corporate control of main-

stream media and the importance of advertising revenue to media companies’

bottom line.8

This chapter synthesizes research that explains how climate dis-

information circulates through media and contributes to climate obstruction

that benefits carbon-based industries and status-quo actors at the cost of soci-

ety and the environment (see Chapters 5 and 7). It focuses on the discourses

and structures that shape the terrain of these practices and then points to areas

where this disinformation and obstruction can effectively be countered.

Contrarians in the Mediated Public Sphere

A growing—at times cacophonous—chorus of climate-contrarian voices has

gained prominence through multiple media platforms and modes of com-

munication. Contrarian views are promoted by a network of obstructionist

organizations and actors with aligned ideological and cultural inclinations

:{:{(see Chapter 1).9}:

These movements often gain attention to their outlier}:

:{:{:{views through media channels.10}:

At least four arguments for climate delay}:}:

can be observed in media communications: (1) shifting the responsibility

for climate action; (2) arguing that mitigating climate change is impossi-

ble; (3) advancing nontransformative solutions; and (4) emphasizing thedownsides of any climate solution.11 }:}:

Captured in media portrayals, advertising}:

and PR campaigns, these discourse types demonstrate the growing tendency

among disinformation actors to move from overt denial of climate change

and its anthropogenic causes to more subtle tactics of delegitimation of cli-

mate solutions. Choices about how to frame communications through media,

advertising, and PR—shaping perceptions of responsibility and solutions, for

example—can channel public attention and action in important ways. In many

cases, this agenda setting can foster preferences for system preservation over

structural transformation.12 Mass media enable the formation of political

structures and norms that condition public responses to climate change. Ulti-

mately, such obstruction efforts seek to advance special-interest goals and

objectives to maintain the status quo or to distract from, delay, and/or deny

science—effectively obstructing climate engagement and action.

How Disinformation Spreads in the Mediated Public Sphere

The deliberate circulation of climate disinformation is partly enabled by

the unprecedented economic and social power of the global media system.

Power structures were further consolidated during the COVID-19 pandemic

when many independent and local newsrooms were shuttered as digital

media expanded and consolidated.13 Boosted by new digital technologies and

legacy/social media, disinformation campaigns can now operate at greater

scale and expanded scope, influencing human experience with increasing con-

trol and precision.14 Technology companies and their platforms allow pow-

erful actors to shape cognition and actions in ways that lack accountability.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) and communications technologies in

political campaigns has had profoundly negative consequences for global cli-

mate mitigation, even when climate policy obstruction was not an explicit or

direct aim.15

New media technologies can boost longstanding patterns of control and

socioeconomic inequality that are harmful for the environment. Social dispar-

ities, a lack of democratic practices, and environmental destruction tend to

reinforce one another.16 To address the problem of disinformation and how it

shapes climate and environmental outcomes, it is vital to broaden the scope

:{:{of what we commonly think of as climate and environmental policy.}:

Collective goals in the name of the public interest, such as democracy, environmental

protection, and socioeconomic equity, are threatened by the concentration of

ownership and corporate control of communications and digital technologies

and how information then becomes subject to financial and political incen-

tives. This concentration is enabled by current policies in the United States and

many other countries that are determined by the wealthiest and most power-

ful players.17 The concentration of media control in relatively few news outlets

and internet companies is a global phenomenon—though concentration can

strategic management, where PR agents engage in intelligence-gathering in

the environmental community, at government agencies and in other organiza-

tions that influence public policy on environment, climate, and energy issues;

and (2) industry-friendly research, public-opinion polling, and data collection

to promote clients’ viewpoints in the media, in addition to producing scien-

tific, legal, or technical expert material for media circulation. One way various

agencies, think tanks, boards and associations are tightly bound with PR firms

is through a revolving door strategy (e.g., former government agency admin-

istrators are hired by PR firms, former PR firm employees are hired as trade

association administrators, and so on).

Media communications aiming to advance climate denial and opposition

often amplify existing patterns of polarization.36 A study of polarizing tweets

on X (Twitter) during United Nations climate (COP) summits identified five

styles of climate contrarianism, from outright denial (“@COP26 You have been

lying to the public and mocking them for decades with your climate scam”)

to (untrue) rejection of climate solutions (“China is not going to COP26.

So what’s the point?”).37

In 2022, the Third Working Group of the United

Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report

pointed to “public discourses of media and organized countermovements” as

fuel for polarization, with damaging potential for climate action.38 The tech-

nical summary noted that “accurate transference of the climate sciences has

been undermined significantly by climate change countermovements, in both

legacy and new/social media environments through misinformation.”39 It also

noted that “on occasion, the propagation of scientifically misleading informa-

tion by organised countermovements has fuelled polarisation, with negative

:{:{implications for climate policy.”40}:

Further linking obstruction activities and}:

polarisation, the report mentions “political polarisation leading to erosion of

environmental governance” (see Chapter 10).41

Digital platforms have also been identified as sources of climate disinfor-

mation. Meta (Facebook), for instance, has overridden the determinations of

its independent fact-checkers for climate science, allowed fossil fuel compa-

nies to purchase misleading ads, and limited the transparency and usefulness

of its data sharing tool, Crowdtangle, relied upon by journalists and academics

to analyze engagement with content on the platform.42 There are claims that

Meta’s own Climate Science Center is underequipped to serve its purpose.

One report estimated that Google alone received $23.7 million between 2020

and 2022 from the five largest oil companies in the world (ExxonMobil,

British Petroleum [BP], Chevron, Shell, and Aramco) to promote their advertis-

ing.43 The nonprofit coalition Climate Action against Disinformation (CAAD)

has found that the major tech platforms (TikTok, Meta, YouTube, and X)

have become “complicit” actors in the spread of climate denial, since “dis-

information is now a guaranteed byproduct, if not a central part, of social

media companies’ business models.”44 Among several findings in the study,

X ranked last among platforms for its absence of policies on climate disin-

formation, lack of public transparency mechanisms, and failures of effective

policy enforcement.45

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AIMS, ALLIANCES, AND STRATEGIES

Climate disinformation disseminated through media content, platforms, and

formats such as legacy news coverage, social media posts and discussions,

advertising campaigns, and corporate promotional strategies often mask the

original source and coordinated efforts of these actors.46

Macro-Scale Influences

At the macro scale, questions of representation in, differential access to, and

regulation and ownership configurations of media systems are crucial fac-

tors in climate policy obstructionism in and by both alternative and main-

stream news media. These are multifaceted processes through which dominant

assumptions, beliefs, values, and election outcomes are shaped, often facili-

tated by public policies that allow private concentration of ownership of media

and associated technologies with limited public oversight and participation.47

Efforts to shape public opinion via media systems, old and new, influence how

publics perceive polluting companies and activities.

Corporate-funded media

tend to privilege certain discourses and make highly unequal access to (and

pollution of) environmental resources seem natural and inevitable, even where

they are irrational and detrimental to the public interest.48 One particularly

problematic phenomenon is the increased funding of social media influencers

by fossil fuel companies to spread a positive image of their sector with the help

of PR firms.49 Research by the international research team DeSmog found that

more than one hundred influencers have been hired by public relations firms

such as Edelman and ad agencies including EssenceMediaCom (owned by WPP,

the largest marketing communications services group in the world) to promote

oil and gas clients Shell and BP internationally since 2017, from the United

States to Malaysia and the South Pole.50

Meso-Scale Factors

At the meso scale, research has considered how multiple organizations have

influenced environmental and climate politics over time. As other chapters in

this volume attest, the political power of intermediaries such as trade asso-

ciations, foundations, think tanks, and universities and research institutes

contribute to the maintenance of the corporate political power of fossil fuel

producers. These organizations, operating worldwide, have helped to harness

the collective power of business and free-enterprise ideology from at least

1970 through the present day. Such power networks wield influence through

both discursive and financial means. Many major national and global media

companies depend on money from advertising, including from fossil fuel com-

panies.51 Media ownership is no longer in the hands of just a few wealthy

moguls, as was the case some decades ago.

The need for capital has pushed

media companies to seek multiple sources of investment, leading to more

differentiated ownership (still largely within the confines of private owner-

ship groups, distinct from community- or state-owned media).52 Still, the

general reliance by media companies on an advertiser-based business model

inhibit more hard-hitting and investigative reporting required to uncover

the root causes and impacts of climate change as well as to illuminate the

different methods and means of climate obstructionism.53 To give but one

devastating example, climate reporters Amy Westervelt and Matthew Green

investigated how seven major news organizations—Bloomberg, The Economist,

the Financial Times, the New York Times, Politico, Reuters, and the Washington

Post—featured content and hosted events favorable to fossil fuel companies.

In some cases, the media companies even used their internal brand studios to

create the content in-house for the fossil fuel corporations.54

Micro-Scale Aspects

At the micro scale, discourse and behaviors at the individual level shape these

spaces of interaction.55 Most forms of media have an original author as well

as an editor who oversees content. These individuals may be influenced by

:{:{incentives within the media organization or many other factors.}:

Harassment of scientists, journalists, researchers, and climate communicators is also a sig-

nificant problem.56 In addition to the suppression or even criminalization

of NGO and activist actions, academic researchers and others investigating

climate obstruction are experiencing online and offline threats to the con-

tinuation of their work.

The Guardian, a British newspaper, reported in 2023

on “striking similarities in the way governments from Canada and the US

to Guatemala and Chile, from India and Tanzania to the UK, Europe and

:{:{Australia, are cracking down on activists trying to protect the planet.”57}:

Often, harassment attempts to leverage commonly shared democratic values such

as freedom of speech, open debate, and due process to legitimate harmful

statements or delay regulatory actions. Politicians and influencers associated

with the circulation of disinformation attempt to frame as censorship initia-

tives such as fact-checking, labeling of content, and enforcement of platform

policies on content moderation. Contrarian claims feed journalistic pressure

...

C H A P T E R 7

Understanding the Political

and Psychological Roots of Climate

Misinformation and Its Impact on

Public Opinion

LE AD AUTHORS: DOMINIK A . STECUŁA AND JOHN COOK

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ARUNIMA KRISHNA , ADRIAN

DOMINIK WÓJCIK , JE AN C ARLOS HOCHSPRUNG

MIGUEL , MAT THEW HORNSEY, AND SALIL BENEGAL

INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

OF CLIMATE MISINFORMATION

Journalists, academics, and politicians have devoted considerable attention

to misinformation since at least 2016, when false information about the

US presidential election and the UK Brexit campaign spread rapidly through

social media. These developments highlighted how quickly and effectively

false information can be disseminated through our digital information ecosys-

tem and the consequences of that spread. Given the urgency of effectively

addressing climate change, preventing and addressing misinformation about

climate-related issues has become an urgent task.

Misinformation can be defined as false and misleading information, most

often spread without the intention to deceive. Disinformation is false and mis-

leading information spread on purpose.1 Given that intention is very difficult

to assess, we use “misinformation” to refer to any falsehoods about climate

change, whether or not they are spread with an intent to harm. Misinforma-

tion matters because it can influence attitudes and behavior of both the public

and political elites. Public opinion is of particular importance in democratic

...

Elite Cues

In seeking to explain how polarization on climate change has shifted over

time and across nations, some have focused on the notion of elite cues: that

people’s beliefs about climate change are influenced by the messages con-

veyed by senior or high-profile figures within their political communities. For

example, aggregates of US polls conducted in the 2000s showed that climate

change concern was influenced by top-down messaging (e.g., Congressional

press releases from Republicans and Democrats or messages about climate

change from political actors transmitted via the mass media) and that these

messages were more influential than scientific communication published in

academic journals—or even than people’s own observations of climate change

effects.45,46

In Australia, polling data over ten years showed that climate skep-

ticism varied reliably as a function of political support for conservative political

parties.47 Furthermore, experiments have shown that when assessing climate

policies, people rely on their source of information rather than on the specific

content of the policy—thus confirming the so-called party over policy effect.48

Both Democrats and Republicans tended to more strongly support specific

environmental solutions (such as cap-and-trade or carbon tax policies) when

they were told that the policy was proposed by representatives of their own

party.49

Elite cues, like messages from trusted political leaders, play an important

role in shaping public opinion about climate change, following top-down mod-

els of attitude formation. Public opinion research has consistently shown that

public opinion follows the opinions of political leaders, and climate change is

no different.50,51 As noted, during the 1970s in the United States, Republican

and Democratic political elites shared similar views on environmental issues

and were able to pass many environmental bills with bipartisan agreement—in

several cases with near-consensus or supermajorities.52,53 But politicians from

both parties diverged on this issue over time.

Elite divergence on climate change after the Kyoto Protocol saw an asym-

metric shift in which Republican politicians began explicitly to deny the

existence of climate change, question the validity or consensus of scientific

findings supporting it, or claimed that climate change was natural and not

affected by human activity.54 Concurrently, segments of an uninformed public

that had heard little about the issue became misinformed as Republican vot-

ers turned to trusted in-group elites as sources of information.55,56 In cases

where Republican elites have changed course or presented pro-climate change

stances, Republican voters have seemed to show more alignment with the sci-

entific consensus on climate change or increased their support for climate

policies.57,58 However, such cases have been rare or politically costly for Repub-

:{:{licans who take such stances: for example, after advocating a bipartisan carbo}:

...

Different Publics

To design effective communication campaigns, understanding the varied audiences for one’s message is crucial. Communication scholars and practitioners

have long advocated for the development and use of public-segmentation

strategies that help classify the broader population into similarly minded

72,73

groups.

Thus, the creation of the typology of disinformation-susceptible publics

may be an important step in helping to address climate change misin-

formation.74 The typology is a theoretically grounded classification of the

broader population into one of four groups: those who are (1) disinformation-

immune, (2) disinformation-vulnerable, (3) disinformation-receptive, and

(4) disinformation-amplifiers. Drawing on the situational theory of problem

solving, scholars have proposed and tested the typology of disinformation-

susceptible publics on the issue of climate change.75

The central feature of the typology of disinformation-susceptible publics

is that individuals who are highly motivated about an issue, hold extreme

attitudes about it, and are knowledge-deficient about it (i.e., have previously accepted false information about the topic) can be classified as lacuna publics

or disinformation-amplifying publics.76

Disinformation-amplifiers are con-

ceptualized not only to accept misinformation messages but also to actively

amplify and share them with others. Although disinformation-amplifiers are

typically very small in number, they tend to be the loudest voices about an issue

around which they are motivated.77 Any efforts to convince disinformation-

amplifiers otherwise will likely not be successful. On the other end of the

spectrum are disinformation-immune publics, or those who are neither knowl-

edge deficient nor hold extreme attitudes about a topic, in this case climate

change. Disinformation-immune publics may benefit most from prophylactic,

or preemptive, “inoculations” to forearm them against future climate change

misinformation efforts.78

Much of the population, however, tends to fall into the categories

of disinformation-vulnerable and disinformation-receptive. Disinformation-

receptive publics comprise individuals who are knowledge-deficient about an

issue and display either high levels of motivation or extreme issue attitudes

around it, making them highly susceptible to misinformation. Disinformation-

vulnerable publics are conceptualized to be at moderate risk of accepting misin-

formation and may be the focal point for communication campaigns designed

to reduce the negative effects of climate change misinformation. Thus, the

typology of disinformation-susceptible publics may provide climate commu-

nicators with a starting point to help design interventions to address climate

:{change misinformation.

Indeed, it has been noted that “a well-constructed}:

typology can advance other aims of science including prediction, explanation,

and understanding, and can offer practitioners insight into how to craft}:

more effective public communication,” and the typology of disinformation-

susceptible publics has the potential of fulfilling this promise.

Several recent studies also identify other individual-level belief systems and

biases that appear to complement and amplify the effects of other factors pre-

viously discussed. Anti-intellectualism—or a generalized mistrust of scientific

experts—plays an important role in fostering belief in misinformation about

climate change.

While mistrust of scientific experts is not new and has been

well documented across various American political eras,79,80 anti-intellectual

attitudes have become more prevalent among the general public as these views

have converged with more populist sentiments 81 and the emergence of pop-

ulist leaders/political figures in countries such as the United States or Brazil,

during the past decade.82 These populist attitudes are typically associated with

a distrust or rejection of scientific experts, and individuals who hold such

worldviews also show a greater tendency to seek or disseminate information

from nonexperts on climate change and other scientific issues.83,84,85

These

processes may be further amplified by populist rhetoric, which exists across

ideological and partisan lines and is prevalent in multiple country contexts.86

Of course, sometimes mistrust of scientists’ statements can be justified, as in

the case of eugenics. However, when a consensus is reached through the appli-

cation of the scientific method, as is the case with climate change, the weight

of evidence is squarely on the side of science.87

Attitudes about race and gender also shape public views about climate

change, motivating both explicit denial of climate change and opposition

to mitigation efforts. Multiple processes appear to play a role in this phe-

nomenon. Within the United States, race may have become more strongly

associated with climate change through a “spillover effect” during the Obama

presidency for voters who frequently viewed Obama and his policy agenda

through a racialized lens 88 and through increased awareness or consideration

of environmental justice issues in climate action.89 Gendered differences have

also become more salient in a range of country and regional contexts via both

conservative elite and media messages that have disproportionately attacked

women climate advocates such as Greta Thunberg 90 and amplified gender dis-

parities in the perceived costs of climate mitigation in wealthier nations like

the United States or the United Kingdom.91

These biases have been amplified by individuals who perceive climate action

as a threat to existing capitalist, racial, and gendered hierarchies, and by far-

right populist movements in several countries that have also emphasized

:{anti-egalitarian views while dismissing climate change.92,93,94

Consequently,}:

a range of studies now documents a growing association between individuals’

racialized and gendered biases and belief in varying types of misinforma-

tion about climate change. While they have become increasingly associated

with far-right political parties and populist elites in the United States, Brazil,

and parts of Western Europe, such as Spain,95,96 these biases are evident

across partisan and ideological divides and may help explain the prevalence

or persistence of climate misinformation in a range of country contexts.

Another dimension of public responses to climate change is explicated in

research that explored three types of climate denial: (1) literal (rejection of

the existence of climate change), (2) interpretive (downplaying its severity or

anthropogenic causes), and (3) implicatory (accepting the basic facts of climate

change but ignoring their implications).97 While literal and interpretive denial

involve rejecting the reality of human-caused global warming and the corre-

sponding impacts,98 implicatory denial describes more subtle psychological

responses such as a disconnection between environmental behavior (or lack

thereof) and its implications for climate change.

Climate considerations, in other words, interact with many other cultural

and political identities and commitments that all citizens have. Ultimately,

effectively communicating climate messages to the public and policymakers

requires framing that information skillfully in order to consider audience

beliefs and identities that might potentially interfere with accepting accurate

scientific information.

CLIMATE MISINFORMATION ARGUMENTS

Surveys of climate attitudes have identified five key beliefs about climate

change: (1) global warming is real, (2) it is human-caused, (3) experts agree on

these two first points, (4) climate impacts are harmful, and (5) there is hope

:{that we can avoid the worst impacts of climate change.99

Of particular note}:

is the perceived scientific consensus, which has been identified as a gateway

belief influencing the other key climate beliefs.100 However, these positively

framed beliefs are mirrored by negatively framed misinformation arguments.

As noted in the previous section, a recently developed taxonomy of contrar-

ian claims about climate change has revealed that climate misinformation can

be grouped into five main categories, paraphrased as: (1) global warming isn’t

real, (2) it isn’t human-caused, (3) climate impacts aren’t bad, (4) climate solu-

tions won’t work, and (5) experts are unreliable. These five themes have been

described as the five key climate disbeliefs.

The researchers found that from 2000 to 2020, contrarian arguments

showed a long-term transition from science-based to solutions-based mis-

information. The newer forms negate not so much the existence of climate

change, but rather the necessity of swift and decisive action.101,102,103 This new

trend goes under many names: climate delayism, response skepticism,104 or

:{secondary obstruction.105

All of those terms describe a new form of climate}:

change misinformation intended to challenge the efficacy of action to address

the problem. It comprises four major arguments: denying that climate change

may be solved, emphasizing the downsides of mitigating actions, redirecting

responsibility for climate change to others, and advocating nontransformative

:{solutions.

This new form of climate change misinformation may be chal-}:

lenging to neutralize, as it is often used to “greenwash” the actions of GHG

emitters, such as by conducting pro-environmental campaigns while with-

drawing from the European Green Deal.106,107 (Greenwashing is a strategy of

misleading public opinion to present entities in a deceptively positive light

in terms of their actions on behalf of the environment.)

The fifth category

of climate misinformation—attacking scientists—is particularly prominent

on social media, with 60% of climate misinformation tweets on Twitter/X

containing conspiracy theories or ad-hominem attacks on climate actors.108

The five climate disbeliefs are content-based in that they describe the

content of contrarian arguments. Another important lens through which

to understand climate misinformation is the technique-based or logic-based

approach, which seeks to understand the misleading rhetorical techniques and

reasoning fallacies used in spreading misinformation.

A useful tool for under-

standing this approach is the FLICC framework, which describes five tech-

niques of science denial: (1) f ake experts, (2) logical fallacies, (3) impossible

expectations, (4) cherry picking, and (5) conspiracy theories.109 While these

techniques can be deployed as intentional strategies to deceive, they can also

result from genuinely held psychological biases. For example, people tend to

ascribe greater expertise to those they agree with, which can result in reliance

on spokespeople with no expertise or whose expertise is in a nonrelevant

domain.110

People’s susceptibility to immediate cues such as warmer or cooler

local temperatures make them vulnerable to anecdotal arguments.111 The dif-

ficulty in distinguishing genuinely believed misinformation from intentionally deceptive disinformation means that care must be taken when attributingdeceptive motives to misinformation sources.

NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE MISINFORMATION

Climate misinformation is associated with specific negative impacts on pub-

lic opinion about climate change. Just a few misleading statistics can lower

people’s acceptance of the reality of climate change.112 Misinformation cast-

ing doubt on the scientific consensus on human-caused climate change—a

gateway belief—has been found not only to reduce the degree of consensus

someone perceives but also to negatively affect other climate attitudes such

as acceptance of the reality of human-caused global warming and support for

climate action.113

Misinformation has also been found to cancel out attempts to commu-

nicate accurate information. When participants received information about

the 97% scientific consensus on human-caused climate change along with

misinformation casting doubt on the consensus, there was no significant

...

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