Open in TheBrain

Kissinger, H

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MERRI OK

BTB attrocities to get gigs

capt 116

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REF 2 OMG FBI

Age Verification | United States Department of Justice

10 2020

LA

OCASTA TOLD EPS IS ALLIED INTEL AGY; DERS AND EPS TALK --> MOSSAD WD CALL FOR DEBRIEF; EPS CLOSE TO BARAK AND TRAINED AS SPY UNDER HIM; BARAK THOT BB CRIM; EPS CO-OPTED MOSSAD AGENT;

DRUKOVA DAY ONE VENTURES STEAL TECH

CHABAD PUTIN JEW OLIG; RABBI SCHEERSOM; KSH STAKE IN CADRE NOT DISCL; JK MOVED RUSS $; CHABAD LAUNDER

CRAIG HOROWITZ ARTL 2004; KEN KURSON KNOWS;

KISSENGER CHS KUSH INTRO TO CUI TUANAKAI CHIN AMB; ANBANG NEGOT 666 5TH AVE

M COHEN BEV HILL HSE UNDER MKT

RENDA REX TILLERSON NY POST SMEARS // STATE DEPT

LEON BLACK BWTR ARMS HU TRFFICK; CEO APOLLO 50M TO EPS 184M LOAN TO JK // 666

ELLIOT BROIDY PLED LANDER; PLAYBOY MODEL; JOEL MOWBRAY --> JEW; REP ED ROYCE, WIFE LOBBYIST;

GAWKER DISINFO 2016? --> ZERO HEDGE

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ttt cartoon -Cartoon-The-bad-place nnoooottrraacc mmooyy

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Glowing obituaries for Henry Kissinger reveal 'moral bankruptcy' of U.S. elites: historian - Alternet.org

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100 yo

https://www.alternet.org/hands-are-drenched-in-blood/

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nyt

The shah, Washington’s closest ally in the Persian Gulf, had fled Tehran in January 1979 in the face of a burgeoning uprising against his 38 years of iron-fisted rule. Liberals, leftists and religious conservatives were rallying against him. Strikes and demonstrations had shut down Tehran, and his security forces were losing control.

The shah sought refuge in America. But President Jimmy Carter, hoping to forge ties to the new government rising out of the chaos and concerned about the security of the United States Embassy in Tehran, refused him entry for the first 10 months of his exile. Even then, the White House only begrudgingly let him in for medical treatment.

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Now, a newly disclosed secret history from the offices of Mr. Rockefeller shows in vivid detail how Chase Manhattan Bank and its well-connected chairman worked behind the scenes to persuade the Carter administration to admit the shah, one of the bank’s most profitable clients.

For Mr. Carter, for the United States and for the Middle East it was an incendiary decision.

The ensuing hostage crisis enabled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to consolidate his theocratic rule, started a four-decade conflict between Washington and Tehran that is still roiling the region and helped Ronald Reagan take the White House. To American policymakers, Iran became a parable about the political perils in the fall of a friendly strongman.

Although Mr. Carter complained publicly at the time about the pressure campaign, the full, behind-the-scenes story — laid out in the recently disclosed documents — has never been told.

Mr. Rockefeller’s team called the campaign Project Eagle, after the code name used for the shah. Exploiting clubby networks of power stretching deep into the White House, Mr. Rockefeller mobilized a phalanx of elder statesmen.

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They included Henry A. Kissinger,the former secretary of state and the chairman of a Chase advisory board; John J. McCloy, the former commissioner of occupied Germany after World War II and an adviser to eight presidents as well as a future Chase chairman; a Chase executive and former C.I.A. agent, Archibald B. Roosevelt Jr., whose cousin, the C.I.A. agent Kermit Roosevelt Jr., had orchestrated a 1953 coup to keep the shah in power; and Richard M. Helms, a former director of the C.I.A. and former ambassador to Iran.

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https://www.alternet.org/2019/05/secret-archives-reveal-a-dirty-war-how-the-us-backed-a-foreign-militarys-conflict-that-kill-30000/

Rut Diamint, Torcuato di Tella University

History books may never tell the full story of the dictatorship that terrorized Argentina from 1976 to 1984.

But newly declassified United States military and intelligence documents recently delivered to Argentina offer new details about the country’s brutal military junta.

The archival documents were the fourth and final batch of 43,000 declassified U.S. telegrams, military records, intelligence and confidential memos given to Argentina following an extraordinary 2016 agreement between Argentine President Mauricio Macri and former U.S. President Barack Obama.

“Argentines now have more information about a dark period of our history that will allow us to continue strengthening justice, seeking and finding the truth,” Macri said on Twitterafter receiving the 7,500-document report on April 12.

The archives narrate the human rights abuses committed by Argentina’s military government, often with the assistance of the United States. They include the forced disappearances of 30,000 people, international assassination squads that stalked their victims abroad and the kidnapping of hundreds of babies born in detention.

Bloody history of US intervention

The U.S. declassification effort began under persistent pressure from Argentine human rights groups founded to uncover the atrocities of the dictatorship – a period I have spent my academic career studying.

Argentine democracy was interrupted by military coups six times in the 20th century.

The declassified documents outline what happened after the last coup, staged in 1976 by Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla. It gave way to the cruelest, most repressive and violent eight years of Argentina’s history.

In August 2000 representatives from Argentina’s Center for Legal and Social Studies and the original Grandmothers and Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo – a human rights group that locates the lost children of the dictatorship, which has since splintered into several factions – met with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

That encounter led to the declassification of 4,700 State Department documents in 2002. Those documents included U.S. diplomatic cables, memoranda, reports and meeting notes related to the Argentine dictatorship, and revealed clear U.S. involvement in the junta’s “dirty war.”

Now, Argentina has the military and intelligence archives behind these operations, too.

The declassified documents show that U.S. intervention in Latin America went well beyond giving “a little encouragement” to Latin American military regimes, as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it in 1976.

Argentina was the operations center for Plan Condor, a U.S-organized alliance between the dictatorships of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, created in 1975 and operational until around 1980.

Fearing the spread of communism across the Americas, the Ford administration offered these rightist military regimes everything from counterinsurgency training and financial assistance to intelligence briefings.

With U.S. support, Argentina’s junta kidnapped leftists, dissidents, union leaders and anyone who looked remotely like a threat. They tortured detainees, and then threw them alive and conscious out of airplanes into the River Plate, near Buenos Aires, or dumped their bodies in mass graves.

Pregnant women were killed after giving birth, their babies adopted by the families of childless generals. Neighbors under police surveillance informed on other neighbors to appease the junta, then were abducted and tortured anyway.

The U.S. eventually grew uncomfortable with the activities of its Argentine allies.

In 1976 Robert C. Hill, U.S. ambassador to Argentina, reported to Washington that the number of people detained by the junta must “run into the thousands” and, with Kissinger’s knowledge, confronted the Argentine government about its human rights abuses.

“[Argentina’s] security forces are totally out of control,” Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman told Kissinger in 1976.

The U.S. withdrew its support from Plan Condor after Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977. Carter, a Democrat, hoped to see democracy restored in Argentina.

That would take another six years.

A bloody history learned little by little

Argentines have learned the details of this sadistic regime little by little.

Even in the waning days of the dictatorship, human rights groups began filing freedom of information requests and writs of habeas corpus with the dictatorship, to little effect.

The law began to work in democracy’s favor again after Argentina’s first post-dictatorship leader, the late President Raúl Alfonsín, was elected in 1983. He created a truth commission that uncovered 340 secret detention centers across Argentina and identified 8,690 “disappeared” people.

Once some perpetrators and victims were known, the victims’ families could file suits to hold the people who oversaw torture centers criminally responsible for their loved ones’ disappearance.

Painstaking archival research, interviews, investigations, lawsuits and prosecutions have followed under every administration since, albeit with differing levels of priority.

Much of what is known about the fates of those abducted by the military regime was discovered in the basement of the Argentine Air Force in 2013, where “black lists” of identified leftists were archived.

The newly declassified U.S. archives offer little new information that might bring closure to thousands of Argentine families whose loved ones remain, officially, “disappeared.”

As of 2017, 2,979 people had been tried for their role in the dictatorship. The charges include crimes against humanity, arbitrary detention and kidnapping. Another 593 cases remained in process.

‘Never again’

The newly declassified U.S. telegrams and confidential communications may spur new prosecutions.

They include the names of government officials and informants complicit in Plan Condor, as well as details on the torture techniques used to extract information from detainees.

“The release of these documents stands as a uniquely valuable contribution to the cause of human rights, the cause of justice and the cause of our fundamental right-to-know,” said Carlos Osorio, a Latin America analyst at George Washington University’s National Security Archive.

In 2014, under President Cristina Fernández, Argentina began its own declassification program, alongside that of the United States. Among other disclosures, it published thousands of dictatorship-era archives, including 648 pages documenting the staffing and day-to-day operations of the military junta’s foreign ministry, including its relations with the United States.

Argentina’s commitment to uncovering every dark detail of the dictatorship derives from a national sentiment that its democracy depends on understanding the past.

“Nunca mas” – “never again” – has become the rallying cry of a population that insists that history should not repeat itself.

Rut Diamint, Political Science Profesor, Torcuato di Tella University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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https://kpfa.org/episode/letters-and-politics-november-19-2018/

picked targets in laos/or cambodia, air force head did not know? cut out laired and __

anna chennault, ellsberg briefly

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https://www.alternet.org/kissinger-it-again

Kissinger spoke at Senator John McCain’s funeral. He said that McCain was one of those rare public servants who understood duty and honor. He believed that McCain embraced America’s power and its ideals, holding each dearly to his chest. This, for Kissinger, is the mark of a true leader.

Of course, Kissinger was really talking about himself. The 95-year-old Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, also recalled that he had met McCain in Vietnam in 1973 when the naval pilot was released by Hanoi after more than five years as a prisoner of war. “I had been in Hanoi that day and they had offered to let me take him on my plane back to the United States and I refused on the grounds that nobody should get special treatment,” Kissinger remembered. This simple act, Kissinger claimed, saved McCain’s honor. It may well have been the one thing that Kissinger got right during his lengthy negotiations with the Vietnamese.

Despite his enormous reputation as a statesman, Kissinger’s lasting legacy is the failed Vietnam peace negotiations that earned him a Noble Peace Prize. He has polished his image as a foreign policy expert since the end of the war by using his intelligence, charm, and wit to recast his time in office. Kissinger is almost consumed by his need to remain at the center of the foreign policy world.

One of Kissinger’s gifts is his ability to be self-effacing and self-critical enough of his own time as a public official to hide his actual record and accomplishments. Given Kissinger’s role in the failed peace agreement, it is surprising that the nation still turns to him for answers to its most intractable problems. Instead of listening to Kissinger’s sage advice, we should remember that he is among those most responsible for the debacle in Vietnam. He prolonged the war unnecessarily and doomed the government of South Vietnam. Examining his record based on words and deeds should provide some insight into how not to succeed in a war and how best to mislead the public. With all the problems facing the United States today—from Iran to North Korea, China, Russia, and now Turkey, and a potential confrontation in the Artic, we should not listen to Henry Kissinger again. 

Here is why. When Kissinger entered the Nixon White House in 1969, he was full of confidence that he, and he alone, could figure out the Vietnam puzzle. Others had failed to properly balance military attacks with diplomacy, he argued. But he thought he had the magic formula, deduced from years of study if not practical experience. He possessed the arrogance and hubris of someone new to office.

Once in power, Kissinger quickly convinced Nixon to send him secretly to Paris to meet with high-ranking Vietnamese Communist officials to end the war honorably. Peace with honor had to meet several essential conditions. There had to be a lasting cease-fire between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Laos and Cambodia also had to be neutralized. North Vietnam had to recognize the Demilitarized Zone as an international boundary. All prisoners of war, including McCain, had to be released following the signing of a peace agreement. There would be a mutual troop withdrawal from South Vietnam. Finally, the Saigon government had to be left in full political control of South Vietnam. To achieve these goals, Kissinger promised to wage a war for peace.

But where has there ever been a successful war for peace? Only someone distantly removed from the fighting and dying would embrace such a flawed concept. And this is exactly what Kissinger did. He was the most outspoken advocate inside the administration for the bombing of Laos and Cambodia; he championed the renewed bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong harbor. He thought he could use super power diplomacy to force Hanoi to make compromises in Paris. When Defense Secretary Melvin Laird called for US troop withdrawals, Kissinger complained. Kissinger never understood that his desperate actions, made alone and without consultation with the State and Defense Departments, actually reduced his future policy options because he squandered the administration’s remaining good will with Congress. With each new military escalation that he supported, Congress and the American public pushed back, speeding up the US troop withdrawals and shortening the time Saigon had to stand on its own. Ever conscious of wanting to deliver a peace agreement to Nixon before the 1972 US presidential election, Kissinger often supported policies that put America’s South Vietnamese allies in jeopardy. And he did all of this without consulting US allies in Saigon.

When the final peace agreement was concluded in January 1973, Kissinger had not accomplished any of his stated goals, despite prolonging the war. He failed to establish a lasting cease-fire between North and South Vietnam. He failed to neutralize Laos and Cambodia (both would fall to the Communists before Hanoi’s tanks rolled into Saigon in April 1975). He failed to make the Demilitarized Zone an international border. And most importantly, he failed to secure a mutual troop withdrawal from South Vietnam, sealing Saigon’s fate. Kissinger’s actions also led to greater domestic unrest as he failed to contain opposition to his policies. Through newly released documents at the Nixon Presidential Library, we can also finally see the many ways that Kissinger failed the president by overstating progress in Paris and the likelihood for success following the military strikes he supported.

Kissinger’s Vietnam record makes clear that he has rested on unearned laurels for far too long. We should not let him use McCain’s funeral to insert himself once again into a national conversation on foreign policy.

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http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/henry-kissinger-jimmy-carter-chile-214603

no link docS

How Henry Kissinger Conspired Against a Sitting President

Watch out, Donald Trump: This could happen to you, too.

By ZACH DORFMAN January 06, 2017

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who has counseled numerous American presidents and statesmen since he left government in early 1977, is back in the halls of power once again. Since the election, he’s positioned himself close to Donald Trump, advising the president-elect on key appointments and praising him in public. And Kissinger, who has maintained close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, is now positioning himself as an intermediary between the Kremlin and the incoming Trump administration.

But previously undisclosed documents that I discovered while poring through the archives at Stanford’s Hoover Institution should give us serious pause about Kissinger’s resurgence. The storied former diplomat is not above using his considerable foreign policy credibility to further his private objectives, even to the detriment of the U.S. national interest. Indeed, on at least one occasion since he left public office, Kissinger used his influence with foreign leaders—in this case, the Pinochet regime in Chile—to undermine his domestic political opponents, including a sitting president of the United States.

It all began on September 21, 1976, when, during the final months of the Gerald Ford administration and Kissinger’s tenure as secretary of state, Chilean President Augusto Pinochet ordered the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a prominent Chilean dissident and former ambassador to the United States who was then working at a think tank in Washington, D.C. At 9:30 a.m. on that drizzly Tuesday, a group of Cuban anti-communist extremists allied with Pinochet’s intelligence services detonated a remote-control bomb placed on the underside of Letelier’s Chevrolet while it rounded Sheridan Circle—a 20-minute walk from the White House. Letelier and his American co-worker, Ronnie Moffit, were killed in the explosion. The first known act of state-sponsored terrorism ever to take place in the American capital, the assassination and its aftermath were national front-page news for years. Investigators and prosecutors tried to crack a case that took them across three continents, all while facing significant pushback from elements within the U.S. government who preferred not to rattle Cold War alliances.

In August 1978, after a long and tortuous investigation, U.S. federal prosecutors indicted three Chilean intelligence agents for masterminding the assassination, including the former head of Pinochet’s intelligence services, Manuel Contreras, and his director of operations, Pedro Espinoza. In a shocking repudiation of a major American ally in the hemispheric battle against communism, President Jimmy Carter’s administration formally requested that Chile extradite the three men to the U.S. to stand trial.

In a six-page memo that he cabled back to Chile, Foreign Minister Cubillo detailed his October 3, 1979 meeting with Henry Kissinger. (Click to see a translation.) New Window

By 1979, the Letelier case threatened to sour relations between the U.S. and the Pinochet government. On October 1, 1979, the Chilean Supreme Court, intimidated by members of the Chilean military (and a bombing campaign targeting the judiciary), rejected the U.S. government’s extradition request. Carter equivocated about how hard of a line to take with Chile in response. U.S. liberals wanted the president to break diplomatic relations entirely; staunch anti-communists were far more forbearing toward Pinochet, who had become president after a coup that Kissinger had helped orchestrate as national security adviser, overthrowing the democratically elected Marxist Salvador Allende.

That was when Kissinger, then a private citizen, decided to weigh in. Two days after the Chilean high court rejected the U.S. demand for extradition, Kissinger hosted Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos at his longtime Manhattan residence, the River Club.

Over a 70-minute-long breakfast, the two men embarked on a wide-ranging discussion, all detailed in an extraordinary memo Cubillos wrote after the meeting and that I discovered in Cubillos’ personal papers at the Hoover Institute archives. According to the record, which the foreign minister sent as a high-level secret diplomatic cable back to Chile, they discussed the recent election of Pope John Paul II (Kissinger was “not completely convinced he will be good for humanity”); Carter’s recent speech on Cuba (which Kissinger called “a disaster”); and Kissinger’s forthcoming memoirs (which the former secretary of state said would “cause great discomfort among liberal circles”). Kissinger denigrated certain prominent State Department officials as “stupid” and “fanatical,” and offered Cubillos advice on whom to lobby in D.C. and New York to improve U.S.-Chilean relations. The Carter administration’s treatment of the Pinochet regime was “a disgrace,” he said. (Kissinger did not respond to requests for comment.)

According to Cubillos’ recounting, the two men also discussed the Letelier case extensively. First, Kissinger told Cubillos he believed that the Chileans made the “correct” decision in rejecting the U.S. government’s extradition request. And then, Kissinger went on to advise the Pinochet regime on how to get what he wanted from Carter. You have to be tough, he told Cubillos—in fact, you must treat the Carter administration “with brutality.” This, Kissinger said, “is the only language they understand.” This was no idle slip of the tongue; according to Cubillos, Kissinger “repeated this same idea several times during the conversation.”

Kissinger then said that Chile would not be able to improve its relations with the U.S. until after the 1980 election, when he believed that the Republican Party (more specifically either Gerald Ford or John Connally) would win the presidency. Until a friendlier regime took power in Washington, Kissinger advised, Chile needed to hold firm.

HISTORY DEPT.

Henry Kissinger: Good or Evil?

By POLITICO MAGAZINE

As the meeting ended, Cubillos invited Kissinger to visit Chile, and Kissinger volunteered to continue the conversation through the Chilean ambassador in Washington. All in all, Cubillos wrote, his meeting with Kissinger was a “fruitful and interesting” one.

Indeed, after this fruitful meeting, Cubillos travelled to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York to meet with State Department officials, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, later that same day. In yet another memorandum I discovered at the Hoover Archives, Cubillos recounted the difficult conversations he had with different U.S. officials about the extradition case, some of whom chastised Cubillos harshly over Chile’s unwillingness to turn over the three officials. In the memo, sent back to Chile as a secret telegram, Cubillos noted how his conversation with Vance “confirms the positive assessment” Kissinger gave of Vance during their conversation that morning. (According to Cubillos, Vance even told him he would “try to reduce the pressure” over the case.)

***

In November 1979, the Carter administration announced that it would punish Chile for its intransigence by banning trade assistance to the country through the Export-Import Bank. This was a far weaker response than many had hoped for, given the seriousness of the crime, and the thoroughness of the obstruction on the part of the Chileans. For another decade, the Pinochet regime remained implacably opposed to extraditing those responsible for the killing. (When democracy returned to Chile in 1990, however, both Contreras and Espinoza were eventually given long jail sentences for their crimes.)

There are those—including me—who believe that Carter should have reacted more forcefully to Chile’s refusal to extradite those responsible for Letelier and Moffit’s murder. Extradition of the three Chileans, if it had been successful, would have provided a powerful deterrent to other state actors considering financing or sponsoring acts of terrorism in the United States, or those considering attacks on U.S. targets abroad. And it would have signaled the lengths to which the U.S. government was willing to go in order to bring terrorists to justice.

Still, there were and are those who believed the opposite. Kissinger might genuinely have believed that the Carter administration had committed a geostrategic error by conducting a thorough murder investigation into high-ranking military officials in a friendly anticommunist regime. And he might genuinely have believed that Chile’s complying with the request would further destabilize a crucial alliance; after all, one of the indicted co-conspirators, Contreras, had previously even served as a CIA informant. There were close, if covert, ties between the two countries.

But the breakfast with Cubillos was never as simple as an unofficial, frank conversation. Hanging over the whole discussion was the unspoken implication that Kissinger himself might soon regain his old job as secretary of state, where he would once again be in charge of shaping U.S. foreign policy towards Chile. Ford, whom Kissinger predicted (incorrectly) would win the presidency in 1980, had remained close to his former top diplomat. (In fact, at the 1980 Republican Convention, Kissinger led a team of Ford loyalists in negotiations with the Ronald Reagan camp. The deal, which would have brought Ford back as vice president in an unusual power-sharing arrangement, would have returned Kissinger to his position at state.)

Henry Kissinger has been promoting himself as a potential intermediary between a Trump White House and Russia.

FOREIGN POLICY

Kissinger, a longtime Putin confidant, sidles up to Trump

By NAHAL TOOSI and ISAAC ARNSDORF

By October 1979, Cubillos very likely believed that Kissinger was on the cusp of a comeback. And the Pinochet government also knew that relations would improve if a Republican were elected president. (Indeed, according to the American ambassador to Chile at the time, members of the Chilean military danced in the streets upon news of Reagan’s electoral victory. And in 1981, against the howls of liberals, Reagan lifted Carter’s trade restrictions. Pinochet remained president for nine more years.)

There is also no doubt that Kissinger, and the Republican Party more broadly, stood to benefit from the sort of Chilean intransigence that Kissinger urged on Cubillos. Greater cooperation by Chile in the case could have handed the Carter administration a major diplomatic victory during a period of great economic and political turbulence. In other words, whether or not Chile’s compliance with the extradition request was in our national interest, it was certainly not in Kissinger’s. And in his icy, amoral advice to the Chilean government, he definitively showed whose interests he was most concerned with.

Consider, too, how inappropriate, how borderline subversive, Kissinger’s counsel to Cubillos was. Not only did he laud Chile’s decision to stymie a murder trial related to a major act of international terrorism carried out in the U.S. capital, but the former secretary of state also actively encouraged the regime ostensibly responsible for that crime to take a hard line with the U.S. government, in order to further stonewall U.S. prosecutors—that is, the Justice Department.

To the best of my knowledge there has never, before now, been proof of Kissinger’s secret interference in U.S. politics after he left public service. The paper trail for Kissinger dries up; there are no more U.S. government documents subject to declassification. Indeed, we know very, very little about Kissinger’s political affairs after 1977. Since 1983, he has run an international consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, that has facilitated contacts between major corporations and a number of authoritarian regimes. During much of this time, he or other members of Kissinger Associates have sat on the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, a little-known civilian panel tasked with intelligence oversight duties where members have access to highly classified data.

What, then, has Kissinger been advising corporate clients or representatives of foreign governments behind closed doors since 1977? Has his counsel been in the best interests of the United States? At least in the case of Letelier and Moffit—in bringing to justice the perpetrators of one of the most audacious acts of terrorism ever conducted on American soil—the answer is a resounding, and disquieting, no. And if the Letelier case is part of a larger pattern, we should be extremely circumspect about Kissinger’s private intercession in our country’s public affairs today.

Zach Dorfman is senior fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs.

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https://www.thenation.com/article/kissinger-and-pinochet/

1999

in te United States, as you know, we are sympathetic with what you are trying to do here. 

–Henry Kissinger to Augusto Pinochet, June 8, 1976

Henry Kissinger, realpolitiker nonpareil, never gave a damn about human rights. “Cut out the political science lectures,” he once scrawled on a cable from the US Ambassador to Chile reporting on atrocities. Now, his proclivity for getting into bed with the most vicious of violators is exposed in arecently declassified secret memorandum of a private conversation with Gen. Augusto Pinochet that took place in Santiago, Chile, in June 1976.

The release of the “memcon” (first obtained by journalist Lucy Komisar) could not come at a worse time for Kissinger. With Pinochet still under house arrest in England for crimes against humanity, the transcript reveals Kissinger’s expressions of “friendship,” “sympathetic” understanding and wishes for success to Pinochet at the height of his repression, when many of those crimes–torture, disappearances, international terrorism–were being committed. The document also shows that Pinochet raised the name of former Chilean Ambassador to the United States Orlando Letelier twice, accusing him of giving “false information” to Congress. In response, Kissinger said nothing, forgoing the opportunity to defend free speech and dissent in the United States–comments that might have deterred the car-bomb assassination of Letelier and his associate Ronni Moffitt in Washington, DC, three months later.

Finally, the third installment of Kissinger’s memoirs, 1,151 pages on theYears of Renewal, hits the bookstores soon. It contains an account of the Pinochet meeting, which took place the day before Kissinger, his arm twisted by his staff, gave a speech on human rights at an OAS conference in Santiago. But Kissinger’s account of his meeting with the dictator is considerably less candid than the memo of their conversation reveals. Kissinger portrays himself as pushing the issue of democracy and human rights while the transcript makes it clear that he is briefing Pinochet, in advance, that the speech is intended to appease the US Congress, and the Chileans should all but ignore it. During the meeting the Secretary of State does not even utter the word “democracy.” Consider this comparison:

The Memoir: “A considerable amount of time in my dialogue with Pinochet was devoted to human rights, which were, in fact, the principal obstacle to close United States relations with Chile. I outlined the main points of my speech to the OAS which I would deliver the next day. Pinochet made no comment.”

The Memcon: “I will treat human rights in general terms, and human rights in a world context. I will refer in two paragraphs to the report on Chile of the OAS Human Rights Commission. I will say that the human rights issue has impaired relations between the U.S. and Chile. This is partly the result of Congressional actions. I will add that I hope you will shortly remove those obstacles…. I can do no less, without producing a reaction in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is not aimed at Chile. I wanted to tell you about this. My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government that was going Communist.” [Emphasis added.]

Pinochet does, in fact respond: “We are returning to institutionalization step-by-step. But we are constantly being attacked by the Christian Democrats. They have a strong voice in Washington…. they do get through to Congress. Gabriel Valdez has access. Also Letelier.”

The Memoir: “As Secretary of State, I felt I had the responsibility to encourage the Chilean government in the direction of greater democracy through a policy of understanding Pinochet’s concerns…. Pinochet reminded me that ‘Russia supports their people 100 percent. We are behind you. You are the leader. But you have a punitive system for your friends.’ I returned to my underlying theme that any major help from us would realistically depend on progress on human rights.”

The Memcon: “There is merit in what you say. It is a curious time in the U.S…. It is unfortunate. We have been through Viet-Nam and Watergate. We have to wait until the [1976] elections. We welcomed the overthrow of the Communist-inclined government here. We are not out to weaken your position.”

In Years of Renewal, Kissinger concludes his section on Chile by implying that his “moral persuasion” worked: “Within Chile, human rights abuses subsided, especially after Pinochet disbanded the counterterrorist intelligence agency responsible for most of them in 1978.” He conveniently omits all reference to the most heinous act of international terrorism ever to take place in the US capital, the Letelier-Moffitt murders–committed by Chile’s terrorist secret police on Kissinger’s watch.

Perhaps the Chileans thought that Washington would overlook this atrocity, as Kissinger appeared to do with the thousands of other barbarous acts. At the end of his meeting with Pinochet, Kissinger concludes with an Orwellian compliment–giving the general credit for advancing the cause of human rights. “I want to see our relations and friendship improve,” Kissinger says in a passage not found in the memoir: “We want to help, not undermine you. You did a great service to the West in overthrowing Allende. Otherwise Chile would have followed Cuba. Then there would have been no human rights.”

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http://www.salon.com/2016/02/12/sanders_proudly_declaring_kissinger_is_not_my_friend_totally_destroys_notion_that_clintons_better_on_foreign_policy/

“I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend. I will not take advice from Henry Kissinger,” Bernie Sanders declaredin the Milwaukee presidential debate Thursday night.

“Where the secretary and I have a very profound difference,” Sanders explained, “in her book and in this last debate, she talked about getting the approval or the support or the mentoring of Henry Kissinger. Now, I find it rather amazing, because I happen to believe that Henry Kissinger was one of the most destructive secretaries of state in the modern history of this country.”

These are some of the most important words Sanders has ever uttered about foreign policy. And they show he is appreciably better on the issue than Hillary Clinton, in all the ways that matter.

The historical facts make it clear that Sanders is absolutely correct; Kissinger was, hands down, one of the most destructive secretaries of state in the modern history of the U.S.

In the previous Democratic presidential debate, on Feb. 4, Clinton bragged that she’s supported by the destructive former secretary of state. “I was very flattered when Henry Kissinger said I ran the State Department better than anybody had run it in a long time,” she said.

Salon detailed at the time how Kissinger is an accused war criminal who oversaw policies that led to the deaths of millions of people. Kissinger met with Nazis who wanted help overthrowing West Germany’s left-leaning government; said “we will be friends with” the Khmer Rouge, who he admitted “are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand in the way”; supported far-right Latin American dictatorships in their campaign of systematic state terrorism against left-wing movements; oversaw the violent coup that toppled Chile’s democratically elected socialist government and installed a far-right dictator who killed, tortured and disappeared countless people; promoted a “madman” strategy in the U.S. war in Vietnam, in which approximately 3 million Vietnamese were killed; and more.

It is hard to overstate the severity of the crimes overseen by Kissinger, who infamously boasted“The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer.”

New York University historian Greg Grandin, one of the leading specialists on Kissinger, has written that “Kissinger’s policies resulted in at least 4,124,000 civilian deaths, probably many times that number of wounded and refugees – and that doesn’t include Kissinger’s victims in Vietnam — a war that he (and Nixon) helped prolong for five years when they sabotaged 1968 peace talks — Laos, or Argentina, Uruguay, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, at the hands of Kissinger’s partners, such as the Shah and the Saudis.”

Grandin spelled out in Salon in detail Kissinger’s involvement in genocides and atrocities in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Cambodia, East Timor, Guatemala and more.

In his landmark book on the former secretary of state, “Kissinger’s Shadow,” Grandin reveals how Kissinger ramped up violent U.S. militarism, pouring gasoline on the fire of the Cold War.

Kissinger’s soi-disant “realist” foreign policy (the so-called “realism” of which Grandin calls into question), which remains influential today, is little more than ruthless realpolitik that deems the imperial projection of American military power beneficent by virtue of it being American.

“And yet Clinton continues to call his name, hoping his light bathes her in wisdom,” the historian says.

Clinton does much more than just continue to call his name, however. Salon has exposed how emails released from Clinton’s time as secretary of state for the Obama administration reveal close ties to Kissinger. One of the emails suggests that Clinton saw Kissinger as her role model. Another is an intimate handwritten message in which Kissinger tells Clinton “I greatly admire the skill and aplomb with which you conduct our foreign policy.”

Salon also noted how, in her glowing review of a new Kissinger book in The Washington Post in September 2014, Clinton revealed “Kissinger is a friend, and I relied on his counsel when I served as secretary of state.” She added, “He checked in with me regularly, sharing astute observations about foreign leaders and sending me written reports on his travels.”

Clinton continues, still today, to laud Kissinger’s record. In her review, she proclaimed that Kissinger’s notoriously belligerent foreign policy “largely fits with the broad strategy behind the Obama administration’s effort.” And, borrowing Kissingerian language, Clinton said she yearns for “sustaining America’s leadership in the world.”

Hillary, an unapologetic hawk, has flaunted her bellicosity in the debates. The fact that she continues to do so, and continues to invoke the name of Kissinger, just shows how much of an ideological imperialist Clinton is. She truly, wholeheartedly believes in the supposed benevolence of U.S. empire and the forceful projection of American military power.

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http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Kissinger/East_Timor_TOHK.html

nairn

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http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/

BC cut off mil aide to indonesia

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 set the stage for the long, bloody, and disastrous occupation of the territory that ended only after an international peacekeeping force was introduced in 1999. President Bill Clinton cut off military aid to Indonesia in September 1999—reversing a longstanding policy of military cooperation—but questions persist about U.S. responsibility for the 1975 invasion; in particular, the degree to which Washington actually condoned or supported the bloody military offensive. Most recently, journalist Christopher Hitchens raised questions about the role of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in giving a green light to the invasion that has left perhaps 200,000 dead in the years since. Two newly declassified documents from the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, released to the National Security Archive, shed light on the Ford administration’s relationship with President Suharto of Indonesia during 1975. Of special importance is the record of Ford’s and Kissinger’s meeting with Suharto in early December 1975.  The document shows that Suharto began the invasion knowing that he had the full approval of the White House.  Both of these documents had been released in heavily excised form some years ago, but with Suharto now out of power, and following the collapse of Indonesian control over East Timor, the situation has changed enough that both documents have been released in their entirety.

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http://www.alternet.org/world/secret-documents-reveal-sick-mindset-people-who-signed-genocide-east-timor

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This Sunday, the New York Times Book Review will publish a review of the first volume of Niall Ferguson’s authorized biography of Henry Kissinger,Kissinger: The Idealist. The reviewer is Andrew Roberts.

Roberts brings an unusual level of familiarity to the subject: It was Roberts whom Kissinger first asked, before turning to Ferguson, to write his authorized biography. In other words, the New York Times is having Kissinger’s preferred authorized biographer review Kissinger’s authorized biography.

Niall Ferguson’s ‘Kissinger. Volume I. 1923-1968: The Ideal­ist’

An official biography’s first volume taps a huge archive dating to the statesman’s youth and…Read more nytimes.​com

Here’s an interview/profile of Roberts from 2009:

He had previously, through his friendship with Henry Kissinger, been offered the job of writing his official biography, but faced with the 30 tons of material in the former secretary of state’s archive and his reluctance to employ researchers – preferring to sift himself – he passed it by. Niall Ferguson has now taken the job. [Says Roberts:] “Niall is a tenured professor and has a team of researchers – he’s also, and I’m the first to admit it, far, far cleverer than I am and will do a wonderful job.”

And now, in the New York Times, Roberts has confirmed his own forecast: If the second volume ends up being as good as he finds the first, Ferguson’s biography will be, Roberts says, a “masterpiece.”

Oh, and Roberts isn’t just close to the subject of the book he is reviewing. He has also been, for a quarter-century, a friend of the book’s author. In a 2006 profile of Ferguson, “The Empire Rebuilder,” The Guardian pointed out that Roberts, who is quoted calling Ferguson “the brightest historian of his generation,” might be “a little biased,” because Roberts had been, at that point, Ferguson’s “friend of 15 years.”

The Times, too, normally checks those things. When I’m approached about reviewing books there, I’m usually asked if I know the author or have a conflict of interest.

My friend Corey Robin had a relevant experience. When his book The Reactionary Mind was coming out in 2011, the Times contacted a widely respected intellectual historian to review it. The potential reviewer didn’t know Corey personally or professionally. Although they had never met, Corey had begun blogging that year, and he and the would-be reviewer began exchanging occasional comments on sites like Facebook. Minimal as the relationship was, the Times nixed the reviewer because of their putative entanglement.

Last May, the Times’ public editor, Margaret Sullivan, weighed in on the topic: How close a connection between reviewer and author (and in this case, between author, reviewer, and subject) is too close a connection? “It’s fine if readers disagree with our reviews,” the Times Book Revieweditor Pamela Paul told Sullivan, “but they should not distrust them.”

Paul also explained that the Book Review sometimes picks reviewers with strong opinions on the book’s subject, who might be able to write an engaging, provocative essay. Fair enough: writers with opinions are more interesting than those who hold to a “on the one hand, on the other” style. Still, it’s a “tricky challenge,” Paul said, “to get someone informed but not entrenched.”

If Roberts were any more entrenched, he’d be wearing a Brodie helmet and puttees.

A spokesperson for the New York Times offered the following statement to Gawker, on behalf of Pamela Paul:

“We always ask our reviewers about any potential conflict of interest, as we define it, and disclose any possible conflicts in the review if necessary. In this particular case, we asked Andrew Roberts and were satisfied with his assurances that no conflicts of interest existed that would sway his review one way or the other.”

The Times might as well have asked Kissinger to review his own biography. Or, better, Ferguson himself, since, along with Roberts, there’s not a nano-difference between the three men, at least when it comes to controversies about war. Like Ferguson and Kissinger, Roberts was an early advocate for a military invasion of Iraq. Kissinger supported torturers in Latin America; Roberts “approves,” according to The Economist, “of American support for some vile regimes and ghastly civil wars in Latin America.” Roberts also advocates torturing the West’s current enemies: “the defense of liberty requires making some pretty unpalatable decisions, but it was ever thus.”

So how is the review itself? Contrary to the bet that an opinionated yet informed expert might turn in an exciting piece, Roberts’s essay is ponderous, and, if possible, even more hagiographic than the authorized biography itself.

“Kissinger’s official biographer,” writes the man Kissinger first asked to be his official biographer, “certainly gives the reader enough evidence to conclude that Henry Kissinger is one of the greatest Americans in the history of the republic, someone who has been repulsively traduced over several decades and who deserved to have a defense of this comprehensiveness published years ago.”

Let me be clear: I think it would be totally legitimate if, say, Ferguson, with his well-known conservative politics, were to review my new, critical book on Kissinger. That might indeed make for an engaging, fun debate; readers would know where author and reviewer stand. However, asking Roberts to review Ferguson, without acknowledging their connections, not to mention Roberts’ history with Kissinger, is a trench too far.

Thus a new genre is born: the authorized review of the authorized biography.

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Greg Grandin teaches history at New York University. He is the author ofFordlandia, a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize and National Book Award, andThe Empire of Necessity, which won the Bancroft Award in American History. His new book isKissinger’s Shadow: The Long Reach of America’s Most Controversial Statesman*.*

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AlterNet [1] / By Fred Branfman [2]

America Keeps Honoring One of Its Worst Mass Murderers: Henry Kissinger

April 16, 2013  |

Henry Kissinger's quote recently released [3] by Wikileaks,"the illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a little longer", likely brought a smile to his legions of elite media, government, corporate and high society admirers. Oh that Henry! That rapier wit! That trademark insouciance! That naughtiness! It is unlikely, however, that the descendants of his more than 6 million victims in Indochina, and Americans of conscience appalled by his murder of non-Americans, will share in the amusement. For his illegal and unconstitutional actions had real-world consequences: the ruined lives of millions of Indochinese innocents in a new form of secret, automated, amoral U.S. Executive warfare which haunts the world until today.

And his conduct raises even more fundamental questions: to what extent can leaders who act secretly ,illegally and unconstitutionally, lying to their citizenry and legislature as a matter of course, legitimately claim to represent their people? How much allegiance do citizens owe such leaders? And what does it say about America’s elites that they have honored a man with so much innocent blood on his hands for the past 40 years?

Mr. Kissinger's most significant historical act was executing Richard Nixon's orders to conduct the most massive bombing campaign, largely of civilian targets, in world history. He dropped 3.7 million tons of bombs** between January 1969 and January 1973 - nearly twice the two million dropped on all of Europe and the Pacific in World War II. He secretly and illegally devastated villages throughout areas of Cambodia inhabited by a U.S. Embassy-estimated two million people; quadrupled the bombing of Laos and laid waste to the 700-year old civilization on the Plain of Jars; and struck civilian targets throughout North Vietnam - Haiphong harbor, dikes, cities, Bach Mai Hospital - which even Lyndon Johnson had avoided. His aerial slaughter helped kill, wound or make homeless an officially-estimated six million human beings**, mostly civilians who posed no threat whatsoever to U.S. national security and had committed no offense against it....

Those who praise Mr. Kissinger for the opening to China but ignore his mass murder in Indochina shame human decency itself. By honoring Mr. Kissinger they dishonor themselves. And they are also blind to the careerist "Executive Branch mentality" he embodied, which poses a clear and present a danger to foreigners and Americans alike today. Adolph Hitler dreamed of conquering and Stalin of communizing the world. Mr. Kissinger destroyed millions of lives primarily to further his career by preventing a communist takeover while he held office. And it is this kind of institutional, bureaucratic mentality, combined with new machines of secret war,  which threatens the humanity today far more than the crazed ideologies of the past.

In the end Mr. Kissinger failed, as the communists took over Indochina in the spring of 1975. The Thieu, Lon Nol and Royal Lao government regimes, which Mr. Kissinger propped up with so many tens of billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars, evaporated. The genocidal Khmer Rouge took over in Cambodia,  which would not have occurred had Mr. Kissinger supported the neutralist Sihanouk and not illegally invaded Cambodia. But though Mr. Kissinger failed miserably in Indochina, he did in the end succeed in his principal goal. He emerged from the wreckage of Indochina with his reputation intact.

Even critics of Mr. Kissinger tend to use euphemisms about his actions for fear of losing their "credibility." But facts are facts. The truth is the truth, and euphemisms obscure it. It is a matter of  fact not rhetoric that Mr. Kissinger bears a major responsibility for murdering masses of people in Indochina. He is a mass murderer.

What is most important about his mass murder, however, was not only that his order to Alexander Haig to undertake [5] "a massive bombing campaign in Cambodia. Anything that flies on anything that moves"  was clear evidence of criminal intent to avoid the laws of war protecting civilians, and that he would have been executed had the Nuremberg Judgment been applied to his blanket bombing of civilian targets.

It was that he conducted a new form of automated, secret and  amoral warfare previously only imagined by George Orwell in 1984 when he described war as fought by machines waged by "very small numbers of people, mostly highly-trained specialists (waging war) on the vague frontiers whose whereabouts the average man can only guess at."  When Richard Nixon decided, and Henry Kissinger executed, a plan to withdraw U.S. ground troops but seek to win by escalating war from the air, they brought into being a new age of automated war that inevitably, and cold-bloodedly, wound up killing large numbers of civilians.

Previous war-makers fomented hatred against the "Jewish scum", "gooks", or "Huns" they massacred. But neither Mr. Kissinger nor his subordinates had anything against the countless Lao, Cambodian and Vietnamese civilians they slaughtered. They simply did not regard them as human beings. They had no more significance for them than cockroaches or ants. It was not immorality but amorality, the murder of countless "non-people" whose existence as human beings was simply ignored. Though the people of the Plain of Jars wanted nothing from America except to be left alone, even this simple wish was denied them, as they were extinguished like flies out of indifference not malice.

An August, 1945 editorial in the London Observereerily foreshadowed what Mr. Kissinger represented,  and what such successors as David Petraeus and John Brennan embody today: "Albert Speer symbolizes a type which is becoming increasingly important in all belligerent countries: the pure technician, the classless, bright young man, without background, with no other original aim than to make his way in the world, and no other means than his technical and managerial ability. It is the lack of psychological and spiritual ballast and the ease with which he handles the terrifying technical and organizational machinery of our age which makes this slight type go extremely far nowadays. This is their age. The Hitlers and Himmlers we may get rid of, but the Speers, whatever happens to this particular special man, will long be with us."

Although Mr. Kissinger failed so miserably in Indochina, he did indeed display great ability in handling the "organizational machinery" of the U.S. Executive Branch -- so much ability in fact that his actions have become the template for most U.S. war-making today. This war-making is:

-- Undemocratic:Mr. Kissinger not only failed to obtain permission from Congress to bomb Laos and Cambodia, he did not even inform it he was doing so. The incredible fact is that a handful of U.S. leaders unilaterally dropped 3.7 million tons of bombs on Indochina entirely on their own initiative - as have U.S. officials today assassinated thousands of unarmed suspects throughout the Muslim world.

-- Unconstitutional: The very foundation of the Constitution is the principle that leaders may only legitimately rule with the "informed consent" of the people. But Mr. Kissinger not only failed to inform the American people or Congress about his bombing of Indochina. He has lied about it  from the day he took office until today. Between January 1969 and March 1970, as he leveled the Plain of Jars, Mr. Kissinger's State Department denied it was even bombing Laos.  And when reports from refugees made it impossible to deny the bombing, Mr. Kissinger's and his representatives continued to lie, denying that they bombed civilian targets. William Sullivan, close Kissinger ally and the former U.S. Ambassador to Laos, testified to Senator Edward Kennedy on April 22, 1971 "the policy of the U.S. is deliberately to avoid hitting inhabited villages."

-- Illegal: By failing to even notify Congress of his massive bombing, Mr. Kissinger broke domestic law. By systematically bombing civilian targets and refusing to observe laws seeking to protect civilians  during wartime, he violated international law. Both conditions are true for U.S. drone and ground assassinations today.

-- Secret:  The bombing of Laos and Cambodia, like that in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia today,  was conducted in secret. Even as U.S. officials first denied they were doing any bombing at all, and then that they were only bombing legitimate military targets, they refused to allow journalists to go out on bombing runs. The  information about the bombing of civilian targets was classified and kept out of the hands of Congress, the media, and the American people.

-- Amoral:  Like Mr. Kissinger, President Obama lied when he recently described his drone assassination program as “a targeted, focused effort at people who are on a list of active terrorists who are trying to go in and harm Americans,  hit American facilities, American bases, and so on ". In fact, U.S. officials have admitted that most of their victims are unarmed suspects  killed in "signature strikes" against people who names are not known. And the Bureau of Investigative Journalism has documented that hundreds of those killed by U.S. drone strikes are civilians. The victims of drone strikes are simply labeled "militants", denied their humanity as well as their lives.

What is most troubling  to anyone with a conscience about Mr. Kissinger's new form of warfare is that, from a bureaucratic perspective, it worked. By keeping the human consequences of their  war-making secret from Congress and the American people, the Kissingers, Petraeuses and Brennans have had a free hand to kill, torture, imprison   and maim anyone they wish. They not only need not fear punishment for their illegal acts. Like Mr. Kissinger, who has grown wealthy on the blood of the innocents of Indochina, they can even look forward to being rewarded for them. We are taught as children that crime does not pay. Mr. Kissinger, who has earned tens of millions since the war ended on the blood of innocent Indochinese, is living proof that this is untrue....

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:{:{Assangespent his time data-mining and preparing the release of 1.7 million intelligence reports and classified communications. The first batch of documents to be released is from 1973 to 1976, the period in which Henry Kissinger served as U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. }:

This period includes the beginnings of the dirty war in Argentina, the 1973 coup d'etat in Chile and other highly controversial aspects of U.S. Cold War policy. Revelations from this period may not only be potentially damaging to Kissinger but also Pope Francis, who was at the time a leader of Argentina's Jesuit order that either tacitly supported, turned a blind eye toward or remained publicly silent about atrocities committed by the military. Thousands who were suspected of "subversion" were rounded up and subsequently "disappeared."}:

These files are being called the Public Library of U.S. Diplomacy (PLUS D). The site boasts this is the "single most significant body of geopolitical material ever published."

Wikileaks (Mirror site)

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put on 911 commission when grudingly made to form it, but shouted down (big lies 195

ashes: had some control of cia; HK hunted by law in chile, argent, spain and Fr for Caravan of Death ? 316

ch 34 VN

phoenix kia 20k VC suspects by 71  colby told it was over, the war, but HK wd not negot; more $ and guns; 3 mos actually 3 wks; 1-2 mil shd have been evac; no plan for hmong tho 15 yrs allies

Role in U.S. foreign policy

Kissinger left office when a Democrat, former Governor of Georgia and "Washington outsider" Jimmy Carter, defeated Republican Gerald Ford in the 1976 presidential elections. Kissinger continued to participate in policy groups, such as the Trilateral Commission, and to maintain political consulting, speaking, and writing engagements.

In 2002, President George W. Bush appointed Kissinger to chair a committee to investigate the September 11 terrorist attacks.[citation ^needed] Kissinger stepped down as chairman on December 13, 2002 rather than reveal his client list, when queried about potential conflicts of interest.

http://en:{.wikipedia.:(style="background-color:#ffff66ff"):}:org/wiki/Henry_Kissinger

Intervention in Chile

Main article: United States intervention in Chile

Chilean Socialist presidential candidate Salvador Allende was elected by a plurality in 1970, causing serious concern in Washington, D.C. due to his openly socialist and pro-Cuban politics. The Nixon administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to instigate a military coup that would prevent Allende's inauguration, but the plan was not successful.[31] The extent of Kissinger's involvement in or support of these plans is a subject of controversy.[32]

United States-Chile relations remained frosty during Salvador Allende's tenure, following the complete nationalization of the partially U.S.-owned copper mines and the Chilean subsidiary of the U.S.-based ITT Corporation, as well as other Chilean businesses. The U.S. implemented economic sanctions, claiming that the Chilean government had greatly undervalued fair compensation for the nationalization by subtracting what it deemed "excess profits". The CIA provided education for the military officers directly involved in the coup against Allende,[33] and funding for the mass anti-government strikes in 1972 and 1973; during this period,Kissingermade several controversial statements regarding Chile's government, stating that "the issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves" and "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its people."[34]

On September 11, 1973, Allende committed suicide during a military coup launched by Army Commander-in-Chief Augusto Pinochet, who became President.[35] A document released by the CIA in 2000 titled "CIA Activities in Chile" revealed that the CIA actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or US military, even though many were known to be involved in notorious human rights abuses,[36] until Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter defeated President Gerald Ford in 1976.

On September 16, 1973, five days after Pinochet had assumed power, the following exchange about the coup took place between Kissinger and President Nixon:

Nixon: Nothing new of any importance or is there?Kissinger: Nothing of very great consequence. The Chilean thing is getting consolidated and of course the newspapers are bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown.Nixon: Isn't that something. Isn't that something.Kissinger: I mean instead of celebrating – in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes.Nixon: Well we didn't – as you know – our hand doesn't show on this one though.Kissinger: We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [garbled] created the conditions as great as possible.Nixon: That is right. And that is the way it is going to be played.[37]

There was information that the Chileans were planning Operation Condor in 1976. Kissinger canceled a letter that was to be sent to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations. Orlando Letelier was then assassinated in Washington, DC with a car bomb on September 21, 1976.[38]

Intervention in Argentina

Kissinger took a similar line as he had toward Chile when the Argentine military, led by Jorge Videla, toppled the democratic government of Isabel Perón in 1976 and consolidated power, launching brutal reprisals and "disappearances" against political opponents. During a meeting with Argentine foreign minister César Augusto Guzzetti, Kissinger assured him that the United States was an ally, but urged him to "get back to normal procedures" quickly before the U.S. Congress reconvened and had a chance to consider sanctions.[citation ^needed]

See also: Dirty War

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East Timor

Main article: Indonesian occupation of East Timor

The Portuguese decolonization process brought US attention to the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, which lies within the Indonesian archipelago and declared its independence in 1975. Indonesian president Suharto was a strong US ally in Southeast Asia and began to mobilize the Indonesian army, preparing to annex the nascent state, which had become increasingly dominated by the popular leftist FRETILIN party. In December 1975, Suharto discussed the invasion plans during a meeting with Kissinger and President Ford in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. Both Ford and Kissinger made clear that US relations with Indonesia would remain strong and that it would not object to the proposed annexation. US arms sales to Indonesia continued, and Suharto went ahead with the annexation plan.

...

Iraq

In 2006, it was reported in the book State of Denial by Bob Woodward that Kissinger was meeting regularly with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to offer advice on the Iraq War.[50] Kissinger confirmed in recorded interviews with Woodward[51] that the advice was the same as he had given in an August 12, 2005 column in The Washington Post: "Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy."[52]

In a November 19, 2006 interview at BBC Sunday AM, Kissinger said, when asked whether there is any hope left for a clear military victory in Iraq, "If you mean by 'military victory' an Iraqi Government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I don't believe that is possible... I think we have to redefine the course. But I don't believe that the alternative is between military victory as it had been defined previously, or total withdrawal."[53]

In an April 3, 2008 interview by Peter Robinson of the Hoover Institution, Kissinger re-iterated that even though he supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq he thought that the Bush administration rested too much of the case for war on Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction. Robinson noted that Kissinger had criticized the administration for invading with too few troops, for disbanding the Iraqi Army, and for mishandling relations with certain allies.[54]

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Isaacson, assistant managing editor of Time, has produced much more than another unauthorized biography, giving extensive insights into the younger years of Heinz Kissinger in Bavaria and how they shaped his character, his style in dealing with others, and his worldview. Over 150 interviews with Kissinger intimates, enemies, subordinates, and the man himself generate a less-than-flattering portrayal of the man behind the intellect and the myths. Isaacson covers Kissinger's Americanization, his use of Harvard ties to enhance his career, his forays into the stratosphere of the Council on Foreign Relations (NY), and his Washington years and exploits. He also examines Kissinger's ill-fated negotiations with the North Vietnamese, empire building as national security assistant, shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, arms control efforts, and later years as private citizen and consultant. While there are other excellent Kissinger biographies (Stephen Graubard's Kissinger , LJ 6/1/73; John Stoessinger's Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power , LJ 9/15/76; Bruce Mazlich's Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy , LJ 9/15/76), this work is the best to date on Henry K. Superstar. Essential for general libraries.

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http://www.**thirdworldtraveler**.com/Kissinger/CaseAgainst1_Hitchens.html

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DRESS REHEARSAL: THE SECRET OF '68
There exists, within the political class of Washington, D.C., an open secret that is too momentous and too awful to tell.
Although it is well known to academic historians, senior reporters, former Cabinet members, and ex-diplomats, it has never been summarized all at one time in any one place. The reason for this is, on first viewing, paradoxical. The open secret is in the possession of both major political parties, and it directly implicates the past statecraft of at least three former presidencies. Thus, its full disclosure would be in the interest of no particular faction. Its truth is therefore the guarantee of its obscurity; it lies like Poe's "purloined letter" across the very aisle that signifies bipartisanship.
Here is the secret in plain words. In the fall of 1968, Richard Nixon and some of his emissaries and underlings set out to sabotage the Paris peace negotiations on Vietnam. The means they chose were simple: they privately assured the South Vietnamese military rulers that an incoming Republican regime would offer them a better deal than would a Democratic one. In this way, they undercut both the talks themselves and the electoral strategy of Vice President Hubert Humphrey. The tactic "worked," in that the South Vietnamese junta withdrew from the talks on the eve of the election, thereby destroying the peace initiative on which the Democrats had based their campaign. In another way, it did not "work," because four years later the Nixon Administration tried to conclude the war on the same terms that had been on offer in Paris. The reason for the dead silence that still surrounds the question is that in those intervening years some 20,000 Americans and an uncalculated number of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians lost their lives. Lost them, that is to say, even more pointlessly than had those slain up to that point. The impact of those four years on Indochinese society, and on American democracy, is beyond computation. The chief beneficiary of the covert action, and of the subsequent slaughter, was Henry Kissinger....
All this law and precedent was to be thrown to the winds when Nixon and Kissinger decided to aggrandize the notion of "hot pursuit" across the borders of Laos and Cambodia. As William Shawcross reported in his 1979 book, Sideshow, even before the actual territorial invasion of Cambodia, for example, and very soon after the accession of Nixon and Kissinger to power, a program of heavy bombardment of the country was prepared and executed in secret. One might with some revulsion call it a "menu" of bombardment since the code names for the raids were "Breakfast," "Lunch," "Snack," "Dinner," and "Dessert." The raids were flown by B-52 bombers, which, it is important to note, fly at an altitude too high to be observed from the ground and carry immense tonnages of high explosive; they give no warning of approach and are incapable of accuracy or discrimination. Between March 1969 and May 1970, 3,630 such raids were flown across the Cambodian frontier. The bombing campaign began as it was to go on-with full knowledge of its effect on civilians and flagrant deceit by Mr. Kissinger in this precise respect.
To wit, a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staffand sent to the Defense Department and the White House stated plainly that "some Cambodian casualties would be sustained in the operation" and that "the surprise effect of attack could tend to increase casualties." The target district for "Breakfast" (Base Area 353) was inhabited, explained the memo, by about 1,640 Cambodian civilians; "Lunch" (Base Area 609), by 198 of them; "Snack" (Base Area 351), by 383; "Dinner" (Base Area 352), by 770, and "Dessert" (Base Area 350), by about 120 Cambodian peasants. These oddly exact figures are enough in themselves to demonstrate that Kissinger must have been Iying when he later told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that areas of Cambodia selected for bombing were "unpopulated."
As a result of the expanded and intensified bombing campaigns, it has been officially estimated that as many as 350,000 civilians in Laos and 600,000 in Cambodia lost their lives. (These are not the highest estimates. ) Figures for refugees are several multiples of that. In addition, the widespread use of toxic chemical defoliants created a massive health crisis that naturally fell most heavily on children, nursing mothers, the aged, and the already infirm. That crisis persists to this day.
Although this appalling war, and its appalling consequences, can and should be taken as a moral and political crisis for American institutions, for at least five United States presidents, and for American society, there is little difficulty in identifying individual responsibility during this, its most atrocious and indiscriminate stage. Richard Nixon, as commander in chief, bears ultimate responsibility and only narrowly escaped a congressional move to include his crimes and deceptions in Indochina in the articles of impeachment, the promulgation of which eventually compelled his resignation. But his deputy and closest adviser, Henry Kissinger, was sometimes forced, and sometimes forced himself, into a position of virtual co-presidency where Indochina was concerned.
...
Partly as a consequence, Congressman Pete McCloskey of California paid a visit to Laos and acquired a copy of an internal U.S. Embassy study of the bombing. He also prevailed on the U.S. Air Force to furnish him with aerial photographs of the dramatic damage. Ambassador Sullivan was so disturbed by these pictures, some of them taken in areas known to him, that his first reaction was to establish to his own satisfaction that the raids had occurred after he left his post in Vientiane. (He was later to learn that, for his pains, his own telephone was being tapped at Henry Kissinger's instigation, one of the many such violations of American law that were to eventuate in the Watergate tapping-and-burglary scandal, a scandal that Kissinger was furthermore to plead-in an astounding outburst of vanity, deceit, and self-deceit-as his own alibi for collusion in the 1974 Cyprus crisis.)
...
CHILE ( PART I ): STATESMAN AS HITMAN
In a famous expression of his contempt for democracy, Kissinger once observed that he saw no reason why a certain country should be allowed to "go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." The country concerned was Chile, which at the time of this remark had a justified reputation as the most highly evolved pluralistic democracy in the Southern Hemisphere of the Americas. The pluralism translated, in the years of the Cold War, into an electorate that voted about one-third conservative, one-third socialist and Communist, and one-third Christian Democratic and centrist. This had made it relatively easy to keep the Marxist element from having its turn in government, and ever since 1962 the CIA had-as it had in Italy and other comparable nations- largely contented itself with funding the reliable elements. In September 1970, however, the left's candidate actually gained a slight plurality of 36.2 percent in the presidential elections. Divisions on the right, and the adherence of some smaller radical and Christian parties to the left, made it a moral certainty that the Chilean Congress would, after the traditional sixty-day interregnum, confirm Dr. Salvador Allende as the next president. But the very name of Allende was anathema to the extreme right in Chile, to certain powerful corporations (notably ITT, PepsiCola' and the Chase Manhattan Bank) that did business in Chile and the United States, and to the CIA.
This loathing quickly communicated itself to President Nixon. He was personally beholden to Donald Kendall, the president of Pepsi-Cola, who had given him his first international account when, as a failed politician, he had joined a Wall Street law firm. A series of Washington meetings, within eleven days of Allende's electoral victory, essentially settled the fate of Chilean democracy. After discussions with Kendall, with David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan, and with CIA director Richard Helms, Kissinger went with Helms to the Oval Office. Helms's notes of the meeting show that Nixon wasted little breath in making his wishes known. Allende was not to assume office. "Not concerned risks involved. No involvement of embassy. $10,000,000 available, more if necessary. Full-time job-best men we have.... Make the economy scream. 48 hours for plan of action."
Declassified documents show that Kissinger- who had previously neither known nor cared about Chile, describing it offhandedly as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica"-took seriously this chance to impress his boss. A group was set up in Langley, Virginia, with the express purpose of running a "two track" policy for Chile, one the ostensible diplomatic one and the other- unknown to the State Department or the U.S. ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry-a strategy of destabilization, kidnapping, and assassination designed to provoke a military coup.
There were long- and short-term obstacles to the incubation of such an intervention, especially in the brief interval available before Allende took his oath of office. The long-term obstacle was the tradition of military abstention from politics in Chile, a tradition that marked off the country from its neighbors. Such a military culture was not to be degraded overnight. The short-term obstacle lay in the person of one man: General Rene Schneider. As chief of the Chilean Army, he was adamantly opposed to any military meddling in the electoral process. Accordingly, it was decided at a meeting on September 18, 1970, that General Schneider had to go.
The plan, well documented by Seymour Hersh and others, was to have him kidnapped by extremist officers, in such a way as to make it appear that leftist and pro-Allende elements were behind the plot. The resulting confusion, it was hoped, would panic the Chilean Congress into denying Allende the presidency. A sum of $50,000 was offered around the Chilean capital, Santiago, for any officer or officers enterprising enough to take on this task. Richard Helms and his director of covert 77 operations, Thomas Karamessines, told Kissinger that they were not optimistic. Military circles were hesitant and divided, or else loyal to General Schneider and the Chilean constitution. As Helms put it in a later account of the conversation: "We tried to make clear to Kissinger how small the possibility of success was." Kissinger firmly told Helms and Karamessines to press on in any case.
Here one must pause for a recapitulation. An unelected official in the United States is meeting with others, without the knowledge or authorization of Congress, to plan the kidnapping of a constitutionally minded senior officer in a democratic country with which the United States is not at war and with which it maintains cordial diplomatic relations. The minutes of the meetings may have an official look to them (though they were hidden from the light of day for long enough), but what we are reviewing is a "hit," a piece of state-supported terrorism.

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cf

http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Kissinger/HKissinger.html

timor

http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Kissinger/East_Timor_TOHK.html

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http://www.zpub.com/un/wanted-hkiss.html

On pages 733-734 a list of some of Kissinger's corporate clients include, aside from ABB: Shearson Lehman Hutton, Atlantic Richfield, Banca Nazionale del Lavora (BNL) , a Rome bank that made illegal loans to Iraq�; Fluor; Hunt Oil; Merck & Co.; Union Carbide.http://www.workonwaste.org/wastenots/wn218.htm

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http://www.huppi.com/kangaroo/CIAtimeline.html

Angola — Eager to demonstrate American military resolve after its defeat in Vietnam, Henry Kissinger launches a CIA-backed war in Angola. Contrary to Kissinger�s assertions, Angola is a country of little strategic importance and not seriously threatened by communism. The CIA backs the brutal leader of UNITAS, Jonas Savimbi. This polarizes Angolan politics and drives his opponents into the arms of Cuba and the Soviet Union for survival. Congress will cut off funds in 1976, but the CIA is able to run the war off the books until 1984, when funding is legalized again. This entirely pointless war kills over 300,000 Angolans.

chile

Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, was closely involved diplomatically with the Southern Cone governments at the time and well aware of the Condor plan. According to the French newspaper L'Humanité, the first cooperation agreements were signed between the CIA and anti-Castro groups, fascist movements such as the Triple A set up in Argentina by Juan Perón and Isabel Martínez de Perón's "personal secretary" José López Rega, and Rodolfo Almirón (arrested in Spain in 2006).[47]

On May 31, 2001, French judge Roger Le Loire requested that a summons be served on Henry Kissinger while he was staying at the Hôtel Ritz in Paris. Loire wanted to question Kissinger as a witness for alleged U.S. involvement in Operation Condor and for possible US knowledge concerning the "disappearances" of 5 French nationals in Chile during military rule. Kissinger left Paris that evening, and Loire's inquiries were directed to the U.S. State Department.[48]

In July 2001, the Chilean high court granted investigating judge Juan Guzmán the right to question Kissinger about the 1973 killing of American journalist Charles Horman, whose execution at the hands of the Chilean military following the coup was dramatized in the 1982 Costa-Gavras film, Missing. The judge’s questions were relayed to Kissinger via diplomatic routes but were not answered.[49]

In August 2001, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba sent a letter rogatory to the US State Department, in accordance with the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), requesting a deposition by Kissinger to aid the judge's investigation of Operation Condor.[50]

On September 10, 2001, a civil suit was filed in a Washington, D.C., federal court by the family of Gen. René Schneider, murdered former Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, asserting that Kissinger ordered Schneider's murder because he refused to endorse plans for a military coup. Schneider was killed by coup-plotters loyal to General Roberto Viaux in a botched kidnapping attempt. As part of the suit, Schneider’s two sons are attempting to sue Kissinger and then-CIA director Richard Helms for $3 million.[51][52][53]

On September 11, 2001, the 28th anniversary of the Pinochet coup, Chilean human rights lawyers filed a criminal case against Kissinger along with Augusto Pinochet, former Bolivian general and president Hugo Banzer, former Argentine general and dictator Jorge Rafael Videla, and former Paraguayan president Alfredo Stroessner for alleged involvement in Operation Condor. The case was brought on behalf of some fifteen victims of Operation Condor, ten of whom were Chilean.[citation ^needed]

In late 2001, the Brazilian government canceled an invitation for Kissinger to speak in São Paulo because it could not guarantee his immunity from judicial action.[citation ^needed]

On February 16, 2007, a request for the extradition of Kissinger was filed at the Supreme Court of Uruguay on behalf of Bernardo Arnone, a political activist who was kidnapped, tortured and disappeared by the dictatorial regime in 1976.[54]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Condor#U.S._Congressman_Edward_Koch

wiki

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mandalay camp

Henry Kissinger was born in the Bavarian city of Fuerth.

He was a son of Louis and Paula Stern Kissinger. The elder Kissinger was a school teacher and after Hitler's rise to power, the family immigrated to London in 1938. After a short stay, they moved to Washington Heights in New York City. Recruited by Fritz Kraemer during WWII. Served in the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps 1943-1946. Captain in the Military Intelligence Reserve 1946-1949. Executive director Harvard International Seminar 1951-1969. Consultant to the Operations Research Office 1950-1961, a John Hopkins University think tank about psychological warfare and under contract to the Department of the Army. Director Psychological Strategy Board 1952. Member of the Department of Government, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1954-1969. Consultant Operations Coordinating Board 1955. Study director of nuclear weapons and foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations 1955-1956. Director Special Studies Project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund 1956-1958. Author of 'Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy', released in 1957.

Consultant Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1959-1960. Consultant National Security Council 1961-1962. Consultant RAND Corporation 1961-1968. Consultant United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1961-1968. Consultant to the Department of State 1965-1968. Nixon's National Security Advisor 1969-1973. Secretary of State 1973-1977.

Made two secret trips to China in 1971 to confer with Premier Zhou Enlai. Negotiated the SALT I and ABM treaty with the Soviet Union. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Made other secret trips to China in later years to make extremely sensitive intelligence exchanges. Robert C. McFarlane was among those who went to China with Kissinger, in his case between 1973 and 1976.

Negotiated the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Said to have played a role in the 1973 Augusto Pinochet coup. Approved President Suharto's invasion of East-Timor in 1973, which resulted in a bout 250,000 dead communists and socialists. Suspected of having been involved in Operation Condor which started around 1975 and was an assassination and intelligence gathering operation on 3 continents. Director Council on Foreign Relations 1977-1981. Annual visitor of Bilderberg since at least the 1970s. Annual visitor of the Trilateral Commission since the late 1970s. Visited Le Cercle. Member of the 1001 Club and the Pilgrims Society. Visitor of Bohemian Grove camp Mandalay. Founder of Kissinger Associates in 1982, a secretive consulting firm to international corporations. Some of the first members to join Kissinger Associates were Brent Scowcroft (vice-chairman), Lawrence Eagleburger (president), Lord Carrington, Lord Roll of Ipsden, Pehr Gyllenhammar, and Viscount Etienne Davignon. Some served until 1989, others were still active for Kissinger Associates in the late 1990s. Chairman National Bipartisan Commission on Central America 1983-1984. Appointed chairman of AIG's advisory council in 1987. Director of the Atlanta branch of the Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) from 1985 to 1991. This was during the 1989 BNL Affair in which it became known that the Atlanta branch had made $4 billion in unreported loans to Iraq. After the revelation, the money was said to be used by the Iraqis to buy food and agriculture equipment, but in reality they were buying loads of military equipment. Founded the America-China Society in 1987, mainly with co-Pilgrims Society member Cyrus Vance.

His aide Robert C. McFarlane also played a role. Member Atlantic Council of the United States. Member of the Council of Advisors of the United States-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce. Trustee of the Center Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Arthur F Burns Fellowship, the Institute of International Education, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Honorary Governor of the Foreign Policy Association. Patron of the Atlantic Partnership and the New Atlantic Initiative. Chairman of the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, the Nixon Center, and the American Academy in Berlin. Co-chairman of the Editorial Board of 'The National Interest' magazine. Chancellor of the College William and Mary. Honorary chairman World Cup USA 1994 (Kissinger has attended football matches with his friend and colleague Etienne Davignon). Named Honorary Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George, 1995.

Director Freeport-McMoRan 1995-2001. Director of Conrad Black's Hollinger International Inc. Member of J.P. Morgan's International Advisory Council. Former member of the Advisory Council of Forstmann Little & Co. and American Express. Advisor to China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC). Member of the Europe Strategy Board of Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst. Director of Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and Revlon. Chairman of the International Advisory Board of the American International Group (AIG), a partner of Kissinger Associates.

Also chairman of the Advisory Boards of AIG Asian Infrastructure Funds I & II and a director of AIG Global. In 2000 Henry Kissinger was quoted by Business Wire: "Hank Greenberg, Pete Peterson and I have been close friends and business associates for decades." Maurice Greenburg is head of AIG and Peter G. Peterson is head of The Blackstone Group, which is the other major partner of Kissinger Associates. Peterson is also a former chairman of Lehman Brothers. Kissinger is a friend of Lynn Forester and introduced her to Sir Evelyn de Rothschild at the 1998 Bilderberg conference. They would soon become married. When Henry Kissinger is invited to speak at the United Nations Association on April 11, 2001 Lord Jacob Rothschild is flanking his side.

Picked as the initial head of the 9/11 investigating committee in 2003, although he turned out to be too controversial to remain in that position. Henry Kissinger is a trustee of the Open Russia Foundation since 2001, together with Lord Jacob Rothschild. The Foundation was set up by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a controversial oligarch, later locked up by Putin. Honorary trustee of the Aspen Institute. Because of previous international attempts by European and South American judges to question him, he is known to take legal advice before traveling to certain countries in either continent

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killing hope

http://killinghope.org/bblum6/guat3.htm

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Suri points to Henry Kissinger, the subject of Suri's latest book, Henry Kissinger and the American Century

http://books.google.com/books?id=ychOXk_P6JYC&dq=Henry+Kissinger+and+the+American+Century&source=gbs_navlinks_s

Read more: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/specialsections/innovators/The-Big-Picture-Jeremi-Suri.html#ixzz0vZPNaReL

Nixon and Kissinger:

Partners in Power

Robert Dallek

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The trial of Henry Kissinger

 By Christopher Hitchens

http://books.google.com/books?id=ufaW8sop_5cC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Henry%20Kissinger%20and%20the%20American%20Century&source=gbs_slider_thumb#v=onepage&q&f=false