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KYOTO

see fork 3 dubya Bush 43

no merri

SEE SMOKING GUN MEMO STOSSEL MENTIONED

BROWNBACK

GGL 6 26

AI Overview

John Stossel is a prominent libertarian journalist and frequent critic of U.S. climate policy, including the Kyoto Protocol. In his reporting, Stossel has argued against treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, raising the following key points: [1, 2,3]

About the Kyoto Agreement Treaty

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desmog 2019? see gcc:

Revealed in the documents is a decades-long campaign that continued until 2002, intended to protect its members’ interests by denying and casting doubt on climate science. Internally, the group acknowledged the dangers of climate change and the scientific consensus that it is overwhelmingly driven by the burning of fossil fuels as early as 1995.

The campaign reached the highest levels of U.S. government, with the State Department giving the GCC credit for leading President George W. Bush to reject the landmark Kyoto Protocol in 2001. An internal State Department briefing, prepared for a meeting with the GCC later that year and included in the documents published Thursday, shows officials were instructed to tell coalition representatives that Bush’s decision was “in part, based on input from you.”

The Kyoto Protocol, agreed upon in 1997, was the first large-scale international agreement to commit to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. was one of only three UN members that did not ratify the treaty (Canada later withdrew).

Influencing the UN’s Panel of Climate Scientists...

city climate lawsuits

Horner102723

horner cruz comer?:

Jean-Paul P. Cart Antonia I. Stabile Venable LLP 101 California Street, Suite 3800 San Francisco, CA 94111 Email: JPCart@Venable.com AIStabile@Venable.com Attys for Respondent, The Regents of the University of California

HORNER DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITION DOCS_LA:351773.1 38333/008 1 James K.T. Hunter (State Bar No. 73369) 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, 13th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067 Telephone: (310) 277-6910 Facsimile: (310) 201-0760 E-mail: jhunter@pszjlaw.com Attorney for Petitioner Energy Policy Advocates SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT ENERGY POLICY ADVOCATES, Petitioner, v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.

Case No. 22STCP03214 DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER HORNER IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT Trial Date: December 14, 2023 (Reserved) Time: 9:30 a.m. Place: Dept. 85 Petition filed: August 30, 2022 I, Christopher Horner, declare: INTRODUCTION 1. I make this declaration in support of the Petition for Writ filed by Petitioner Energy Policy Advocates (“EPA”) in the above-captioned proceeding against Respondent The Regents of the University of California (“Regents”). In this Declaration, I address the Regents’ response to the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) request at issue in this matter dated August 2, 2021 (the “8/2/21 CPRA Request”)1 , and also set forth my opinions based on my experience with open records requests in California and nationwide, particularly as they relate to energy, environmental policy, and the global warming debate

...

...

h requests to federal agencies, state executive and

attorneys general offices and other agencies, and over two dozen academic institutions.

  1. I came to this work after learning, relatively and somewhat embarrassingly late in life but at least first-hand, about the business of leveraging pressure campaigns to influence public

institutions. Specifically, I began using open records laws to explore public-private interplay after,

and in great part inspired by, an eye-opening stint with a Houston-based energy company in 1997, after having left my law firm to become the company’s director of federal government relations (in a

non-attorney capacity). I was gone from the company’s ranks within weeks, about four years before it found itself in the news and its very name, Enron, became a cultural metaphor in 2001. After arriving at Enron I helped create an uncomfortable work environment for myself by indelicately voicing concerns over the company’s leading role in what was becoming a “global warming” industry. I was particularly struck by a meeting I had attended on the company’s behalf, in a large national law firm’s Washington, D.C. conference room among a Who’s Who of environmentalist

pressure groups as well as senior representatives of individual companies and trade associations representing several industry sectors, discussing how to ensure U.S. participation, despite public and congressional opposition, in what several months later would be called the Kyoto Protocol, a “global warming” treaty. As Lawrence Solomon of Canada’s Financial Post wrote as part of a series

p 3

exposing industry’s driving role behind this pact and related policies, Enron was the early ringleader of the global warming industry:

Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay...saw his opportunity when Bill Clinton and Al Gore were

inaugurated as president and vice-president in 1993. To capitalize on Al Gore’s interest in global warming, Enron immediately embarked on a massive lobbying effort to develop a

trading system for carbon dioxide, working both the Clinton administration and Congress.

Political contributions and Enron-funded analyses flowed freely, all geared to demonstrating

a looming global catastrophe if carbon dioxide emissions weren’t curbed. An Enron-funded

study that dismissed the notion that calamity could come of global warming, meanwhile, was

quietly buried.2

To magnify the leverage of their political lobbying, Enron also worked the environmental

groups. Between 1994 and 1996, the Enron Foundation donated $1-million to the Nature Conservancy and its Climate Change Project, a leading force for global warming reform,

while Lay and other individuals associated with Enron donated $1.5-million to environmental

groups seeking international controls on carbon dioxide.3

In December 1997, immediately on the heels of the 1997 Kyoto negotiation, CEO Ken Lay received

a memo titled “Implications of the Climate Change Agreement in Kyoto & What Transpired” from

Enron’s point-man on the issue (“You know that I am responsible for developing "climate change"

polices that promote our products and services”

4

), one who urged a (different) opponent of this form

of corporate “rent-seeking” (infra) to come around in an email, Subject line: “Climate Change/work with me to make Enron rich.”5 The memo noted, inter alia, “this treaty is exactly what I have been

lobbying for,” “This agreement will be good for Enron stock!!,” “if implemented, this agreement

will do more to promote Enron’s business than will almost any other regulatory initiative outside of restructuring of the energy and natural gas industries in Europe and the United States,” “Enron has

2 Sadly, no donors at the time or since have had the vision to organize an “Enron Knew” campaign.

3 Lawrence Solomon, "Enron's Other Secret", Financial Post (Canada), May 30, 2009, available at

https://ep.probeinternational.org/2009/05/30/enrons-other-secret/. This was “real money” at the time.

4 Memo from John Palmisano to Steve Kean, Cynthia Sandherr, February 28, 1997, available at

https://climatelitigationwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Principal-Enron-docs-11.11.15.pdf.}:

5 https://climatelitigationwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Work-with-me-to-make-Enronrich.pdf. ...

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  1. Please describe the nature of UCLA’s Environmental Law Clinic’s work for Sher Edling,

the years during which that assistance was provided, and the specific cases that members of

that clinic worked on. Please also identify any expenses for that work that Sher Edling

reimbursed and any donations the firm or its partners have made to UCLA School of Law

since 2017.

  1. Please provide a list of every person and entity, excluding clients and vendors, that

provided Sher Edling with any amount of money. For each person or entity listed, please

include the following information: (a) the amount of the money provided; (b) the date the

money was provided; (c) the purpose for which the money was directed to be used; and (d)

the manner in which that money was provided, i.e., through a grant, litigation funding

agreement, or some other contract or agreement. If the funding was provided pursuant to a

written agreement, please provide a copy of that agreement.

Sincerely,

---

Ted Cruz James Comer

Ranking Member Chairman

Committee on Commerce, Science, Committee on Oversight and

and Transportation Accountability

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https://theecologist.org/**2018/oct/**08/why-did-george-w-bush-pull-out-kyoto-protocol

Despite the huge amount of fossil fuel funding upon which George W. Bush was elected president in 2001, insiders in the monopoly-dominated oil industry remained unsure that he would fight for them - and against climate scientists.

Bush had suggested during his candidacy that CO2 should be treated as a pollutant and, therefore, subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act - even if the international Kyoto Agreement was not economically favourable for America.

Bush’s fence-sitting was strategic: swing states such as Florida were environmentally conscious and speaking out would likely give Democrat presidential candidate Al Gore the advantage.

But, optimistic environmentalists remained hopeful while wary oil-men were worried that it demonstrated a willingness to agree to the broad principles of the treaty.

A Rumoured Speech

Shortly after his inauguration, a rumour circulated that Bush planned to include a line reinforcing his earlier pledge in a forthcoming speech.

Word of the speech reached the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), a Koch- and Exxon-funded think tank that helped donate to Bush’s presidential campaign. CEI set to work. As their founder and president, Fred Smith latertold Newsweek: “We alerted anyone we thought could have influence and get the line, if it was in the speech, out.”

Despite the think tank’s best efforts, Environmental Protection Agency administrator Christine Todd Whitman testified, on 27 February 2001 at a Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works subcommittee, that she was in favour of regulating CO2 emissions under the Clean Air Act.

A week later, she signed a joint statement at the G8 Environment Ministers Meeting [ITALY?] which said: “We commit ourselves to strive to reach agreement on outstanding political issues and to ensure in a cost-effective manner the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.”

The President’s Position

At this, the denial machine set in motion.Haley Barbour, a lobbyist for a utility firm that stood to lose if greenhouse gases were regulated, urged Vice President Dick Cheneyin a March 1 memo to persuade Bush not to align with the “eco-extremism” of those who saw carbon dioxide as a pollutant.

A group of far-right Republican senators wrote an open letter to their new president. In light of Whitman’s testimony, they asked that Bush clarify his position on climate change, “in particular the Kyoto Protocol, and the regulation of carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act.”

Aware of the rising tide against her, Whitman went to the Oval Office to fight her case on the morning of March 13. But, Bush had already composed his response, shortly to be [ACUTALLY WRITTEN BY DC?] sent via Cheney to the senators, which he read to her.

“I do not believe,” read the letter, “that the government should impose on power plants mandatory emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not a ‘pollutant’ under the Clean Air Act.”

Information from the Department of Energy had shown that consumers’ energy bills might be affected, and that this warranted a re-evaluation of his earlier pledge, “especially… given the incomplete state of scientific knowledge of the causes of and solution to global climate change.”

Polluter Pull-Out

Whitman left defeated, just as the puppeteer Cheney arrived to hand-deliver the President’s response to the senators.

By the end of the month, the world’s biggest polluter had pulled out of Kyoto.

Whitman, who later said the decision was “the equivalent to ‘flipping the bird’ frankly to the rest of the world,” was the one to deliver the news. “We have no interest in implementing that treaty,” the former New Jersey Governor told assembled journalists.

Though the terms of the treaty would be finalised in Bonn that July, they would be made all but useless, with the world’s largest polluter out of the game.

Years later, freedom of information disclosures revealed the industry’s input to this decision.

A briefing note prepared for Paula Dobrianksy, Under-Secretary of State for Global Affairs, ahead of her meeting with Glenn Kelly of the Exxon-bankrolled Global Climate Coalition, states: “POTUS [President of the United States] rejected Kyoto, in part, based on input from you… Interested in hearing from you, what type of international alternatives to Kyoto would you support?”

This Author

Brendan Montague is editor of The Ecologist, founder of Request Initiative and co-author of Impact of Market Forces on Addictive Substances and Behaviours: The web of influence of addictive industries (Oxford University Press).He tweets at @EcoMontague. This article first appeared at Desmog.uk.

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july 1997

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byrd%E2%80%93Hagel_Resolution

The Byrd–Hagel Resolution was a United States Senate Resolution passed unanimously with a vote of 95–0 on 25 July 1997, sponsored by Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and Robert Byrd (D-WV). The resolution stated that the US should not sign a climate treaty that would 'mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless ...[it]... also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period', or would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States. This effectively prohibited the US from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.[1]

Impact[

Despite the unanimous passage of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, U.N. Ambassador Peter Burleigh signed the Kyoto Protocol on behalf of the Clinton Administration on November 12th 1998.[2] However the Clinton Administration ultimately withheld the treaty from acquiring Senate approval due to potential political backlash and disapproval.[3]

During the Bush administration, Senators Robert Byrd, Jesse Helms, Pat Roberts, and Larry Craig issued a letter to President George W. Bush to identify the President's stance on the Kyoto Protocol and climate change policy.[4] President Bush responded "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is a clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate change concerns."[5]

During the Obama administration, the U.S. pursued climate policies such as the Copenhagen Accord and Paris Agreement in advocating for more comprehensive environmental reform and to allow nations to self determine their own emission based commitments.[6] In a 2014 Time article, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that "Congress should play an active role in the negotiations—not by blocking the deal, but by sending a new Global Climate Change Observer Group to report on the proceedings in Paris and closely evaluate other countries’ climate plans".[7]

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game theory?

https://pub.cicero.oslo.no/cicero-xmlui/handle/11250/2466148

why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto ...journals.sagepub.com › doi › full

Dec 7, 2010 - Finally, explanation 3 suggests that in Kyoto the Clinton–Gore ... at COP3 in Kyoto, participants at other COPs, and observers (such as ...

by J Hovi - ?2012 - ?Cited by 89 - ?Related articles

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1992: Renewable energy gets a boost. To help support the fledgling wind industry, Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA) added the renewable energy production tax credit to the 1992 Energy Policy Act, which has been critical in the rapid expansion of the wind energy industry. The tax credit has been extended in short stints – with occasional lapses – since then. An investment tax credit for solar energy installations was later added to the tax code through the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

1997: Senate pre-empts Kyoto Protocol. In June 1997, six months ahead of a U.N. climate conference in Kyoto, Japan, the Senate adopted a nonbinding resolution introduced by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), with Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and 44 other cosponsors, stating that the United States should not enter into any international climate agreement that did not include comparable emissions commitments by developing countries or that “would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States…” The Clinton Administration proceeded to negotiate and sign the Kyoto Protocol, which set emission targets for developed countries only. But the agreement was never submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, and in 2001, President George W. Bush declared that the United States would not join it.

==

https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-lesson-from-kyotos-failure-dont-let-congress-touch-a-climate-deal/

but the agreement never went into effect in the U.S. After Kyoto, where Al Gore, then the vice president, spoke of setting “binding emissions limits,”the Clinton administration returned home to a Congress that refused to take part in the treaty. Before the conference, the GOP-controlled Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution in a 95 to 0 vote; it resolved that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that mandated the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions unless it also required reductions from developing countries during the same time period. That meant Clinton never got the Kyoto Protocol ratified, and George W. Bush never tried. The U.S.’s abandonment of the treaty didn’t kill it, but it severely limited its effectiveness.

==

==

https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-lesson-from-kyotos-failure-dont-let-congress-touch-a-climate-deal/

In 1997, more than 150 countries came together in Kyoto, Japan, to negotiate a deal

to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions driving global warming.

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Back then, the negotiations centered around developed countries, like the U.S., 

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Japan and Australia with the intention that richer countries would lead the way and create a legally binding treaty with emissions targets and reduction timelines.

Eighteen years later, the world is still trying to agree on how to tackle climate change. But this time around, the U.S. pledge does not require congressional approval. That approach echoes an important lesson from Kyoto: A treaty’s worth is directly tied to the president’s ability to enact it.

In Kyoto, one of the U.S.’s top priorities was to establish a structure and market for limiting and trading emissions. Elliot Diringer, who attended the Kyoto talks as communications director for the Clinton administration’s White House Council on Environmental Quality, told me recently that emissions trading had proved very effective for tackling acid rain and that American negotiators considered that problem a good model to apply to greenhouse gases.

But the agreement never went into effect in the U.S. After Kyoto, where Al Gore, then the vice president, spoke of setting “binding emissions limits,” the Clinton administration returned home to a Congress that refused to take part in the treaty.Before the conference, the GOP-controlled Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution in a 95 to 0 vote; it resolved that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that mandated the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions unless it also required reductions from developing countries during the same time period. [also could not affect economy X%  ?]That meant Clinton never got the Kyoto Protocol ratified, and George W. Bush never tried. The U.S.’s abandonment of the treaty didn’t kill it, but it severely limited its effectiveness.

The lesson of Kyoto was stark. “We learned the limits of what the U.S. can agree to,” said Rafe Pomerance, who went to Kyoto as deputy assistant secretary of state for environment and development. “Climate change policy is not fully dictated by negotiations,” he said. “They’re dictated by domestic political opportunities and constraints.” President Obama can pledge only what he can achieve through executive action, and that means that the agreement has to be a non-binding commitment that does not require congressional approval. “If the U.S. Congress won’t move, the U.S. is heavily constrained and therefore the world is constrained,” Pomerance said. Whether or not the U.S. is the largest emitter (China overtook the U.S. as the world’s biggest emitter in 2007), it’s still a major actor.

So the Paris negotiations have taken an alternative tactic.At Kyoto, actual targets were hashed out at negotiations run by Argentinian Ambassador Raul Estrada-Oyuela, who famously insisted on keeping the talks moving forward and even physically stopped the clocks at one point to ensure that a deal was struck. This time, the meeting is taking a bottom-up approach. Rather than negotiating their targets in Paris, countries submitted their pledges ahead of time, and there’s little expectation that these pledges will be negotiated further, as they were in Kyoto. (The U.S. arrived in Kyoto with a proposal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels but left having agreed to reduce them to 7 percent below 1990 levels.)

The Paris approach is less ambitious, but it’s probably more realistic. The pledge that his administration submitted to the climate conference — to reduce emissions by 26 percent to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025 — relies on actions administered through the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Energy, which gets around the need for congressional ratification. Republican members of Congress are already fighting these measures, and if a Republican takes the White House, the administrative actions could be undone.

While politicians talk about what to do, greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise.Since the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated, the number of weather and climate disasters worldwide has risen 42 percent, and the seas have risen nearly 6.2 centimeters, on average.

Christie Aschwanden is FiveThirtyEight’s lead writer for science.

==

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July 25, 1997

Mr. BYRD (for himself, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. WARNER, Mr. FORD, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr.MCCONNELL, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. BURNS, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. GLENN, Mr. ENZI, Mr. INHOFE,Mr. BOND, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. DEWINE, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. GORTON, Mr. HATCH, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. CLELAND, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. JOHNSON, Ms. LANDRIEU, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. FRIST, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. ALLARD, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. COATS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr.GRAMM,Mr. GRAMS, Mr. LOTT, Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN, Mr. ROBB, Mr. ROCKEFELLER, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. REID, Mr. BRYAN, Mr. THOMPSON, and Mr. CAMPBELL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

July 21, 1997

Reported by Mr. HELMS, without amendment

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==

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol

==

COP3

1997: COP 3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change

COP 3 took place in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. After intensive negotiations, it adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which outlined the greenhouse gas emissions reduction obligation for Annex I countries, along with what came to be known as Kyoto mechanisms such as emissions trading, clean development mechanism and joint implementation. Most industrialized countries and some central European economies in transition (all defined as Annex B countries) agreed to legally binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6 to 8% below 1990 levels between the years 2008–2012, defined as the first emissions budget period. The United States would be required to reduce its total emissions an average of 7% below 1990 levels; however Congress did not ratify the treaty after Clinton signed it. The Bush administration explicitly rejected the protocol in 2001.[cda bailed 2011?]

==

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol

The agreement supplements the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which did not set any limitations or enforcement mechanisms. ?

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The Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or FCCC), aimed at fighting global warming. The UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty with the goal of achieving "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."[4]

:{The Protocol was initially adopted on 11 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan and entered into force on 16 February 2005. As of July 2010, :{191 states have signed :(style="background-color:#ffff66ff"):}:and ratified the protocol.[5]}:

Under the Protocol, 37 countries "Annex I countries") commit themselves to a reduction of four greenhouse gases (GHG) (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride) and two groups of gases (hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons) produced by them, and all member countries give general commitments. Annex I countries agreed to reduce their collective greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% from the 1991 level. Emission limits do not include emissions by international aviation and shipping, but are in addition to the industrial gases, chlorofluorocarbons, or CFCs, which are dealt with under the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

The benchmark 1990 emission levels were accepted by the Conference of the Parties of UNFCCC (decision 2/CP.3) were the values of "global warming potential" calculated for the IPCC Second Assessment Report.[6] These figures are used for converting the various greenhouse gas emissions into comparable CO~2 equivalents (CO2-eq) when computing overall sources and sinks.

The Protocol allows for several "flexible mechanisms", such as emissions trading, the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation to allow Annex I countries to meet their GHG emission limitations by purchasing GHG emission reductions credits from elsewhere, through financial exchanges, projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I countries, from other Annex I countries, or from annex I countries with excess allowances.

Each Annex I country is required to submit an annual report of inventories of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals from sinks under UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. These countries nominate a person (called a "designated national authority") to create and manage its greenhouse gas inventory. Virtually all of the non-Annex I countries have also established a designated national authority to manage its Kyoto obligations, specifically the "CDM process" that determines which GHG projects they wish to propose for accreditation by the CDM Executive Board.

1 Background](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol#Background)

...

US position[

The U.S. signed the Protocol, but did not ratify it. Before the Protocol was agreed on, the US Senate passed theByrd-Hagel Resolution unanimously [?] disapproving of any international agreement that 1) did not require developing countries to make emission reductions and 2) "would seriously harm the economy of the United States".[111] Therefore, even though the Clinton administration signed the treaty,[112] it remained only a symbolic act and was never submitted to the Senate for ratification.

When George W. Bush was elected US president in 2000, he was asked by US Senator Hagel what his administration's position was on climate change. Bush replied that he took climate change "very seriously,"[113] but that he opposed the Kyoto treaty, because "it exempts 80% of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US economy".[26] Almost all world leaders (e.g., China, Japan, South Africa, Pacific islands) expressed their disappointment over President Bush's decision not to support the treaty.[114]

The US accounted for 36% of emissions in 1990, and without US ratification, only an EU+Russia+Japan+small party coalition could place the treaty into legal effect. A deal was reached in the Bonn climate talks (COP-6.5), held in 2001.[115]

Withdrawal of Canada[

Main article: Kyoto Protocol and government action#Withdrawal of Canada

See also: Canada and the Kyoto Protocol

In 2011, Canada, Japan and Russia stated that they would not take on further Kyoto targets.[116] The Canadian government announced its withdrawal -possible at any time three years after ratification- from the Kyoto Protocol on 12 December 2011, effective 15 December 2012.[117]Canada was committed to cutting its greenhouse emissions to 6% below 1990 levels by 2012, but in 2009 emissions were 17% higher than in 1990. Environment minister Peter Kent cited Canada's liability to "enormous financial penalties" under the treaty unless it withdrew.[116][118] He also suggested that the recently signed Durban agreement may provide an alternative way forward.[119] Canada's decision received a mixed response from representatives of other ratifying countries.[119]

Other states and territories where the treaty is not applicable[

Andorra, the United States and, following their withdrawal on 15 December 2012, Canada are the only UNFCCC Parties that are not party to the Protocol. Furthermore, the Protocol is not applied to UNFCCC observers Palestine, South Sudan and the Holy See.

Mr. BYRD (for himself, Mr. HAGEL, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr.CRAIG, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. WARNER, Mr. FORD, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. HELMS, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. ABRAHAM, Mr. MCCONNELL, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. KEMPTHORNE, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. BURNS, Mr. CONRAD, Mr. GLENN, Mr. ENZI, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. BOND, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. DEWINE, Mrs. HUTCHISON, Mr. GORTON, Mr.HATCH,Mr. BREAUX, Mr.CLELAND, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. JOHNSON, Ms.LANDRIEU, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr.SHELBY, Mr. SMITH of Oregon, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. FAIRCLOTH, Mr. FRIST, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. ALLARD, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. COATS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. GRAMM,Mr. GRAMS, Mr. LOTT, Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN, Mr. ROBB, Mr.ROCKEFELLER, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. REID, Mr. BRYAN, Mr. THOMPSON, and Mr. CAMPBELL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

July 21, 1997

Reported byMr. HELMS, without amendment

GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS

ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE:

FRAMES ISSUES TO MOBILIZE CONSTITUENTS

by Hiromitsu Araki  MA thesis

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/49368/1/Hiromitsu%20Arak

i.%20Grassroots%20organizations%20addressing%20climat1.pdf

Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement's Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy

Aaron M. McCright; Riley E. Dunlap

Social Problems, Vol. 50, No. 3. (Aug., 2003), pp. 348-373.

Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0037-7791%28200308%2950%3A3<348%3ADKT

CMI>2.0.CO%3B2-T

Social Problems is currently published by University of California

Press.

In this article, we argue that a major reason the United States failed

to ratifji the Kyoto Protocol to ameliorate

global warming is the opposition of the American conservative movement,

a key segment of the anti-environmental

countermovement. We examine how the conservative movement mobilized

between 1990 and

1997 to construct the "non-problematicity" of global warming. After we

describe how conservative think tanks

mobilized to challenge the global warming claims of mainstream climate

science, we examine how these countermovement

organizations aligned themselves with prominent American climate change

skeptics known for their

staunch criticism of mainstream climate research and their affiliations

with the fossil fuels industry. We then

examine how the efforts of these conservative think tanks were enhanced

by the shift in the political opportunity

structure created by the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress. This

study demonstrates how a powerful countermovement

effectively challenged the environmental communityk definition of global

warming as a social problem

and blocked the passage of any significant climate change policy.  Some

commentators point to the growth of a diverse array of

anti-environmental forces

in general (e.g., Austin 2002; Helvarg 1994), while others specifically

identify the intense lobbying

by the American fossil fuels industry (e.g., Gelbspan 1997; Levy and

Egan 1998; Newell

2000) and the heightened mobilization of different segments of the

American conservative

movement (e.g., Luke 2000; McCright and Dunlap 2000).

...

However, on July 25, 1997, the United States Senate unanimously (95-0)

passed Senate

Resolution 98 (also referred to as the Hagel-Byrd Resolution) which

notified theClinton Administration that the Senate would not ratify any treaty that would:

(a) impose mandatory greenhouse gas emissions reductions for the United States without also

imposing such reductions

for developing nations, or (b) result in serious harm to our economy.

Thus, at the end of

the Clinton Administration, the Kyoto Protocol lay dormant with little

likelihood of being ratified

by the Senate. Then, in March 2001, President George W. Bush renounced

any plans to

establish carbon dioxide emissions reductions for U.S. power plants and

subsequently announced

that the U.S. has no intention of abiding by the Kyoto Protocol-an act

which provoked international

dismay and hostility.

This is a significant puzzle. Despite the growing consensus within the

scientific community regarding global warming, the success of the environmental community in

getting global

warming on the national agenda, and the receptive nature of public

opinion, it nevertheless

appears that claims about the existence of global warming became more

contested in the

United States policy arena in the late 1990s-with the result that

effective policy-making ground

to a halt.

...

Second, building upon our earlier work (McCright and Dunlap 2000), we

conceptualize

the public global warming debate as a social movement phenomenon in

order to provide theoretical

guidance for our case study. In the process, we employ three major

concepts from

social movement theorizing-framing, mobilizing structures, and political

opportunity structure(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996a; Tarrow 1998)-as

well as recent ideas on uldeologically

Structured Action" (e.g., Zald 2000a, 2000b) to solve the puzzle of the

delegitimation of global

warming as a major problem within the policy arena. Third, we extend the

arguments made

in our previous work in two crucial ways. In a previous article

(McCright and Dunlap 2000),

we describe the content of the specific global warming counter-claims

and the general antienvironmental

counter-frame promoted by leading conservative think tanks in the

American

conservative movement. In this article, we examine (1) how these

conservative think tanks

promoted these counter-claims, and (2) the extent of the impact that

these countermovement

organizations achieved in the global warming policy arena. That is, we

identify the strategic

activities performed by conservative think tanks as mobilizing

structures and demonstrate how

a shift in the political opportunity structure-the 1994 Republican

takeover of Congress enhanced

their impact in Congressional hearings and in the national print media.

...

The Social Construction of Non-Problematicity

In an industrial capitalist society where the political economy is

characterized by a "treadmill

of production," Allan Schnaiberg (1994) maintains that corporate actors

employ consciousness lowering

activities that challenge environmentalists' claims that environmental

problems are

serious, are the result of the production system, and can be alleviated

without unreasonable

costs. In line with those theorists who study non-decision-making and

the creation of nonissues

associated with the second dimension of power (e.g., Bachrach and Baratz

1970),

Freudenburg (2000) argues that analyzing efforts to define ecological

degradation or technological

risks as non-problematic provides insight into the use of indirect forms

of power by

dominant interests. Indeed, Freudenburg (2000) and associates (e.g.,

Freudenburg and Gramling

1994; Freudenburg and Pastor 1992) lead the way in identifying and

analyzing how certain

environmental conditions become defined as non-problematic through

consciousnesslowering

activities5

The most robust finding gleaned from this burgeoning body of literature

is that powerful

interests engage in strategic tactics ranging from outright manipulation

of information (Crenson

1971; Molotch 1970) to more subtle "diversionary reframing" (Freudenburg

and Gramling

1994; Icrogman 1996) to define certain negative environmental conditions

as non-problematic.

Harvey Molotch (1 970) documents how oil companies and the Nixon

administration manipulated

information to diffuse local opposition to offshore drilling and

delegitimize protest groups

in 1969 Santa Barbara, California. Matthew Crenson (1971) reveals how

U.S. Steel in Gary,

Indiana, at first effectively prevented the issue of air pollution from

even being introduced into

the policy arena, later successfully impeded the public's attempts to

raise the issue, and ultimately

weakened the final draft of pollution control legislation that was

eventually enacted.

In their study of offshore oil drilling politics in California and

Louisiana, William Freudenburg

and Robert Gramling (1994) argue that representatives of the oil

industry and the U.S.

minerals Management Service, the primary federal agency for regulating

offshore oil activities,

employed diversionary reframing tactics to change the nature of the

public debate on offshore oil

drilling. By heavily promoting the benefits of drilling and diverting

attention away from the criticisms

mounted by challenging groups, these dominant interests were able to

question the legitimacy

of challengers and their claims. In her analysis of the framing dispute

over wetlands

regulation in Louisiana, Naomi Icrogman (1996:371) argues that the

regulated community had

"greater interpretive dominance" than regulatory and environmental

interests because it was

more skillful at diversionary reframing. Not only do scholars identify

how powerful groups utilize

diversionary reframing in inter-organizational conflicts, but they also

identify similar dynamics

in intra-organizational conflicts. For instance, in her examination of

genetic testing and workplace

safety, Elaine Draper (1991) argues that management's ability to control

genetic testing and

its accordant expectations explains the prevalence of genetic monitoring

in the workplace

and the fact that the burden of proof is regularly on workers to

identify attendant risks.

the fact that the burden of proof is regularly on workers to identify

attendant risks.

Some scholars examine the range of factors that facilitate the

construction of nonproblematicity

by corporate interests, including the rationalities inherent in a public

arena

(Wynne 1982) and the crescive nature of some environmental conditions

(Beamish 2002). In

his examination of the public debate regarding the proposal by British

Nuclear Fields, Ltd. to

construct a thermal oxide reprocessing plant in Windscale, Great

Britain, Brian Wynne (1982)

argues that the decision to support the building proposal was made

effectually before the

inquiry even commenced, since the rationalities and scientific meanings

in the inquiry process

highly favored the interests of nuclear industrialists. In his study of

the failure of Unocal to

recognize an oil spill in Central California for nearly forty years, not

only does Thomas

Beamish (2002) indict the hierarchical structure and organizational

culture of Unocal and the

self-monitoring and self-reporting mandates in environmental

legislation, but he also argues

that passivity and inaction further stemmed from the fact that this oil

spill was a crescive problem:

a creeping event that developed so slowly as to elude most people's

perceptions.

Most of these case studies document how powerful interests succeed not

only in keeping

environmental problems and technological risks off the political agenda,

but also in preventing

such conditions from becoming widely defined as problems in the first

place. The current study

differs from existing analyses of the use of the second dimension of

power in the social construction

of non-problematicity. By the early 1990s, the environmental community

established global

warming as a legitimate social problem on the national policy agenda (as

evidenced by public

opinion and the Clinton Administration's endorsement of the Kyoto

Protocol), and this would

not have occurred if anti-environmental forces effectively exercised the

second dimension of

power as traditionally conceived. The "anti-environmental

countermovement" (Austin 2002;

McCright and Dunlap 2000) subsequently mobilized to challenge the

legitimacy of global warming,

as detailed below. Thus, we examine a somewhat different aspect of

non-problematicity than

emphasized by Freudenburg and his colleagues-namely, how a

countermovement attempts to

delegitimate a putative problem once it has already gained a place on

the agenda.

...

In this context, it is not surprising that the conservative movement

turned its attention to

global warming. Despite assertions that environmentalism represents a

new ideology that is

orthogonal to traditional liberalism-conservatism (e.g., Paehlke 1989),

studies consistently

find conservatism to be negatively related to pro-environmental

attitudes and actions among

the general public and especially among political elites, such as

members of Congress (Dunlap,

Xiao, and McCright 2001). A key reason is that pursuit of environmental

protection often

involves government action that is seen as threatening economic

libertarianism, a core element

of conservatism. Yet, most environmental protection up to the

present-such as regulations

designed to control air or water pollution-was accomplished without

posing a major

threat to industrial capitalism, despite protests from the corporate

sector.

In contrast, the emergence of global warming and the possibility of

large-scale social

change resulting from efforts to ameliorate it are seen as far more

threatening to American

industry, prosperity, lifestyles, and the entire "American way of life"

than are traditional pollution

control measures (e.g., Bailey 1993). Growing concern over global

warming clearly

poses a threat to the conservative movement's ideology and material

interests. Specifically, the

characterization of global warming as a major problem and the consequent

possibility of an

internationally binding treaty to curb carbon dioxide emissions are seen

as direct threats to

sustained economic growth, the free market, national sovereignty, and

the continued abolition

of governmental regulations-key goals promoted by the conservative

movement. Given

the success of the conservative movement in other policy areas in recent

years (Blumenthal

1986; Diamond 1995; Stefancic and Delgado 1996), it seems reasonable to

assume that the

conservative movement would vigorously oppose internationally binding

climate policies by

challenging the environmental community's claims about the seriousness

of global warming

and consequent need for ameliorative action.

Indeed, we (McCright and Dunlap 2000) argue that conservatives often

strongly defend a

traditional frame about humans and nature that some call the Dominant

Social Paradigm, or

"DSP" (Dunlap and Van Liere 1984), and others call Manifest Destiny

(Brulle 2000). Both the

DSP and Manifest Destiny constitute a worldview in which modern

societies are seen as able

to control nature, making it difficult to accept that global warming

poses an unprecedented

danger to our nation. By systematically analyzing the thematic content

of 224 documents on

global warming produced and/or circulated by 14 influential conservative

think tanks between

1990 and 1997, we (2000) identify three major counter-claims through

which the conservative

movement challenged the framing of global warming by the environmental

community. First,

the conservative movement claimed that the evidentiary basis of global

warming is weak, if

not wrong. Second, conservatives argued that the net effect of global

warming would be beneficial

should it occur. Third, conservatives argued that the policies proposed

to ameliorate the

alleged problem of global warming would do more harm than good. These

three counterclaims

comprised the conservative movement's response to the environmental

community's

call for ameliorative action on global warming.

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