Merck

BALLROOM INAUG TRUMP

#3 in size

interconnected bd from odd industries corning exxon?

see vioxx evil infiltration of fda? told PM to jam it on secondhand smoke,

Miller henry not involved?

SCALIA LAW?AEI

FUSION CTR:

In July 2006, DSAC created a leadership board of 29 business leaders from major companies in the United States. These include companies in the airline, banking, entertainment, food, and other industries.^[2] Two-thirds of the members of the leadership board cross-affiliate with the Business Roundtable. In 2010, over 200 companies participated in DSAC, constituting over one third of the US GDP and almost 10% of its labor force.^[2] Merck Vice President Grant Ashley, American Undersecretary Dawn Scalici, and assistant FBI director Ronald C. Ruecker are all chairpersons of and executives for DSAC.^[2]

https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/12/pharma-lobby-poured-millions-into-darkmoney-groups/

pharmaceutical companies’ top lobbying group funneled millions of dollars to prominent “dark money” groups that pushed industry friendly messages to lawmakers and 2020 voters.

The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America raised nearly $527 million last year and spent roughly $506 million, new tax returns obtained by OpenSecrets reveal. That’s a record haul for the organization, which is funded by the world’s most powerful pharmaceutical companies.

The trade association made its largest political donation of 2019 — $4.5 million — to the American Action Network, a dark money group that backs House Republicans. The conservative nonprofit and its pharmaceutical industry donor share disdain for proposals to regulate the price of prescription drugs.

The same year it received PhRMA’s donation, theAmerican Action Networklaunched several multi-million dollar ad campaigns opposing President Donald Trump’s proposal to let Medicare negotiate drug prices. This year, the group launched multi-million dollar ad campaigns opposing House Democrats’ bill to lower drug prices and ads boosting vulnerable Republicans who supported an alternative bill considered much friendlier to drugmakers.

The alliance between drugmakers and GOP groups isn’t new. PhRMA has given $14.6 million to the American Action Network since 2016. In that time, the American Action Network became a major contributor to GOP causes.During the 2020 election cycle, it gave $26.4 million to the Congressional Leadership Fund, the House Republicans’ top super PAC that helped unseat several freshman Democrats.

In several key 2020 races, the American Action Network battled with a Democratic group that also received funding from drugmakers. PhRMA gave nearly $1.6 million to Center Forward, a dark money group aligned with moderate Blue Dog Democrats, last year. That nonprofit provided most of the funding for an allied super PAC that spent $3.3 million supporting House Democrats. The pharma-backed GOP and Democratic groups went head-to-head in several key House races, including a tightly contested New York race that has come down to a handful of votes.

Late last year, as Congress debated drug pricing bills, Center Forward flew House staffers to San Francisco to meet with drug company executives. The nonprofit’s board members have also lobbied for pharmaceutical interests. Republicans in Congress are the most vocal opponents of efforts to have the government regulate drug prices — a measure that would damage drugmakers’ profits — but Blue Dog Democrats also pushed back on more aggressive proposals to lower drug prices.

Drugmakers bankroll groups pushing industry talking points to Trump

Prominent drugmakers have spent much of 2020 developing vaccines to fight COVID-19, and the threat of drug pricing legislation in Congress has died down amid the pandemic. But Trump has continued to push forward with executive actions on prescription drugs opposed by the pharmaceutical industry.

PhRMA deployed creative tactics in an attempt to persuade Trump against following through on his campaign promise to aggressively lower drug prices. During the Trump era, the trade association has bankrolled conservative groups that have access to the president.

The American Conservative Union, which hosts the annual Conservative Political Action Conference, received $150,000 from PhRMA in 2019. Led by Trump ally and corporate lobbyist Matt Schlapp,the conservative nonprofit launched theCoalition Against Socialized Medicine late last year tooppose effortsto regulate drug prices and enact single-payer health care proposals.

Nearly all of the coalition’s members received funding from drugmakers within the last two years. Big pharma’s trade group gave $505,000 to American Commitment, $78,500 to Americans for a Balanced Budget and $60,000 to the Taxpayers Protection Alliancelast year alone, according to new tax returns. The Taxpayers Protection Alliance launched a six-figure ad campaign last month aimed at killing “surprise” medical billing legislation and calling it a “handout” to big insurance companies.

New tax returns also show that pharmaceutical manufacturers’ trade group gave$200,000 to the National Sheriffs Association, a nonprofit representing thousands of law enforcement officials. The grouplaunched a six-figure ad campaignlast year warning against Trump’s proposal to import drugs from foreign countries, a measure bitterly opposed by drugmakers. Those ads specifically targeted Trump, airing in Washington, D.C., on his favorite Fox News programs.

Trump ultimately approved a plan to import drugs from Canada in September, but its scope was limited. He also moved ahead with a rule that would allow Medicare to negotiate the cost of drugs based on the price foreign governments pay, another measure strongly opposed by drugmakers.

Still, while Trump has moved ahead with industry-opposed measures, his GOP allies in Congress have not made drug pricing legislation a priority. Republican lawmakers and their aides are consistently fed opinion pieces and ad campaigns from conservative groups urging them to reject “socialist price controls.”

Republicans ran political ads in 2020 that mirrored talking points from major healthcare industry players. Super PACs aligned with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) attacked Democrats’ over their support for a public health insurance option, a proposal that could hurt drugmakers’ profits. Those ads cited a study from the Partnership For America’s Health Care Future, a conglomerate of insurers, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies that received $300,000 from PhRMA last year.

Longtime pharmaceutical ally gets seven-figure gift in retirement

One of PhRMA’s largest 2019 gifts was a $2 million donation to the Orrin Hatch Foundation, athink tank and research library launched by former Sen.Orrin Hatch(R-Utah). The trade group gave $140,000 to the foundation between 2017 and 2018.

Hatch, who retired in January 2019, was known as the pharmaceutical industry’s “man on the Hill” by the end of his 42-year tenure. Hatch helped shape current laws that regulate generic drugs and opposed measures to limit drugmakers’ monopoly protections. As chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Hatch was considered the major roadblock to drug pricing changes proposed by Democrats and Trump.

the pharmaceuticals and health products industry gave $2.8 million to Hatch’s campaign committee since 1998, more than any member of Congress who didn’t run for president.When Hatch faced a primary challenge in 2012, PhRMAgave $750,000to a super PAC boosting his reelection campaign.

During Hatch’s final years in office, his allies reportedly asked pharmaceutical companies and K Street lobbyists for donations to fund the Orrin Hatch Foundation. In 2018, the foundation invited major corporations, including pharmaceutical giant Merck, to a luxury mountain resort for a fundraiser.

While the foundation will serve as a library to catalogue Hatch’s government service and provide civic education, it has also put out policy reports on pressing issues. Its most recent report delves into how lawmakers can craft “sensible solutions to both foster innovative biologics and curb skyrocketing drug prices.”

Entirely unsurprising': Merck slammed for 4,000% markup of taxpayer-funded Covid drug

Jake Johnson Common Dreams

The New Jersey-based pharmaceutical giant Merck is facing accusations of price gouging after it charged the U.S. over $700 per patient for a taxpayer-funded coronavirus treatment...

...tent."

The payments are revealed in a new database compiled by ProPublica, an independent nonprofit that focuses on investigative journalism.

California received more drug company money than any state, exceeding 10 percent of the $2 billion paid out nationally, the database reveals. And that is only a partial accounting covering payments from 15 companies -- such as Merck, Johnson and Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline and Astra Zeneca -- representing about 47 percent of U.S. prescription drug sales in 2011.

Some of the biggest Bay Area research institutions, who tout their own disclosure rules, showed hundreds of thousands of dollars in research grants.

Consumers who visit the ProPublica website at www.propublica.org can type in their doctor's name and find out if he or she received money. Next year, every drug and medical device maker that pays physicians will have to report such spending to a federal database as part of the Affordable Care Act health reform law.

Lewis, the Redwood City doctor, said he supports the transparency and insists the money does not influence him.

He said he lectures to doctors about new medications on the horizon. "I don't over-endorse one product over another. I try to align myself with companies that I find to be ethical, that have not had multiple products pulled from the market."

His 2011 payments included $76,450 in speaking fees and $27,283 for travel from AstraZeneca, $20,700 for speaking and $3,159 for travel from Eli Lilly, and $7,250 for speaking and $961 for travel from Johnson & Johnson. He also received several thousand dollars for meals.

The database links Dr. Gurkirpal Singh to more than $248,000 in Pfizer payments it lists for speaking, consulting, travel and meals since 2009. He said all the money went to Institute of Clinical Outcomes Research and Education in Palo Alto, where he is the chief scientific officer. Singh said the money paid for research.

"I receive nothing -- let me be very clear on that," said Singh, who is an adjunct clinical professor at Stanford University."There's absolutely issues of conflict that you have to be careful about," he said. "That's why our contracts are written in such a way that we have 100 percent control over what we do."

Several years ago, Singh pointed out potential risks for patients of an anti-arthritis drug known as Vioxx while he was a paid consultant to Merck, its manufacturer. Merck ultimately withdrew the drug from the market.

Concerns over influence have prompted institutions such as Stanford University to guard against conflicts.

In 2006, Stanford's medical school banned its physicians from accepting gifts from companies, including free meals and drug samples. It also limited industry marketing at the medical center. And in 2009, Stanford required its medical school faculty to publicly disclose on their website profiles if they received $5,000 or more for consulting activities from outside firms.

"Stanford has been concerned that the integrity of research and patient care" not be influenced by private financial interests, said Kathryn Gillam, who since January has directed Stanford's conflict of interest program.

UC San Francisco requires its faculty to report funds from outside of the university and limits such payments to $20,000 per year, or less in some departments. Faculty members cannot spend more than 21 days per year on outside industry activities.

Direct payments to doctors raise the most questions, but critics also worry about bias when drug companies pay for research, which Stanford and UCSF accept.

Lisa Bero, a professor of clinical pharmacy and health policy at UCSF who studies bias and conflict of interest, and others recently published a study that found an association between industry funding of research and a favorable outcome for the company's product.

"There are many, many ways to influence the outcome of drug studies," she said. "We need studies that aren't done by the people who profit from the outcome."

The Los Angeles Daily News reporter Susan Abram and ProPublica contributed to this report. Sandy Kleffman covers health. Contact her at 510-293-2478. Follow her at

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4696609

Part 1: Documents Suggest Merck Tried to Censor Vioxx Critics

Part 2: Did Merck Try to Censor Vioxx Critics? June 9, 2005

More on Merck's Attempts to Quash Criticism June 10, 2005

Med Schools & Drug Firm Funds

An informal survey of medical schools by NPR found that some schools rely on funding from pharmaceutical and other health-industry sources.

The issue is taking on increasing importance. Government funding for medical research is not expected to increase in coming years and could decline. Medical schools will be more reliant on private, for-profit industry for funding. That raises concerns about academic freedom and restrictions on what researchers can and cannot say in print and in public.

Full Story June 9, 2005

Because of intense interest in this report, NPR has decided to present a full transcript.

Introduction: At least 38,000 Americans are believed to have died from taking the pain pill Vioxx before it was withdrawn last year. Drug maker Merck is now facing thousands of lawsuits.

Over the past few months, it has emerged that the company was aware for years that Vioxx might be dangerous. Now, new documents obtained by NPR suggest that even as Merck was making Vioxx into a bestseller, the company was putting pressure on independent doctors. The company's apparent aim: to keep them from discussing evidence of Vioxx's potential safety problems. The documents show that Merck exerted pressure not only on individual doctors, but also on several of the nation's top medical schools.

Merck tells NPR it did nothing wrong. NPR's Snigdha Prakash has the first story in a two-part report.

Transcript: When a drug company wants to sell a pill to a doctor, its best salesperson is usually another doctor.

Of course, drug companies don't call that selling. They call it "medical education." Or even medical research.

Well before Merck launched Vioxx, the company was targeting influential doctors who could help it build Vioxx's sales.

When they located a prospect, they entered the details about that doctor into a spreadsheet at headquarters. Spreadsheet entries included items such as:

"...treats all of the major sports teams, including the Lakers basketball team and the Dodgers baseball team, as well as the high-profile members of our society."

"... 2,4OO prescriptions per year... also known nationally... Writes for a lot of rheumatology textbooks."

Merck's vast army of sales representatives gathered intelligence on what it would take to win over individual doctors. Their notes included the following strategic observations:

"Use in many speaking engagements... At least $20,000 for speaking engagements for the remainder of the year."

"Will speak for us only at certain restaurants and high honorarium... Likes to feel important... He needs the VIP treatment."

One of the physicians whom Merck recruited to promote Vioxx was Gurkirpal Singh of Stanford University.

Merck wanted Singh on board because he was a senior researcher on a seminal study of arthritis patients. The study showed that older painkillers, such as Naproxen, commonly caused gastrointestinal bleeding. It established the need for new painkillers, such as Vioxx and its rival, Celebrex, that were gentler on the stomach.

NPR has examined Merck documents provided by sources working with individuals and families who allege Vioxx harmed them. They're now suing Merck.

Among those documents is a memo that shows Merck started to focus on Singh in April or May of 1998 — almost two years before Vioxx was ready for market. The overture was successful. A year later, Merck was launching Vioxx, and Singh was an important spokesman.

One document reads: "March-May 1999. Aggressively scheduled Dr. Singh for talk in preparation for launch... Reviews and feedback of Dr. Singh's presentations were generally positive." And it notes that "Dr. Singh commanded relatively large honoraria."

Merck paid Singh fees of up to $2,500 for each talk. He gave 40 talks over seven months.

Singh described the system in an interview with NPR:

"One setting which is where I was speaking predominantly was in the grand round situation in hospitals, or in medical schools, or in the universities, where like you're giving a formal lecture to the physicians," Singh said. "It's always lectures to physicians. And then the other set is usually these evening programs that drug companies arrange, where you also present your research, and then there's often a dinner with it."

Merck was pushing hard to catch up with rival drug maker Pfizer. Pfizer's new painkiller, Celebrex, had beaten Vioxx to market by a few months. It was gobbling up market share.

Then in early 2000, Merck got news of a potential problem. A large study commissioned by the company showed that patients on Vioxx suffered more heart attacks, strokes and deaths than those on the older pain pill Naproxen.

For some researchers, the results were a red flag that Vioxx might be dangerous. But according to the company, the new evidence was outweighed by many previous studies that showed the drug was safe.

Merck scientists interpreted the study in a postive way. In a series of press releases, Merck said the study showed that the older drug protected against heart attacks — not that Vioxx caused them. The company confirmed that Vioxx was safe for the heart.

Merck gave the study data to the Food and Drug Administration, and the two began a protracted debate over what the study meant, and what to telldoctors and patients about it.

Meanwhile, despite the positive spin of Merck's press releases, Singh was uneasy about the new study.

"I was worried, because obviously this was something new," Singh said. "This was something we had never seen before."

As an independent scientific expert, Gurkirpal Singh wanted to evaluate the study for himself.

Singh asked Merck repeatedly for the data. "I wanted to know how many heart attacks, how many strokes, how many deaths were occurring in each one of the groups, and what were these actual number of patients at risk, and how many ended up having an event," he said.

Singh says for months, Merck's scientific education department assured him that the results would be available soon — at one scientific meeting, then another. They never were.

Singh got tired of waiting. He shared his concerns with at least one prominent European scientist, and he began to allude to his concerns in talks.

Inside Merck, Susan Baumgartner, a Vioxx marketing manager, wrote this e-mail:

"June 19, 2000: Dr. Singh continues to play up the cardiovascular adverse events associated with Vioxx... I think there are many other speakers who deliver good messages, and we should not risk supporting the negative messages that he continues to deliver."

The Merck sales machine, which included the departments of marketing, scientific education and physician outreach, had begun to show its other face. It had paid Singh fat speaking fees. Now it was canceling many of his educational lectures.

The documents obtained by NPR show that for much of June 2000, Merck executives conferred on how to rein in their skeptical consultant. At least 23 local, regional and national executives took part in the discussions. They feared that just as Singh's credibility had opened doors for Merck, it could close them.

Singh was widely respected at the FDA. He also had connections with large institutional buyers that were vital to Vioxx's sales.

Terry Strombom, who was senior business director for the San Francisco region, sent an e-mail on June 5, 2000, that shows Merck was walking a tight rope — it wanted to censor Singh, but was afraid of alienating him. The e-mail read:

"The one thing I am pretty sure of is that Dr. Singh could impact us negatively if he chose to do so... I would recommend we handle this very carefully... I just don't think canceling all the programs and walking away completely will serve us well in the long term."

The e-mails show that at the same time that Merck was trying to censor Singh, at least one Merck official acknowledged that Singh's concerns about Vioxx were legitimate.

Heather Robertson, the coordinator of health education liaisons for the San Francisco region, reported on a conversation with Singh's main scientific contact at Merck, who has since left the company. Her e-mail of June 5, 2000, read:

"I spoke to Kirsten directly for the first time this past week to learn that Dr. Singh makes a balanced presentation (he must since he is an FDA advisor) but reports product information that is not favorable to Merck... Kirsten feels that no amount of work would change Dr. Singh's position, and although we may not like to hear about it, his information is scientifically accurate."

Later, Merck would advise its sales representatives not to discuss Vioxx's risks to the heart, and to have doctors send their questions to headquarters.

We showed the Merck documents to David Rothman, director of the Center on Medicine as a Profession at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons. He says the Merck documents consistently show a disregard for the substance of the scientific arguments about Vioxx.

"The drug companies will use the language of objective neutral science," Rothman says. "But what speaks much louder is 'You're for us, or you're again' us. And if you're again' us, we're going to try to get you.'"

Merck's surveillance system had many ways to pick up who was for them or against them. Physicians, including advocates with financial ties to Merck, contacted the company when they heard criticism.

A document from July 21, 2000, reads:"Communication from advocate regarding a program given by Dr. Singh... It was hyper-inflammatory."

Singh's allegiance was shifting. He was now promoting Vioxx's rival, Celebrex. He was being paid by Pfizer, and he was telling his audiences that Merck had refused to answer his questions about Vioxx's safety. A July 2000 document notes: "Received reports that Dr. Singh showed a cartoon of a character hiding under a blanket and asked the audience to speculate about what it is that Merck is trying to hide."

Merck's sales force was also keeping tabs on the buzz in doctors' offices. As sales representatives gave out free Vioxx samples, they asked doctors if they'd heard anything new about Vioxx. The sales reps would transmit this intelligence via voicemail to the company's National Service Center. Another Merck document, from July 26, 2000, notes:

"NSC report that at nine meetings in the L.A. area over the last three days, Singh presented sessions that were very unfavorable to Vioxx."

A week later, Singh would convey his concerns to one of the country's largest and most influential drug purchasers, the Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA started asking Merck if Vioxx was safe for the heart. The company's most senior scientists were brought in to answer the VA's questions. It was clearer than ever that Singh had become a major liability for the company.

Dealing with Singh was now a job for Merck's senior vice president for medical and scientific affairs — Dr. Louis Sherwood. Sherwood was a former academic and had been chief of medicine at a top medical school.

Merck documents obtained by NPR show that a detailed account of Singh's activities was now prepared for Sherwood. Almost a dozen Merck executives were involved. A senior regional executive who had supervised Singh's scientific handlers sent this Oct. 4, 2000, e-mail:

"I have in excess of 80 e-mails pertaining to interactions with Dr. Singh from March 1999 to present. The following is my best recollection of what has happened. Because of the sensitive nature of the following,I strongly encourage you not to share with anyone unless they clearly have a need to know."

The profile of Dr. Singh is remarkably complete," says Columbia's David Rothman, who reviewed the final document for NPR. "One can't help but almost frame it in terms of an FBI dossier, except here Dr. Singh is not cavorting with possible communists, or possible gangsters. Here the dossier is filled with Dr. Singh's take on Vioxx, who is Dr. Singh talking to. It's scrupulously watched and very, very carefully recorded."

The profile was dispatched to Sherwood and six other executives. Around the same time, Singh heard from a friend inside Merck: "I was told that Dr. Lou Sherwood, who was then vice president at Merck, had become 'very interested,' in quotes, in what I was doing, and that Dr. Sherwood is "very powerful, and he's going to crush you and he's going to fix you.'"

Introduction: NPR's story about Merck and its efforts to suppress safety concerns about the painkiller Vioxx continues with a look at how Merck exerted its influence in the world of top medical institutions. NPR's Snighda Prakash presents part two of her report.

Transcript: Dr. Louis Sherwood's campaign to "fix" Vioxx critic Gurkirpal Singh began with a series of phone calls to Singh's bosses at Stanford University.

"I don't usually receive phone calls on a Saturday at home from representatives of drug companies," says James Fries, a professor of medicine at Stanford. "So it was definitely unusual."

The call came on Oct. 28, 2000. " I received a call from a medical director at Merck, stating that someone on my staff had been making wild and irresponsible public statements about the cardiovascular side effects of Vioxx," Fries says. He says Sherwood hinted there would be repercussions for Fries and Stanford if Singh's statements didn't stop. He was left with the sense that Merck's financial support to Stanford was at risk.

Fries started making calls of his own and learned that researchers at seven other institutions, including the University of Minnesota, the University of Texas Southwestern and a Harvard teaching hospital, had also raised doubts about Vioxx's safety. Sherwood had placed calls to those institutions as well.

"A number of investigators who had spoken publicly had been called or the chairs of their departments had been called, "Fries says. "The deans of their medical schools, and a variety of veiled and not so veiled threats had been made — that they were saying bad things about the drug company, and that the people to whom they reported should take steps to see that this stopped."

At Merck, Medical Director Sherwood wrote an e-mail to bring the marketing department up to speed. NPR has obtained that e-mail. It suggests that part of Merck's strategy to suppress criticism was intimidation. The e-mail, dated Nov. 7, 2000, reads:

"Fries and I discussed getting Singh to stop making the outrageous comments he has in the past few months... I will keep the pressure on and get others at Stanford to help."

Sherwood advises one of the marketing executives how to pressure Singh himself. He says: "Tell Singh that we've told his boss about his Merck-bashing." And tell him, " should it continue, further actions will be necessary (don't define it.) "

Lisa Bero is a professor of clinical pharmacy and health policy at the University of California, San Francisco. She's done extensive research showing how funding from drug companies influences academic science. She reviewed Sherwood's email at NPR's request.

"I didn't realize how powerful the drug companies thought they were," Bero said. "For example, having enough influence over a department to say 'change what your faculty member is saying.' I haven't ever seen that documented before."

Another document written by Sherwood shows Merck tried to use that influence on several occasions. After Stanford Professor James Fries learned about Sherwood's calls to other medical institutions, he sent a strongly worded letter to Merck's CEO. The letter questioned the propriety of Sherwood's calls. Sherwood wrote an internal memo in response. NPR has obtained that memo.

In it, Sherwood writes there was no "orchestrated campaign or specific program" to deal with what he calls '"problem individuals." Yet, he lists groups of Merck executives who managed those critics. The memo, dated Jan. 23, 2001, reads in part:

"I will only get involved when our representatives... regional medical directors, Merck research lab physicians... or key individuals in the therapeutic business group have felt frustrated by their inability to reach out or to 'balance' selected individuals."

And Sherwood implies that when that happened, he did lean on Vioxx critics — and on their institutions: "Without trying to appear immodest, I believe I am the most respected physician in the pharmaceutical industry among academic chairs and deans... Therefore, when I call them on a matter of urgent concern, they generally take it seriously... This has been a source of strength ... as I have been able to exert balanced leverage in some difficult situations."

UCSF's Bero says, "Well, the first thing I thought is, 'What kind of leverage are we talking about?' And the first thing I thought of was money, in all the various ways that it can come to departments."

In 2004, Stanford's medical school got 9 percent of its research budget — $29 million — from drug companies. NPR surveyed several medical schools and found that's not unusual.

David Rothman is at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons.

"Look, medical research is expensive," says David Rothman of the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons. "No one can take a call from a drug company high official, critical of an investigator, and not realize that behind that call is the implicit reminder, implicit threat — 'If you can't control your folks, how do you expect us to continue to do business with you?''"

Merck and Sherwood deny the allegations in this story. Ted Mayer, a lawyer representing Merck, says, "Merck was not trying to silence critics. The scientific or the safety profile of this product was very well known in data that was available to the public, and it was vigorously debated in the public, and it's perfectly appropriate to have that vigorous debate."

Mayer says Merck was concerned about Dr. Singh because many of his talks went far beyond that vigorous debate: "The number of people who heard those talks and who were physicians and understood thedata well believed that those talks contained unbalanced and inaccurate information, and that the views weren't supported by the data and were kind of at the extreme end among hundreds of scientists who were making these kinds of presentations."

In an interview with NPR, Dr. Louis Sherwood says it was rare for him to complain to department heads. He says he firmly believes in academic freedom. He says he only made calls when faculty members were being unfair to Merck and acting unprofessionally.

"I never, never made any threats to withdraw funding or hamper anyone's faculty appointment," Sherwood said. "Under no circumstances did I ever do that."

Then why did Stanford's James Fries feel threatened when Sherwood called?

"No one likes to be criticized," Sherwood said. "Now sometimes, when an academic physician is criticized for his or her actions, they may interpret that as a threat. But under no circumstances did I threaten Stanford or Dr. Fries or anyone with funding issues or anything else. That would've been inappropriate."

FDA whistleblower Doctor David Graham estimates that at least 38,000 people died from taking Vioxx. Drummond Rennie, deputy editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, notes that "each one of those is somebody, is a real person, with a real family, real people who grieve for them."

"I think it's the job of a physician, physicians who're doing research, physicians who work in drug companies — all physicians — to care about that," Rennie said.

Merck says its physicians strongly believed in the safety and benefits of Vioxx. The company says the risks of Vioxx weren't clear until just last fall, when, it says, Merck acted promptly and voluntarily withdrew Vioxx.

eh f/u

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4697507

Rofecoxib gained widespread acceptance among physicians treating patients with arthritis and other conditions causing chronic or acute pain. Worldwide, over 80 million people were prescribed rofecoxib at some time.^[1]

On September 30, 2004, Merck withdrew rofecoxib from the market because of concerns about increased risk ofheart attackandstrokeassociated with long-term, high-dosage use. Merck withdrew the drug after disclosures that it withheld information about rofecoxib's risks from doctors and patients for over five years, resulting in between 88,000 and 140,000 cases of serious heart disease.^[2]Rofecoxib was one of the most widely used drugs ever to be withdrawn from the market. In the year before withdrawal, Merck had sales revenue of US$2.5 billion from Vioxx.^[3] Merck reserved $970 million to pay for its Vioxx-related legal expenses through 2007, and has set aside $4.85bn for legal claims from US citizens.

Rofecoxib was available on prescription in both tablet-form and as an oral suspension. It was available by injection for hospital use.

BIG PHARMA BOMBSHELL: JUDGE FINDS MERCK LIED IN PATENT TRIAL, OVERTURNS $200 MILLION VERDICT

fake journal elsevere

http://www.independentsciencenews.org/science-media/the-goodman-affair-monsanto-targets-the-heart-of-science/

Censoring spokes doctor-turned-critic

InJune 2005, U.S. National Public Radio's Snigdha Prakash reported:

- "New documents obtained byNPRsuggest that even as Merck was makingVioxxinto a bestseller, the company was putting pressure on independent doctors. The company's apparent aim: to keep them from discussing evidence of Vioxx's potential safety problems. The documents show that Merck exerted pressure not only on individual doctors, but also on several of the nation's top medical schools."

Merck's campaigned torecruit physician Gurkirpal Singh of:{Stanford:(style="background-color:#ffff66;"):}::{University:(style="background-color:#ffffff;"):}:as a Vioxx spokesperson"because he was a senior researcher on a seminal study of arthritis patients." Starting in 1998, Singh became a Vioxx booster and was paid $2,500 per speaking engagement by Merck. However, in 2000, a study suggesting heart problems among Vioxx users worried Dr. Singh and he requested the data. According to Dr. Singh in an interview with NPR:

- "I wanted to know how many heart attacks, how many strokes, how many deaths were occurring in each one of the groups, and what were these actual number of patients at risk, and how many ended up having an event."

Merck originally promised to share the information with Dr. Singh, but never did. When Dr. Singh began including his concerns in his public presentations on Vioxx, Merck began closely tracking his activities. According to NPR, almost a dozen Merck executives were involved in tracking Dr. Singh. According to an October 4, 2000 email sent by a senior, regional executive who had supervised his scientific handlers:

- "I have in excess of 80 e-mails pertaining to interactions with Dr. Singh from March 1999 to present. The following is my best recollection of what has happened. Because of the sensitive nature of the following, I strongly encourage you not to share with anyone unless they clearly have a need to know."

As Singh's public criticisms of Vioxx continued (he was by this time, promoting Vioxx's rival, Celebrex, while being paid by Pfizer), ^[17]^ Merck began calling his superiors at the university.According to Stanford medical professor James Fries:

- "(I) received a call from a medical director at Merck, stating that someone on my staff had been making wild and irresponsible public statements about the cardiovascular side effects of Vioxx." According to Dr. Fries, the representative "hinted there would be repercussions for Fries and Stanford if Singh's statements didn't stop. He was left with the sense that Merck's financial support to Stanford was at risk." ^[18]^

http://ahrp.org/conflicts-of-interest-stanford-university/

Conflicts of Interest: Stanford University

Paul Jacobs, spent six months investigating financial ties between Stanford University’s 700 faculty members and the bio-tech-medical products industry, who simultaneously received substantial grants from the NIH.

His report (the cover story) confirms that conflicts of interest cannot be contained by mere disclosure—which in any case fails to disclose $$ mounts. The report confirms the implausibility of self-enforced policies which fly in the face of human nature. Indeed, Stanford’s written conflict of interest policy notwithstanding, financial ties between industry and senior Stanford scientists, deans, and administrators are substantial and pervasive.http://www.mercurynews.com/multimedia/mercurynews/news/stanford_conflict_of_interest_070906.pdf

• The Mercury News investigation found 299 potential conflicts of interest related to faculty’s research.

• More than a third of the school’s administrators, department heads and other leaders — at least 26 out of 67 reviewed by the Mercury News — have reported outside financial interests related to their research within the last four years. These are scientists who are role models for junior faculty members and graduate students.

• Perhaps most important, seven of the 10 members of the school’s conflicts of interest committee, which is responsible for enforcing the rules, have financial relationships with medical companies.

“What is happening at Stanford is not unique. Critics say conflicts pervade much of the nation’s academic research. The rewards for researchers range widely, from a few thousand dollars in consulting fees to millions of dollars in founders stock or options.”

Indeed, the report reveals that often as not, NIH grant disclosure requirements are violated: “The National Institutes of Health has strict rules requiring universities to monitor and report financial conflicts of interest, but the sprawling federal agency does little to enforce those rules. Instead, it leaves the schools — which receive billions of taxpayer dollars in NIH research funding each year — to police themselves.

NIH doesn’t maintain reliable statistics on the number of conflicts reported by universities that receive its grants. And it does not routinely ask schools to explain how they resolve the financial conflicts they do report.

It is largely a don't ask don't tell' scenario,'' said Dr. Edward Greg Koski, former director of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services office of human research protections.”

Stanford “itself failed to report several large conflicts to the government as required, an error that has since been corrected. The potential risks posed by industry ties are significant. Financial conflicts can turn campus laboratories funded by taxpayer money into outposts of corporate research. They can divert researchers from work that might have a bigger impact on health toward research with bigger financial rewards. And in the worst cases, they can blind scientists to the dangers of treatments they are studying, resulting in injury or even death among volunteers...

Stanford president John Hennessy “said he's proud that Stanford faculty member Dr. Gurkirpal Singh, a paid consultant to Merck, began pointing out the risks of Vioxx early on and that Singh's university boss, Dr. James Fries, refused to buckle under pressure from a Merck executive to silence Singh.” See: http://www.ahrp.org/infomail/05/06/vioxxNPR060905.php The case graphically demonstrates how tainted journal reports affect patient safety: the authors of the Vioxx trial report published in the New England Journal of Medicine (2000) omitted negative data on increased heart attacks. All 11 authors are university-affiliated and had financial ties to Merck. [2]

1/14 chimp use ends

Merck, the world's third-biggest drugmaker, is the largest to make the switch.

Companies that develop medicines and consumer products such as cosmetics have long used animals to test safety and effectiveness. In the case of experimental medicines, drugmakers must test on animals before the Food and Drug Administration will let them do the human testing needed for approval of a new therapy.

Nearly all animal experiments in the U.S. involve mice, rats and guinea pigs, although some are done on dogs and great apes, almost always chimpanzees.

But animal research, particularly on primates and pet species such as dogs and rabbits, has long drawn criticism from animal rights groups, including protests outside laboratories and at annual shareholder meetings. Besides calling the practice inhumane, activists often have alleged — and sometimes proven — that animals were being abused.

Many companies previously said it was necessary to test potential medicines and vaccines on nonhuman primates because they needed an animal in which the anatomy and disease course were very similar to that in humans.

That thinking changed as technology allowed researchers to do initial testing via computer simulations, in bacteria or cells, and in animals as small as fish. Many drugmakers also found ways to do testing on far fewer animals and to limit the discomfort of experiments by using painkillers and tranquilizers. And many of the companies pledging not to use chimps in the future never did so.

British drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline PLC was one of the first to stop research in chimps, back in 2008.

"Research we did on nonhuman primates was kept to a minimum" even before that, said spokeswoman Melinda Stubee.

Because chimpanzees used for commercial medical research generally are confined in the labs of contract testing companies, Conlee said the Humane Society is trying to convince them that there's no longer enough demand to continue warehousing chimpanzees for potential future work. She hopes they'll pay to support those chimpanzees in one of five U.S. accredited sanctuaries for former research chimps.

Online:

http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/chimpanzee_research/

http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Merck

Merckis an internationalpharmaceuticalcompany and publishes the industry standard Merck Drug Guide. Top competitors includeBristol-Myers Squibb,Pfizer, andSanofi-Aventis. Top brand namepharmaceuticalsinclude Singulair (asthma), Cozaar and Hyzaar (hypertension) and Vytorin, Zetia and Zocor (cholesteral). Merck also manufactures Januvia (type 2 diabetes), Fosamax (osteoporosis), Cosopt and Trusopt (eye disease). The company manufactures childhood and adult vaccines for measles, mumps, hepatitis, and shingles.^[1]

In the fiscal year ending in December of 2011, Merck reported global sales of approximately $48 billion^[2]and had 86,000 employees^[3](down from 100,000 employees in 2009, when it had $27.43 billion in sales).^[4]

Ties to Pete Peterson's "Fix the Debt"

TheCampaign to Fix the Debtis the latest incarnation of a decades-long effort by former Nixon man turned Wall Street billionairePete Petersonto slash earned benefit programs such asSocial SecurityandMedicareunder the guise of fixing the nation's "debt problem." Merck is part of the Campaign to Fix the Debt as of February 2013.

This article is part of the Center for Media and Democracy's investigation of Pete Peterson's Campaign to "Fix the Debt."Please visit our main SourceWatch page onFix the Debt.

Schering-Ploughwas a globalpharmaceuticalcompany based in New Jersey, United States. It manufactured prescription and over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, animal health products, and personal care products. Well known brand names included the allergy medications Clarinex and Nasonex. The firm also specialized in anti-inflammatory, infectious disease, cancer, cardiovascular and women's health drugs. Schering-Plough's OTC products included Claritin allergy pills, Afrin nasal sprays, Dr. Scholl's foot care products and the Coppertone sun care line. Its products were marketed in some 140 countries.^[7]

In 2009, Merck agreed to acquire Schering-Plough for $41 billion.^[8]

Vioxx (subsection)

Other drug issues

Vytorin

Merck and Schering-Plough, which co-marketed the cholesterol drug Vytorin, went intodamage-controlmode taking out newspaper ads, reportedAdvertising Agein January 2008. The pharmaceutical companies'public relationscampaign followed their reluctant publication of a study which revealed that neither drug in present in Vytorin reduced fatty plaque build-up in arteries. The study was completed in 2006, but Merck and Schering did not release it for 21 months, allegedly due to "complexity of the data and their own scientific concerns."

The drug companies' newspaper ads, which ran in theNew York Timesand USA Today, referred to the damning study as "a single study that has generated a lot of confusion." They stressed that the drugs "have been proven to lower LDL (bad) cholesterol." However, the study showed was that Vytorin was not "any better than generic Zocor in reducing the buildup of fatty plaque." Members of Congress called for an investigation into why the "massiveadvertisement campaignfor Vytorin was allowed to continue," after the study was belatedly made public. Class-action lawsuits were file, alleging that Merck and Schering-Plough "misrepresented and withheld significant information" from theFood and Drug Administration(FDA) and the public.^[9]In July 2008, a major European study of over 1,800 patients and researchers at 173 hospitals and other sites found that Vytorin:

- "was no better than placebo at lowering the risk of major cardiovascular events -- including heart attack, stroke, heart surgery and death -- in patients with aortic stenosis." Vytorin "did cut cholesterol levels about 60 percent," but that effect was previously known and is also seen when Zocor (one of two drugs that comprise Vytorin) is taken alone. The European study also observed an increase in cancer cases and deaths among patients taking Vytorin, but researchers said this was not likely due to the drug.^[10]

Mercury levels and Thimerosol vaccines

The Truth is Out There - Interview with Dr. Leonard Horowitz - Maureen Kelleher Productions & Mystique Films - 2008

In early 2005, theLos Angeles Timesobtained a memo from Merck revealing that, prior to the first public disclosure, senior executives were concerned about mercury levels in vaccinations containing a widely used sterilizing agent. The March of 1991 memo revealed concerns about 6-month-old children getting a mercury dose as much as 87 times higher than guidelines for the maximum daily consumption of mercury from fish. According to Dr. Maurice R. Hilleman in a memo to the president of Merck's vaccine division:

- "When viewed in this way, the mercury load appears rather large."

The memo was prepared as U.S. health authorities aggressively expanded their immunization schedule by adding five new shots for children in their first six months. Many of these shots, as well as some previously included on the schedule, contained thimerosal, an anti-bacterial compound that is nearly 50% ethyl mercury, a neurotoxin. In 1999, federal health officials disclosed that many infants were being exposed to dangerously high mercury levels, following a review by theFood and Drug Administration(FDA). However, the memo revealed that Merck was aware of the concern much earlier.

As of February of 2005, over 4,200 claims have been filed in a special federal tribunal, theVaccine Injury Compensation Program, by parents asserting that their children suffered autism or other neurodevelopmental disorders from mercury poisoning. Thimerosal has been largely removed from pediatric vaccines as a "precautionary measure."^[11]

Gardasil

During 2006, five products received FDA approval, includingGardasil:

- “The first vaccine for the prevention of cervical cancer and genital warts caused by certain kinds of human papillomavirus.” Gardasil later became a subject of controversy when Gov. Rick Perry of Texas signed an executive order that required all girls entering the 6th grade to receive this vaccination, starting in September 2008.^[12]

Clinical trials

Tobacco issues

Merck was an early supporter of smoke-free workplaces. In 1988, Merck launched a corporate policy prohibiting smoking in all of their workplaces and that paid the full costs of approved smoking cessation classes for workers and their spouses. The policy covered over 29,000 U.S. workers. Merck CEO Roy Vagelos, M.D. stated before a Congressional hearing on March 17, 1994 that during the first eighteen months of their policy, the number of Merck employees who smoked fell by 25 percent.^[13]

On April 4, 1993,William Ian Campbell, CEO ofPhilip Morris, wrote to Merck about Merck's nonsmoking workplace policy. Campbell explained why he believed theEPA's ratingsecondhand tobacco smokea human carcinogen was flawed, and suggested a meeting to discuss "cost-effective ways to protect and respect the rights of all employees by accommodating non-smokers and smokers at Merck." In his letter, Campbell further cited the "arbitrary and damaging manner in which certain industries are made scapegoats." He suggested that PM and Merck could possibly become allies. Noel M. Howard, Director of Executive Communications at Merck wrote back to Campbell on May 14, 1995 and declined the meeting:

- "Given our strong corporate commitment to a smoke-free workplace, and in light of Philip Morris' understandable interest in promoting the tobacco use, we do not believe that a meeting between representatives of our two companies would be productive."^[14]

Bone Measurement Institute

TheBone Measurement Instituteis afront groupformed by big drug makerMerckto help expand the market for its drug Fosamax. See alsoBone Measurement Institute.

Personnel

Executive Management

As of February 2013:^[15]

Kenneth C. Frazier- President & CEO
Willie A. Deese - Executive VP & President, Manufacturing
Richard R. DeLuca Jr. - Executive VP & President, Merck Animal Health
Cuong Viet Do - Executive VP & Chief Strategy Officer
Clark Golestani, Executive VP & Chief Information Officer
Mirian M. Graddick-Weir - Executive VP, Human Resources
Bridgette P. Heller - Executive VP & President, Consumer Care
Michael J. Holston - Executive VP & Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer
Peter N. Kellogg - Executive VP & CFO
Peter S. Kim, Ph.D. - Executive VP & President, Merck Research Laboratories
Bruce N. Kuhlik - Executive VP & General Counsel
Michael Rosenblatt - Executive VP & Chief Medical Officer
Adam H. Schechter - President, Global Human Health

Former executives include:^[16]

Richard S. Bowles III, Ph.D. - former Executive VP & Chief Compliance Officer
Raymond V. Gilmartin, former CEO (total pay of $37.8 million in 2005)^[17]
Raul E. Kohan - former Executive VP & President, Animal Health
J. Chris Scalet - former Executive VP, Global Services & Chief Information Officer
Mervyn Turner, Ph.D. - Chief Strategy Officer & Senior VP, Emerging Markets R&D

Key executives and 2010 salaries:^[18]

Richard Clark (64), Chairman - $1,800,000
Kenneth Frazier (55), CEO - 1,044,688
Peter Kellegg (54), Executive VP & CFO - $903,978

Board members

Leslie A. Brun - Chairman & CEO, Sarr Group, LLC
Thomas R. Cech, Ph.D. - Investigator, Howard Hughes Medical Institute, University of Colorado
Kenneth C. Frazier - Chairman, President & CEO, Merck;Director,Exxon Mobil
Thomas H. Glocer- retired CEO,:{Thoma:(style="background-color:#ffffff;"):}::{s Reuters:(style="background-color:#ffff66;"):}::{Corporation:(style="background-color:#ffffff;"):}:
William B. Harrison, Jr.- Lead Board Director, Merck; retired Chairman,JP Morgan Chase& Co.
C. Robert Kidder- Director,Morgan Stanley
Rochelle B. Lazarus- Chairman,Ogilvy & Mather; Director,General Electric
Carlos E. Represas- retired Chairman,NestleGroup Mexico
Patricia F. Russo- Lead Director,General Motors; Director,Alcoa, Inc.; Director,Hewlett-Packard Company
Craig B. Thompson, M.D.-President & CEO,Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center
Wendell P. Weeks - Director,Corning,Inc.
Peter C. Wendell - Managing Director, Sierra Ventures

Former board members include:^[19]

Richard T. Clark - former chairman of the board
Steven F. Goldstone - retired CEO, Nabisco; non-executive chairman,ConAgra Foods, Inc.
Harry R. Jacobson, M.D. - Vice Chancellor Emeritus, Health Affairs, Vanderbilt University
William N. Kelley, M.D. - Professor, University of Pennsylvania Medical School
Thomas E. Shenk, Ph.D.
Anne M. Tatlock- Director, Fortune Brands, Inc.

Political contributions

Merck gave $$1,497,944 to federal candidates in the 2008 election cycle through itspolitical action committee(PAC); 51% toDemocratsand 49% toRepublicans.^[20]

Public relations & lobbying

The company spent $$6,410,000 forlobbyingin 2009. Of this total, $1,530,000 was to 12 outsidelobbying firmswith the remainder being spent using in-house lobbyists.^[21]

Contact

Merck

One Merck Drive

Whitehouse Station, NJ 08889

Phone: 908-423-1000

Fax: 908-735-1253

Web address:http://www.merck.com

Articles & sources

SourceWatch articles

Perry has drawn scrutiny for his cozy relationships with top donors. According to the group Texans for Public Justice (PDF), nearly 20 percent of the governor’s fundraising totals since 2001 have come from people whom he has appointed, while programs like the $200 million Texas Enterprise Fund, designed to help the state lure new businesses with tax incentives, have been criticized as a "slush fund" for Perry donors. Toomey, the aide-turned-lobbyist who Texas Monthly ranked as one of the 25 most influential politicos in the state, was the key player in Perry’s decision, overturned by the Legislature, to require all adolescent girls to receive an HPV vaccination. At the time, Toomey was a lobbyist for Merck, the pharmaceutical company that manufactured the vaccine.

Toomey, known in Austin as "Mike the Knife," served as Perry’s chief of staff for almost two years, from November 2002 through September 2004. The two have remained close—in August, Toomey formed a Super PAC, Make Us Great Again, specifically to support Perry’s presidential campaign. He added CCA to his client roster in 2007.

http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/09/rick-perry-prison-privatization

Merck

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Censoring spokes doctor-turned-critic

Conflicts of Interest: Stanford University

Ties to Pete Peterson's "Fix the Debt"

Vioxx (subsection)

Other drug issues

Vytorin

Mercury levels and Thimerosol vaccines

Gardasil

Clinical trials

Tobacco issues

Bone Measurement Institute

Personnel

Executive Management

Board members

Political contributions

Public relations & lobbying

Contact

Articles & sources

SourceWatch articles

Featured SourceWatch Articles on Fix the Debt

References

External articles

External resources

Attachments