Open in TheBrain

tobaco

probably should make a new tobacco page?

this is tag?



4/15

Big tobacco is suing Uruguay for their anti-smoking laws. If they win, it will threaten public health laws everywhere and prove one corporation can trump the public good, even when its product kills! But if we launch a giant call and Avaaz hires a world class legal team to carry our voices into the courtroom, the judges won’t be able to turn a blind eye.


Shopping for cigarettes in Uruguay isn't a pleasant experience. Photos of decaying teeth, premature babies and gruesome hospital scenes wrap around every pack. In fact, the country requires manufacturers to cover at least 80 percent of the packaging with medical warnings and graphic images.

Cigarette giant Philip Morris Internationalsees this requirement as a violation of a treaty law. So it's suing the country of Uruguay for $25 million.

The lawsuit is based on a 1991 trade agreement between Uruguay and Switzerland, where the company is located. The cigarette manufacturer says Uruguay is violating its promise to respect intellectual property rights.

Studies have found that such gruesome packaging reduces smoking, particularly in pregnant women.

To better understand this case before it goes in front of the World Bank this month, NPR's David Greene spoke with Alexandra Hall, a reporter based in Uruguay's capital city, Montevideo.


==

Podcast: In Big Tobacco Cash, a Boon Turned Burden

by Nicole Collins Bronza

9/14

Investors Haul In Nearly Half the Tobacco Settlement Cash

by Cezary Podkul and Claire Kelloway | @Cezary and@kuhlair3

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More coverage:}: How Wall Street Tobacco Deals Left States With Billions in Toxic DebtAn updated tally by ProPublica shows that tobacco bondholders are due $2.6 billion of the $6 billion in this year's payouts to state and local governments from Big Tobacco.

http://www.propublica.org/article/how-wall-street-tobacco-deals-left-states-with-billions-in-toxic-debt

How Wall Street Tobacco Deals Left States With Billions in Toxic Debt

Politicians wanted upfront cash from a legal victory over Big Tobacco, and bankers happily obliged. The price? A handful of states promised to repay $64 billion on just $3 billion advanced.

by Cezary Podkul

ProPublica, Aug. 7, 2014, 8 a.m

In November 1998, attorneys general from across the country sealed a historic deal with the tobacco industry to pay for the health care costs of smoking. Going forward, nearly every cigarette sold would provide money to the states, territories and other governments involved — more than $200 billion in just the first 25 years of a legal settlement that required payments to be made in perpetuity.

Then, Wall Street came knocking with an offer many state and local politicians found irresistible: Cash upfront for those governments willing to trade investors the right to some or all of their tobacco payments. State after state struck deals that critics derided as “payday loans” but proponents deemed only prudent. As designed, private investors — not the taxpayers — would take the hit if people smoked less and the tobacco money fell short.

Things haven’t exactly worked out as planned.

A ProPublica analysis of more than 100 tobacco deals since the settlement found that they are creating new fiscal headaches for states, driving some into bailouts or threatening to increase the cost of borrowing in the future.

One source of the pain is a little-known feature found in many of the deals: high-risk debt that squeezed out a few extra dollars for the governments but promised massive balloon payments, some in the billions, down the road.

These securities, called capital appreciation bonds, or CABs, have since turned toxic. They amount to only a $3 billion sliver of the approximately $36 billion in tobacco bonds outstanding, according to a review of bond documents and Thomson Reuters data. But the nine states, three territories, District of Columbia and several counties that issued them have promised a whopping $64 billion to pay them off.

Under the deals, the debts must be repaid with settlement money and not tax dollars. Still, taxpayers lose out when tobacco income that could be spent on other government services is diverted to paying off CABs. And states can’t simply walk away from the debt — bondholders have a right to further tobacco payments even after a default.

“It’s going to cost taxpayers, either directly or indirectly,” said Craig Johnson, an associate professor of public finance at Indiana University in Bloomington who has studied tobacco bonds and CABs. “I don’t doubt that at all.”

ProPublica’s analysis is the first to measure the magnitude of the high-risk debt involved in the tobacco deals and to calculate how much Wall Street’s dealmakers earned. It also shows how much of the tobacco money has been securitized — that is, turned into payments that go to investors. As of this year, at least one out of every three dollars coming in under the settlement is pledged to investors, according to bond disclosures and payment data from the National Association of Attorneys General, which tracks the flow of funds.

The sure winners so far: Investment bankers from Citigroup, the now defunct Bear Stearns and others who, along with consultants and lawyers, have pocketed more than $500 million in fees for their financial engineering, ProPublica estimates. They now stand to make more as the governments look to rework old deals and try to get even more tobacco cash upfront.

In part, the troubles in the tobacco bonds arise from the same kind of miscalculation that led to the housing bubble.

Just as mortgage lenders bet that home prices would keep rising, the tobacco deals relied on optimistic predictions of how much Americans would smoke. Forecasters rightly saw that cigarette sales would continue to decline, but now the yearly drop — about 3 to 3.5 percent — is nearly double what was cooked into the deals.

Because the bonds sold to investors can stretch 40 years or more, the outdated estimates mean an ever-widening gap between what states expected to collect under the settlement and the payments they promised investors.

The CABs promise gigantic payouts — as high as 76 times what’s borrowed — because nothing is due on them for decades. Meantime, interest compounds on both the principal and accumulating balance.

Defaults by state and local governments are rare, but rating agencies have been warning that tobacco bonds in general could go under en masse. Moody’s said in May that up to 80 percent of the tobacco issues it tracks are likely to default.

For CABs, defaults appear certain....


us 1st to label

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobacco_packaging_warning_messages#Cigarettes

In 1973, the Assistant Director of Research at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company wrote an internal memorandum regarding new brands of cigarettes for the youth market. He observed that, "psychologically, at eighteen, one is immortal" and theorized that "the desire to be daring is part of the motivation to start smoking." He stated, "in this sense the warning label on the package may be a plus." [29]

In 1999, Philip Morris U.S.A. purchased three brands of cigarettes from Liggett Group Inc. The brands were: Chesterfield, L&M, and Lark. [30] At the time Philip Morris purchased the brands from Liggett, the packaging for those cigarettes included the statement, "Smoking is Addictive." After Philip Morris acquired the three Liggett brands, it removed the statement "Smoking is Addictive" from the packages. [31]

Though the United States started the trend of labeling cigarette packages with health warnings, today the country has one of the smallest, least prominent warnings placed on their packages.[32] Warnings are usually in small typeface placed along one of the sides of the cigarette packs with colors and fonts that closely resemble the rest of the package, so the warnings essentially are integrated and do not stand out with the rest of the cigarette package.[32]

However, this is subject to change as the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 requires color graphics with supplemental text that depicts the negative consequences of smoking to cover 50 percent of the front and rear of each pack. The nine new graphic warning labels were announced by the FDA in June 2011 and were required to appear on packaging by September 2012, though this was delayed by legal challenges.[33]

In August 2011, five tobacco companies filed a lawsuit against the FDA in an effort to reverse the new warning mandate. Tobacco companies claimed that being required to promote government anti-smoking campaigns by placing the new warnings on packaging violates the companies' free speech rights.[34] Additionally, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard, Commonwealth Brands Inc., Liggett Group LLC and Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company Inc. claimed that the graphic labels are an unconstitutional way of forcing tobacco companies to engage in anti-smoking advocacy on the government's behalf.[35] A First Amendment lawyer, Floyd Abrams, represented the tobacco companies in the case, contending that requiring graphic warning labels on a lawful product cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.[36] The Association of National Advertisers and the American Advertising Federation also filed a brief in the suit, arguing that the labels infringe on commercial free speech and could lead to further government intrusion if left unchallenged.[37]

On 29 February 2012, U.S. District Judge Richard Leon ruled that the labels violate the right to free speech in the First Amendment.[38] However, the following month the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit upheld the majority of the Tobacco Control Act of 2009, including the part requiring graphic warning labels. In April 2013 the Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal to this ruling, allowing the new labels to stand. As the original ruling against the FDA images was not actually reversed, the FDA will again need to go through the process of developing the new warning labels, and the timetable and final product remain unknown.[39][40][41][42]


In 1994, the Attorneys General of four states—Mississippi, Minnesota, Florida, and Texas—separately filed lawsuits against the tobacco industry in an effort to secure reimbursement for health care expenditures arising from tobacco-related illnesses. During the course of this litigation, 42 other states joined in similar legal actions. In 1998, a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was signed by the Attorneys General of 46 states and the nation's five major tobacco companies: Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Lorillard, Brown & Williamson, and the American Tobacco Company. The MSA effectively settled the outstanding lawsuits by requiring yearly payments by the tobacco companies to the states and placing restrictions on the advertising and marketing of tobacco products. The MSA provisions also created and currently fund theAmerican Legacy Foundation, an anti-smoking advocacy group, which in turn funded the creation of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library as well as its ongoing maintenance and collection activities.

As part of this Master Settlement Agreement, the U.S. tobacco companies were ordered to release the internal documents produced for the case for public access in both a physical depository in Minnesota and on their own document websites. The international tobacco company, British American Tobacco, was not mandated to provide a document website but they were required to deposit documents into a physical depository in Guildford, England. The National Association of Attorneys General(NAAG) provides oversight and enforcement of this operation. In 2006, U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler ruled in a separate case that thenation's top tobacco companies violated racketeering laws, misleading the public for years about the health hazards of smoking. These companies were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act). Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds filed an appeal but Judge Kessler's ruling was upheld. As a result of this case and its appeals, the companies are now obliged to make available any documents produced for litigation on smoking and health until 2021.[2]


ATRA tort reform came out of PM dirty tricks shop:

Adlkofer

Franz

Controller of research at the German Verband [the German Tobacco Institute/TIRC] He was a disinformation expert, but he maintained closer relationships with German health authorities than the US companies liked.

Auchter

Thorn

Florida Republican; Reagan's head of OSHA; lobbyist partner of Jim Tozzi and George Carlo in MBS, HES, Federal Focus, IRP, and other fake policy institutes.

Balter

Nancy

at Georgetown University, Washington DC. She worked closely with an associate Sorrel Schwartz (Professor of Pharmacology) in running the US Whitecoats organisation IAPAG, which recruited and supplied scientific witnesses, letter-writers, etc. for the tobacco industry.

Bennett

James

George Mason University Professor of Economics, who worked on the side for the tobacco industry through the Capital Research Center.

Bible

Geoff

President, CEO and spin-chief at PM: He was No.3 in the troika which ran the company in the 1990s (under Hamish Maxwell, then Bill Murray). Bible was the top strategist for the tobacco industry for many years, and had a close personal friendship with Rupert Murdoch and Bill Murray. He also mentored Andrew Whist and Bryan Simpson, and designed the Boca Raton Action Plan. He now works for Murdoch's News Ltd.

Borelli

Tom

Biochemist; Head of Science & Technology Affairs (science disinformation) at PM. He was central to most of the domestic Philip Morris scams. He later joined Steve Milloy in a fund-management venture.

Bring

Murray

An Arnold & Porter legal partner who advised Philip Morris at the Boardroom level, He became a member of the Board, then joined the company and became VP of the company's External Affairs.

Carlo

George

Science-for-sale entrepreneur who worked for Dow-Chemicals, Philip Morris, and a range of chemical/pharmaceutical companies, before taking on the task of deflecting criticism about the lack of mobile-phone health research for the CTIA. Later became a vigorous cellphone critic when he discovered that sham 'protection devices' generated even more revenues. He ran WTR and the Health & Environmental Services Group.

Coors

Joseph

The head of the family which owns Coors Breweries. His [also right-wing] brother complained that Joseph "was to the right of Genghis Khan", which says something. Joseph Coors joined forces with Richard Mellon Scaife in funding socially disruptive 'anti-liberal' organisations. He was the power behind Colorado University, the Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation and many others organisations. Other members of the Coors family were also involved in far-right-wing Republican politics, think-tanks, etc.

Cullman

Hugh

Nephew of Joseph Cullman III who was CEO and Chairman of the Philip Morris Group in the 1970s. Hugh had an oversight role of the PM International operations, but he was pushed out of the top job by the son of the British tobacco executive, Hamish Maxwell.

Cullman

Joseph III

The legendary Chairman and CEO of Phillip Morris.He was the head of the Cullman family which controlled Philip Morris until the 1980s and turned it into the leading cigarette company both in the US and worldwide. He was Jewish and a marketing specialist, which broke with the old-South traditions of the industry.

He became the driving force behind inter-company co-operative agreements to work against anti-smoking forces, and he personally planned and controlled the deliberate scientific misinformation project to counter the Auerbach beagle study.

DuPuis

Bob

Head of PM's R&D in Richmond who, back in 1954, attacked VP George Weissman for saying there was nothing harmful in tobacco.

Francis

Phil

Australian PR operator brought to New York by Andrew Whist to help run disinformation campaigns.

Fuller

Craig

Top Reagan Republican aide and campaign manager bought in to Philip Morris (by way of PR firm Buston-Marsteller) to run the domestic political operations. A Republican revolving door operator. Was Senior VP for PM's Corporate Affairs.

Gaisch

Helmut

Head of the FTR division of PM International, based in Switzerland. One of the top spin-doctors in the Whitecoat/science areas.

Goldsmith

Cliff

Took over PM briefly from Joe Cullman. CEO and President for a while. Became Chairman of the Tobacco Institute.

Gonzalez

Aurora

Manager of PR for the Latin American Region of Philip Morris International in New York.

Gori

Gio

NCI Research bureaucrat who promoted the idea that a safe cigarette could be developed -- then prematurely announced that it had -- and was fired. He then went to work for the tobacco industry through a number of different organisations, including the Frazer Institute.

Griscom

Tom

Journalist/Editor; Reagan aide, who became VP External Affairs and the head the RJ Reynolds disinformation operations.

Hammond

Cuyler

Research head at the American Cancer Society who co-authored a number of studies showing the link between smoking and lung-cancer, coronary heart disease.

Han

Vic

PM disinformation operator who worked as the head of the team under Ellen Merlo (herself under Steve Parrish)

Hirayama

Takeshi

Japanese cancer epidemiologist who put the tobacco industry in a tail spin by showing through a massive study of non-smoking housewives, that passive-smoking had a substantial effect on their health.

Huber

Gary

Medical researcher in the pay of the combined tobacco industry. He operated out of Harvard (Beth Israel Hospital), then Kentucky University, then at the Texas University Medical Center.

Huber

Peter

Lawyer who worked through the Manhattan Institute (later American Spectator magazine) for any unfettered free-enterprise, corporate-promoting cause. He is said to have invented the term 'junk-science'.

Kraus

Margery

Nominally the 'founder' of APCO, Philip Morris's privately controlled PR firm which was originally an Arnold & Porter's legal/PR operations. Later she headed an IPO.

Layard

Max

Science-for-sale operator. He worked for the tobacco industry, often in partnership with Maurice LeVois.

Lee

Peter N

A UK Statistician who worked as an independent advisor to the British tobacco industry (TAC), proving them with points of vulnerability to attack research the industry wanted to label as 'junk'.

Leslie

George

A toxicologist from a pharmaceutical firm, who set up as a consultant and scientific recruiter to the UK tobacco industry. He co-founded the ARIA 'Whitecoats laundry' group and worked for Philip Morris on its scientific witness program in Europe and Asia.

LeVois

Maurice

Science-for-sale operator (tobacco, chemical and other industries). He worked with George Carlo, and later Max Layard (c 1990) [Environmental Health Resources]

Linehan

Kathleen

(Buffy) Washington in-house political lobbyist and spin-meister for Philip Morris.

Maxwell

Hamish

CEO and Chairman at PM. No 1 in the troika who ran the company in the 1990s, and top strategist for the tobacco industry. He was English.

Meese

Ed

Attorney-General in the Reagan Administration, and long-term powerbroker (some would say 'manipulator' or 'Svengali') behind Reagan. Ran or influenced many of Scaife/Coors legal institutes.

Merlo

Ellen

(Czarina) A marketing manager who rose to head the disinformation operations of Philip Morris USA, under Steve Parrish. She relished the wheelings and dealings.

Milloy

Steve

Backroom lobbyist for APCO and other industry policy institutes, who became prominent running TASSC ('junk-science') organisation and web-site for Phillip Morris and other poisoning and polluting companies.

Munro

Ian

Close associate of George Carlo. Canadian science-for-sale entrepreneur who also worked for the cellphone industry in the sham WTR operation. [CanTox]

Murray

RW (Bill)

CEO and spin-chief at PM: No.3 in the troika which ran the company in the 1990s. Top strategists for the tobacco industry.

Olson

Walter

Manhattan Institute 'researcher' who worked with Peter Huber to promote the tort-reform cause through labelling anti-tobacco/corporate science as "junk".

Osdene

Tom

London-born Philip Morris R&D executive who became one of the industry's top science-manipulation experts. He organised/corrupted conferences, recruited industry Whitecoats; and established the infamous CIAR. He also provided a liaison service between UK and US tobacco scientist (genuine and other).

Parrish

Steve

Lawyer fromShook Hardy & Bacon, bought in to run the PM USA (domestic company's) disinformation and political influence programs in 1990. He became the industry spokesman during the Master Settlement Agreement negotiations.

Perry

Roger

Professor of Engineering and Environmental sciences at Imperial College (Uni of London). He conducted a major air-quality survey for the UK tobacco industry; prepared a very dubious report; then set up a major conference (heavily loaded with tobacco scientists) at the college to promote his findings. He was a cofounder of the ARIA group and worked as a scientific recruiter for Philip Morris in Europe and Asia (paid via a Swiss bank account)

Pershagen

Goran

Epidemiologist at the Institute of Environmental Medicine, Karolinska Institute, Stockholm. He also worked with the WHO's IARC, while serving the tobacco industry surreptitiously.

Peterson

Jack

A trusted "industry outsider', who worked as an industrial hygienist (air-quality testing in buildings). He supported other tobacco-funded testing organisations in maintaining that second-hand smoke was only a minor factor in office air pollution.

Petersson

Carl-Gustav

Ran a couple of air-quality testing operations in Europe, some of them in association with Gray Robertson of HBI

Pottorff

Mary

(Mopsy) In-house spin controller in Philip Morris's Corporate Affairs division

Quinn

Jack

A democrat lawyer with Arnold & Porter who was involved in setting up many of Philip Morris's dirty-tricks campaigns (ATRA and TASSC). He became Al Gore's chief-of-staff, then counsel to President Clinton. Later he joined Ed Gillespie in a 'bipartisan' lobbyshop which had direct connections into the top administrators of both political parties.

Remes

David

He was a lawyer associate of John Rupp at Covington & Burling, who worked extensively on the tobacco industry's "WhiteCoats" projects.

Resnik

Frank

In charge of PM's Tobacco Technology group; disinformation organiser on Smoking & Health issues.

Robertson

Gray

An expert in indoor air-quality and 'sick building syndrome' who was employed by the tobacco industry (via his firms ACVA and HBI) to promote the idea that second-hand smoke wasn't a real problem in the workplace or in general public smoking.

Robinson

Bernie

A second-level Philip Morris executive who looked after the European, African, Middle Eastern and some Asian operations. He also worked in the USA at various times (particularly Texas).

Rodriguez

Cesar

Director for the Latin American Region of PMI, Corporate Affairs, in the New York (Rye Brook) office. His main associate appears to be Aurora Gonzalez.

Roe

Francis

A UK scientist who cast his lot with the tobacco industry at an early stage and provided them with a range of consulting services over the years. He became a key "WhiteCoat" recruiter, and helped run the ARIA and EGIL operations in Europe.

Rupp

John

Lawyer handling tobacco account at Covington & Burling. He ran many of the US and global scientific disinformation campaigns - especially the recruitment of scientists and academics under various 'WhiteCoats' projects. He was at the center of most of the tobacco industry's main conspiracies.

Rylander

Ragnar

Professor at both the Stockholm Karolinska Institute, and at Geneva University, Switzerland. He was one of the earliest and most productive tobacco scientists the industry ever owned. He was instrumental in setting up numerous (loaded) scientific conferences and he consulted to Philip Morris over its secretly-controlled INBIFO research organisation in Germany. He also worked with Linda Koo (Asian Whitecoat in Hong Kong) and visited her regularly;

Scaife

Richard Mellon

Pittsburgh billionaire who controlled a number of family foundations, and used these to channel hundreds of millions of dollars into far-right-wing 'libertarian' think-tanks, legal institutes and policy institutes. He was the main funder of the anti-Clinton Arkansas Project, and he controlled the American Spectator magazine via a foundation.

Schwartz

Sorrel

Professor of Pharmacology at Georgetown University, Washington DC. who headed the CEHHT division of the Medical School. He and his associate Nancy Balter also ran the US Whitecoats organisation IAPAG, which recruited and supplied scientific witnesses, letter-writers, etc. for the tobacco industry.

Seckler

Jeff

A whistle-blower on the fake air-testing operations of HBI and ACVA.

Seitz

Fred

Atomic physicist who squandered his considerable scientific reputation through alliance with the gung-ho right wing of the Republican party. President of Rockefeller University; he constantly begged money from the tobacco industry for research, and became a long-term adviser to RJ Reynolds. At the George C Marshall Institute, he led the climate denier chorus. The tobacco industry thought he was senile, but continued to use him because he supported their cause ... and they, his.

Seltzer

Carl

Harvard physical anthropologist, who was transformed through clever PR (by Philip Morris and Harvard's Fred Stare) into a "world famous heart specialist." He toured the world saying smoking was safe -- and proving it though many fake research projects published in 'peer reviewed journals'.

Stare

Frederick

Professor of Nutrition at Harvard University, who joined forces with Elizabeth Whelan to create the (anti-smoking) ACSH think-tank while secretly laundering payments from the tobacco industry to Harvard scientists/academics.

Staunton

Donna

Australian lawyer who headed both the Tobacco Institute of Australia, and PM Australia's disinformation operations.

Staunton-Mayne

Donna

Australian lawyer (ex Clayton Utz) who headed both the Tobacco Institute of Australia, and PM Australia's disinformation operations.

Tozzi

Jim

ex-Reagan OMB aide; Tozzi and Thorn Auchter ran the MBS lobbyshop, Federal Focus, and a half-dozen other pseudo-policy institutes. Worked extensively for tobacco and other poisoning and polluting industries.

Walk

Roger (aka Reudiger-Alex)

PM (International and USA) disinformation manager

Wall

Chuck

Lawyer with SH&B who joined PM International in 1990 to run their main anti-litigation operations. Close associate of Steve Parrish.

Weinberg

Myron

A professional recruitment operator for 'friendly scientists'. He worked for the tobacco, chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Ran his own business, and the Washington Technology Group. Operated in the US, Europe and Asia.

Weissman

George

Chairman and CEO of PM in 1978-80 period. His roots were in PR and journalism, and he focussed on dirty-tricks and pseudo-science. He followed Cullman, and preceded Maxwell.

Wells

Kendrick

B&W's General Counsel who was a key member of the lawyer's cadre which ran tobacco research.

Westcott

David

UK Imperial Tobacco's Director of R&D - later he worked as a consultant for Tom Osdene of Philip Morris.

Westlin

Arne

Swedish occupational hygienist; member of both ARIA and EGIL tobacco-laundry groups.

Wexler

Anne

Secretary of Commerce and aide to Jimmy Carter; Close friend of the Clintons; she ran of Democratic lobbyshop which joined with Republican Robert Walker and others. She specialised in international friendship organisations and bilateral trade.
Weyrich Paul & DianaGoldwater/Reagan Republicans who joined forces with the far-right, religious-conservatives, and pro-segregationists. They ran dozens of neo-con operations, including NET (television network). Involved in any nefarious Republican activity going.

Whelan

Elizabeth

Student/partner with Fred Stare at Harvard in running support for food processing, chemicals and pharmaceutical industries. Was fervently anti-smoking - which gave her credibility. Ran the ACSH 'scientific grassroots' operation.

Whist

Andrew

Top spin-executive (Vice President, Corporate Affairs) at Philip Morris International (ex Australia). Operated globally.

Witorsch

Phillip

(Brother of Ray/Rafael) Pulmonary surgeon. Founder with Sorrel Schwartz of the IAPAG/CEHHT tobacco scientific support group, and a professional witness around the world for the tobacco industry. He now runs the International Center for Toxicology and Medicine, Rockville

Witorsch

Ray (Rafael)

Professor of Physiology at the Medical College of Virginia. He follows in his older brother's footsteps; he is a peripatetic witness and junketeer for the global tobacco industry.

Wynder

Ernest

Genuine anti-smoking researcher at SKI, who took over the AHF and then found he had to maintain the flow of money from the tobacco industry in order to continue his research. He sometimes crossed the line between criticising and supporting the tobacco industry. They saw him as a gullible old fool in later years.